Tamils - a Trans State Nation..

"To us all towns are one, all men our kin.
Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill
Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
Thus have we seen in visions of the wise !."
Tamil Poem in Purananuru, circa 500 B.C 

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Rajiv Gandhi's War Crimes

துயிலும் இல்லம், Jaffna
includes those Eelam Tamils who died in the war against the Indian Army in 1987-1989

Rajiv Gandhi Assassination - the Verdict, 1999
 India played a critical, albeit covert, role in  Sri Lanka’s war against the Tamil Tigers - Nitin A. Gokhale in “Sri Lanka – From War to Peace”, 22 August 2009
 "LTTE is deservedly dying, but long live the Tamil cause" - B.Raman, 22 April 2009
The Situation in Sri Lanka - Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Indian Minister for External Affairs, Suo Motu Statement in Parliament, 18 February 2009
Demonstration in New Delhi in Support of Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle 17 February 2009
India in duplicitous, murderous collaboration with Sri Lanka's genocidal regime - SA Post, 15 February 2009
Sri Lanka Air Force being trained in Tamil Nadu, 3 February 2009
India-Sri Lanka Joint Press Release, 26 October 2008
We won’t stop military cooperation with Lanka says Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, 23 October 2008
Change Course in Sri Lanka or Face Misfortune - M.S.S.Pandian, 23 October 2008
Presence of ex Deputy Director of RAW disturbs Sri Lanka, says Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Island, 21 October 2008
""India loves to play all sides, and has always done that," said Reva Bhalla, an analyst with the U.S. private intelligence firm Stratfor.  "They can cater to the Tamil politicians and benefit from the Tigers' military capability going down without taking too much political risk." Underscoring India's dual-track approach to Sri Lanka, furious denials erupted from Colombo and New Delhi last month after two Indian radar technicians were injured in a Tiger assault on a Sri Lankan military base. Rajapaksa later said the men were providing after-sales service to radars India's Bharat Electronics sold to the military. India has also helped Sri Lanka intercept Tiger boats, which it considers a threat to national security..." C. Bryson Hull in India Rumbles over Sri Lanka war, but to what end?, 17 October 2008, Thomson Reuters
Stop arms supply to Sri Lanka: CPI urges Indian government, 27 March 2008
Stop Indian military aid to Sri Lanka: Tamil Nadu leaders, 13 March 2008
The Re-emergence of the Tamil Nadu Factor in India’s Sri Lanka Policy  - M. Mayilvaganan, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India, November 2007 "...There is a view in Tamil Nadu that India played a role in the division of LTTE, primarily to weaken the LTTE and force it to come to the negotiating table. But people in Tamil Nadu would rather argue that any effort by India aimed at trouncing the LTTE at the moment, when the government of Sri Lanka has launched its full-scale offensive against the LTTE, would be construed as inimical to the interests of the Tamils and give rise to spontaneous opposition by the people of Tamil Nadu..." more
India admits helping Sri Lanka Navy, 17 January 2007
தமிழீழ பிரச்சினையின் தீர்வுக்கான சர்வதேசப் பாதை திறப்பு "தமிழக"த்தில்தான் உள்ளது - M.Thirunavakarasu, Jaffna 18 November 2007
Eelam and Indian Security: Need for policy alternatives - Ampalam, 16 November 2007
India's intelligence support for Sri Lanka in the waters of the Tamil homeland, 4 November 2007
RAW recalls Colombo officer suspected of  ‘Chinese Connection’, 7 October 2007
India opposes Sri Lanka buying arms from China, Pakistan, 31 May 2007
India Circumspect about LTTE air strike whilst UK All-Party Parliamentary group on Sri Lanka rushes in...28 March 2007
B.Raman, South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) On LTTE's Air Capability, March/April 2007
LTTE Air Raid on Katunayake Air Base - Col R Hariharan 26 March 2007 together with a Response by Jayantha Gnanakone, USA
India must stop assistance to Sri Lankan government: Thamil Chelven, 29 January 2007
LTTE Avoids Battle of Attrition in the East - B.Raman, 22 January 2007
"Cool reception" in Delhi for Rajapakse, 30 November 2006
Indian Re-Thinking of the Sri Lankan Situation - Thomas Webber, 25 November 2006
 Sri Lanka: Marginalisation of India, B.Raman, 26 November 2006
India seeks solution with a united and federal Sri Lanka - Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 16 November 2006
India trains Sri Lanka jet bomber support crews, 15 November 2006
The Way Ahead in Sri Lanka: Summary of an interaction organised by Observer Research Foundation,Chennai  2 September 2006, published November 2006
Atharma Bhumi? - Sanmuga Suntharam, 6 October 2006
Father Chandiravarman Sinnathurai on Palacingham Pragmatism , 1 July 2006
India and the LTTE: Out of the Box - K.T.Kumaran, 29 June 2006
RAW aiding paramilitary recruitment in India, 25 June 2006
LTTE strategies for War & Peace - Col.Hari Haran, 19 June 2006
LTTE faces difficulties without anti aircraft support - B.Raman, 18 June 2006
Implications of EU Ban on LTTE - Indian Point of View, June 2006
Indian General Raghavan(retd) advises International Community on its Role June 2006
B.Raman Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India on Pakistan Intelligence Base in Colombo , June 2004
Need for a Balanced Assessment Arjun Katoch, November 1991 "It is not the purpose of this article to defend or glorify the LTTE. But one man's terrorist, they say is another's freedom fighter. Currently, despite the fuss over the Sri Lankan army and LTTE fighting together in 1989 to eliminate the TNA, the LTTE are no doubt the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments' terrorists, but with equal certainty they are, and always have been, the Sri Lankan Tamil's freedom fighters. To conclude with the basic rationale behind the LTTE's continued presence against heavy odds - and to repeat a point made earlier - the whole struggle is for land. The logic behind the LTTE's popularity in the Tamil speaking part of Sri Lanka is that they are trying to protect what they consider to be their homeland from incursions by settlers from the south, under the protection of the Sri Lankan army. This fact must be understood for a balanced assessment of their durability and influence in the Sri Lanka imbroglio."
Two Voices but One Policy - 20 Years Later, 11 November 2004
Memorandum submitted by Tamil Professionals in London to Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, 22 May 2000
Shiv Sena and MDMK support LTTE,  10 May 2000
Glimpse of the LTTE's Fortunes in Sri Lanka: Designs on India - Major General Asfir Karim, 1993
India's  Major General Mehta on the Pooneryn Debacle, 1993
India's Vietnam: the IPKF in Sri Lanka, Rediffusion, March 2000
Related Offsite Links
 Indian Peace Keeping Mission in Sri Lanka - India's Vietnam - Pakistan Military Consortium
Research and Analysis Wing - New Delhi, India
Indian Armed Forces
Institute of Peace & Conflict
Observer Research Foundation
ORF Institute of Security Studies


China/India: Cooperation and Competition
Indian Ocean
Asian Chessboard

Tamil  Struggle for Freedom: India
- An Ignominious Role

[see also Tamils: A Trans State Nation - Tamil Nadu]

ig·no·min·i·ous  1 : marked with or characterized by disgrace or shame : dishonorable 2 : deserving of shame or infamy : despicable 3 : humiliating, degrading

"Inter-state relations are not governed by the logic of  morality. They were and they remain an amoral phenomenon.." Jyotindra Nath Dixit Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka 1985 /89, Foreign Secretary in 1991/94 and National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister of India 2004/05, speaking in Switzerland, February 1998

"Amorality is distinct from immorality, although in common use the terms are often conflated. One who is amoral denies the existence of morality, whereas one who is immoral believes in the existence of morality but chooses not to comply with it. An immoral person who violates a certain moral code may still believe in the underlying truth of that moral code. For example, a thief may not deny that stealing is immoral, but may attempt to deflect the blame or offer excuses in order to justify his or her actions." Wikipedia

"...The fundamental premise of India's strategic policies can be simply stated - and that is to deny any intermediary role to extra regional powers in the affairs of South Asia..."Nadesan Satyendra in Sri Sabaratnam Memorial Lecture, 9 May 1987

"...The Shah of Iran once said that in his role as the gendarme of the region he had two main weapons for dealing with the revolutionary threat which existed in the region. First, was direct intervention. This was applied in the case of Oman in 1973, and also in the case of Baluchistan when the Shah provided armaments and military finance for the Pakistani state's repression in the area. The second weapon was internal subversion of the national liberation movements among the various nationalities. This method was applied in Kurdistan. The goal, ofcourse, was to allow the national movement to grow in a particular direction in order to defeat it. The case of Kurdistan was classic. The Shah said openly that the Kurdistan operation was relatively cheap for him. With 30 million dollars the job was done. He simply supported Kurdistan to destroy it. " (Murad Khan of the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front, speaking to Raymond Noat - Interview quoted in Tariq Ali's 'Can Pakistan Survive')

New Delhi's Amoral  Record...

Defend Eelam Tamils Arm & Train Eelam Tamils  Coerce Eelam Tamils
 Secure New Delhi's Geo Political Goals Attack Eelam Tamils Rajiv Gandhi's War Crimes Indian Army Forced to Leave Tamil Eelam Rajiv Gandhi Assassination  Ban Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Calibrated Approach Covert Support to Sri Lanka Failed Efforts of Eelam Tamils to stem New Delhi's Attack

Defending Eelam Tamils.... 1981 - 1985
August 1984

Statement  by Mr.R.C.Bandare, Indian Expert Member of Sub Commission at  UN Sub Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, August 1984

"...mounting violence continues to work against the search for a political solution because it leads to a hardening of positions, the building up of resentment, the depending of the feeling of insecurity, of fear and desperation, of being victims of a concerted plan of genocide. Above all, violence imparts a surrealistic character to political negotiations and in turn induces loss of faith in peaceful methods. Mr Chairman, today, not only is the right to life of Tamils threatened but their property, their way of life is jeopardised. They are made to suffer political and civic disabilities. Draconian laws and emergency regulations reinforce and react with harsh counter-measures taken by the Government to severely curtail their human rights and effectively block out any access to remedies..."

  India's Annexure "C" Proposals, December 1983 "

Subsequent to Genocide'83 and the death of thousands of Tamils at the hands of Sinhala mobs in July/August 1983, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent her representative, Mr. G. Parthasarathy for discussions with Sri Lanka. The proposals which emerged as a result of discussions between the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka during August/November 1983 were presented as Annexure "C" to a statement submitted by President Jayawardene to the All Party Conference on the 1st of December 1983. However, the Government of Sri Lanka failed to adopt these Proposals at the All Party Conference discussions which commenced in December 1983 and ended inconclusively in December 1984.

8 March 1985 Statement by Dr.G.S.Dhillon, Leader of Indian Delegation at UN Commission on Human Rights 1985

"Over the past few months the everyday lives of ordinary citizens, particularly in the North and East, have been adversely affected Following the imposition of a security zone in the Jaffna Peninsula, movement of persons and vehicles has been restricted. There are reports of an acute shortage of food and thousands of fisherfolk have been unable to ply their trade and are now without any means of livelihood. Recent reports of organised colonisation of the Northern and Eastern Provinces have added to the friction between different communities. Such an atmosphere, Mr.Chairman, breeds hate and fear - and these are emotions which are not conducive to creating the atmosphere necessary for finding a solution to the problem."

Arming & Training Eelam Tamils... 1981-1985
  Shri V.P. Singh, former Prime Minister of India, deposition before the Jain Commission, 5 November 1996

".....the first batch of training of the militants was done in 1983 under the Congress Government. I will not disclose the place where this training was held. It was done in Chakarata. Then in 1984, weapons were given to all the militant groups. The Camps were set up in Tamil Nadu. Monetary help was given. MGR in his statement in the Assembly of Tamil Nadu said that Rs.4 crores aid has been given by him to Tamil Militant Groups. The other information I will not give to the Commission, which I believe is sensitive..."


Jain Comission Report - Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu Chapter I - Phase I (1981-1986), August 1997

"7.11 A first hand assessment of the camps being organised by the various Sri Lankan militant groups is found in the enclosure to a letter (DO C.11. No. 1634/M dated Feb. 8, 1986, referred to in details at page 111) written by Shri K. Mohan Das, the then Director General of Police (Intelligence), Tamil Nadu to the Chief Secretary, Tamil Nadu.

The enclosure gives detailed particulars including strength, weaponry and type of training in the camps, which, according to Shri Mohandas were being organised by the militant groups themselves.

The information contained in the enclosure is summarised as follows:-

LTTE:- 6 camps were reported being conducted by the LTTE in the districts of Anna (1 camp), Thanjavur West (1 camp), Thanjavur East (1 camp), Salem (1 camp, Madurai (1 camp) and Ramnad ( 1 camp) of Tamil Nadu. The total strength of trainees in these camps was reported to be 495 cadres including 90 female Tigers. The camp at Sirumalai (Anna district) was the only camp were all the 90 female Tigers were getting training along with 40 male Tigers. The largest LTTE camp was located at Kumbarapatti in Salem district. The training comprised Arms Training, swimming, boat driving and physical training. The camps were equipped with transport facilities such as Jeeps, Vans, motor cycles etc.

TELO:- Five camps organised by Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) were reported to be running in the districts of Ramnad ( 3 camps) and Salem ( 2 camps). There were totally 233 male cadres undergoing this training which comprised Physical Training, Arms training, swimming and boat driving.

EROS:- Eelam Revolutionary Organisers (EROS) were reported to be conducting two camps in the districts of Ramnad and Pasumpon Muthuramalingam districts. There were 8 male trainees in these camps which were imparting Physical Training and Arms Training.

EPRLF: The Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) was reported to be conducting 7 training camps in the districts of Thanjavur West (3 camps), South Arcot (2 camps), Trichy ( 1 camp) and Ramnad (1 camp) with a total strength of 73 male trainees who were being trained in Guerilla warfare, Physical Training and Arms training. These camps reportedly possessed sophisticated weapons such as Light Machine -guns as well as transport vehicles.

PLOT:- The Peoples Liberation Organisation for Tamil Eelam (PLOT) was conducting training in 18 camps located in the districts of Thanjavur West (11 camps), Pudukottai ( 4 camps), Tirunelvei East (2 camps) and Thanjavur East (1 camp). Totally 2236 cadres in addition to 94 female cadres were getting trained in these camps. The camps possessed transport facilities, boats and some weapons. Predominantly, the training comprised guerrilla warfare and also Physical Training, Swimming and Boat Driving.

Other assorted organisations were also conducting their camps in Tamil Nadu such as Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) - 2 camps, 31 trainees; TELA -Kanthan group ( 3 camps, 117 trainees); TELA-Rajan group (1 camp, 10 trainees); TENA (1 camp, 25 trainees); RELO ( 1 camp, 13 trainees; NLFT (1 camp, 2 trainees); ECRP (1 camp, 4 trainees) and TMPP ( 1 camp, 6 trainees).

As per the enclosure, the total number of trainees of various Sri Lankan Tamil militant organisations in their training camps being conducted in Tamil Nadu was 3179 males and 184 females, totally 3363 cadres..."

  Ninan Koshy on India's Consistently Unsound Policy, Indian Express, 30 December 1997

"The...assertion by the Jain Commission that the training given to militant groups on Indian soil was essentially for self-defence is an exercise in self- deception. The type of training and weaponry belies such claims. By 1984, Sri Lankan Tamil groups abroad had the impression that at an opportune time, if the need arose, India would intervene militarily...During the Sub-Commission meeting in Geneva in August 1985 the leader of a Tamil group who was a participant at the Thimpu talks chaired by Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari told me about attitudes there: ``We have fixed Punjab, we have fixed Assam, now we will fix you bloody Tamils''. Those were the heady days of `quick-fix' under Rajiv. .."" more

  Jyotindra Nath Dixit, Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka 1985 /89, Foreign Secretary in 1991/94 and National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister of India 2004/05 on India's Role in the Struggle for Tamil Eelam - Speaking in Switzerland, February 1998

"(In the 1980s) ...Tamil militancy received support both from Tamil Nadu and from the Central Government not only as a response to the Sri Lankan Government's military assertiveness against Sri Lankan Tamils, but also as a response to Jayawardene's concrete and expanded military and intelligence cooperation with the United States, Israel and Pakistan. ...The assessment was that these presences would pose a strategic threat to India and they would encourage fissiparous  movements in the southern states of India. .. a process which could have found encouragement from Pakistan and the US, given India's experience regarding their policies in relation to Kashmir and the Punjab....

In normal terms of international law and principles of neutrality was Mrs. Gandhi correct in giving political and material support to Sri Lankan Tamils ? The answer is obvious and has to be in the negative. ..Had Sri Lanka been several hundred miles away from the coast of India this approach could have been adopted. But Sri Lanka was only 18 miles away from Tamil Nadu. Inter-state relations are not governed by the logic of  morality. They were and they remain an amoral phenomenon. Unilateral adherence to morality, if it affects your very existence as a united country, may be admired as an idealistic principle. But it is neither desirable nor practical if another country deliberately indulges in policies which are amoral and at the same time pose threat to you. So practical corrective action has indeed to be taken..."

Coercing Eelam Tamils... 1985-1987
  Murad Khan, Baluchistan People's Liberation Front, speaking to Raymond Noat - Interview quoted in Tariq Ali's 'Can Pakistan Survive?'...

" The Shah of Iran once said that in his role as the gendarme of the region he had two main weapons for dealing with the revolutionary threat which existed in the region. First, was direct intervention. This was applied in the case of Oman in 1973, and also in the case of Baluchistan when the Shah provided armaments and military finance for the Pakistani state's repression in the area. The second weapon was internal subversion of the national liberation movements among the various nationalities. This method was applied in Kurdistan. The goal, ofcourse, was to allow the national movement to grow in a particular direction in order to defeat it. The case of Kurdistan was classic. The Shah said openly that the Kurdistan operation was relatively cheap for him. With 30 million dollars the job was done. He simply supported Kurdistan to destroy it...."


  Nadesan Satyendra in Tamil Eelam, Kurds & Bhutan, July 1985

"..The Shah of Iran was never willing to go as far as he could have for the Kurds, even in terms of weapon supplies. Kurdish nationalism in Iraq was in the long run, disadvantageous for Iran. For Iran the Kurdish fight against the Iraqis was a convenient way of keeping Iran's chief rival off balance...When it became advantageous for Iran to come to an agreement with Iraq, the Kurds were abandoned... ...Let us learn from the experience of the Kurds of Iraq. It is said that fools fail to learn even from their own experience. Wise men learn from the experience of others. We are a people - not without wisdom..."

  The Thimpu Talks, July/August 1985

"In June 1985, at the initiative of the Government of India, the leaders of the Tamil militant movements which were engaged in an armed struggle for the establishment of a separate Tamil Eelam state in the North and East of the island of Sri Lanka, agreed to a 'cease-fire' as a preliminary step to creating a 'congenial' atmosphere for 'peace talks'. Phase I of the talks commenced on 8th July 1985 and concluded on 13th July 1985. Phase II of the talks commenced on 12th August 1985 and concluded on 17th August 1985. The venue of the talks was Thimpu, the capital city of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan..."

  The 1986 "December 19th Proposals"  

Subsequent to the collapse of the Thimpu Talks in August 1985, and the September 1985 Working paper, the Indian External Affairs State Minister Natwar Singh and Home, Pensions, Personnel and Public Grievances Minister P. Chidambaram visited Sri Lanka in 1986 to discuss a political solution along the lines of "Eastern Province Trifurcation proposals" of J. R. Jayawardene. India suggested that the predominantly Sinhala Amparai electorate be delinked from Eastern Province and attached to Uva Province. The proposals which emerged as a result of discussions of this Indian delegation (who left Sri Lanka on December 19, 1986) came to be known as the "December 19th Proposals".

  Nadesan Satyendra in Sri Sabaratnam Memorial Lecture, 9 May 1987

"...The fundamental premise of India's strategic policies can be simply stated - and that is to deny any intermediary role to extra regional powers in the affairs of South Asia. Mr.Onkar Marwah, Joint Director, Asian Centre, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, has commented:

"...It is feared for instance that in addition to facilities in Pakistan, the United States may also be in search of bases for its Rapid Deployment Force in Sri Lanka (Trincomalee naval installations) and Bangaladesh (Chittagong harbour). Such moves, if undertaken, would create immediate negative repercussions in India-Sri Lanka and India-Bangladesh relations. India's hardened reactions would complicate the settlement of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka..."

  Romesh Bhandari, Indian Foreign Secretary on 'Settlement by Persuasion' in the Hindustan Times, 11 July 1987

"..No one individual formulates and decides (Indian) Government's policy. There are always in depth internal consultations and discussions. There are several inputs before decisions are taken. Any individual entrusted with a task does so on directions... it has been made clear at all times to Sri Lanka, that India's national compulsions cannot also be set aside. In any final reckoning these would prevail over anything else...Besides being a neighbour and non-aligned, Sri Lanka is a small island strategically located in the Indian Ocean having harbours on which some outsiders have their eyes. Continued strife and disorder only weakens Sri Lanka and makes itself vulnerable to foreign interference, presence and even involvement. None of these can suit India..." more


  "I have never mistrusted India" - Sri Lanka President J.R.Jayawardene, 15 September 1987

" Having in mind LTTE's assertion that India did not come to Sri Lanka to help the Tamils but came to further her own geo political interests I once asked the Indian High Commissioner, Mr.Dixit: “Who benefited by the Peace Accord?”. After a good look around, Mr. Dixit asked: “Do you want the truth?”, and when I replied “Yes”, he said “India stands to gain most, not Sri Lanka, nor the Tamils.” To the question that I put to Mr.Dixit “Why did India take such an interest in the Tamil problem?”, his reply was: “ The shores of India and Sri Lanka are only 21 miles apart. If they were 500 miles apart, India would not have bothered that much.” Dixit went on to say: “New Delhi is concerned only with the interests of India; not the welfare of the Tamils. If the interest of India and the Tamils are the same, we help each other. India’s first priority is to further her own interests.”"

Securing its geo political goal... 1987
  Indo Sri Lanka Agreement, July 1987
  The Indo Sri Lanka Accord - Nadesan Satyendra, 15 January 1988

 "...It would seem that a spectre is haunting both the Sri Lankan Government and the Indian Government - the spectre of Tamil nationalism. And in their fear they are hugging each other. And if both the Indian Government and the Sri Lankan Government are hugging each other in fear of the political force of Tamil nationalism, then clearly it is a political force which must be reckoned with...."

  Political Committee of LTTE on Collapse of Indo Sri Lanka Accord,30 April 1988

.....Tamil interests are the price paid by India to Jayawardene's regime to secure its consent for the Accord. By subordinating the Island to India's regional supremacy, Jayawardene has secured from India what his imperialist masters couldn't provide, that is the total suppression of the Tamil liberation movement and the permanent subjugation of the Tamils under Sinhala hegemony... The Government of India is only concerned with securing and consolidating her national interests and geopolitical gains. Whereas, Sri Lanka is only concerned with the liquidation of the Tiger movement and the destruction of the Tamil freedom struggle. The people of Tamil Eelam have become the unfortunate victims of these different designs of a regional super-power and a racist State.....Utilizing the Tamil struggle to interfere in the conflict, encouraging the Tamil resistance movement to bring pressure on Jayawardene, taking the responsibility upon itself to mediate on behalf of the Tamils, the Government of India has finally achieved her strategic interests but the Tamils are left alienated, helpless, defenceless, with their fundamental political problems unresolved"

  13th Amendment to Sri Lanka Constitution - Devolution or Comic Opera? - Nadesan Satyendra 1988

In August 1987, the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the ancillary Provincial Councils Act. The Sri Lankan Government declared that the enactment of these laws fulfilled the promises made in the Accord, to 'devolve power' on the Tamil people.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who (together with the other armed resistance groups) were recognized as 'combatants' by the Accord and who had emerged as the leaders of the Tamil national struggle, rejected the basic provisions of the 13th Amendment.

This Article  examines the basic provisions of the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act and inquires whether these laws devolved power on the Tamil people or whether these laws amount to a constitutional script for a comic opera, with power continuing to reside in a Sinhala dominated Central government within the frame of an unitary constitution.

Attacking Eelam Tamils... 1987-1990
  India's Defence of its Role, July 1987

"..As hundreds of innocent civilians - both Sinhala and Tamil - perish in the escalating violence in Sri Lanka, the question of a negotiated political settlement becomes ever more difficult. Any such complex issue is inevitably rendered more complicated by the malevolent involvement of external powers. This involvement does unfortunately have long-term implications for India's security..."

  Indian army intervention at invitation of  Sinhala Sri Lanka government , 15 July 1990

"The violence in the north) was also stopped by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. (Though the fighting went on) no Sinhalese, no Sinhalese soldiers were killed... only the Indian soldiers and the LTTE (were killed). Yes, (I had to invite a foreign army to do this on our sovereign soil)... I was doing what so many Sinhala kings had done in the past in similar circumstances." - ex President Jayawardene, Interview with Mervyn de Silva, Lanka Guardian, 15 July 1990

  Rajiv Gandhi's War Crimes....

Rajiv Gandhi's War Crimes
நெற்றிக்கண் திறப்பினும் குற்றம் குற்றமே...

உண்மைகள் ஒருபோதும் உறங்குவதில்லை, உறங்கவும் கூடா...  Truth never sleeps - and it should not....


  Eduardo Marino's report to International Alert, October - November 1987

"..Over a period of about 20 days (from 9 October 1987) , the Indian Army's direct attack on LTTE positions, and defence from LTTE attacks, was coupled with the Indian Army's attack and storming of still unevacuated Jaffna - and many villages and settlements throughout the Peninsula - with widespread (insofar as territory), indiscriminate (insofar as targeting) and sustained (insofar as intensity) artillery shelling. Only less widespread, sustained and indiscriminate, there was air-strafing from helicopter as well. It was not "cross-fire" that incidentally killed thousands of civilians. The majority were killed  inside their houses and huts under shelling, or were shot at random by the roads and on the streets.

A large number of people were 'only' wounded - yet, many of them died in the absence of medical care, especially under the 24-hour curfew over a period of about one month, to mid-November. It was a combination of firing and shelling... that made an estimated 175,000 families ( that is, about 500,000 people) refugees into the Jaffna outskirts within days. .."


  A.P.Venkateshwaran, Former Indian Foreign Secretary, at World Federation of Tamils Conference, 30 April 1988

"...I feel ashamed that under the Indo Sri Lanka agreement, our forces are fighting with Tamils whom they went to protect. Speaking of blaming the Indian soldiers, soldiers are meant to carry out commands, but I do believe that in our own Indian ethics, soldiers are not merely meant to carry out commands because if you look at the history and the mythology and the culture which is Indian, we do not believe in the British concept of the Charge of the Light Brigade, 'Theirs is not to reason why, theirs is but to do and die'. No. We are supposed to fight only for Dharma. Only if the war is righteous shall you fight it. By that yardstick I believe that the Indian Government had betrayed its own culture and ethics. For the first time, it had sent out soldiers to fight when there was no cause for us to fight..."

  Annai Poopathy's fast for freedom, 19 March 1998

"On 19th March 1988 Poopathy amma took up residence at Mahmangam Pillayar temple and commenced her fast. She put forward two demands: (1)An immediate unconditional ceasefire between the LTTE and the IPKF. (2)Unconditional talks between the LTTE and the Indian government..."

  A.P.Venkateshwaran, former Indian Foreign Secretary at Eelam Tamils Solidarity Conference  Madurai, 7 March 1999

"...Rajiv Gandhi foolishly sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka in 1987. But what happened afterwards was the Tamils were persecuted by the troops. The war against the Tamils was escalated. When the then Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardene met Rajiv Gandhi in 1986 during the SAARC conference in Bangalore, Jayawardene warned Rajiv that it would be dangerous for India if a separate state were be established in Eelam and then extended by merging Tamil Nadu. Rajiv easily believed what Jayawardene said. I talked to Rajiv immediately after JR left, as it was not proper for me to interfere in the talks between the two heads of state. I said that things would never develop the way Jayawardene's predicted. 'This was rubbish. Tamil Nadu will never be separated from India - and I like to say this as a Tamil'. But he, Rajiv believed what the head of a neighbouring state said than what I said. The Indian Peace Keeping Force was sent to Sri Lanka within a few months after I resigned my job. You all know what happened after this - thousands of Eelam Tamils were killed and more than 1500 Indian troops lost their lives. In the end, the Indian troops were asked to withdraw from Sri Lanka without any gratitude...


Indian Army Forced to leave Tamil Eelam... 1989/1990
  Sri Lanka President Premadasa's Failed attempt to Replace the 1987 Indo Sri Lanka Accord, March 1989
  Texts of Letters Exchanged between Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, June/July 1989
  IPKF Withdrawal - Joint Communiques, July/September 1989

"The President of Sri Lanka has requested the Prime Minister of India to recommence the withdrawal of the IPKF. The withdrawal will recommence on the 29th of July 1989. The High Commissioner of India reiterated the invitation of the Minister of External Affairs of the Government of India to the Foreign Minister of the Government of Sri Lanka to visit India to discuss the time schedule for the withdrawal of the remaining IPKF contingent in Sri Lanka. The invitation has been accepted. This opportunity will be used to review the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. During the visit of the delegation of the question of cessation of all offensive military operation by the IPKF and the safety and security of all communities in North Eastern Province of Sri Lanka will also be discussed. "

  A Post Mortem on the Indian Intervention - Voice of the Tigers Bulletin, 12 February 1990

"...The military annihilation of the LTTE, the Indian policy planners assumed, would put an end to the Tamil nationalist movement and the Tamil demand for self-determination. Such a measure will certainly placate the chauvinistic Sinhala ruling elite whose support India needed to implement the Accord and to secure India's geo-political aspiration..."

   IPKF Departure & the Orissan Odyssey - Tamil International April 1990

"An odyssey is a long adventurous journey, or a series of wanderings. How the EPRLF and ENDLF leaders and cadres and families left Trincomalee for Madras, then left for Visakhapatnam, and eventually ended up in Orissa after five days of sailing and waiting at sea, was itself an odyssey for a total of 1,335 men, women and children... Now that he has led his "people", unlike Moses, into a promise-less land, where is Mr Annamali Varadaraja Perumal ?... "

  India & the Struggle for Tamil Eelam, 15 March 1992

"New Delhi’s track record shows that it regards the Eelam Tamils as an expendable commodity - expendable in the altar of its own self interest. The simple political reality is that New Delhi gave limited support to the Tamil militant movement before 1987 with the principal intent of destabilising Colombo and making Colombo move towards New Delhi. The Annexures to the 1987 Accord are proof enough of that intent. "

  The Indo-LTTE War (1987-90) - An Anthology - Sachi Sri  Kantha, 2007-2008
New Delhi bans Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 1992
  India Bans LTTE -1992/2006 ...

"The Subjects Committee of the Indian Congress unanimously adopted, on April 14 1992 the Political Resolution with a significant amendment which called on the Union Government to impose a ban on the Liberation Tigers.

The amendment for banning LTTE for its alleged involvement in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination was moved by Rajya Sabha member Mr. S. Ahlualia.The amendment said that it had now become more or less clear that the LTTE was involved in the brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It also called for steps to extradite those responsible for perpetrating the crime. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said in answer to questions by the press that the Government will consider all aspects before taking a decision on imposing a ban.

The Indian Government could have imposed a ban on the LTTE without going through the process of obtaining a resolution at the Congress sessions. This lends credence to the view that the Indian government’s actions were politically motivated. Furthermore, the resolution of the ruling Congress party, by judging the LTTE in advance of the court proceedings,  prejudiced the fairness of any such court proceedings. Any ‘trial’ may well become a mere show trial. In the event, however, the ban was imposed on the ground that the LTTE was engaged in activities in Tamil Nadu which threatened the territorial integrity of India."


Indian Ban & Sri Lanka Offensive, Nadesan Satyendra 1992

The initial question is: what did India gain by the ban? Or to put it in another way: what was it that India could do after the ban, which it could not do before the ban? During the past several months the Indian intelligence services and the CBI, not to mention the SIT, and a host of other agencies, have been more than energetic in their hunt for LTTE bases and safe houses in Tamil Nadu even without any order making the LTTE an unlawful association. New Delhi knows that such an order will do little to add to the capabilities of these agencies to carry out their task.

Again, New Delhi also knows that 'banning' militancy may serve to send it further underground. In 1978, Sri Lanka banned the Liberation Tigers under the then Emergency Regulations. Five years later, in 1983, the Tigers were banned again under Sri Lanka's notorious Prevention of Terrorism Act. 14 years after the first ban and nine years after the second, Tamil militancy has not weakened but has grown stronger. A movement which consisted of tens has grown to an army of thousands. ..

Why then the ban? Two reasons are apparent. The ban will make it a crime for any one in Tamil Nadu to openly, repeat, openly, support the LTTE. Though such support may now go underground, New Delhi appears to take the view that a ban will nevertheless help to stem open mass mobilisation of separatist sentiment in Tamil Nadu.

But that is not all. There is a further reason. New Delhi seeks to use the ban to deny recognition in the international arena to the Liberation Tigers - recognition, that is, without India having a say in the matter. New Delhi seeks to exercise a veto on any attempt to settle the Tamil - Sri Lanka conflict, which sidelines India and its interests - interests which are quite plainly spelt out in the annexures to the Indo Sri Lanka 1987 Agreement.

High Commissioner Jha was almost viceregal in an interview reported in Sri Lanka Sunday Times of May 17. He said: ''The ban is a symbolic gesture with international ramifications. India's ban on the LTTE has confronted Sri Lanka with hard political realities which it will have to take into consideration before embarking on a political solution.'' ...

New Delhi's foreign policy has stayed constant during these past several years. Non alignment, was after all, a way of increasing India's influence in a bipolar world. Today, New Delhi stays steadfast to its objective of increasing Indian influence and aspires to become one of the big powers of the emerging multipolar world. High Commissioner Jha gave some indication of this when he said:

''There are many items that have come straightaway into focus almost simultaneously... Question of India-US relationship, non proliferation treaty, now this rocket deal, the breaking of the Soviet Union, India's entry into West Asia peace talks, the India-Pakistan relations and the Afghanistan situation.''


  Rajiv Gandhi - Secret Trial, Nadesan Satyendra, 1992

"We have said it before and we say it again. The assassination of ex Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was wrong. It was wrong not because ex Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was innocent of responsibility for the war crimes committed during the IPKF occupation of Tamil Eelam.... The assassination of ex Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was wrong because it was wrong to punish without charge and without trial according to law. But, if that was wrong, then, as we have said before, and we say again, the Chengalpattu trial (of those accused of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination)  is worse because the Indian Government seeks to give the appearance of punishing through a ‘trial’ which, in truth, is no trial at all..."

  Rajiv Gandhi - the Verdict - Nadesan Satyendra 1999

"....Procedural law is civilisation's substitute for private vengeance and self-help. 'Lynch law' is no law. Was the procedure adopted to establish  the guilt of the accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination a fair one?... As an appellate court, the Indian Supreme Court was bound by the facts as determined by the trial court, unless it was shown that the trial court had erred in law. But were the findings of fact by the trial judge vitiated by the draconian provisions of the law  itself - the TADA provisions, which in the assessment of Amnesty International, contravened 'several international  standards for fair trial, including the holding of trials in camera and the non-disclosure of the identity of witnesses'?... What reliance may be placed on the results of a police investigation which was subject to immense political pressure to 'deliver the goods'?  What weight may be placed on the testimony of witnesses whose identities were not disclosed - secret witnesses who stood behind a screen to answer Counsel's queries? What value may be placed on confessions secured in a police dominated environment where torture was 'routine'? "

  India Renews Ban on LTTE - Indian Home Ministry Notification, 20 May 2004

"...The activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continues to pose threat to, and are detrimental to, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India as also public order...The LTTE's objective for a separate homeland (Tamil Eelam) for all Tamils threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, and amounts to ceding a part of the territory of India and thus fall within the ambit of an unlawful activity...The turbulence in Sri Lanka is being exploited by pro-LTTE forces to draw support for the LTTE and its cause by taking out processions, demonstrations etc, in spite of the ban, causing disquiet and threat to the security of Tamilnadu..."

  Removal of POTO, should be followed by removal of ban on  LTTE- Interview with Revathi , 27 September 2004
New Delhi's Calibrated Approach...
  Nadesan Satyendra on India & US -  the Calibrated Approach, 15 April 1992

"...The ending of the cold war signalled also the end of India’s ‘non aligned’ world role. Today, instead of seeking to lead the non aligned in a bipolar world, New Delhi aspires to be a ‘big power’ in the emerging multi polar world - with, possibly, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as the badge of that status. India is going for gold...  Clearly, the US would be willing to offer ‘carrots’, provided New Delhi ‘plays ball’. The bottom line is that India should not become too big for its shoes. Closer economic, and military ties may help to create what is called euphemistically, an ‘atmosphere of mutual confidence - but which in truth will all be a part of the ‘calibrated approach’. Amongst other matters, the US will also be looking for movement from India in respect of the vexed ‘intellectual property rights’ question and informed sources say that the dialogue with the Bush administration will start in May in Delhi. Again, the proposed joint naval exercises and additional IMF/World Bank support in the coming months will further enable the two countries to explore, in a measured, ‘calibrated’ way, areas of cooperation..."more


  Nadesan Satyendra on Good Bye Non Alignment, 15 October 1993

"Indian Foreign Secretary J.N.Dixit delivering a lecture on September 16, at the influential German Society for Foreign Policy bade official good bye to non alignment and rolled out the welcome mat for the 'emerging multi polar world.'  Speaking at Bonn he said: ''We are diversifying our relations....At the same time Dixit sought to put a brave face on Delhi's internal problems by saying: ''We are committed to the pluralistic society despite challenges. Ethnicity cannot be the basis of democratic state.'' Foreign Secretary Dixit's assertion that 'ethnicity' and 'democracy' were somehow mutually exclusive exposed the soft under belly of Delhi's foreign policy. It was this myopic approach to struggles for self determination on the Indian sub continent which may have served to encourage the very outside 'pressures' which Delhi appeared to resent. Coincidentally, in the same week that Foreign Secretary Dixit was speaking at Bonn, the new US Asst. Secretary State for South Asia Affairs, Robin Raphel, in her first public comments on the region after being confirmed as head of the newly created South Asian Bureau, said in Washington: ''While India and Pakistan have got to talk seriously about Kashmir any solution there that is going to stick and is going to be meaningful must take into account what the Kashmiri people want for their political future''.."

  Nadesan Satyendra in the Buddha Smiled, 12 June 1998

"...New Delhi will need to recognise that, in the end, the strength of India will lie not in the nuclear bomb, but in its peoples. The economy of India will not grow unless the different peoples of India are energised to work together to achieve their shared aspirations. Here, the failure of successive Indian governments to openly recognise that India is a multi-national state, has served to weaken the Indian Union rather than strengthen it. The European Union (established albeit, after two World Wars), may serve as a pointer to that which may have to be achieved in the Indian region in the years to come.   There may be a need for India to recognise the force of reason in that which Pramatha Chauduri declared more than 70 years ago...

Nuclear capability will not guarantee unity. The nuclear bomb did not prevent the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the non-nuclear states of Latvia, Estonia and Georgia. Peoples speaking different languages, tracing their roots to different origins, and living in relatively well defined and separate geographical areas, do not easily 'melt'. And in any event, a 'third world' economy will not provide a large enough 'pot' for the 'melting' to take place.

A people's struggle for freedom is also a nuclear energy and the Fourth World is a part of today's enduring political reality. India may need to adopt a more 'principle centred'  approach towards struggles for self determination in the Indian region. A  myopic (and amoral) approach, apart from anything else, may well encourage the very outside 'pressures' which New Delhi seeks to exclude. And, if India can grasp this, then, the Buddha may have cause to truly smile..." more

New Delhi's Covert Support to Sri Lanka's Attack on Eelam Tamils... 1995 - .....
  Sri Lanka is fighting India’s war, - Sri Lanka Air Marshal Ranasinghe, 26 February 2001

"At present, we are fighting a war which is not ours but India's. We are fighting it in our country for India... India was cleverly engaging the LTTE outside its shores in order to prevent the militant group from coming to India. Like the Americans, we should have fought the war in somebody's else's country such as India, UK, Germany or Canada where funds are being generated for the LTTE"

  Lanka owes India a deep debt of gratitude to India  says Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, 3 March 2001

"Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar said on Friday that Sri Lanka owed India a "deep debt of gratitude" for persuading Britain to include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in its list of banned terrorist organisations. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to India. Unsolicited by us, Jaswant Singh (External Affairs Minister) made representations to the British government for the banning of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)," Kadirgamar said, two days after the British government's announcement of its new anti-terrorism laws. Kadirgamar said he had taken up the matter with his Indian counterpart, but Singh had told him that New Delhi had already lobbied London. "That is a particularly friendly gesture by India," he said..."


  Natwar Singh, Currently (in 2004) Indian Foreign Minister  Brahmin owned Frontline, 21 December 2002

"....Oslo has been much in the news on account of the Sri Lanka-LTTE agreement arrived at some days back. It is the first step and one hopes it will not have the same fate as the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. A good comparison is the Northern Island situation. But V. Pirabaharan is no Gerry Adams. The Congress(I) has made it known that while we welcome the outcome of the Oslo agreement, we are unequivocally committed to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. No support for Eelam under any circumstances. Neither can the Congress(I) compromise on Pirabaharan's extradition since he has been named by the Supreme Court as the mastermind behind the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Under no circumstances would the Congress(I) agree to Pirabaharan getting any formal high office or position in the new set up in the North-East of Sri Lanka. He remains persona non grata with us. He invented suicide bombing, if we leave the Kamakazis of Japan.

The India-Sri Lanka Agreement that Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayawardene signed in July 1987, had, broadly speaking, almost all the elements in the Oslo document. The LTTE has come to the negotiating table because after September 11, 2001, their funds have dried and they can't buy or import any arms..."


  The RAW Factor in Col.Karuna's Revolt - Sachi Sri Kantha, 1 April 2004

“The Cabinet Secretariat Research and Analysis Wing [RAW], India's most powerful intelligence agency, is India’s external intelligence agency. RAW has become an effective instrument of India's national power, and has assumed a significant role in formulating India's domestic and foreign policies. RAW has engaged in disinformation campaigns, espionage and sabotage against Pakistan and other neighboring countries. RAW has enjoyed the backing of successive Indian governments in these efforts. Working directly under the Prime Minister, the structure, rank, pay and perks of the Research & Analysis Wing are kept secret from Parliament.”

  Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh meets Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in New Delhi, 31 May 2004

"... India trains Sri Lankan defence forces and said last October it would send them equipment, without specifying what type. New Delhi opposes Tamil rebel demands for a separate state in Sri Lanka, a policy diplomats feel is aimed at discouraging the myriad of separatist movements in India..."


  Keep RAW Agents out of the Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka - Thanjai Nalankilli in Tamil Tribune, 1 July 2004

"...A 'peace support' conference was held in in Oslo, Norway in November 2002... More than 30 countries pledged seventy million US Dollars at the conference. Notable absentee in the list of donors was India... (However) this same Indian Government had given or loaned 'at favourable terms' 100 million US Dollars to the Sri Lankan Government, some of which was used to build army barracks in Tamil areas. The Indian newspaper Hindu, which is usually pro-Sri Lankan Government, called it 'India's indirect contribution to Sri Lanka's war effort'...Now India wants to send construction crews to LTTE held Tamil areas...Indian Government says that.. it would go to LTTE-controlled areas to provide humanitarian assistance...  (the) Reason is staring at our face. India wants to send its spies (RAW agents and others) into LTTE areas to identify strategic targets, LTTE camps, weapons locations and the whereabouts of LTTE commanders and leaders. Such information would be passed on to the Sri Lankan military. It is well known that India provides information about LTTE sea movements to the Sri Lankan Navy. India will also attempt to recruit spies from among the local population..."



Avtar Singh Bhasin, sometime Director, Historical Division, Indian External Affairs Ministry  in "India in Sri Lanka – between the Lion and the Tigers", 1 November 2004

" Rajiv Gandhi wished to drive home the point that the IPKF’s fight in Sri Lanka was for the unity of India...There is little chance of any change coming about in the decision making process in the LTTE so long as Prabhakaran heads the organisation. And there is no chance of his being replaced in his lifetime.."


  Tsunami & the Killing of Pirapaharan! - New Delhi's RAW & its Media Agents, 7 January 2005


  யாழ்ப்பாணத்தில் 'றோ'வின் கண்கள் New Delhi's RAW in Jaffna, 1 April 2005

"தமிழகத்தில் இருந்து மூட்டைகட்டி வீடு வீடாக துணிகள் விற்பவர்கள் இங்கு களமிறங்கி யுள்ளனர். இவர்கள் தமிழகத்திலிருந்து விமானம் வழியாக கொழும்புக்கும் அங்கிருந்து விமானம் வழியாக யாழ் பாணத்துக்கும் வருகின்றனர்.


 India and the Sri Lankan Peace Process - Lieutenant General (Retd.) V.R. Raghavan, 10 July 2005

"The role expected from India in the peace process would be determined primarily by its interest in the security of Sri Lanka and itself. This could not have been better expressed than by Mr.Kadirgamar. He stated during the time of fierce battles around Jaffna in the year 2000,

“ Indian policy on such a sensitive issue as the current situation in Sri Lanka, would have to take into account the complex issues of domestic and international concern to India and her interests regarding its role in Sri Lanka.”

That wise judgment applies equally to the role India would play in the peace process."


  Sri Lanka: Taking Stock of L.T.T.E. - Colonel (Retd) R. Hariharan, formerly of the Intelligence Corps of the Indian Army, 29 July 2005

"..L.T.T.E. has taken full advantage of the absence of a force to ensure the ceasefire terms are not violated by carrying out selective assassinations that could affect the Sri Lankan Security Force's capability to wage war effectively. It has also increased its strength and wartime capability by strengthening its sea and air capabilities. Thus, it has emerged as the world's first (and probably only) insurgent force with capability to fight on land, sea and air. However, the organization is yet to overcome the damage created by the defection of the powerful eastern commander Karuna from its ranks. This will weaken its negotiating strength as the sole representative of Tamil people in the northeast. It will also affect its military capability adversely in the east if and when it has to resort to the military option. Therefore, it will have to overcome Karuna and his followers before it can resume negotiations from a position of strength..."

[see also Pigs are Flying in Batticaloa!- Sachi Sri Kantha  ".... the entire puppet show is being run by the Indians (UNP, SLFP, JVP- on the Sinhalese side; Karuna, Anandasangaree and other Tamil paramilitaries, on the Tamil side). This is an open secret to all in Sri Lanka. So, now the only game in town is LTTE (Eelam Tamils) vs Indian tentacles, namely - the RAW.  Now, RAW has access to any place or any facility in Sri Lanka, except in LTTE-controlled areas. Karuna cannot be (need not be) in Sri Lanka. He is only a faceless phantom figure used by the Indians (and Sinhalese) to break- up the Tamil solidarity, mainly the North and East bond and linkage..."]

  A Tribute to a Friend - Ashok Mehta in the Pioneer, 23 August 2005

"(Government TV Channel) Rupavahini showed no British or American at the state funeral, though the representatives of these governments were doubtless present. Seated on President Kumaratunga's right was Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse. On her left was Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and next to him, Foreign Minister Natwar Singh. India's representation was a clear message to the LTTE as well as the international community of Delhi's solidarity with Colombo... (Kadirgamar) was for active intervention by India during the standoff at the strategic Elephant Pass in 2000, the turning point in the battle for the north by Sri Lankan security forces..."

  Indian Commander visits Vavuniya SLA frontlines, 1 December 2005

"General Officer Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command Lt. Gen. B.S. Thakker Thursday visited the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) front lines in Vavuniya and discussed with SLA Commanders matters related to security."

  India clawing back to Sri Lanka's North East - M.R Narayan Swamy, 22 March 2006

"India is slowly, patiently and with a clear agenda finding its way back into Sri Lanka's North East... .In just a year after Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran declared in Trincomalee that the "North East is very close to India's heart", New Delhi is making its presence felt again...Unlike in the 1980s when it was accused of covertly arming Tamil guerrillas, India is maintaining a safe distance from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which New Delhi outlawed in 1992 on charges of killing Gandhi. The objective this time is to reach out to the predominantly Tamil and Muslim people of the northeast with development projects, which have the full backing of the Sri Lankan government..."

Failed Efforts of Eelam Tamils
  An Independent Tamil Eelam will be a natural ally of India -Veluppillai Thangavelu,  6 May 2000

"It is necessary for India at this crucial stage to identify those fundamental Indian interests that will guarantee the security of its southern flank against India’s enemies. Only an independent Tamil Eelam will provide such guarantee at all times and under all circumstances. The Tamil people are the natural allies of India because of the cultural, religious and historical ties the Tamils have with India. With Tamils of Tamil Nadu the relationship is that of mother and child’s umbilical cord. India need not entertain fears that an independent Eelam will fuel secessionist forces in Tamil Nadu..."


  Caste/Class Opposition to Tamil Eelam -  Prof P. Ramasamy National University of Malaysia, May 2000

"...The anti-LTTE crusade mounted by the caste/class associations and establishments closely linked to major magazines like the Frontline are basically below the belt punchers...Hundreds and thousands of Tamils have been pushed out of the country, killed, displaced and destroyed in the name of maintaining the synthetic territorial integrity of an island that has been never united or integrated in the first place. The forces opposed to Eelam are basically driven by the desire to maintain intact and indeed extend the hegemony of certain caste/class forces not only in India but also in Sri Lanka.  Democratic and egalitarian social movements having roots in subaltern and Dravidian philosophies are natural enemies of these conservative and reactionary forces..."

  Think, India, Think - Sanmugam Sabesan,16 January 2004

"...The Sri Lankan Tamils have had political as well as cultural ties with India, especially South India, which dates backs thousands of years. These ties continued even after India gained independence from Britain. The relationship between Sri Lankan Tamils and India peaked during Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s last tenure, due to her visionary politics and her empathy towards the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The relations soured after the Indo Sri Lanka Accord, which was orchestrated as beneficial to the Sri Lankan Tamils, notwithstanding their non-participation. The Rajiv Gandhi regime’s failure to comprehend the Sri Lankan Tamil problem thoroughly and its lack of long-term vision drove hasty decisions which brought pain and destruction to all parties concerned. India would have reacted the same way the Sri Lankan Tamils reacted, had a foreign power imposed an accord like the Indo Sri Lanka Accord on itself. Therefore, any right-minded person would see the justification behind the Sri Lankan Tamil struggle against the imposition of the Indo Sri Lanka accord.

Addressing the Remembrance Day event in London recently, the LTTE’s Political Advisor and Chief Negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham, stated, "We would not act in anyway prejudicial to India’s geo-political, strategic and economic interests. We want to establish friendly relations with the Government of India. As such we are seeking a radical change in India’s attitude.."

  India’s Sri Lanka Policy: Need For A Review - Ana Pararajasingham, 13 December 2004  

“It appears evident, then, that the Indian State failed to take the political force and mass appeal of Tamil nationalism seriously If the violence and perfidy of the Sri Lankan State had given rise to Tamil nationalism in the first place, the popular commitment to Eelam was cemented and solidified by the Tamils bitter experience with the Indian State. The current policy of supporting the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka while not addressing the spectre of Tamil nationalism will therefore have to be construed as a policy not much different from that which resulted in the physical intervention by India in support of Colombo. The question that needs to be asked is how realistic is it for the Indian Government to persist with such a policy when ground realities have changed significantly during the intervening period."

  இந்தியாவும் ஈழத்தமிழர்களின் சுயநிர்ணய போராட்டமும் – பேசாப்பொருளை பேச நான் துணிந்தேன் - M.Thanpalasingham, 15 December 2004

"The Tamil people recognise that no people and no country can live alone. One people’s independence should not impinge on the existence of another people. The Tamil people of Eelam and the Sinhala people are linked with India by geography, religion, culture, language and history. Neither the Tamil nation nor the Sinhala nation will in any way, be a hindrance or threat to India's unity or to India’s geo political interests. On the contrary these two nations will serve to strengthen and advance those interests. The Tamil nation has never wavered in this desire..."



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