CONTENTS OF
THIS SECTION |
|
Rajiv
Gandhi's War Crimes |
துயிலும் இல்லம்,
Jaffna
includes those Eelam Tamils who died in the
war against the Indian Army in 1987-1989 |
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination - the
Verdict, 1999 |
India played a
critical, albeit covert, role in Sri Lanka’s war against the Tamil Tigers
- Nitin A. Gokhale in “Sri Lanka – From War to Peace”,
22 August 2009 |
"LTTE is deservedly
dying, but long live the Tamil cause" - B.Raman, 22 April 2009 |
The Situation in Sri
Lanka - Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Indian Minister for External Affairs, Suo Motu
Statement in Parliament, 18 February 2009 |
Demonstration in New Delhi in Support of Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle
17 February 2009 |
India in duplicitous, murderous collaboration with Sri Lanka's genocidal regime
- SA Post, 15 February 2009 |
Sri Lanka Air Force
being trained in Tamil Nadu, 3 February 2009 |
India-Sri Lanka Joint Press Release, 26 October 2008 |
We won’t stop
military cooperation with Lanka says Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab
Mukherjee, 23 October 2008 |
Change Course in Sri Lanka or Face Misfortune -
M.S.S.Pandian, 23 October 2008 |
Presence of ex Deputy Director of RAW disturbs
Sri Lanka, says Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Island,
21 October 2008 |
""India
loves to play all sides, and has always done
that," said Reva Bhalla, an analyst with the
U.S. private intelligence firm Stratfor. "They
can cater to the Tamil politicians and benefit
from the Tigers' military capability going down
without taking too much political risk."
Underscoring India's dual-track approach
to Sri Lanka, furious denials erupted from
Colombo and New Delhi last month after two
Indian radar technicians were injured in a Tiger
assault on a Sri Lankan military base. Rajapaksa
later said the men were providing after-sales
service to radars India's Bharat Electronics
sold to the military. India has also helped Sri
Lanka intercept Tiger boats, which it considers
a threat to national security..."
C. Bryson Hull in India Rumbles over Sri Lanka
war, but to what end?, 17 October
2008, Thomson Reuters |
Stop arms supply to Sri Lanka: CPI urges Indian
government, 27 March 2008 |
Stop Indian military aid to Sri Lanka: Tamil
Nadu leaders, 13 March 2008 |
The Re-emergence of the Tamil Nadu Factor in
India’s Sri Lanka Policy - M. Mayilvaganan,
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
India, November 2007 "...There is a view in
Tamil Nadu that India played a role in the
division of LTTE, primarily to weaken the LTTE
and force it to come to the negotiating table.
But people in Tamil Nadu would rather argue that
any effort by India aimed at trouncing the LTTE
at the moment, when the government of Sri Lanka
has launched its full-scale offensive against
the LTTE, would be construed as inimical to the
interests of the Tamils and give rise to
spontaneous opposition by the people of Tamil
Nadu..."
more |
India admits helping Sri Lanka Navy, 17
January 2007 |
தமிழீழ பிரச்சினையின் தீர்வுக்கான சர்வதேசப் பாதை
திறப்பு "தமிழக"த்தில்தான் உள்ளது -
M.Thirunavakarasu, Jaffna 18 November 2007 |
Eelam and Indian Security: Need for policy
alternatives
- Ampalam, 16 November 2007 |
India's intelligence support for Sri Lanka in
the waters of the Tamil homeland, 4 November
2007 |
RAW recalls Colombo officer suspected of
‘Chinese Connection’, 7 October 2007 |
India opposes Sri Lanka buying
arms from China, Pakistan,
31 May 2007 |
India Circumspect about
LTTE air strike whilst UK All-Party
Parliamentary group on Sri Lanka rushes in...28
March 2007 |
B.Raman,
South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) On LTTE's Air Capability,
March/April 2007 |
LTTE Air Raid on Katunayake Air Base - Col R Hariharan
26 March 2007
together with a
Response by Jayantha Gnanakone, USA |
India must stop assistance to Sri
Lankan government: Thamil Chelven, 29 January 2007 |
LTTE Avoids Battle of Attrition
in the East - B.Raman, 22 January 2007 |
"Cool reception" in Delhi for
Rajapakse, 30 November 2006 |
Indian Re-Thinking of the Sri
Lankan Situation - Thomas Webber, 25 November 2006 |
Sri Lanka: Marginalisation of
India, B.Raman, 26 November 2006 |
India seeks solution
with a united and federal Sri Lanka - Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
16 November 2006 |
India trains Sri Lanka jet bomber support crews, 15 November 2006 |
The Way Ahead in Sri Lanka:
Summary of an interaction organised by Observer Research Foundation,Chennai
2 September 2006, published November 2006 |
Atharma Bhumi? - Sanmuga
Suntharam, 6 October 2006 |
Father Chandiravarman Sinnathurai on Palacingham Pragmatism , 1 July 2006 |
India and the LTTE: Out of the
Box - K.T.Kumaran, 29 June 2006 |
RAW aiding paramilitary
recruitment in India, 25 June 2006 |
LTTE
strategies for War & Peace - Col.Hari Haran, 19 June 2006 |
LTTE
faces difficulties without anti aircraft support - B.Raman, 18 June 2006 |
Implications of EU Ban on LTTE -
Indian Point of View, June 2006 |
Indian General Raghavan(retd)
advises International Community on its Role June 2006 |
B.Raman Additional
Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India on Pakistan
Intelligence Base in Colombo , June 2004 |
Need for a Balanced Assessment Arjun Katoch, November 1991
"It is not the purpose of this article to defend or glorify the LTTE. But
one man's terrorist, they say is another's freedom fighter. Currently,
despite the fuss over the Sri Lankan army and LTTE fighting together in 1989
to eliminate the TNA, the LTTE are no doubt the Indian and the Sri Lankan
governments' terrorists, but with equal certainty they are, and always have
been, the Sri Lankan Tamil's freedom fighters. To conclude with the basic
rationale behind the LTTE's continued presence against heavy odds - and to
repeat a point made earlier - the whole struggle is for land. The logic
behind the LTTE's popularity in the Tamil speaking part of Sri Lanka is that
they are trying to protect what they consider to be their homeland from
incursions by settlers from the south, under the protection of the Sri
Lankan army. This fact must be understood for a balanced assessment of their
durability and influence in the Sri Lanka imbroglio." |
Two Voices but One Policy
- 20 Years Later, 11 November 2004 |
Memorandum submitted by Tamil Professionals in London to Indian Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, 22 May 2000 |
Shiv Sena and MDMK support LTTE, 10 May 2000 |
Glimpse of the LTTE's Fortunes in Sri Lanka: Designs on India - Major
General Asfir Karim, 1993
|
India's Major General Mehta on the Pooneryn Debacle, 1993 |
India's Vietnam: the
IPKF in Sri Lanka, Rediffusion, March 2000 |
Related Offsite Links |
Indian Peace Keeping Mission in Sri Lanka - India's Vietnam - Pakistan
Military Consortium |
Research and Analysis Wing - New Delhi, India |
Indian Armed Forces |
Institute of Peace & Conflict |
Observer Research Foundation |
ORF Institute of Security Studies |
|
|
INTERNATIONAL FRAME
&
Tamil Struggle for Freedom:
India
- An Ignominious Role
[see also
Tamils: A Trans State Nation - Tamil Nadu] |
ig·no·min·i·ous 1 : marked with or characterized by
disgrace or shame : dishonorable 2 : deserving of shame or
infamy : despicable 3 : humiliating, degrading
"Inter-state relations are not governed by the logic of
morality. They were and they remain an amoral phenomenon.."
Jyotindra Nath Dixit
Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka 1985 /89, Foreign
Secretary in 1991/94 and National Security Adviser to the Prime
Minister of India 2004/05,
speaking in Switzerland,
February 1998
"Amorality is distinct from
immorality, although in common use the terms are
often conflated. One who is amoral denies the
existence of morality, whereas one who is
immoral believes in the existence of morality
but chooses not to comply with it. An immoral
person who violates a certain moral code may
still believe in the underlying truth of that
moral code. For example, a thief may not deny
that stealing is immoral, but may attempt to
deflect the blame or offer excuses in order to
justify his or her actions."
Wikipedia
"...The fundamental premise of India's
strategic policies can be simply stated - and that is to deny
any intermediary role to extra regional powers in the affairs of
South Asia..."Nadesan
Satyendra in Sri Sabaratnam Memorial Lecture,
9 May 1987
"...The Shah of Iran once
said that in his role as the gendarme of the region he had
two main weapons for dealing with the revolutionary threat
which existed in the region. First, was direct intervention.
This was applied in the case of Oman in 1973, and also in the
case of Baluchistan when the Shah provided armaments and
military finance for the Pakistani state's repression in the
area. The second weapon was internal subversion of the
national liberation movements among the various nationalities.
This method was applied in Kurdistan. The goal, ofcourse,
was to allow the national movement to grow in a particular
direction in order to defeat it. The case of
Kurdistan was classic. The Shah said openly that the
Kurdistan operation was relatively cheap for him. With 30
million dollars the job was done. He simply supported
Kurdistan to destroy it. " (Murad Khan of the Baluchistan
People's Liberation Front, speaking to Raymond Noat - Interview
quoted in
Tariq Ali's 'Can Pakistan Survive')
|
|
New Delhi's Amoral Record...
Defend Eelam Tamils
Arm & Train Eelam Tamils
Coerce Eelam Tamils
Secure
New Delhi's Geo Political Goals
Attack Eelam Tamils
Rajiv Gandhi's War Crimes
Indian Army Forced to Leave
Tamil Eelam
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination
Ban
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Calibrated Approach
Covert Support to Sri Lanka
Failed Efforts of Eelam Tamils
to stem New Delhi's Attack
|
Defending Eelam
Tamils.... 1981 - 1985 |
August
1984 |
Statement by Mr.R.C.Bandare, Indian Expert Member of Sub
Commission at UN Sub
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, August 1984
"...mounting violence continues to work against
the search for a political solution because it leads to a hardening
of positions, the building up of resentment, the depending of the
feeling of insecurity, of fear and desperation, of being victims of
a
concerted plan of genocide. Above all, violence imparts a
surrealistic character to political negotiations and in turn induces
loss of faith in peaceful methods. Mr Chairman, today, not only
is the
right to
life of Tamils threatened
but their property, their way of life is jeopardised. They are
made to suffer
political and
civic disabilities.
Draconian laws and
emergency regulations reinforce and react with harsh
counter-measures taken by the Government to severely curtail their
human rights and effectively block out any access to remedies..."
|
|
India's Annexure "C" Proposals, December 1983 "
Subsequent to
Genocide'83 and the death of thousands of Tamils at the hands of
Sinhala mobs in July/August 1983, Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi sent her representative, Mr. G. Parthasarathy for discussions
with Sri Lanka. The proposals which emerged as a result of
discussions between the Government of India and the Government of
Sri Lanka during August/November 1983 were presented as Annexure "C"
to a statement submitted by President Jayawardene to the
All Party Conference on the 1st of December 1983. However, the
Government of Sri Lanka failed to adopt these Proposals at the All
Party Conference discussions which commenced in December 1983 and
ended inconclusively in December 1984.
|
8 March
1985 |
Statement by Dr.G.S.Dhillon, Leader of Indian Delegation at
UN Commission on Human Rights 1985
"Over the past few months the everyday lives of
ordinary citizens, particularly in the North and East,
have been adversely affected Following the imposition of a
security zone in the Jaffna Peninsula, movement of persons and
vehicles has been restricted. There are reports of an acute shortage
of food and thousands of fisherfolk have been unable to ply their
trade and are now without any means of livelihood.
Recent reports of organised colonisation of the Northern and Eastern
Provinces have added to the friction between different
communities. Such an atmosphere, Mr.Chairman, breeds hate and fear -
and these are emotions which are not conducive to creating the
atmosphere necessary for finding a solution to the problem."
|
Arming & Training
Eelam Tamils... 1981-1985 |
|
Shri V.P. Singh, former Prime Minister of India, deposition
before the Jain Commission, 5 November 1996
".....the first batch of training of the militants was done in
1983 under the Congress Government. I will not disclose the place
where this training was held. It was done in Chakarata. Then in
1984, weapons were given to all the militant groups. The Camps were
set up in Tamil Nadu. Monetary help was given. MGR in his statement
in the Assembly of Tamil Nadu said that Rs.4 crores aid has been
given by him to Tamil Militant Groups. The other information I will
not give to the Commission, which I believe is sensitive..."
|
|
Jain Comission Report - Growth of Sri Lankan
Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu Chapter I -
Phase I (1981-1986), August 1997
"7.11 A first hand assessment of the camps being
organised by the various Sri Lankan militant groups is
found in the enclosure to a letter (DO C.11. No. 1634/M
dated Feb. 8, 1986, referred to in details at page 111)
written by Shri K. Mohan Das, the then Director General
of Police (Intelligence), Tamil Nadu to the Chief
Secretary, Tamil Nadu.
The enclosure gives detailed particulars including
strength, weaponry and type of training in the camps,
which, according to Shri Mohandas were being organised
by the militant groups themselves.
The information contained in the enclosure is
summarised as follows:-
LTTE:- 6 camps were reported being conducted by the
LTTE in the districts of Anna (1 camp), Thanjavur West
(1 camp), Thanjavur East (1 camp), Salem (1 camp,
Madurai (1 camp) and Ramnad ( 1 camp) of Tamil Nadu. The
total strength of trainees in these camps was reported
to be 495 cadres including 90 female Tigers. The camp at
Sirumalai (Anna district) was the only camp were all the
90 female Tigers were getting training along with 40
male Tigers. The largest LTTE camp was located at
Kumbarapatti in Salem district. The training comprised
Arms Training, swimming, boat driving and physical
training. The camps were equipped with transport
facilities such as Jeeps, Vans, motor cycles etc.
TELO:- Five camps organised by Tamil Eelam Liberation
Organisation (TELO) were reported to be running in the
districts of Ramnad ( 3 camps) and Salem ( 2 camps).
There were totally 233 male cadres undergoing this
training which comprised Physical Training, Arms
training, swimming and boat driving.
EROS:- Eelam Revolutionary Organisers (EROS) were
reported to be conducting two camps in the districts of
Ramnad and Pasumpon Muthuramalingam districts. There
were 8 male trainees in these camps which were imparting
Physical Training and Arms Training.
EPRLF: The Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation
Front (EPRLF) was reported to be conducting 7 training
camps in the districts of Thanjavur West (3 camps),
South Arcot (2 camps), Trichy ( 1 camp) and Ramnad (1
camp) with a total strength of 73 male trainees who were
being trained in Guerilla warfare, Physical Training and
Arms training. These camps reportedly possessed
sophisticated weapons such as Light Machine -guns as
well as transport vehicles.
PLOT:- The Peoples Liberation Organisation for Tamil
Eelam (PLOT) was conducting training in 18 camps located
in the districts of Thanjavur West (11 camps),
Pudukottai ( 4 camps), Tirunelvei East (2 camps) and
Thanjavur East (1 camp). Totally 2236 cadres in addition
to 94 female cadres were getting trained in these camps.
The camps possessed transport facilities, boats and some
weapons. Predominantly, the training comprised guerrilla
warfare and also Physical Training, Swimming and Boat
Driving.
Other assorted organisations were also conducting
their camps in Tamil Nadu such as Tamil Eelam Army (TEA)
- 2 camps, 31 trainees; TELA -Kanthan group ( 3 camps,
117 trainees); TELA-Rajan group (1 camp, 10 trainees);
TENA (1 camp, 25 trainees); RELO ( 1 camp, 13 trainees;
NLFT (1 camp, 2 trainees); ECRP (1 camp, 4 trainees) and
TMPP ( 1 camp, 6 trainees).
As per the enclosure, the total number of trainees of
various Sri Lankan Tamil militant organisations in their
training camps being conducted in Tamil Nadu was 3179
males and 184 females, totally 3363 cadres..."
|
|
Ninan Koshy on India's Consistently Unsound Policy, Indian Express,
30 December 1997
"The...assertion by the
Jain Commission
that the training given to militant groups on Indian soil was
essentially for self-defence is an exercise in self- deception. The
type of training and weaponry belies such claims. By 1984, Sri
Lankan Tamil groups abroad had the impression that at an
opportune time, if the need arose, India would intervene
militarily...During the
Sub-Commission meeting in Geneva in August 1985 the leader of a
Tamil group who was a participant at the
Thimpu talks chaired by Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari told
me about attitudes there: ``We have fixed Punjab, we have fixed
Assam, now we will fix you bloody Tamils''. Those were the heady
days of `quick-fix' under Rajiv. ..""
more
|
|
Jyotindra Nath
Dixit, Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka 1985
/89, Foreign Secretary in 1991/94 and National Security
Adviser to the Prime Minister of India 2004/05 on India's
Role in the Struggle for Tamil Eelam
- Speaking in Switzerland, February 1998
"(In the 1980s) ...Tamil militancy received support
both from Tamil Nadu and from the Central Government not only as a
response to the Sri Lankan Government's military assertiveness
against Sri Lankan Tamils, but also as a response to Jayawardene's
concrete and expanded military and intelligence cooperation with the
United States, Israel and Pakistan. ...The assessment was that these
presences would pose a strategic threat to India and they would
encourage fissiparous movements in the southern states of
India. .. a process which could have found encouragement from
Pakistan and the US, given India's experience regarding their
policies in relation to Kashmir and the Punjab....
In normal terms of international law and principles
of neutrality was Mrs. Gandhi correct in giving political and
material support to Sri Lankan Tamils ? The answer is obvious and
has to be in the negative. ..Had Sri Lanka been several hundred
miles away from the coast of India this approach could have been
adopted. But Sri Lanka was only 18 miles away from Tamil Nadu.
Inter-state relations are not governed by the logic of
morality. They were and they remain an amoral phenomenon.
Unilateral adherence to morality, if it affects your very existence
as a united country, may be admired as an idealistic principle. But
it is neither desirable nor practical if another country
deliberately indulges in policies which are amoral and at the same
time pose threat to you. So practical corrective action has indeed
to be taken..."
|
Coercing Eelam Tamils...
1985-1987 |
|
Murad Khan, Baluchistan People's Liberation Front, speaking to
Raymond Noat - Interview quoted in
Tariq Ali's 'Can Pakistan Survive?'...
" The Shah of Iran once said that in his role as
the gendarme of the region he had two main weapons for dealing with the
revolutionary threat which existed in the region. First, was direct
intervention. This was applied in the case of Oman in 1973, and also in
the case of Baluchistan when the Shah provided armaments and military
finance for the Pakistani state's repression in the area. The second
weapon was internal subversion of the national liberation movements
among the various nationalities. This method was applied in Kurdistan.
The goal, ofcourse, was to allow the national movement to grow in a
particular direction in order to defeat it. The case of Kurdistan was
classic. The Shah said openly that the Kurdistan operation was
relatively cheap for him. With 30 million dollars the job was done.
He simply supported Kurdistan to destroy it...."
|
|
Nadesan Satyendra in Tamil Eelam,
Kurds & Bhutan, July 1985
"..The Shah of Iran was never willing to go as far as he could have
for the Kurds, even in terms of weapon supplies. Kurdish nationalism in
Iraq was in the long run, disadvantageous for Iran. For Iran the Kurdish
fight against the Iraqis was a convenient way of keeping Iran's chief
rival off balance...When it became advantageous for Iran to come to an
agreement with Iraq, the Kurds were abandoned... ...Let us learn from
the experience of the Kurds of Iraq. It is said that fools fail to
learn even from their own experience. Wise men learn from the experience
of others. We are a people - not without wisdom..."
|
|
The Thimpu Talks, July/August 1985
"In June 1985, at the initiative of the Government of India, the
leaders of the Tamil militant movements which were engaged in an
armed struggle for the establishment of a separate Tamil Eelam state
in the North and East of the island of Sri Lanka, agreed to a
'cease-fire' as a preliminary step to creating a 'congenial'
atmosphere for 'peace talks'. Phase I of the talks commenced on 8th
July 1985 and concluded on 13th July 1985. Phase II of the talks
commenced on 12th August 1985 and concluded on 17th August 1985. The
venue of the talks was Thimpu, the capital city of the Himalayan
kingdom of Bhutan..."
|
|
The 1986 "December 19th Proposals"
Subsequent to the collapse of the
Thimpu Talks in August 1985, and the
September 1985 Working paper, the Indian External Affairs State
Minister Natwar Singh and Home, Pensions, Personnel and Public
Grievances Minister P. Chidambaram visited Sri Lanka in 1986 to discuss
a political solution along the lines of "Eastern Province Trifurcation
proposals" of J. R. Jayawardene. India suggested that the predominantly
Sinhala Amparai electorate be delinked from Eastern Province and
attached to Uva Province. The proposals which emerged as a result of
discussions of this Indian delegation (who left Sri Lanka on December
19, 1986) came to be known as the "December 19th Proposals".
|
|
Nadesan Satyendra in Sri Sabaratnam Memorial Lecture, 9
May 1987
"...The fundamental premise of India's strategic policies
can be simply stated - and that is to deny any intermediary
role to extra regional powers in the affairs of South Asia.
Mr.Onkar Marwah, Joint Director, Asian Centre, Graduate
Institute of International Studies, Geneva, has commented:
"...It is feared for instance that in addition to
facilities in Pakistan, the United States may also be in
search of bases for its Rapid Deployment Force in Sri Lanka
(Trincomalee naval installations) and Bangaladesh
(Chittagong harbour). Such moves, if undertaken, would
create immediate negative repercussions in India-Sri Lanka
and India-Bangladesh relations. India's hardened
reactions would complicate the settlement of the Tamil
problem in Sri Lanka..."
|
|
Romesh Bhandari, Indian Foreign Secretary on
'Settlement by Persuasion' in the Hindustan Times, 11 July
1987
"..No one individual formulates and decides (Indian) Government's
policy. There are always in depth internal consultations and
discussions. There are several inputs before decisions are taken.
Any individual entrusted with a task does so on directions... it has
been made clear at all times to Sri Lanka, that India's national
compulsions cannot also be set aside. In any final reckoning these
would prevail over anything else...Besides being a neighbour and
non-aligned, Sri Lanka is a small island strategically located in
the Indian Ocean having harbours on which some outsiders have their
eyes. Continued strife and disorder only weakens Sri Lanka and makes
itself vulnerable to foreign interference, presence and even
involvement. None of these can suit India..."
more
|
|
"I have never mistrusted India" - Sri Lanka
President J.R.Jayawardene, 15 September 1987
" Having in mind
LTTE's assertion that India did not come to Sri Lanka to help the
Tamils but came to further her own geo political interests I
once asked the Indian High Commissioner,
Mr.Dixit: “Who benefited
by the Peace Accord?”. After a good look around, Mr. Dixit asked:
“Do you want the truth?”, and when I replied “Yes”, he said “India
stands to gain most, not Sri Lanka, nor the Tamils.” To the question
that I put to Mr.Dixit “Why did India take such an interest in the
Tamil problem?”, his reply was: “ The shores of India and Sri Lanka
are only 21 miles apart. If they were 500 miles apart, India would
not have bothered that much.” Dixit went on to say: “New Delhi is
concerned only with the interests of India; not the welfare of the
Tamils. If the interest of India and the Tamils are the same, we
help each other. India’s first priority is to further her own
interests.”"
|
Securing its
geo political goal... 1987 |
|
Indo Sri Lanka Agreement, July 1987 |
|
The Indo Sri Lanka Accord
- Nadesan Satyendra, 15 January 1988
"...It would seem that a spectre is haunting both the Sri Lankan
Government and the Indian Government - the spectre of Tamil
nationalism. And in their fear they are hugging each other. And if
both the Indian Government and the Sri Lankan Government are hugging
each other in fear of the political force of Tamil nationalism, then
clearly it is a political force which must be reckoned with...."
|
|
Political Committee of LTTE on Collapse of Indo Sri Lanka Accord,30
April 1988
.....Tamil
interests are the price paid by India to Jayawardene's
regime to secure its consent for the Accord. By
subordinating the Island to India's regional supremacy,
Jayawardene has secured from India what his imperialist
masters couldn't provide, that is the total suppression
of the Tamil liberation movement and the permanent
subjugation of the Tamils under Sinhala hegemony...
The Government of India
is only concerned with securing and consolidating her
national interests and geopolitical gains. Whereas, Sri
Lanka is only concerned with the liquidation of the
Tiger movement and the destruction of the Tamil freedom
struggle. The people of Tamil Eelam have become the
unfortunate victims of these different designs of a
regional super-power and a racist State.....Utilizing
the Tamil struggle to interfere in the conflict,
encouraging the Tamil resistance movement to bring
pressure on Jayawardene, taking the responsibility upon
itself to mediate on behalf of the Tamils, the
Government of India has finally achieved her strategic
interests but the Tamils are left alienated, helpless,
defenceless, with their fundamental political problems
unresolved"
|
|
13th Amendment to Sri Lanka Constitution - Devolution or Comic Opera? -
Nadesan Satyendra 1988
In August 1987, the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution and the ancillary Provincial Councils
Act. The Sri Lankan Government declared that the enactment of these
laws fulfilled the promises made in the Accord, to 'devolve power'
on the Tamil people.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who (together with the other armed
resistance groups) were recognized as 'combatants' by the Accord and who had
emerged as the leaders of the Tamil national struggle, rejected the basic
provisions of the 13th Amendment.
This Article examines the basic provisions of the 13th Amendment
and the Provincial Councils Act and inquires whether these laws devolved
power on the Tamil people or whether these laws amount to a constitutional
script for a comic opera, with power continuing to reside in a Sinhala
dominated Central government within the frame of an unitary constitution.
|
Attacking Eelam
Tamils... 1987-1990 |
|
India's Defence
of its Role, July 1987
"..As hundreds of innocent civilians - both Sinhala and Tamil -
perish in the escalating violence in Sri Lanka, the question of a
negotiated political settlement becomes ever more difficult. Any such
complex issue is inevitably rendered more complicated by the
malevolent
involvement of external powers. This
involvement does unfortunately have long-term implications for India's
security..."
|
|
Indian army
intervention at invitation of Sinhala Sri Lanka government
, 15 July 1990
"The violence in the north) was also stopped by the Indian Peace
Keeping Force. (Though the fighting went on) no Sinhalese, no
Sinhalese soldiers were killed... only the Indian soldiers and the
LTTE (were killed). Yes, (I had to invite a foreign army to do this
on our sovereign soil)... I was doing what so many Sinhala kings had
done in the past in similar circumstances." - ex President
Jayawardene, Interview with Mervyn de Silva, Lanka Guardian, 15 July
1990
|
|
Rajiv
Gandhi's War Crimes....
Rajiv
Gandhi's War Crimes
நெற்றிக்கண் திறப்பினும் குற்றம் குற்றமே...
உண்மைகள் ஒருபோதும் உறங்குவதில்லை, உறங்கவும்
கூடா...
Truth never sleeps - and it should not.... |
|
Eduardo Marino's report
to International Alert, October - November 1987
"..Over a period of about 20 days (from 9
October 1987) , the Indian Army's direct attack on LTTE
positions, and defence from LTTE attacks, was coupled with
the Indian Army's attack and storming of still unevacuated
Jaffna - and many villages and settlements throughout the
Peninsula - with widespread (insofar as territory),
indiscriminate (insofar as targeting) and sustained (insofar
as intensity) artillery shelling. Only less widespread,
sustained and indiscriminate, there was air-strafing from
helicopter as well. It was not "cross-fire" that
incidentally killed thousands of civilians. The majority
were killed inside their houses and huts under
shelling, or were shot at random by the roads and on the
streets.
A large number of people were 'only'
wounded - yet, many of them died in the absence of medical
care, especially under the 24-hour curfew over a period of
about one month, to mid-November. It was a combination of
firing and shelling... that made an estimated 175,000
families ( that is, about 500,000 people) refugees into the
Jaffna outskirts within days. .."
|
|
A.P.Venkateshwaran, Former Indian
Foreign Secretary, at World Federation of Tamils Conference,
30 April 1988
"...I feel ashamed that under the
Indo Sri Lanka agreement, our forces are fighting with Tamils
whom they went to protect. Speaking of blaming the Indian soldiers,
soldiers are meant to carry out commands, but I do believe that in
our own Indian ethics, soldiers are not merely meant to carry out
commands because if you look at the history and the mythology and
the culture which is Indian, we do not believe in the British
concept of the Charge of the Light Brigade, 'Theirs is not to reason
why, theirs is but to do and die'. No.
We are
supposed to fight only for Dharma. Only if the war is righteous
shall you fight it. By that yardstick I believe that the Indian
Government had betrayed its own culture and ethics. For the first
time, it had sent out soldiers to fight when there was no cause for
us to fight..."
|
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Annai Poopathy's fast for freedom, 19 March 1998
"On
19th March 1988 Poopathy amma took up residence at Mahmangam Pillayar
temple and commenced her fast. She put forward two demands: (1)An
immediate unconditional ceasefire between the LTTE and the IPKF.
(2)Unconditional talks between the LTTE and the Indian government..."
|
|
A.P.Venkateshwaran, former Indian Foreign
Secretary at Eelam Tamils Solidarity Conference Madurai,
7 March 1999
"...Rajiv Gandhi
foolishly sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka in 1987. But what
happened afterwards was the
Tamils were
persecuted by the troops. The war against the Tamils was
escalated. When the then Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardene met
Rajiv Gandhi in 1986 during the SAARC conference in Bangalore,
Jayawardene warned Rajiv that it would be dangerous for India if a
separate state were be established in Eelam and then extended by
merging Tamil Nadu. Rajiv easily believed what Jayawardene said. I
talked to Rajiv immediately after JR left, as it was not proper for
me to interfere in the talks between the two heads of state. I said
that things would never develop the way Jayawardene's predicted.
'This was rubbish. Tamil Nadu will never be separated from India -
and I like to say this as a Tamil'. But he, Rajiv believed what the
head of a neighbouring state said than what I said. The Indian Peace
Keeping Force was sent to Sri Lanka within a few months after I
resigned my job. You all know what happened after this -
thousands of Eelam Tamils were killed and more than 1500 Indian
troops lost their lives. In the end, the Indian troops were asked to
withdraw from Sri Lanka without any gratitude...
|
Indian Army Forced to leave
Tamil Eelam... 1989/1990 |
|
Sri Lanka President Premadasa's
Failed attempt to Replace the 1987 Indo Sri Lanka Accord, March 1989 |
|
Texts of Letters Exchanged
between Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi,
June/July 1989 |
|
IPKF Withdrawal - Joint
Communiques, July/September 1989
"The President of Sri Lanka has requested the Prime Minister of India
to recommence the withdrawal of the IPKF. The withdrawal will recommence
on the 29th of July 1989. The High Commissioner of India reiterated the
invitation of the Minister of External Affairs of the Government of
India to the Foreign Minister of the Government of Sri Lanka to visit
India to discuss the time schedule for the withdrawal of the remaining
IPKF contingent in Sri Lanka. The invitation has been accepted. This
opportunity will be used to review the implementation of the Indo-Sri
Lanka Agreement. During the visit of the delegation of the question of
cessation of all offensive military operation by the IPKF and the safety
and security of all communities in North Eastern Province of Sri Lanka
will also be discussed. "
|
|
A Post Mortem on the
Indian Intervention - Voice of the Tigers Bulletin, 12
February 1990
"...The military annihilation of the LTTE, the Indian
policy planners assumed, would put an end to the Tamil
nationalist movement and the Tamil demand for
self-determination. Such a measure will certainly placate
the chauvinistic Sinhala ruling elite whose support India
needed to implement the Accord and to secure India's
geo-political aspiration..."
|
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IPKF
Departure & the Orissan Odyssey - Tamil International April
1990
"An odyssey is a long adventurous
journey, or a series of wanderings. How the EPRLF and ENDLF
leaders and cadres and families left Trincomalee for Madras,
then left for Visakhapatnam, and eventually ended up in
Orissa after five days of sailing and waiting at sea, was
itself an odyssey for a total of 1,335 men, women and
children... Now that he has led his "people", unlike Moses,
into a promise-less land, where is Mr Annamali Varadaraja
Perumal ?... "
|
|
India & the
Struggle for Tamil Eelam, 15 March 1992
"New Delhi’s track record shows that it regards the Eelam
Tamils as an expendable commodity - expendable in the altar
of its own self interest. The simple political reality is
that New Delhi gave limited support to the Tamil militant
movement before 1987 with the principal intent of
destabilising Colombo and making Colombo move towards New
Delhi.
The Annexures to the 1987 Accord are proof enough of
that intent. "
|
|
The Indo-LTTE War (1987-90) - An Anthology - Sachi Sri
Kantha, 2007-2008 |
New Delhi bans
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 1992 |
|
India Bans
LTTE -1992/2006
...
"The Subjects Committee of the Indian Congress
unanimously adopted, on April 14 1992 the Political
Resolution with a significant amendment which called on the
Union Government to impose a ban on the Liberation Tigers.
The amendment for banning LTTE for its alleged
involvement in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination was moved by
Rajya Sabha member Mr. S. Ahlualia.The amendment said that
it had now become more or less clear that the LTTE was
involved in the brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It
also called for steps to extradite those responsible for
perpetrating the crime. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said in
answer to questions by the press that the Government will
consider all aspects before taking a decision on imposing a
ban.
The Indian Government could have imposed a ban on the
LTTE without going through the process of obtaining a
resolution at the Congress sessions. This lends credence to
the view that the Indian government’s actions were
politically motivated. Furthermore, the resolution of the
ruling Congress party, by judging the LTTE in advance of the
court proceedings, prejudiced the fairness of any such
court proceedings. Any ‘trial’ may well become a mere show
trial. In the event, however, the ban was imposed on
the ground that the LTTE was engaged in activities in Tamil
Nadu which threatened the territorial integrity of India."
|
|
Indian Ban &
Sri Lanka Offensive, Nadesan Satyendra 1992
The initial question is: what did India gain by the ban? Or to
put it in another way: what was it that India could do after the
ban, which it could not do before the ban? During the past several
months the Indian intelligence services and the CBI, not to mention
the SIT, and a host of other agencies, have been more than energetic
in their hunt for LTTE bases and safe houses in Tamil Nadu even
without any order making the LTTE an unlawful association. New Delhi
knows that such an order will do little to add to the capabilities
of these agencies to carry out their task.
Again, New Delhi also knows that 'banning' militancy may serve to
send it further underground. In 1978, Sri Lanka banned the
Liberation Tigers under the then Emergency Regulations. Five years
later, in 1983, the Tigers were banned again under Sri Lanka's
notorious Prevention of Terrorism Act. 14 years after the first ban
and nine years after the second, Tamil militancy has not weakened
but has grown stronger. A movement which consisted of tens has grown
to an army of thousands. ..
Why then the ban? Two reasons are apparent. The ban will make it
a crime for any one in Tamil Nadu to openly, repeat, openly, support
the LTTE. Though such support may now go underground, New Delhi
appears to take the view that a ban will nevertheless help to stem
open mass mobilisation of separatist sentiment in Tamil Nadu.
But that is not all. There is a further reason. New Delhi seeks
to use the ban to deny recognition in the international arena to the
Liberation Tigers - recognition, that is, without India having a say
in the matter. New Delhi seeks to exercise a veto on any attempt to
settle the Tamil - Sri Lanka conflict, which sidelines India and its
interests - interests which are quite plainly spelt out in the
annexures to the Indo Sri Lanka 1987 Agreement.
High Commissioner Jha was almost viceregal in an interview
reported in Sri Lanka Sunday Times of May 17. He said: ''The ban is
a symbolic gesture with international ramifications. India's ban on
the LTTE has confronted Sri Lanka with hard political realities
which it will have to take into consideration before embarking on a
political solution.'' ...
New Delhi's foreign policy has stayed constant during these past
several years. Non alignment, was after all, a way of increasing
India's influence in a bipolar world. Today, New Delhi stays
steadfast to its objective of increasing Indian influence and
aspires to become one of the big powers of the emerging multipolar
world. High Commissioner Jha gave some indication of this when he
said:
''There are many items that have come straightaway into focus
almost simultaneously... Question of India-US relationship, non
proliferation treaty, now this rocket deal, the breaking of the
Soviet Union, India's entry into West Asia peace talks, the
India-Pakistan relations and the Afghanistan situation.''
|
|
Rajiv Gandhi - Secret Trial, Nadesan Satyendra, 1992
"We have said it before and we say it again. The
assassination of ex Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was wrong. It was wrong not
because ex Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was innocent of responsibility for
the war crimes
committed during the IPKF occupation of Tamil Eelam.... The
assassination of ex Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was wrong because it was
wrong to punish without charge and without trial according to law. But, if
that was wrong, then, as we have said before, and we say again, the
Chengalpattu trial (of those accused of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination)
is worse because the Indian Government seeks to give the appearance of
punishing through a ‘trial’ which, in truth, is no trial at all..."
|
|
Rajiv Gandhi - the Verdict -
Nadesan Satyendra 1999
"....Procedural law is civilisation's substitute for private
vengeance and self-help. 'Lynch law' is no law. Was the procedure
adopted to establish the guilt of the accused in the Rajiv
Gandhi assassination a fair one?... As an appellate court, the
Indian Supreme Court was bound by the facts as determined by the
trial court, unless it was shown that the trial court had erred in
law. But were the findings of fact by the trial judge vitiated by
the draconian provisions of the law itself - the TADA
provisions, which
in the assessment of Amnesty International, contravened 'several
international standards for fair trial, including the holding of
trials in camera and the non-disclosure of the identity of
witnesses'?... What reliance may be placed on the results of a
police investigation which was subject to immense political pressure
to 'deliver the goods'? What weight may be placed on the
testimony of witnesses whose identities were not disclosed - secret
witnesses who stood behind a screen to answer Counsel's queries?
What value may be placed on confessions secured in a police
dominated environment where torture was 'routine'? "
|
|
India Renews Ban on LTTE - Indian Home Ministry Notification, 20 May
2004
"...The activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
continues to pose threat to, and are detrimental to, the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of India as also public order...The LTTE's
objective for a separate homeland (Tamil Eelam) for all Tamils
threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, and
amounts to ceding a part of the territory of India and thus fall
within the ambit of an unlawful activity...The turbulence in Sri
Lanka is being exploited by pro-LTTE forces to draw support for the
LTTE and its cause by taking out processions, demonstrations etc, in
spite of the ban, causing disquiet and threat to the security of
Tamilnadu..."
|
|
Removal of POTO, should be
followed by removal of ban on LTTE- Interview with Revathi , 27
September 2004 |
New Delhi's Calibrated
Approach... |
|
Nadesan Satyendra on India & US - the
Calibrated Approach, 15 April 1992
"...The ending of the cold war signalled also the end of India’s
‘non aligned’ world role. Today, instead of seeking to lead the non
aligned in a bipolar world, New Delhi aspires to be a ‘big power’
in the emerging multi polar world - with, possibly, a permanent
seat in the UN Security Council as the badge of that status. India
is going for gold... Clearly, the US would be willing to offer
‘carrots’, provided New Delhi ‘plays ball’. The bottom line is that
India should not become too big for its shoes. Closer economic, and
military ties may help to create what is called euphemistically, an
‘atmosphere of mutual confidence - but which in truth will all be a
part of the ‘calibrated approach’. Amongst other matters, the US
will also be looking for movement from India in respect of the vexed
‘intellectual property rights’ question and informed sources say
that the dialogue with the Bush administration will start in May in
Delhi. Again, the proposed joint naval exercises and additional
IMF/World Bank support in the coming months will further enable the
two countries to explore, in a measured, ‘calibrated’ way, areas of
cooperation..."more
|
|
Nadesan Satyendra on Good Bye Non Alignment,
15 October 1993
"Indian Foreign Secretary J.N.Dixit delivering a lecture
on September 16, at the influential German Society for
Foreign Policy bade official good bye to non alignment and
rolled out the welcome mat for the 'emerging multi polar
world.' Speaking at Bonn he said: ''We are
diversifying our relations....At the same time Dixit sought
to put a brave face on Delhi's internal problems by saying:
''We are committed to the pluralistic society despite
challenges. Ethnicity cannot be the basis of democratic
state.'' Foreign Secretary Dixit's assertion that
'ethnicity' and 'democracy' were somehow mutually exclusive
exposed the soft under belly of Delhi's foreign policy. It
was this myopic approach to
struggles for self determination
on the Indian sub continent which may have served to
encourage the very outside 'pressures' which Delhi appeared
to resent. Coincidentally, in the same week that Foreign
Secretary Dixit was speaking at Bonn, the new US Asst.
Secretary State for South Asia Affairs, Robin Raphel, in her
first public comments on the region after being confirmed as
head of the newly created South Asian Bureau, said in
Washington: ''While India and Pakistan have got to talk
seriously about Kashmir any solution there that is going to
stick and is going to be meaningful must take into account
what the Kashmiri people want for their political
future''.."
|
|
Nadesan Satyendra in the
Buddha Smiled, 12 June 1998
"...New Delhi will need to recognise
that, in the end, the strength of India will lie not in
the nuclear bomb, but in its peoples. The economy of
India will not grow unless the different peoples of
India are energised to work together to achieve their
shared aspirations. Here, the failure of successive
Indian governments to openly recognise that India is a
multi-national state, has served to weaken the Indian
Union rather than strengthen it. The European Union
(established albeit, after two World Wars), may serve as
a pointer to that which may have to be achieved in the
Indian region in the years to come. There
may be a need for India to recognise the force of reason
in that which
Pramatha Chauduri
declared more than 70 years ago...
Nuclear capability will not guarantee unity. The
nuclear bomb did not prevent the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the emergence of the non-nuclear states
of Latvia, Estonia and Georgia. Peoples speaking
different languages, tracing their roots to different
origins, and living in relatively well defined and
separate geographical areas, do not easily 'melt'. And
in any event, a 'third world' economy will not provide a
large enough 'pot' for the 'melting' to take place.
A people's struggle for freedom is also a nuclear
energy and the
Fourth World is a part of today's enduring political
reality. India may need to adopt a more 'principle
centred' approach towards struggles for self
determination in the Indian region. A myopic
(and amoral) approach, apart from anything else, may
well encourage the very outside 'pressures' which New
Delhi seeks to exclude. And, if
India can grasp this, then, the Buddha may have cause to
truly smile..."
more
|
New Delhi's Covert Support
to Sri Lanka's Attack on Eelam Tamils... 1995 - ..... |
|
Sri Lanka is fighting India’s war, - Sri
Lanka Air Marshal Ranasinghe, 26 February 2001
"At present, we are fighting a war which is not
ours but India's. We are fighting it in our country for India...
India was cleverly engaging the LTTE outside its shores in order to
prevent the militant group from coming to India. Like the Americans,
we should have fought the war in somebody's else's country such as
India, UK, Germany or Canada where funds are being generated for the
LTTE"
|
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Lanka owes India a deep debt of gratitude to
India says Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, 3
March 2001
"Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar said on Friday that Sri
Lanka owed India a "deep debt of gratitude" for persuading
Britain to include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
in its list of banned terrorist organisations. We owe a deep debt of
gratitude to India. Unsolicited by us, Jaswant Singh (External
Affairs Minister) made representations to the British government for
the banning of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam),"
Kadirgamar said, two days after the British government's
announcement of its new anti-terrorism laws. Kadirgamar said he had
taken up the matter with his Indian counterpart, but Singh had told
him that New Delhi had already lobbied London. "That is a
particularly friendly gesture by India," he said..."
|
|
Natwar Singh, Currently (in 2004) Indian Foreign Minister Brahmin
owned Frontline, 21 December 2002
"....Oslo has been much in the news on
account of the Sri Lanka-LTTE agreement arrived at some
days back. It is the first step and one hopes it will
not have the same fate as the Oslo agreement between
Israel and the Palestinians. A good comparison is the
Northern Island situation. But V. Pirabaharan is no
Gerry Adams. The Congress(I) has made it known that
while we welcome the outcome of the Oslo agreement, we
are unequivocally committed to the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. No support for Eelam under
any circumstances. Neither can the Congress(I)
compromise on Pirabaharan's extradition since he has
been named by the Supreme Court as the mastermind behind
the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.
Under no circumstances would the Congress(I) agree
to Pirabaharan getting any formal high office or
position in the new set up in the North-East of Sri
Lanka. He remains persona non grata with us. He
invented suicide bombing, if we leave the Kamakazis of
Japan.
The India-Sri
Lanka Agreement that Rajiv Gandhi and J.R.
Jayawardene signed in July 1987, had, broadly speaking,
almost all the elements in the Oslo document. The
LTTE has come to the negotiating table because after
September 11, 2001, their funds have dried and
they can't buy or import any arms..."
|
|
The RAW Factor in Col.Karuna's Revolt - Sachi Sri Kantha, 1 April
2004
“The Cabinet Secretariat Research and Analysis Wing [RAW],
India's most powerful intelligence agency, is India’s external
intelligence agency. RAW has become an effective instrument of
India's national power, and has assumed a significant role in
formulating India's domestic and foreign policies. RAW has engaged
in disinformation campaigns, espionage and sabotage against Pakistan
and other neighboring countries. RAW has enjoyed the backing of
successive Indian governments in these efforts. Working directly
under the Prime Minister, the structure, rank, pay and perks of the
Research & Analysis Wing are kept secret from Parliament.”
|
|
Indian
External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh meets Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar in New Delhi, 31 May 2004
"... India trains Sri Lankan defence forces and said last October
it would send them equipment, without specifying what type. New
Delhi opposes Tamil rebel demands for a separate state in Sri Lanka,
a policy diplomats feel is aimed at discouraging the myriad of
separatist movements in India..."
|
|
Keep RAW Agents out of the Tamil
Homeland in Sri Lanka
-
Thanjai Nalankilli in Tamil
Tribune, 1 July 2004
"...A 'peace support'
conference was held in in Oslo, Norway in November 2002... More than
30 countries pledged seventy million US Dollars at the conference.
Notable absentee in the list of donors was India... (However) this
same Indian Government had given or loaned 'at favourable terms' 100
million US Dollars to the Sri Lankan Government, some of which was
used to build army barracks in Tamil areas. The Indian newspaper
Hindu, which is usually pro-Sri Lankan Government, called it
'India's indirect contribution to Sri Lanka's war effort'...Now
India wants to send construction crews to LTTE held Tamil
areas...Indian Government says that.. it would go to LTTE-controlled
areas to provide humanitarian assistance... (the) Reason is
staring at our face. India wants to send its spies (RAW agents and
others) into LTTE areas to identify strategic targets, LTTE camps,
weapons locations and the whereabouts of LTTE commanders and
leaders. Such information would be passed on to the Sri Lankan
military. It is well known that India provides information about
LTTE sea movements to the Sri Lankan Navy.
India will also attempt to recruit spies from among the local
population..."
|
|
Avtar Singh Bhasin, sometime Director, Historical Division, Indian
External Affairs Ministry in
"India in Sri Lanka – between the Lion and the Tigers", 1 November
2004
" Rajiv Gandhi wished to drive
home the point that the IPKF’s fight in Sri Lanka was for the unity
of India...There is little chance of any change coming about in the
decision making process in the LTTE so long as Prabhakaran heads the
organisation. And there is no chance of his being replaced in his
lifetime.."
|
|
Tsunami & the Killing of Pirapaharan! - New Delhi's RAW & its Media
Agents, 7 January 2005 |
|
யாழ்ப்பாணத்தில்
'றோ'வின் கண்கள்
New Delhi's RAW in Jaffna, 1 April 2005
"தமிழகத்தில்
இருந்து மூட்டைகட்டி வீடு வீடாக துணிகள் விற்பவர்கள் இங்கு களமிறங்கி
யுள்ளனர். இவர்கள் தமிழகத்திலிருந்து விமானம் வழியாக கொழும்புக்கும்
அங்கிருந்து விமானம் வழியாக யாழ் பாணத்துக்கும் வருகின்றனர்.
|
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India and the
Sri Lankan Peace Process - Lieutenant General (Retd.) V.R. Raghavan, 10
July 2005
"The role expected from India in the peace process would
be determined primarily by its interest in the security of Sri Lanka and
itself. This could not have been better expressed than by
Mr.Kadirgamar. He stated during the time of fierce battles around Jaffna
in the year 2000,
“ Indian policy on such a sensitive issue as the
current situation in Sri Lanka, would have to take into account the
complex issues of domestic and international concern to India and
her interests regarding its role in Sri Lanka.”
That wise judgment applies equally to the role India
would play in the peace process."
|
|
Sri Lanka: Taking Stock of
L.T.T.E. - Colonel (Retd) R. Hariharan, formerly of the Intelligence Corps
of the Indian Army, 29 July 2005
"..L.T.T.E. has taken full advantage of the
absence of a force to ensure the ceasefire terms are not
violated by carrying out selective assassinations that could
affect the Sri Lankan Security Force's capability to wage
war effectively. It has also increased its strength and
wartime capability by strengthening its sea and air
capabilities. Thus, it has emerged as the world's first (and
probably only) insurgent force with capability to fight on
land, sea and air. However, the organization is yet to
overcome the damage created by the defection of the
powerful eastern commander Karuna from its ranks. This
will weaken its negotiating strength as the sole
representative of Tamil people in the northeast. It will
also affect its military capability adversely in the east if
and when it has to resort to the military option. Therefore,
it will have to overcome Karuna and his followers before it
can resume negotiations from a position of strength..."
[see also
Pigs are Flying in Batticaloa!- Sachi Sri Kantha "....
the entire puppet show is
being run by the Indians (UNP, SLFP, JVP- on the Sinhalese side;
Karuna, Anandasangaree and other Tamil paramilitaries, on the Tamil
side). This is an open secret to all in Sri Lanka. So, now the only game
in town is LTTE (Eelam Tamils) vs Indian tentacles, namely - the
RAW.
Now, RAW has access to any place or any facility in Sri Lanka,
except in LTTE-controlled areas. Karuna cannot be (need not be) in
Sri Lanka. He is only a faceless phantom figure used by the Indians (and
Sinhalese) to break- up the Tamil solidarity, mainly the North and East
bond and linkage..."]
|
|
A Tribute to a Friend - Ashok
Mehta in the Pioneer, 23 August 2005
"(Government TV Channel) Rupavahini showed no British or American at
the state funeral, though the representatives of these governments were
doubtless present. Seated on President Kumaratunga's right was Prime
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse. On her left was Indian Defence Minister
Pranab Mukherjee and next to him, Foreign Minister Natwar Singh. India's
representation was a clear message to the LTTE as well as the
international community of Delhi's solidarity with Colombo...
(Kadirgamar) was for active intervention by India during the
standoff
at the
strategic Elephant Pass in 2000, the turning point in the battle for
the north by Sri Lankan security forces..."
|
|
Indian Commander visits Vavuniya SLA frontlines, 1 December 2005
"General
Officer Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command Lt. Gen. B.S. Thakker
Thursday visited the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) front lines in Vavuniya and
discussed with SLA Commanders matters related to security."
|
|
India clawing back to Sri Lanka's North East - M.R Narayan Swamy, 22
March 2006
"India is slowly, patiently and with a clear agenda finding its
way back into Sri Lanka's North East... .In just a year after
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran declared in Trincomalee that the
"North East is very close to India's heart", New Delhi is making its
presence felt again...Unlike in the 1980s when it was accused of
covertly arming Tamil guerrillas, India is maintaining a safe
distance from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which New
Delhi outlawed in 1992 on charges of killing Gandhi. The objective
this time is to reach out to the predominantly Tamil and Muslim
people of the northeast with development projects, which have the
full backing of the Sri Lankan government..."
|
Failed Efforts of Eelam
Tamils |
|
An
Independent Tamil Eelam will be a natural ally of India -Veluppillai
Thangavelu, 6 May 2000
"It is necessary for India at this crucial stage to identify
those fundamental Indian interests that will guarantee the security
of its southern flank against India’s enemies. Only an independent
Tamil Eelam will provide such guarantee at all times and under all
circumstances. The Tamil people are the natural allies of India
because of the cultural, religious and historical ties the Tamils
have with India. With Tamils of
Tamil Nadu
the relationship is that of mother and child’s umbilical cord. India
need not entertain fears that an independent Eelam will fuel
secessionist forces in Tamil Nadu..."
|
|
Caste/Class
Opposition to Tamil Eelam - Prof P. Ramasamy National University of
Malaysia, May 2000
"...The anti-LTTE crusade
mounted by the caste/class associations and establishments closely
linked to major magazines like the Frontline are basically below the
belt punchers...Hundreds and thousands of Tamils have been pushed
out of the country, killed, displaced and destroyed in the name of
maintaining the synthetic territorial integrity of an island that
has been never united or integrated in the first place. The forces
opposed to Eelam are basically driven by the desire to maintain
intact and indeed extend the hegemony of certain caste/class forces
not only in India but also in Sri Lanka.
Democratic and egalitarian social movements having roots in
subaltern and Dravidian philosophies are natural enemies of these
conservative and reactionary forces..."
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Think, India, Think
- Sanmugam Sabesan,16 January 2004
"...The Sri Lankan Tamils have had political as well as cultural
ties with India, especially South India, which dates backs thousands
of years. These ties continued even after India gained independence
from Britain. The relationship between Sri Lankan Tamils and India
peaked during Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s last tenure, due to her visionary
politics and her empathy towards the plight of the Sri Lankan
Tamils.
The relations soured after the Indo Sri Lanka Accord, which was
orchestrated as beneficial to the Sri Lankan Tamils, notwithstanding
their non-participation. The Rajiv Gandhi regime’s failure to
comprehend the Sri Lankan Tamil problem thoroughly and its lack of
long-term vision drove hasty decisions which brought pain and
destruction to all parties concerned. India would have reacted the
same way the Sri Lankan Tamils reacted, had a foreign power imposed
an accord like the Indo Sri Lanka Accord on itself. Therefore, any
right-minded person would see the justification behind the Sri
Lankan Tamil struggle against the imposition of the Indo Sri Lanka
accord.
Addressing the Remembrance Day event in London recently, the LTTE’s
Political Advisor and Chief Negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham,
stated, "We would not act in anyway prejudicial to India’s
geo-political, strategic and economic interests. We want to
establish friendly relations with the Government of India. As such
we are seeking a radical change in India’s attitude.."
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India’s Sri
Lanka Policy: Need For A Review - Ana Pararajasingham, 13
December 2004
“It appears evident, then, that the Indian State failed to take
the political force and mass appeal of Tamil nationalism seriously
If the violence and perfidy of the Sri Lankan State had given rise
to Tamil nationalism in the first place, the popular commitment to
Eelam was cemented and solidified by the Tamils bitter experience
with the Indian State. The current policy of supporting the unity
and integrity of Sri Lanka while not addressing the spectre of Tamil
nationalism will therefore have to be construed as a policy not much
different from that which resulted in the physical intervention by
India in support of Colombo. The question that needs to be asked is
how realistic is it for the Indian Government to persist with such a
policy when ground realities have changed significantly during the
intervening period."
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இந்தியாவும் ஈழத்தமிழர்களின்
சுயநிர்ணய போராட்டமும் – பேசாப்பொருளை பேச நான் துணிந்தேன் -
M.Thanpalasingham, 15 December 2004
"The Tamil people recognise that no people and no country can
live alone. One people’s independence should not impinge on the
existence of another people. The Tamil people of Eelam and the
Sinhala people are linked with India by geography, religion,
culture, language and history. Neither the Tamil nation nor the
Sinhala nation will in any way, be a hindrance or threat to India's
unity or to India’s geo political interests. On the contrary these
two nations will serve to strengthen and advance those interests.
The Tamil nation has never wavered in this desire..."
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