The ending of the cold war signalled also the end of India�s �non
aligned� world role. Today, instead of seeking to lead the non aligned in a
bipolar world, New Delhi aspires to be a �big power� in the emerging multi
polar world - with, possibly, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as
the badge of that status. India is going for gold.
Nowhere is India�s changed foreign policy stance, more self evident that
in relation to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. That should not come as
a surprise. After all, nuclear non pro-liferation is the major plank of US
foreign policy in the 1990s. The Gulf conflict showed that, if pushed, the
US was willing to go to war to stop nuclear �proliferation�. The recently
�leaked� Pentagon papers examining the strategic options that are open ,
says, clinically, that the US ��may be faced with the question of whether to
take military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass
destruction�� .
India has responded to US pressures to sign on the dotted line, by
continuing to insist that the NPT, is discriminatory, because the Treaty
divides the world into the nuclear haves and have-nots. But, though India�s
policy pre-dates the 1974 explosion of India�s nuclear "device" (said by
India to be for peaceful purposes, but reckoned by the outside world to have
been part of India�s nuclear-weapons programme), the nuances of New Delhi�s
approach have changed with the end of the cold war.
Now, whilst declaring that the NPT is discriminatory, India is also
letting it be known that it does not expect the big five powers (i.e. US,
UK, France, Russia & China, who as the victors of World War Two have
permanent seats on the UN Security Council and who in addition are the major
nuclear powers today) to disarm. Foreign Secretary J.N.Dixit declared
recently: �India does not expect the big five to disarm... If they did
disarm, any tin pot dictator with a couple of bombs could be a world power
�.
The implication was clear: Rather than tear up the NPT, India
wants to redefine the number of world powers to include itself. The cry
about nuclear haves and have nots is a negotiating chip to secure
admission to the �big power club� - once that is achieved, India will be
willing to sign the NPT.
Given this approach, of going for gold, India has been luke-warm towards
the proposal for five power talks, between India, Pakistan, the United
States, China and Russia, leading to a non nuclear pact between India and
Pakistan of the kind agreed by Ar-gentina and Brazil.
This proposal was initially made by Pakistan last year. It was then
�taken over� by the US and enthusiastically recommended to India by UK
Foreign Secretary Hurd. Whether the idea was origi-nally Pakistan�s alone
remains a moot point. India�s lukewarm re-sponse was for more than one
reason. It was not only that China is an acknowledged nuclear power and
Pakistan is, by India�s measure, ahead of India. (Some American officials
reckon it would take Pakistan 15 hours to assemble a bomb. There is no such
esti-mate for India. Reports that India has a number of bombs already
assembled are denied in Delhi.)
India�s General Sunith Francis Rodrigues� response to the Five Power
talks,( in an interview published in the Pioneer newspaper on March 14) was
blunt to the point of being rude: ��Washington was pressing India to
negotiate a regional accord against building nuclear arsenals. When you have
a regional grouping, what is the role of these three bandicoots? You have
two protagonists and three supervisors. Are they supervisors, are they
guarantors, or are they part of this whole arrangement?��
The India Abroad report of March 20 commented that the General was
�apparently referring to reports that the US, Russia and China might oversee
an anti nuclear pact between India and Pakistan.�� India�s Defence Minister,
Pawar who has aspirations to lead the country, was careful in his choice of
words to describe the General�s outburst :��I have discussed the matter with
the General.. I am satisfied with the General�s explanation. However I feel
that such interviews by serving officers are best avoided. I wish he had
resisted the temptation.��
It appears that multilateral talks of the kind proposed by Pakistan, US
and UK are a non starter - at any rate at this stage of the game play. It
seems that India�s negotiating ploy is to �talk about talks� whilst in the
meantime opening a security dialogue with the US to make the Indian region a
�nuclear safer" zone (not necessarily a nuclear free zone). Such a
�dialogue� it is said, will explore, on a bilateral basis, what the Bush
administration would expect of Pakistan, China and Russia if five power
talks were to begin. The very fact of such bilateral talks with the US will
help to raise New Delhi�s world status and give it greater space to
manoeuvre.
The process has to be taken step by step, says Dixit who spoke about
�a calibrated interaction� between India and the US. Some reports say that
Mr.Dixit, during his recent Washington visit, gave �mixed� signals. It was ,
perhaps, his way of managing and hopefully influencing the end results of
the �calibrated� inter-action with the US.
But �mixed signals� is ofcourse, a game at which two can play. When a
super power plays the game, it is usually called the carrot and stick
approach - a super power usually has a large number of carrots and sticks,
after all it is this which makes it a super power in the first instance. The
leaking of the first draft of the Pentagon Strategic Plan served the useful
purpose, whether intended or not, of letting New Delhi know something about
the �sticks� in the US armoury.
The statements in the leaked plan that the US " should discourage
Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the
Indian Ocean.�� and that ��with regard to Pakistan, a constructive
US-Pakistani military relationship will be an impor-tant element in US
strategy to promote stable security conditions in Southwest Asia and Central
Asia�� would not have gone unnoticed by Foreign Secretary Dixit.
That is not to say that, the US will not prefer to manage its
relationship with India without actual resort to force. Clearly, the US
would be willing to offer �carrots�, provided New Delhi �plays ball�. The
bottom line is that India should not become too big for its shoes. Closer
economic, and military ties may help to create what is called
euphemistically, an �atmosphere of mutual confidence - but which in truth
will all be a part of the �calibrated approach�.
Amongst other matters, the US will also be looking for movement from
India in respect of the vexed �intellectual property rights� question and
informed sources say that the dialogue with the Bush administration will
start in May in Delhi.
Again, the proposed joint naval exercises and additional IMF/World Bank
support in the coming months will further enable the two countries to
explore, in a measured, �calibrated� way, areas of cooperation.
Mr.Dixit , during his recent visit to Washington, was noticeably coy
about specifying the exact location of the joint naval exercises. ��Not in
the middle of the Indian Ocean, otherwise they will say too near and that it
is Indian hegemony. It is somewhere in the coastal area.��
He did not however say who might complain about Indian hegemony. Asked
whether such exercises were not contrary to India�s professed views that the
Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace, Dixit said: ��Why do we discuss in
speculation? Who is maintaining the peace there? The Americans, the
Russians, the Chinese submarines - so why do we go by nebulous concepts?��
The implication that the � holy cow � of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone was now
regarded as a �nebulous concept� was a signal that would have been duly
received in Washington and elsewhere.
New Delhi�s foreign policy has also not been unmindful of the warning
expressed in the leaked Pentagon plan, ��that if Pakistan is forsaken by the
US, it could become radicalized and also develop a closer reliance on either
Iran or China, or both for its security needs��.
India has recognised for sometime that to the extent it mends its fences
with China, the China-Pakistan axis will not solidify and this in turn will
give it greater flexibility to deal with its US relationship. The Brahmins
of the Indian foreign policy establishment have always prided themselves
about the sophisticated nature of their thinking.
It is reported that India�s talks with China on the border dispute
between the two countries have been proceeding well. Both sides realise that
demarcation of the border is not going to be achieved quickly but each has
its own interest in improving relations. So they will concentrate on issues
that can be dealt with easily, such as trade and better political relations.
The overall improvement will eventually help to resolve the border issue
says Dixit. It seems clear that this will consist of small adjustments to
the existing line of control. The future of Tibet may well be an item for a
horse deal at an appropriate stage.
But for India to aspire to Big Power status is one thing. To achieve it
is another. The Big Five are not about to freely give away their dominant
position. It is true that as the US begins to use the United Nations as a
suitable and convenient vehicle (as it did in the case of the Gulf War) to
secure �common� objectives, it will become increasingly difficult to resist
pressures from Japan and Germany for permanent seats on the UN Security
Council and a UN voice in determining those �common� objectives.
But, India does not have the economic clout of either Germany or
Japan. It may seek to use its nuclear power - in - waiting status to
find a place at the High Table. But there are many nuclear
powers-in-waiting including North Korea, South Africa, South Korea,
Brazil, Argentina and Iran, not to mention Ukraine and Kazakhastan.
However, even apart from the external constraints, India�s central
problem is internal. Even with, say, US support, Narasimha Rao may end up
becoming a Gorbachev - a powerless spectator of a disintegrating Indian
Union. It is not that the US seeks the disintegration of the Indian Union.
US preference would be for an undivided but manageable India just as much as
its preference was for an undivided but manageable Soviet Union - or for
that matter, an undivided but weak Iraq. But the US probably recognises
that, in the longer term, it cannot disregard the political force generated
by struggles for national self determination - increasingly so, as the
decade unfolds.
The political reality is that the peoples of India are as different from
one another as, for instance, the peoples of Europe. Whilst it is true that
they share a common heritage, it will be idle to pretend that the separate
national identities of the Indian Union will not grow and solidify in the
years ahead. The opening out of the Indian economy will hasten this process
rather than diminish it.
In 1977, President J.R.Jayawardene opened out the Sri Lanka economy and
it was thought that the separate national identities of the Tamil people and
the Sinhala people, would somehow disappear in the melting pot of private
enterprise and the free market. But the opposite happened. National
aspirations are usually reinforced by �economic freedom�. In the third
world, the free market �pot� is not big enough for thousands of years old
�ethnic identities� to melt.
US policy towards New Delhi
will be influenced by its recognition that whatever may be the short term
calibrated �adjustments�, in the longer term, stability will be achieved in
the Indian region only on the basis of some sort of confederal union of the
separate nations of the sub continent. It may therefore seek to build up
influence within struggles for national self determination both as a way of
monitoring and managing them and also as a useful addition to its armoury in
managing New Delhi. It is within this matrix of power balances that any
national liberation struggle in the Indian region would have to adopt its
own calibrated approach, both towards New Delhi and Washington.