Norwegian Peace Initiative
Sri Lanka Peace Process: Role of the International Community
Jayantha Dhanapala,
Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process
& Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka Caucus: US Congressional Briefing, 8 September 2005
"A Sri Lanka caucus was formed in the House
of Representatives in 1998. The caucus seems to be a cheerleader for the Sri
Lankan government, and it periodically issues statements praising the
government and condemning the LTTE. These statements, which often bear
little resemblance to reality in the country, appear in the headlines of
Colombo�s newspapers the next day..."
Miriam Young, Executive director
of the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace and the coordinator of the
U.S. NGO Forum on Sri Lanka, 2000
Comment by tamilnation.org:
"Mr.Dhanapala's wide ranging Briefing to the US Congress Sri Lanka
Caucus merits attention notwithstanding Miriam Young's characterisation of
the Caucus as a 'cheer leader for the Sri Lankan government'. The briefing
merits attention for more reasons than one. For one thing,
Mr.Dhanapala's appointment as Secretary General of the Sri Lanka Peace
Secretariat was welcomed by the opposition United National Party and had its
support. For another, the briefing is of interest not only for that which
Mr.Dhanapala said but also for that which he did not say. It is not without
significance that in a Briefing on 'Sri Lanka Peace Process: Role of
the International Community' Mr.Dhanapala (unlike
Ms. Teresita Schaffer) makes no explicit reference to
India.
Thank you for the privilege of addressing
this Congressional gathering.
It is a pleasure to be
back in Washington, DC - a city I first visited as an 18
year old and where later I served six and a half years as a
professional diplomat including a term as Ambassador of Sri
Lanka.
I am here today at a sad and sombre time for
both our countries. I would like to express my deep sympathy
and sincere solidarity with the people of the United States
and especially with those in Louisiana, Alabama and
Mississippi, who have experienced death and destruction due
to hurricane Katrina. In my own country, the
Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26th last year took over
thirty thousand lives, displaced one million people and
caused enormous destruction to infrastructure, property and
livelihoods.
Sri Lanka is yet recovering from this
natural disaster of unprecedented magnitude, but the task of
recovery and reconstruction has been made easier by the
assistance so generously provided by the international
community, including the government and people of the USA.
In our own modest way Sri Lanka has made a
donation to the victims of Katrina as a gesture symbolizing
a spontaneous bonding between peoples in humanitarian crises
as well as the close and traditional ties between two
democracies.
I am here to speak to you on the �Sri
Lanka Peace Process and the Role of the International
Community�, at a crucial moment in Sri Lanka�s peace
process, less than a month after the premeditated and
diabolically planned assassination of Sri Lanka�s former
Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, which on the basis of
the investigations carried so far, unmistakably points to
the culpability of the LTTE.
Evidence so far gathered shows that days
prior to the assassination LTTE cadres were apprehended
carrying out surveillance on the Minister�s private
residence, the accomplices of the assassins were carefully
cultivated at different layers of the organization, duress
had been used to force them to cooperate and that in May
2005 they had travelled to Kilinochchi and met the LTTE
hierarchy including one Charles - an intelligence chief of
the LTTE responsible for operations in the south of Sri
Lanka.
Let me begin with the Government of Sri
Lanka�s (GOSL�s) policy in relation to the peace process and
its engagement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) before the assassination of Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar.
That policy has had elements of continuity through the two
decades of conflict, spanning changes of government through
democratic elections. More recently, a firm commitment to
the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002 with its
Nordic-staffed monitoring mission; the objective of a
politically negotiated solution; the retention of the Royal
Norwegian Government as the facilitator; adherence to the
principles of the Oslo Decision of 2 December 2002, where
the GOSL and the LTTE signed an agreement to explore a
solution based on a federal structure within a united Sri
Lanka; the Tokyo Declaration; and the infrastructural
support of the Peace Secretariat, were the elements of
continuity between the previous United National Front
Government and the United People�s Freedom Alliance
Government elected in April 2004.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala's assertion about 'elements
of continuity' between the previous United National
Front Government and the United People�s Freedom
Alliance Government elected in April 2004 appears
to fly in the face of the facts.
On
1 March 2002,
in a letter
to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, President
Kumaratunga complained that she was not properly
consulted before Wickremesinghe committed the Colombo
government to a ceasefire with the LTTE.
Additionally she criticised the powers given to Norway
through a monitoring mission to demarcate "lines of
control" within Sri Lanka that would separate
government-held areas and rebel-held areas - and this
was a matter that went to the root of the Cease Fire
Agreement.
Again,
On 1 November 2003, the European Union welcomed the
ISGA proposals (submitted by the LTTE) as "an
important step forward in the peace process".
The US Embassy in Colombo declared that it " has
taken note of the LTTE's delivery of counterproposals
made in response to the Sri Lankan Government's interim
administration proposal for the North and East" and
urged "both parties to build on this step by
resuming negotiations in a timely manner..."
But, President
Kumaratunga's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)
rejected the
ISGA proposals and on 4 November 2003,
within days of the LTTE proposal, the President in
the exercise of powers vested in her under the 1978
constitution took over from the UNF government which
enjoyed a majority in Parliament, the Ministries of
Defense, Interior and Media, which were directly linked
to the peace process, and assigned the portfolios
either to herself or to nominees from within her party.
The actions of President Kumaratunga
resulted in the facilitator, the Norwegian Government
suspending its role in November 2003, in view of the
lack of clarity in regard to who was responsible for the
peace process.
By using the felicitous phrase 'elements
of continuity', Mr. Dhanapala seeks to gloss over
the fundamental issue that has confronted conflict
resolution in the island of Sri Lanka for the past
several decades - an issue which Professor
Marshall Singer pointed out ten years ago to the
US Congress Committee on International Relations
-
"...One of the essential
elements that
must
be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic
conflict is that, since 1958 at least, every time Tamil
politicians negotiated some sort of power-sharing deal
with a Sinhalese government - regardless of which party
was in power - the opposition Sinhalese party always
claimed that the party in power had negotiated away too
much. In almost every case - sometimes within days - the
party in power backed down on the agreement..."
It is a view
reiterated by Professor Neil Devotta, ten years later in
From ethnic
outbidding to ethnic conflict: the institutional bases
for Sri Lanka's separatist war -
"...Beginning in the mid-1950s Sri Lanka's politicians
from the majority Sinhalese community resorted to
ethnic outbidding
as a means to attain power and in doing so
systematically marginalised the country's minority
Tamils...parties in power seek to promote dubious
conflict resolution only to be checkmated by the
respective opposition which typically claims that the
proposed solutions are bound to eventually dismember the
island.."
At the same time engagement with the LTTE
was based on the expectation that this militant group would
abandon the terrorism and violence of the past and would
gradually move into the democratic mainstream in the same
way as other groups including minority Tamil rebel groups
had done in Sri Lanka and other groups elsewhere in the
world, have done.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala obfuscates when he fails to
draw a distinction between violence and terrorism. The
war on Iraq was a violent act but (whatever its
legitimacy) it was not by itself an act of terror.
Admittedly, a resort to arms must be truly a last
resort. The question is when is enough, enough? After
the
Sinhala pogrom against the Tamils in 1958, Tarzie
Vittachi, a distinguished Sinhala journalist with an
international reputation asked: "What are we left
with? A nation in ruins, some grim lessons which we
cannot afford to forget and a momentous question: Have
the Sinhalese and Tamils reached the parting of ways?"
Forty seven years later, Mr.Dhanapala and the Government
he represents may also want to consider the conclusion
reached by Paul Sieghart Q.C. in his Report
of a Mission to Sri Lanka on behalf of the International
Commission of Jurists in March1984 - "..
Communal riots in which Tamils are killed, maimed,
robbed and rendered homeless are no longer isolated
episodes; they are beginning to become a pernicious
habit." [see
1958,
1961,
1974,
1977 and
1983]
Here the views expressed
by
UNESCO International Conference of Experts, Barcelona in
1998 may also be
helpful -
"...In all regions of the
world conflicts turn violent over the desire for full
control by state governments, on the one hand, and
claims to
self-determination (in a broad sense) by peoples,
minorities or other communities, on the other. Where
governments recognise and respect the right to
self-determination, a people can effectuate it in a
peaceful manner. Where governments
choose to use force to crush or prevent the
movement, or where they attempt to
impose assimilationist policies against the wishes
of a people, this polarises demands and generally
results in armed conflict. The Tamils, for example,
were not seeking independence and were not using
violence in the 1970s. The government response
to further deny the Tamil people equal expression of
their distinct identity led to armed confrontation
and a war of secession..."
Mr.Dhanapala's glib
reference to the 'democratic mainstream' raises
questions which any person truly concerned with
progressing the peace process will need to confront -
and not simply paper over. What is the 'democratic
mainstream' towards which the LTTE should 'gradually
move'? Rule by a permanent ethnic majority within
the confines of an unitary state is no 'democratic'
mainstream.
The fifty year record in Sri Lanka shows the
consequences of that 'democratic' rule. Mr.Dhanapala
and the Government he seeks to serve with distinction
may want to meaningfully address
the concerns expressed by
Professor Margaret Moore in 2001:
"...One of the most
pressing problems in societies with severe divisions and
this may be true of ethnic, linguistic, religious,
national or ideological divisions is the problems that
they pose for normal electoral (democratic)
politics...In this situation, the basic conditions for
responsible democracy are not met. ... in a
well�functioning democracy, the outvoted minority will
respect the majority decision in the expectation that,
at some later time, they will be part of a winning
coalition and will require minority compliance. ...
(and) a majority will tend to refrain from upsetting the
minority because they anticipate that they will be in
need of majority self-restraint when they are converted
to minority status .. This dynamic does not occur in a
state in which
different national communities consistently vote for
nationally aligned parties - there is no
outlet for minority disaffection; there is no moderating
influence on minority demands; and no mechanisms, at
least internal to the democratic system, to prevent the
majority from oppressing the minority..."
Consequently confidence building measures
were unilaterally pursued by the GOSL without demanding any
reciprocal gestures. Interaction with foreign governments by
the LTTE was encouraged in the hope that this exposure would
broaden the thinking of a group wedded to a weapon-based
culture.
Comment:
Here, it appears that Mr.Dhanapala chooses to be
economical with the truth. The
CFA
did provide
reciprocal steps in confidence building at each
progressive step in time. The failure of Sri Lanka to
implement that which was agreed, remains a bone of
contention between the signatories to the CFA. Again the
international community is well aware that the
LTTE interaction with foreign governments took place
not with Sri Lanka's 'encouragement' but with its
reluctant acquiescence.
The Kadirgamar assassination is the worst of
a series of ceasefire violations. It is the most high
profile assassination since the ceasefire came into force
and is no doubt an outrage and a grave setback to the peace
process.
Comment:
What is high profile and what is 'most high profile'
will ofcourse remain a matter of opinion.
Mr.Dhanapala's remarks may have had a more balanced ring
if he had referred to the UN Secretary General's
condemnation of the killing of E.Kaushalyan, who played
a role no less important for the people living in
the NorthEast than that of Lakshman Kadirgamar for those
in the Sinhala South.
"The
UN Secretary-General condemns the killings of Mr. E.
Kaushalyan, (8 February 2005) a senior political
leader of the LTTE Eastern Province Division, and
several colleagues travelling with him, when their
vehicle came under attack yesterday evening. He extends
his sincere condolences and deepest sympathies to the
families of all the victims of these callous killings.
The Secretary-General urges all parties to exercise calm
and restraint so as to avoid actions that could disrupt
the Cease-fire Agreement of February 2002 or the
long-term interest of peace in Sri Lanka."
Not much may be gained at
the present time by considering whether the murder of
E.Kaushalyan was 'an outrage and a grave set back to the
peace process'. However, the fact that the LTTE
continued with the ceasefire despite that killing may be
of some significance.
It is also one of hundreds of killings
carried out by the LTTE after the CFA was signed, as part of
its unabated policy to eliminate all political dissent.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala allegation of 'hundreds' of killings does
not appear to be founded on evidence of any kind. The
use of hyperbole does not advance reason. Be that as it
may, it may be helpful if Mr.Dhanapala had commented on
the views widely held in Sri Lanka that its intelligence
agencies (with the help of India's RAW, amongst others)
have sought to secure intelligence of LTTE activities
with a view to undermining the armed strength of the
LTTE -
an armed strength which led to the ceasefire
and which also serves to underpin the peace process.
Here, we have in mind the matters stated in
யாழ்ப்பாணத்தில் 'றோ'வின் கண்கள்
and the remarks of S.Sivakumaran in
Pigs are Flying in Batticaloa! -
"....
the entire puppet show is being run by the Indians
(UNP, SLFP, JVP- on the Sinhalese side; Karuna,
Anandasangaree and other Tamil paramilitaries, on the
Tamil side). This is an open secret to all in Sri Lanka.
So, now the only game in town is LTTE (Eelam Tamils) vs
Indian tentacles, namely - the
RAW.
Now, RAW has access to any place or any facility in
Sri Lanka, except in LTTE-controlled areas. Karuna
cannot be (need not be) in Sri Lanka. He is only a
faceless phantom figure used by the Indians (and
Sinhalese) to break- up the Tamil solidarity, mainly the
North and East bond and linkage. .."
Democratic Tamil leaders such as Mr. A.
Amirthalingam former leader of the TULF and Dr. Neelan
Tiruchelvam, TULF M.P., and Human Rights Activist, who were
seen by the LTTE as traitors or opponents of their cause
were eliminated. While the LTTE is internationally notorious
for their signature style of political killings - the
suicide bomber - it is not their only modus operandi for
carrying out assassinations. Pistol gangs and snipers are
also part of their tactical repertoire.
Comment: That
Mr.Dhanapala should seek to explain away the
uncomfortable fact that a suicide bomber was not
involved in the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar is
understandable - understandable in the context of his
desire to implicate the LTTE. But Mr.Dhanapala would
know that pistol gangs and snipers are part of the
political culture of
Democracy, Sri Lanka Style
in the South.
"...The progressive
destruction of the political process in Sri Lanka has
led to both domestic and international tolerance of an
enormous amount of violence by the government
(regardless of party affiliation) against its citizens.
Increasingly, it seems that the government of Sri Lanka
is accountable to no one - not its citizens, and not its
foreign counterparts who rubber-stamped the recent
parliamentary elections. In Sri Lanka's current
political climate, power seems to be determined by the
number of thugs a given politician has at his/her
disposal..."
Sri Lanka's Elections 2000: Fear and Intimidation Rule
the Day - An Observer's Report - Laura Gross
Investigations into the assassination of Mr.
Kadirgamar so far have clearly established a direct link to
the LTTE. The GOSL will act expeditiously to conclude
investigations, apprehend those responsible and bring them
to justice.
Comment: Again,
Mr.Dhanapala's anxiety to condemn is understandable. But
by so doing, he denies due process and the rule of law
to those who may be accused. This is more so because the
record shows that the Sri Lanka judiciary has been
singularly amenable to bowing to political pressure.
Despite this dastardly act, the GOSL will
continue to adhere to and respect the CFA. As a responsible
democratic government committed to the rule of law and human
rights, the GOSL does not want to plunge the country back
into armed conflict.
 Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala's statement about Sri Lanka's commitment
'to the rule of law and human rights' is ofcourse
welcome. More so, because
the
record
shows the gross and consistent violation of the rights
of the Tamil people, by the Sri Lankan government and
its agencies during the past several decades, including
grave breaches of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the
Genocide Convention, and the
Geneva Conventions relating to the
humanitarian law of armed conflict. The whole is a
chilling chronology of
discrimination,
arbitrary arrest and detention,
torture,
extra judicial killings and massacres,
mass graves,
indiscriminate aerial bombardment and artillery
shelling,
wanton rape,
impunity, and
genocide.
The CFA has saved countless lives and
prevented the wanton destruction of property. It has
facilitated the movement of people, goods and services from
the North and the East to the South and vice versa. Despite
reports to the contrary, it has brought about a peace
dividend for people particularly in the North and the East.
But after the Kadirgamar assassination it cannot be business
as usual.
Comment: For more
than 15 months before the Kadirgamar assassination, the
Sri Lanka government failed to implement the
provisions of the CFA. That was business as usual.
Again, though the
Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE signed Post-Tsunami
Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)
Agreement on 24 June 2005, within a couple of weeks
President Kumaratunge requested that
Article 7 of the
signed agreement
dealing with the Regional Fund be amended. The agreement
provided for the government and the LTTE to appoint a
suitable multilateral agency to be the custodian of the
Regional Fund. However, the President wanted that the
Sri Lanka Treasury be nominated as the custodian of the
Regional Fund. A few days after the President's request,
the
Supreme Court obliged by staying the implementation
of the clause which the President had wanted amended.
We are therefore engaged in a policy review,
which we would like to share with the international
community and seek cooperation in its implementation.
Comment: Many will
take the view that Sri Lanka seeks a policy review
because it has been thwarted in its efforts to use
the CFA as a cover to infiltrate and undermine the armed
strength of the LTTE. Here,
the views expressed by D.Sivaram in 2000 are not
irrelevant:
"Sri Lanka is easily the
only country in the world to fight its insurgency with
the undivided support of the international community,
the backing of all the important nations across the
global political spectrum. It is the most advantageous
external environment that any country may have ever had
in fighting an insurgency. And yet something is
obviously going wrong. There are three reasons that may
be attributed to the apparent failure of western counter
insurgency - CI - methods in Sri Lanka....Firstly,
the LTTE has developed over the years a fairly
sophisticated counter-counter insurgency system.
Secondly, it has consistently focused its resources on
building a conventional force and on preserving the
minimum required territory to sustain such a force. And
thirdly it never lets itself be inveigled or coerced
into the political space that is so necessary for
diluting and mystifying the basic cause fuelling the
insurgency..."
The areas in which we think policy review is
necessary are:
The more effective functioning of the
CFA
Ensuring the practice of democratic freedoms by
all Tamils and Muslims in the LTTE dominated areas of
the North and the East
A serious effort to stop child
recruitment by the LTTE
The urgent need to address
human rights issues involved in ceasefire violations
The continuation of development and humanitarian
assistance to the people of the North and the East
The urgent need for sanctions by the international
community for persistent violations of the CFA
In all of these areas, we seek the
understanding and active co-operation of the international
community in general and the USA in particular.
(a) Reviewing the CFA
There is, first of all, a
need to review the functioning of the CFA that is now far
more urgent than before. In the aftermath of the
assassination, the President of Sri Lanka wrote to the Prime
Minister of Norway, requesting �an urgent meeting between
the government and the LTTE�. to review the practical
functioning of the ceasefire with a view to preventing
further killings and other violations".
The GOSL has been calling for a review of
the implementation of the CFA for quite sometime, a request
endorsed by the SLMM but steadfastly resisted by the LTTE
until they found it expedient to divert the recent outrage
and opprobrium expressed by the international community in
the aftermath of the Kadirgamar assassination by agreeing to
these talks.
The GOSL expectation is that these talks will be
technical level discussions between representatives of the
armed forces of the government on the one part and the LTTE
on the other on the practical functioning of the CFA with a
view to preventing further killings. I have just been
informed that the LTTE has rejected a Norwegian proposal
that the talks be held at the Bandaranaike International
Airport, which the government had accepted.
Comment:
"We consider the Sri Lankan government's
insistence on holding future peace talks in Sri Lanka
and not abroad is with a view to sever the rapport the
LTTE has built up with the international community,"
Mr.Thamilchelvan -
An embodiment of antimony - Thamilchelvan on
Kumaratunga's speeches in New York
(b) Democratic freedoms
The
GOSL also recognizes that in the long run a mere review of
the CFA may not be sufficient to halt violations of the CFA.
According to statistics maintained by the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, which monitors the CFA, up to August
2005 the LTTE has a record of 3113 violations of the CFA as
against 141 by the Government, which represents a ratio of
22 to 1.
Comment:
Here D.Sivaram's remarks in
War Remains an Option Three Years After Cease-fire
may be helpful.
"Trying to score points
over each other at this juncture with SLMM statistics is
an absolutely futile exercise. The number of violations
has nothing to do with the stability of the ceasefire
because there is a conventional fighting force on either
side of the line of control as defined by the CFA. When
and why these two forces would go to war is a strictly
centralized decision of their respective leaderships and
has nothing to do with the manner in which the CFA is
violated. SLMM's ceasefire statistics do not tell us
anything about war and peace. If the army says the LTTE
has committed greater violations, then Tigers would
say that the military has not fulfilled its pledges to
vacate all public buildings, homes etc., and disarm
paramilitaries." And
Mr.Dhanapala may have usefully addressed
the matters raised by the LTTE with Head of the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) on 15 July 2005
-
".. the CFA contains within it time
frames stipulating moving away of the military from
occupied positions in places of worship, schools and
densely populated habitats and public buildings paving a
way for restoration of normalcy. (Time frames which have
not been kept by Sri Lanka) It is relevant to remind the
Secretary General (of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat)
that it is on the acknowledgement of the ground reality
of two power positions and territories being
administered under their respective control, that the
CFA has been formulated..."
I would like to highlight for you the
qualitative nature of these violations. Political killings
are merely a symptom of LTTE�s intolerance of dissent. The
basic right to express one�s opinion, to associate, to
engage in political activity, to vote freely - are the
foundations of a democracy. More than three years after the
CFA it does not appear that the LTTE is able to change and
accept the imperative for democratization and the fact that
it is not the �sole representative of the Tamil people�.
Similarly, more than three years after the
CFA, Tamil people, or the representatives of the Tamil
political parties, who express independent opinions or
engage in political activity outside the framework laid down
by the LTTE are still on a death sentence. In contrast, the
CFA in Art. 1.13 allows LTTE cadres to engage in political
work in GOSL controlled areas and the GOSL has also
recognized LTTE�s right to set up political offices in these
areas. International pressure on the LTTE is needed to allow
other parties to conduct political activities in LTTE
controlled areas.
Comment: The
real question that may need to be explored carefully is whether Sri Lanka's
intelligence agencies have been operating under cover of the ceasefire and
whether the LTTE was right when
it pointed out in August 2005 that "five Tamil paramilitary armed
groups, including the Karuna group, are being paid and provided with
logistic support by the Sri Lanka security forces in a covert military
campaign" to destabilise the Eastern province and to paralyse the LTTE�s
political engagement in the region." If this be the case, the so called
'political killings' may not be a 'symptom of LTTE�s intolerance of dissent'
but its intolerance of Sri Lanka funded intelligence operatives. There may
be a need for the evidence to be sifted and examined in an objective manner.
Mr.Dhanapala may also want to pay attention to the
statement of the co chairs to the peace process (US, Japan and the EU)
on 19 July 2005 -
�The Sri Lankan government, in accordance
with the Ceasefire Agreement, must ensure that all paramilitary groups are
disarmed and prevented from any activity that might lead to acts of
violence. The government must also guarantee the security of unarmed LTTE
cadres in government controlled areas�
(c) Child Combatants
A majority of CFA violations
(54%) relate to child recruitment, in blatant disregard of the undertaking the
LTTE has given to the United Nations in 1998 and the UNICEF Action Program of
mid 2003.
On the question of child recruitment, the Sri Lankan
government welcomes the UN Security Council Resolution 1612(2005), which
establishes a monitoring and reporting mechanism on the use of child soldiers,
and will work closely with UNICEF to give effect to this resolution.
Comment: Here, the
comments of the International Red Cross in its Introduction to the
Geneva Conventions Optional Protocol (which requires that armed groups may
not recruit persons under the age of 18 years) are not without
relevance -
"..The ICRC welcomes the fact that the issue
of non-state actors has been included in the Optional Protocol, but regrets
that the provision imposes a moral, as opposed to a legal obligation.
Although Article 4 also provides for criminal prosecution under domestic
law, this is likely to be of limited effect, because those who take up arms
against the lawful Government of a country already expose themselves to the
most severe penalties of domestic law, and because the capacity of a
Government to enforce its laws is often very limited in situations of
non-international armed conflicts. Third, it is uncertain whether
non-state actors will feel bound by a norm which is different from that
imposed on States, and thus whether it will be respected..."
There is a further complicating factor. The
LTTE is not simply an armed group. It also administers civil institutions in
a de facto state in control of a demarcated area recognised by the
CFA.
Ms.Virginia Judge MP from Australia stated recently -
"... I observed that in a remarkable three
year period the Tamils developed a virtual state within the north and
north-east of Sri Lanka.I visited their judiciary and court, school of law,
police station, police academy, medical and technical colleges and small
industries, a community bank plus a children's home housing 278 children
left orphaned by the war and the recent tsunami. The
Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) runs a variety of development, relief
and reconstruction projects as well as
assisting
several non-government organisations with their projects. All this is a
tribute to the spirit and resilience of the Tamil people..."
A question that may have to be examined is
whether recruitment of those under 18 by the LTTE is for its armed forces or
whether those under 18 are employed in the various institutions of the de
facto state such as the judiciary and court, school of law, police station,
police academy, medical and technical colleges and small industries.
(d) Human Rights
These
violations, whether they are political killings or child
recruitment, are carried out with impunity even in the face
of international condemnation as there are no sanctions
against such violations. The SLMM as conceived in the CFA
has a �naming and shaming� role. Furthermore, given that a
majority of CFA violations fall into the category of
violations of a human rights nature, rather than of a
military nature, the SLMM is inadequately equipped to deal
with such violations, as they are mainly staffed by
personnel with a military/police background.
There
is also now a consensus emerging among civil society in Sri
Lanka that a separate human rights agreement may be
necessary to stem the tide of human rights violations by the
LTTE. Human rights missions in El Salvador and Guatemala
demonstrate the crucial role of promoting and protecting
human rights in rebuilding trust and fostering a climate of
reconciliation after an armed conflict. In Guatemala the
human rights verification mission (MINUGUA) was deployed in
1994, two years in advance of the final peace agreement
signed by the Government and the Opposition. The National
Peace Accord was signed in South Africa September 1991, long
before agreement was reached on a new constitution for SA.
 Comment:
Many Tamils will be heartened by Mr.Dhanapala's
concern about impunity. Heartened because of the
impunity enjoyed by Sri Lanka's security forces
during the past several years despite condemnation
by innumerable human rights organisations - and despite
persistent 'naming and shaming'.
As recently as October
2004,
Amnesty International called on the Sri Lankan
Government to prosecute security forces responsible for
disappearances in Sri Lanka. The situation has
not changed since Amnesty 'named and shamed' in 1996 -
"The People's Alliance (PA) government has repeatedly
proclaimed its commitment to human rights since it came
to power in August 1994 and has introduced a number of
safeguards to prevent torture and 'disappearances'.
However, the Amnesty
International delegation found that these grave
violations of human rights are continuing...
Amnesty International is concerned that the government
is not living up to its stated commitment to human
rights. Despite lobbying by local and international
human rights organizations, including the Human Rights
Committee and the United Nations (UN) Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the
government refuses to amend provisions in several laws
which fall far short of international standards and
continue to facilitate torture, death in custody,
"disappearances" and extrajudicial executions... "
Clearly human rights is
of vital importance and it appears that it was in
recognition of that importance that the
Northeast Secretariat of Human Rights
was established in August 1984 to monitor human
rights violations and implement actions to strengthen
human rights in the NorthEast. Mr.Dhanapala's failure to
inform the Congress Sri Lanka Caucus of the work
of NESHOR accords with the general tenor of his address.
In Sri Lanka, it was understood that the
process of negotiations for a solution to the armed conflict
will be a long one, before ultimate human rights commitments
are agreed upon and included as part of constitutional
arrangements. But the need to address human rights issues in
the interim was recognized by both parties during the fourth
and fifth rounds of the peace talks. Accordingly, the two
parties agreed to invite Mr. Ian Martin to act as an
international human rights advisor and to draw up a road map
on human rights issues relating to the peace process, which
could form an agreement between the two parties.
However, with the unilateral suspension of the peace talks
in April 2003, it has not been able to make any progress on
the road map.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala is yet again economical with truth.
Sometimes to be silent is also to lie. Mr.Dhanapala
omits to mention that the LTTE submitted its ISGA
proposal in November 2003 and that it was
the actions
of President Kumaratunga that resulted in the
facilitator, the Norwegian Government suspending its
role in November 2003.
The
Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister declared on 14
November 2003 " Peace
talks could have started tomorrow, provided there
was clarity about who is holding political authority and
responsibility on behalf of the Government to ensure the
continuation of the ceasefire agreement and the
resumption of peace negotiations. Until last week there
was such clarity. Today there is no such clarity. Until
such clarity is re-established, there is no space for
further efforts by the Norwegian government to assist
the parties."
Mr. Ian Martin is expected to visit Sri
Lanka again this year, and it is our hope that we will be
able to recommence the discussion relating to addressing
human rights as a matter of priority as the continuation of
these violations will seriously jeopardize the future of our
peace process.
The GOSL has also commenced a
dialogue with the UN on the issue of addressing human rights
within the peace process. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special
Advisor to the SG was in Sri Lanka just before my departure
to the US to discuss a possible UN role in this regard.
This discussion on the CFA and its limitations has, I
believe, already highlighted the considerable role played by
the international community in the peace process in Sri
Lanka and the potential for other actors. The Royal
Norwegian Government, which facilitated the CFA in 2001,
continues to act as the facilitator and the CFA is monitored
by the Nordic staffed SLMM. Other international actors have
also supported Sri Lanka�s peace process through economic
assistance and a variety of diplomatic tools.
Comment:
Mr.Dhanapala refers to 'the considerable role played by
the international community in the peace process in Sri
Lanka and the potential for other actors' though
he does not name these 'other actors'. Who are these
'other actors' i.e. other than the so called
'international community'?
In a statement on 21 August 2005, the leader of the
JVP, Mr.Somawansa Amarasinghe emphasised that by
"International Community" he means 'western powers' and
not India - and it is to this "International
Community" that he appeals, when he urges that 'the
international community must support us in (our)
legitimate self- defence'. Whether Mr.Dhanapala
subscribes to this usage is not altogether clear.
The report in the Hindustan Times on 25 August 2005
may be helpful in this regard -
"According to sources, the Indian
leaders expressed concern about the "over
internationalisation" of the Sri Lankan peace process.
... New Delhi is said to be unhappy with the performance
of the "co-chair" of the June 2003 Tokyo Aid Lanka
conference. The co-chair (US, EU, Japan and Norway) have
arrogated to themselves a role not assigned to them.
They style themselves as the "international community"
and strut about as the "co-chair of the Sri Lankan peace
process". India feels that they have been pampering the
LTTE a bit too much and have been ineffective..."
(e) Development and Humanitarian
Assistance
The international community has provided enormous
support to the peace process in Sri Lanka through economic
assistance to rebuild the North and the East affected by the
armed conflict. Since the CFA was signed, international
donor conferences were held in Oslo and Tokyo, as well as a
preparatory meeting in Washington to mobilize political and
economic support for the peace process. At the Tokyo Donor
Conference held in June 2003, the international community
pledged $4.5 billion to support the GOSL's efforts to
address the immediate and long-term needs of the
conflict-affected North and the East. The US, EU, Norway and
Japan, which were named Co-Chairs to the Tokyo Donor
Conference, have continued to meet to monitor progress in
Sri Lanka�s peace process.
The Government through
the Ministry of RRR has been delivering this international
humanitarian and development assistance to the affected
people of the North and the East, including those in the
uncleared areas of Mullaitivu and Killinochchi. I am happy
to say that this work has been done with the cooperation of
the LTTE, and as I mentioned earlier, people in the North
and the East have therefore benefited from the ceasefire,
through a peace dividend. Let me now identify some of the
very specific programmes being undertaken in the North and
the East, since the ceasefire was signed.
The RRR Ministry with donor assistance is at present
implementing an impressive number of projects, which include resettlement of
internally displaced persons and assistance to host communities, rehabilitation
of basic physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation programmes, power,
and communication facilities as well as rebuilding of social and communal
services such as health, education, sanitation and judicial services. The CFA
has also enabled the return of a large number of refugees mainly from India.
The demining efforts undertaken by the Government together with NGO�s have
facilitated this resettlement of IDP�s as well as reconstruction and
rehabilitation work in the North and the East. Consequent to the ceasefire
agreement, a comprehensive programme for demining is being coordinated and
implemented by the GOSL during the last 2 years. We are particularly
appreciative of the role of the U.S. in this programme.
Perhaps as a
direct result of these efforts, GDP in the Northern and the Eastern Provinces
has shown remarkable growth. According to research done by the Economic Affairs
Division of my office, the highest GDP growth rates during the post-CFA period
are in the Northern Province (12.6% per annum) and in the Eastern Province
(10.1% per annum.), in contrast to other provinces in Sri Lanka. The engine of
growth in the North and the East during the post-CFA has been the agricultural
sector with the industrial and service sectors also making useful contributions;
rice production in the North and the East has reached pre-conflict levels and
recorded a surplus during the last harvest. The North has the lowest rate of
unemployment - 5.8% as against 8.9% for the national average.
Furthermore, GOSL is looking at investment promotion strategies specific to the
conflict-affected areas and exploring ways of improving the investment climate
in general in the North and the East. Attracting private-sector investment in
troubled areas is not easy and at present the government is negotiating a
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) facility to promote investment
in the North and the East. MIGA is the political risk insurance arm of the World
Bank, which promotes foreign direct investment in developing countries by
insuring against political risk and by providing technical assistance.
While the international community also
showed a keen interest to support the Post Tsunami
Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), which was agreed
upon by the GOSL and the LTTE for equitable allocation of
donor funds, the implementation of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) has been delayed due to a stay order on
some provisions of the MOU by the Supreme Court, relating to
the Regional Committee and the Regional Fund set up under
the MOU. The Government has filed its written objections to
the case and will also vigorously argue that the MOU does
neither violate provisions of the Constitution nor
governmental regulations, when the case is taken up on the
12th of September.
Comment: In
the event, (contrary to Mr.Dhanapala's statement) the
Supreme Court did not hear the case on 12 September 2005
and his promise that the Government will 'vigorously
argue that the MOU does neither violate provisions of
the Constitution nor governmental regulations' remains a
promise. Meanwhile the P-TOMS is a dead letter and the
people in the NorthEast continue to suffer the ravages
of the
Tsunami.
Despite the delay in implementing the MOU on
P-TOMS, foreign economic assistance obtained for post
tsunami reconstruction work is being disbursed through the
Ministry of RRR and other line Ministries in order to bring
relief to the tsunami affected people in the North and the
East. The role of the UN agencies and the local and
international NGOs remain significant in these areas. I must
also emphasize that the GOSL will continue its humanitarian
and development work in the North and the East as a matter
of priority, irrespective of the progress made in the peace
process, as the people of the North and the East cannot be
penalized for the faults of the LTTE.
Comment: Here, the
US Congress may have found
Mr.Lakshman Kadirgamar remarks on BBC Hard Talk, 22
March 2005
of some interest: "BBC:
What is the government's response to the accusation that
aid is being withheld from Tamil Tiger areas?
Kadirgamar. Totally and horribly false - this is
being put about by mischief makers and propagandists..
Take the food situation in the first two months.
Earlier on there were accusations that people in the
Tamil areas were starving and had no water - that was a
load of rubbish.."
BBC: It is not only Tamil Tigers who are saying
this. Local NGOs are saying it. Western Aid
organisations.. Let me tell you what John Charly
from Refugees International said - he says that the
Government when faced with the choice of spending
foreign aid in Galle in the south or in Tamil
areas in the North and East, the government would give
it in Galle where its Sinhala constituencies are based
Kadirgamar: That is a wholly unsubstantiated
allegation.
BBC:
This is not a Tiger rebel saying it, is it
Kadirgamar: I do not know who he is
BBC: He is a western NGO. He is one of many NGOs who
is saying that this government is withholding aid to
Tamil Tiger areas
Kadirgamar:
I am sorry - that does not impress me in the
slightest...."
(f) Sanctions and Pressures
With the exception
of the USA, UK, Australia and India, which has banned the LTTE as a terrorist
outfit, a number of international governments have followed a policy of
constructive engagement with both parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka.
Comment: India has not banned the
LTTE as a 'terrorist outfit' and Mr.Dhanapala's statement is factually
incorrect.
India banned the LTTE on the ground that 'LTTE's
objective for a homeland for all Tamils disrupts the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of India'. In the Rajiv
Gandhi assassination case, the Indian Supreme Court acquitted
the accused of the 'terrorism' charge,
Sri
Lanka de proscribed the LTTE on 4 September 2002
and Peace Talks commenced thereafter. Whatever may have been the
position before such de proscription, it will be strange (and opportunistic)
if after itself de proscribing the LTTE and seeking to engage in talks with
it, Sri Lanka should now be concerned that 'a number of international
governments have followed a policy of constructive engagement' with both
parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka.'
Constructive engagement with the LTTE has meant direct
interaction with the LTTE in Kilinochchi, on issues relevant to the peace
process, reconstruction and rehabilitating activities and hosting LTTE
delegations in their own countries. Since the CFA, the LTTE has made several
tours to Europe. The last tour also included a visit to South Africa.
In the past, the GOSL has encouraged these
visits, in the belief that it is a useful exercise for the
LTTE to learn about democracy, concepts of governance, power
sharing, federalism etc., to broaden their horizons and that
it will assist in their transformation from a terrorist
outfit to a democratic institution.
Foreign
governments have also sought to make public, their stance on
issues related to the Sri Lanka peace process through policy
statements or statements of encouragement/condemnation
thereby influencing the actors and stakeholders in the
conflict in Sri Lanka. These diplomatic tools have however,
made little or no impact on the LTTE to either desist from
violations of the CFA or return to the negotiating table,
which they left in April 2003.
Direct peace negotiations between the GOSL and the LTTE that are
critical in any peace process have been stalled since April 2003. The six (6)
rounds of peace talks yielded a number of significant decisions such as the
establishment of a Committee for De-escalation and Normalization, a Gender
Committee, a Sub Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs,
and the Oslo Decision signed by the two sides in December 2002, in which both
parties agreed �to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal
self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking
peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka�. None of these
committees are now functioning and the Oslo decision also remains a dead letter
with the LTTE steadfastly refusing to reiterate it publicly.
The
stalemate over the reopening of negotiations has revolved around whether the
ISGA proposal by the LTTE alone should be the only subject of the agenda as the
LTTE has demanded or whether all proposals for an interim authority should be
discussed as a prelude to a final settlement within the framework of the Oslo
decision, as the Government has proposed.
Comment: The record shows that the
stalemate over the reopening of negotiations had everything to do with the
divisions amongst Sinhala political parties in the South and very little to
do with agreeing on the wording of the proposed agenda.
"The representatives of three of the four
co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference (Japan, EU and US) called on Her
Excellency President Kumaratunga on December 14. The co-chair
representatives .. expressed deep concern about the ongoing JVP-led actions
against the peace process in Sri Lanka and the Government of Norway's
efforts as facilitator of that process. The representatives expressed
bewilderment that a member party of the UPFA could engage in such a
campaign in absolute contradiction of the clearly stated position of the
President and the Government that they endorse and support the Norwegian
role. "
Address the JVP problem -
Tokyo co-chairs urge President, 14 December 2004
"The responsibility of resurrecting the
stalled peace process is entirely with the government in ensuring that its
coalition partners reflect the thinking of the president, if she is in fact
really sincere, and her military refrains from coercive and provocative
actions", Mr. S. P. Thamilchelvan, Head of the Political Wing of the LTTE
told the Norwegian facilitators Wednesday (15 December 2004) in
Kilinochchi. "Norwegian delegation was unable to give assurance that Sri
Lanka Government will take any constructive steps to take the peace process
forward" Thamilchelvan told the Press after the meeting. "
GoSL entirely responsible for resuming talks - LTTE, 15 December 2004
This dispute over the agenda probably conceals other factors.
Comment: It may well be correct that
the dispute over the agenda conceals other factors. Mr.Dhanapala may have
helped the Sri Lanka Caucus to draw its own conclusion as to what those
factors were, if he had brought to the notice of the Caucus the views
expressed in Securing
Peace: An Action Strategy for Sri Lanka - A Report Prepared by
Princeton University for the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), June 2004
"..In our view,
resolution of the Sinhalese political party struggle is the top priority.
This conflict�whatever the merits of the arguments�is selfish in the
short-term and self defeating in the long-term. The country is ready for
peace. The LTTE is ready to continue negotiations. The world cannot
understand why Sri Lanka does not move ahead to peace. All parties need to
seize this moment, honor their constituents� faith in them, and settle their
dispute immediately. The critical next steps we explore in this report will
go unaddressed if this issue is not resolved immediately."...
Since March 2004 a dramatic split in the ranks of the LTTE has
resulted in a murky internecine war between the Karuna faction, a break away
group of the LTTE, and the Kilinochchi based LTTE.
Comment: The timing of the Karuna
'break away' after nominations were submitted for the General Elections and
before the actual vote in April 2004, the help provided by a Sri Lanka
Member of Parliament (albeit from the United National Party) for Karuna to
escape to Colombo, the provision of a 'safe house' in Colombo for Karuna's
associates by the Sri Lanka intelligence services, show the need for an
examination of Sri Lanka's 'murky' role in the Karuna 'break away'.
The SLMM has strongly urged the government to
take meaningful and effective action to curb the activities of paramilitary
groups including that of Karuna faction and the EPDP'', Major General (retd)
Trond Furuhovde, Head of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission told LTTE Head of
Political Wing, S.P.Thamilchelvan"
Curb activities of paramilitaries, SLMM urges SL
Government,
22 July 2004
In many ways, the international community has been indulgent of
the LTTE, subordinating
democracy and
human rights to
keep the peace process alive, rewarding the LTTE with various incentives, in the
hope that dialogue and engagement will slowly democratize the organization. This
however is no longer a tenable policy.
The recent Kadirgamar assassination has thrown up hard questions
about the role of the international community in Sri Lanka�s peace process. Both
the Royal Norwegian Government and the SLMM has had to perform a difficult task
under extremely difficult circumstances and the GOSL is extremely grateful to
them for the work they are doing to support peace in Sri Lanka. Despite media
criticism and widespread speculation, I must emphasize here that the GOSL does
not intend to replace Norway as facilitator.
Comment:
"...There is widespread questioning of the Norwegian role in Sri Lanka, and
senior government officials have been publicly critical of Norway. I believe
Norway has handled itself with skill and professionalism. Nonetheless, no
negotiator is perfect, and after a frustrating two years the Sri Lankan
government and the LTTE may want to reassess what they seek from the
international community.
If there is to be a change, both parties need to be involved..."
International Community and Sri Lanka: Playing a Modest Hand Better -
Teresita C. Schaffer
The GOSL, however, believes that the international community has
an important role to play in supplementing the role of Norway as facilitator by
applying pressure on the LTTE.
This may be an opportune moment to undertake a fundamental
review or �redesign� of the peace process in Sri Lanka. GOSL�s discussions with
representatives of the international community in Colombo reveal that there is
broad agreement that we have to take a fresh look at the peace process.
The route of appeasement or the �carrot and more carrots�
approach, have not worked with the LTTE. Immediately after the Kadirgamar
assassination, the GOSL called for concerted international action that is
immediate and tangible against the LTTE, to include not only those that have a
bearing on the LTTE, but also its numerous front organizations in many countries
through which it continues its reign of terror in Sri Lanka.
In the
globalized world of today, the trajectory of internal conflicts are often
influenced by international developments and pressures. Analysts of internal
conflicts have concluded that international involvement in internal conflicts is
eventually inevitable as a passive as well as an active factor. The question is
how to ensure such pressure is positive rather than negative.
Comment: Here, it may have been
helpful if in relation to the 'globalized world of today',
Mr.Dhanapala had expressed his views on the question whether there may be a
difference in the end goals that US and India may have in the emerging multi
lateral world, and whether for that reason, the policies of the United
States and New Delhi in relation to Sri Lanka and the LTTE
may not always be congruent - and, examined the extent to which
this impacts on the Sri Lanka Peace Process.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in a recent address to the
nation pointed out that, �Terrorism has become today, the single most dominant
global phenomenon. From New York to London, the western world has begun to
experience terrorism, which we have for long suffered in Sri Lanka. Terrorism
has been condemned globally while its true nature is recognized and rejected.
The community of nations represented by the United Nations Organization and its
Security Council has now united to oppose terrorism practically and
effectively�.
The United States as a close friend of Sri Lanka, and as a
member of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference, has consistently
supported a sanctions based approach to the LTTE, and maintained that the US
listing of the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization will remain in effect
until it renounces terrorism in word and deed.
Comment: At the time that
Mr.Dhanapala made his presentation, he may or may not have had access to
Teresita C. Schaffer's Briefing Paper on International Community and
Sri Lanka: Playing a Modest Hand Better
-
"U.S. terrorism policies have effectively prevented the
United States from developing any real leverage on the LTTE. U.S. laws on
terrorism would have made it impossible for the United States to contribute
to post-Tsunami relief through the P-TOMS mechanism; a different approach
might have made it easier for that mechanism to survive. This is not the
time for a major shift in those policies. However, should the talks on
revitalizing the ceasefire get somewhere, I believe the Administration and
the Congress should consider giving the Administration some flexibility in
this area. We cannot put pressure on the LTTE if we have no means of
engagement with them."
International Community and Sri Lanka: Playing a Modest Hand Better -
Teresita C. Schaffer
Indeed it is the international safety net provided by such a sanctions based
approach that has allowed the GOSL to continue to negotiate with the LTTE to
find a peaceful solution to the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. In order for the
GOSL to be able to talk to the LTTE without further alienating the peace
constituency in Sri Lanka, the international community must take a tough stand
against them. This will help move the peace process forward.
I would
like to conclude by saying that the impact of the international community has
been mixed in Sri Lanka�s peace process. On the one hand it has had a positive
impact on the sustainability of the peace process through sustained interest and
economic support. It has however, not been particularly effective in stemming
the tide of grave ceasefire violations, insisting on a resumption of talks or
transforming the LTTE into a democratic institution.
The next meeting of
the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference is scheduled for the 19th of
September in New York. It is an opportunity for the U.S. to continue to show
leadership at that meeting to ensure that acts of terrorism like the Kadirgamar
assassination would not go unpunished and that conditions for
human rights and
democracy
to flourish in all parts of Sri Lanka would be created.
As Sri Lanka
enters a
democratic
process of electing a new President, the LTTE must be under no illusion that
they can get away by assassinating political leaders and resorting to electoral
malpractices in the areas controlled by them as they have done on previous
occasions.
Comment: At the end of Mr.Dhanapala's
Briefing the question remains as to the way forward. Here,
the
Tamil Guardian editorial of 12 September 2005, on 'Main Stream
Extremism' merits the attention of all who are genuinely concerned with
securing a just peace in the island of Sri Lanka -
"The stark polarisation amongst Sri Lanka�s
ethnic communities is undoubtedly set to deepen further. The Sinhala right
wing coalition that emerged this week behind Prime Minister Mahinda
Rajapakse�s Presidential candidacy is not just a marriage of political
convenience but an assertive statement of their shared vision of a future
Sri Lanka � one in which the Sinhala-Buddhism is the prevailing order and
the minorities know their place. Mr. Rajapakse is going to sign an agreement
with the Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP), the third force in the Sinhala
politics and another with the small, but important monks� party, the Jeyatha
Hela Urumaya. The text of the JVP deal makes grim reading for those
concerned with promoting a peaceful solution to Sri Lanka�s protracted
ethnic conflict. It is a comprehensive attack on the very foundations of the
Norwegian peace process. Every concept around which dialogue has been
proposed � joint aid mechanism, interim administration, etc � has been
rejected. The ceasefire is criticised. Even Oslo�s invaluable role in
stopping the bloodshed is denounced. The most important aspect of these
attitudes, as far as the Tamils are concerned, is that they are mainstream
values in the south...
 ...Those
still optimistic about a liberal peace in a united Sri Lanka need to
seriously reconsider the viability of their vision. Three decades of
violence have not dulled
Sinhala nationalist aspirations, nor have four years of peace and
increasing enmeshment in the threads of globalisation. On the other hand,
these - and a
half-century of increasing Sinhala oppression - have
concretised a Tamil national consciousness. It is these polarised
sentiments that are playing out in the political developments today..."
We may all gain by revisiting the words of
Professor
Margaret Moore in Nations & Nationalism in 2001 -
""...The problem in nationally divided
societies is that the different groups have different political
identities, and, in cases where the identities are mutually exclusive (not
nested), these groups see themselves as forming distinct political
communities. In this situation, the options available to represent these
distinct identities are very limited, because any solution at the state
level is inclined to be biased in favour of one kind of identity over
another. That is to say, if the minority group seeks to be self-governing,
or to secede from the larger state, increased representation at the
centre will not be satisfactory. The problem in this case is that the
group does not identify with the centre, or want to be part of that
political community...One conclusion that can be drawn is that, in some
cases, secession/partition of the two communities, where that option is
available, is the best outcome overall. .."
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