Norwegian Peace Initiative
Sri Lanka Peace Process: Problems & Prospects
Jayantha Dhanapala,
Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process
& Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka
Speech to Asia Society, Washington DC, 12 September 2005
Over nine years ago, I had the pleasure of
addressing the Asia Society�s Washington Centre as my
country�s Ambassador to the USA. The subject of my
presentation then was the conflict in Sri Lanka and the
steps that were being taken to negotiate a solution notably
through the
1995 Constitutional proposals.
Comment: It may have been helpful if
Mr.Dhanapala had made clear the approch adopted by President Kumaratunga in
1995/6. On 3 August 1995, Sri Lanka
President Kumaratunga released a 'Devolution' package with the stated
objective of ending the ethnic conflict in the island. At the same time she
re affirmed her intention to wage war against the Liberation Tigers and
launched a
genocidal attack on the Tamil homeland
in the north of the island of Sri Lanka. She
promised the
Buddhist High Priests in Kandy that the 'Devolution' package will not be
finalised until the 'war is won'. She added that the
package
will not 'erode the powers of the centre' and declared that there would be
no merger of the North and East'. It was later announced that the
'Devolution' package
would be
further watered down.
While those and subsequent steps have not been successful, my
themes were that the presence of
disaffected minorities
in democracies was not a basis for secession and that violence and terrorism
are inadmissible as a means of redressing grievances under any circumstances.
Those themes remain valid.
Comment: Mr Dhanapala may want to re
examine the validity of these themes in the light of observations such as
those made by the
UNESCO International Conference of Experts in
Barcelona in 1998 "...In all regions of the
world conflicts turn violent over the desire for full control by state
governments, on the one hand, and claims to
self-determination (in a broad sense) by peoples, minorities or other
communities, on the other. Where governments recognise and respect the right
to self-determination, a people can effectuate it in a peaceful manner.
Where governments
choose to use force to crush or prevent the movement, or where they
attempt to
impose assimilationist policies against the wishes of a people, this
polarises demands and generally
results in armed conflict. The Tamils, for example, were not seeking
independence and were not using violence in the 1970s. The government
response to further deny the Tamil
people equal expression of their distinct identity led to armed
confrontation and a war of secession..."
Since my last address here the quest for peace in Sri Lanka has
gone on despite changes in government through
democratic
elections.
Comment: Over the years, democracy in
Sri Lanka has acquired a special flavour. In 1986, Senator A.L.Missen, then
Chairman of the Australian Parliamentary Group of Amnesty International,
declared in the Australian Senate: "....The democracy of Sri Lanka has been
described in the following terms, terms which are a fair and accurate
description: 'The reluctance to hold general elections, the muzzling of the
opposition press, the continued reliance on extraordinary powers unknown to
a free democracy, arbitrary detention without access to lawyers or
relations, torture of detainees on a systematic basis, the intimidation of
the judiciary by the executive, the disenfranchisement of the opposition, an
executive President who holds undated letters of resignation from members of
the legislature, an elected President who publicly declares his lack of care
for the lives or opinion of a section of his electorate, and the continued
subjugation of the Tamil people by a permanent Sinhala majority, within the
confines of an unitary constitutional frame, constitute the reality of
'democracy', Sri Lankan style.'"
(Australian Senate Hansard, 13 March 1986)
Since then not much has changed.
"The people of Sri Lanka can no longer hope for
the peaceful exercise of their right to freely elect their representatives
at national, or even local, elections...The concept of free and fair
elections has become an illusion in Sri Lanka..."
Lost Dream of Free and Fair Elections
-
Asian Human Rights Commission, 1999
Each chapter of the peace process has contributed its lessons
both positive and negative. No peace process can succeed unless both parties to
the conflict genuinely want success.
For a non-state organization like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) - built as a war machine with single minded aims of secession, one
party dictatorship, and racial exclusivism- the transition into adopting a
non-violent political approach, the give and take of negotiations and abiding by
the global norms of democracy and human rights has been very difficult.
Comment:
"...One of the essential elements that
must
be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is that,
since 1958 at least, every time Tamil politicians negotiated some sort of
power-sharing deal with a Sinhalese government - regardless of which party
was in power - the opposition Sinhalese party always claimed that the party
in power had negotiated away too much. In almost every case - sometimes
within days - the party in power backed down on the agreement..."
Professor Marshall Singer to the
US Congress Committee on International Relations ,1995
Peace has to be built on a foundation of
democracy,
human rights,
development and disarmament with the human security and legitimate aspirations
of all citizens assured if it is to be durable.
Before I focus on the
problems and prospects and in order to clear the unique �fog of peace� in Sri
Lanka, let me give you a brief background to the current phase of the peace
process. The genesis of this phase is in a
ceasefire agreement which was brokered by Norway and signed by the
Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in
February 2002.
Direct talks between the government and LTTE with
Norwegian facilitation
began in
September 2002. Six rounds of negotiations were held with a thematic focus
on political issues, humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development of the
North and the East, military issues of normalization and de-escalation, human
rights, gender issues, and children in armed conflict.
Full implementation of the decisions made on these themes have
not been possible due to the fact that talks between the two parties have been
stalled since April 2003, when the LTTE unilaterally walked away from the
negotiating table.
Comment:
"..In our view,
resolution of the Sinhalese political party struggle is the top priority.
This conflict�whatever the merits of the arguments�is selfish in the
short-term and self defeating in the long-term. The country is ready for
peace. The LTTE is ready to continue negotiations. The world cannot
understand why Sri Lanka does not move ahead to peace. All parties need to
seize this moment, honor their constituents� faith in them, and settle their
dispute immediately. The critical next steps we explore in this report will
go unaddressed if this issue is not resolved immediately."...Securing
Peace: An Action Strategy for Sri Lanka - A Report Prepared by
Princeton University for the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), June 2004
The peace process in Sri Lanka at present can therefore best be
characterized as a �no war, no peace� situation with the whole weight of the
peace process being carried on the shoulders of the CFA. The CFA is itself under
enormous strain due to almost daily violations by the LTTE which, at the end of
August this year had reached a total of 3113 as against 141 by the government
according to the independent rulings of the Nordic ceasefire monitors.
The assassination of Mr. Lakshman
Kadirgamar, the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka on 12 August
this year was the most egregious of such LTTE violations.
Acts such as these have led to the collapse of peace
processes in some other countries. Despite this grave
provocation, the GOSL will continue to strictly adhere to
and respect the CFA while seeking to improve its
implementation.
Because of the systematic violations
of several provisions of the Ceasefire, and especially the
LTTE�s refusal to hold problem-solving talks in conflict
zones between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and LTTE
area leaders (Article 3.11), the Government has been, for
quite sometime, asking for a review of the implementation of
the CFA.
This has been resisted by the LTTE, until
now. But, in the face of the outrage expressed by the
international community over the Kadirgamar assassination,
the LTTE agreed to these talks with remarkable speed.
However, negotiations on a venue for these talks have proved
inconclusive.
The GOSL has maintained that it wants the
meeting to be held in Sri Lanka in consideration of the
nature of the talks, while the LTTE wanted a venue outside
Sri Lanka or in Killinochchi, which is in the LTTE dominated
area.
The Norwegians in their most recent effort
to find a compromise solution suggested the International
Airport as a venue, on the basis that if the LTTE is
prepared to travel abroad for a meeting, then they have to
be ready to pass through the same airport. The GOSL accepted
this proposal, but the LTTE has rejected it. The GOSL is,
therefore, compelled to come to the conclusion that the LTTE
was not sincere when they readily agreed to hold these
talks.
Comment: At the time that Mr.Dhanapala
addressed the Sri Lanka Caucus on 8 September 2005, it may be possible that
he was unaware of the
agreement signed by his Prime Minister and SLFP Presidential Nominee with
the JVP on the same date, the same cannot be said four days later. That
Mr.Dhanapala failed to inform the stand of his Prime Minister and
Presidential nominee that the 'unitary nature of the Sri Lankan
State'would be secured 'under any solutions to be presented, formed or
formulated for the purpose of the resolution of Sri Lanka's national
question' raises questions about Mr.Dhanapala's transparency.
Going beyond a review of the implementation of the CFA, the GOSL
is also concerned about the qualitative nature of CFA violations committed by
the LTTE and the lack of provision for targeted sanctions against violations.
Most violations of the CFA by the LTTE fall into the category of human rights
violations such as child recruitment, political killings, abductions, torture,
extortions and harassment.
The LTTE has recruited and used children as
soldiers throughout the conflict in Sri Lanka and especially since 1987. In
2003, the GOSL and the LTTE formally agreed to an Action Plan for Children
Affected by War that included a pledge by the LTTE to end all recruitment of
children. This was in fact the only signed agreement to result from the peace
talks.
After initially releasing a handful of
children, they appear to have abandoned the Action Plan
altogether. Indeed UNICEF under whose aegis the Action Plan
was developed and signed, has documented a significant
increase in under-age recruitment in recent months. As of 31
July 2005, the total under-age recruitment cases known to
UNICEF was 5081 children. Of these, 1209 children are
continuing to be used as child combatants by the LTTE at
present.
In this context the government welcomes the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 of July 26,
2005 on protection of children in armed conflict. The
Resolution calls for �targeted and graduated measures� to be
imposed on parties that are in violation of international
law relating to the rights and protection of children in
armed conflict. The LTTE is named as an Offending Party
under the Resolution, for its continued recruitment and
forcible abduction of children into its fighting forces.
The LTTE�s lack of tolerance for political dissent, which
made it one of the most feared terrorist organizations in
the world prior to the ceasefire, has also not undergone any
change in the post CFA period. Velupillai Prabhakaran, the
leader of the LTTE in his first media conference following
the CFA, when questioned whether the LTTE would allow other
political groups to operate in the North and the East stated
that �We can assure you that other political parties,
whatever their policies may be - will be allowed to function
in the north and east�. It is a promise that he has not
kept.
Despite these assurances systematic
killings, abductions, and torture of opponents and even
inadvertent dissidents have continued posing a serious
threat to the CFA.
These violations continue with
impunity, as the success of the CFA depends on good faith of
both parties, and on a naming and shaming concept which does
not work well with the LTTE. Given these gaps in the CFA,
there is now a growing consensus on the need for a separate
human rights agreement to supplement the CFA.
This
preoccupation with the CFA and its limitations has also
diverted attention from the core issues that underpin the
conflict. The lack of direct face-to-face peace negotiations
since April 2003 has meant that it has not been possible to
make any progress on the substantive core issues of the
conflict, three years after the CFA, despite the best
efforts of the Government. Dialogue is vital for a peace
process to move forward.
The problem has been in
relation to developing an agenda acceptable to both sides.
The LTTE has taken the stance that the next round of
negotiations must be based solely on its proposal for an
Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) in the North and
East of Sri Lanka put forward in October 2003, whereas the
GOSL has insisted that the next round of negotiations must
be on all available proposals for an Interim Authority (IA),
provided the IA as well as the final settlement, is based on
the Oslo decision of December 5, 2002.
The Oslo
decision was one of the most significant achievements of the
six rounds of peace talks, a paradigm shift, where the GOSL
and the LTTE agreed �to explore a solution founded on the
principle of internal self-determination, based on a federal
structure within a united Sri Lanka�.
This was a significant breakthrough towards
an enduring political settlement of the island's armed
conflict. It was an indication that the LTTE was willing to
give up its demand for a separate state, i.e. external
self-determination and that the GOSL was willing to consider
constitutional reforms to accommodate a federal system of
devolution and power sharing. The LTTE in recent times have
however refused to even refer to their commitment to power
sharing on the basis of a federal solution.
A factor
which I believe has contributed to the current impasse and
the intransigence of the LTTE on the agenda, is the
internecine violence in the East of Sri Lanka as a result of
the defection of Karuna, the leader of the Eastern command
of the LTTE in March 2004. He demanded that the GOSL and
Nordic monitors recognise his group as an entity separate
from the LTTE under the CFA. The LTTE�s preoccupation with
neutralizing Karuna cadres in the East has certainly
influenced their approach to negotiations with the GOSL.
In this context where the LTTE appears to be shying away
from any direct contact with the GOSL whether on core issues
relating to the peace process or on issues related to the
CFA, the negotiations leading to the signing by the LTTE and
the GOSL of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the
establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS) has to be seen as a significant
milestone. Following the tsunami of December 26th last year,
the GOSL and the LTTE embarked on several rounds of
technical level negotiations to discuss an arrangement for
equitable allocation of tsunami aid which would be
acceptable to both parties. Based on these discussions which
were facilitated by the Norwegians a Memorandum of
Understanding was agreed upon and signed by the two parties
on 24th June 2005. The joint structure envisaged by the MOU
is broadly as follows:
It is a three-tiered structure
comprising a high level committee at the national level, a
regional committee for the North and the East, and District
Committees in the 6 Districts of the North and the East
affected by the tsunami.
The High Level Committee
comprising one GOSL, one LTTE and one Muslim member will be
responsible for the allocation of donor funds on the basis
of the needs assessments and in proportion to the number of
affected persons and the extent of damaged infrastructure.
The Regional Committee comprising 5 LTTE, 3 Muslim and 2
GOSL will be responsible for development of strategies for
implementation and prioritization of post tsunami work,
project approval and management, and overall monitoring of
projects.
The District Committees will be
responsible for identification and prioritization of needs,
preparing and receiving project proposals and monitoring and
reporting on project progress to the regional committee.
At the regional level a fund will be established
comprising donor funds for relief, rehabilitation,
reconstruction and development projects in the tsunami
affected areas of the North and the East.
Safeguards
for the Muslims and Sinhala communities have been built into
the structure and adequate space created for non LTTE
parties and civil society to function at the District
Committee level.
The implementation of this MOU has, however,
been delayed due to a stay order issued by the Supreme Court
on some provisions of the MOU relating to the Regional Fund
and the Regional Committee in response to a petition filed
by the JVP, a southern political party.
The Muslims
have also expressed their dissatisfaction with the process
as well as some of the substantive provisions of the MOU and
withheld their cooperation to implement the MOU.
The
problems in implementing the P-TOMS MOU has highlighted most
vividly one of the fundamental challenges facing the peace
process which goes beyond the current impasse between the
GOSL and the LTTE - the Muslim dimension. Given the nature
of the conflict, Sri Lanka�s peace process has been very
much a bi-lateral interaction between the GOSL and the LTTE
with very little space for the participation of Muslims and
also other stakeholders such as non-LTTE Tamil political
parties, southern political formations and civil society
groups.
Although Muslims were not a party to the
conflict in Sri Lanka, they have been demanding a place at
the negotiating table based on their identity as a separate
ethnic and religious group as well as being equally affected
by the conflict. As the conflict progressed Muslims
experienced violence and oppression at the hands of the LTTE
over disagreements on the nature of a separate state as
espoused by the LTTE, and the status of Muslims within the
North and the East. When the LTTE realized that the Muslims
were not willing to be subsumed under the category of �Tamil
speaking people� and have their political rights suppressed,
Muslims in the North and the East became a target of LTTE
violence.
In October 1990, in an attempt at ethnic
cleansing, more than 80,000 Muslims living in the Northern
Province were expelled from their homes by the LTTE, some of
who are still languishing in refugee camps in the South. The
security of Muslims in the East was also severely affected,
and continues to be an issue of concern today. Although at
the fourth round of peace talks both parties agreed to
include Muslims in the negotiations at the appropriate time
when considering relevant and substantial political issues,
the LTTE does not appear to be ready to recognise and
accommodate Muslims as a third and distinct party in the
negotiating process. For instance the LTTE refused to accede
to a Muslim demand - strongly supported by the Government -
to be a co-signatory to the P-TOMS MOU.
The P-TOMS
MOU has also highlighted another problem - divisions within
the southern polity which can undermine the peace efforts of
incumbent governments. Sri Lanka has a boisterous democracy
which accommodates a multiplicity of political opinions. In
Sri Lanka, as in other conflict situations, some of the core
issues dividing society - the nature of the state,
power-sharing, etc.,- have become extremely politicized
issues, and some political parties have been using these
issues to deepen the divisions in society and enhance their
own support base.
Despite these endemic problems, I
strongly believe that the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka
are strong. My reasons are as follows:-
Firstly,
despite the enormous strain that has been put on the
ceasefire Agreement, the present ceasefire is the longest
cessation of hostilities to date since 1983. The ceasefire
celebrated three years on 23rd February this year. Although
there have been numerous ceasefire violations there have
been no direct military confrontations with the LTTE. The
CFA has helped to save lives and improved the quality of
life of people throughout the island. The GOSL for its part
has repeatedly stressed its firm commitment to the CFA,
despite continued and grave provocations by the LTTE,
including the recent assassination of the Foreign Minister
Lakshman Kadirgamar.
The ceasefire has also
facilitated humanitarian and development assistance in the
war ravaged North and the East of Sri Lanka, including in
the LTTE dominated districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi.
This is an area where the two sides have been able to
cooperate so far with the support of the international donor
community, UN agencies and the business sector in Sri Lanka.
The GOSL is strongly committed to continuing and enhancing
its development activities in the North and the East.
Three years after the CFA, people in the North and the East
are enjoying the benefits of a peace dividend. Development
is an investment in a permanent peace. Let me now identify
some of the very specific programmes being undertaken in the
North and the East, since the ceasefire was signed.
The RRR Ministry with donor assistance is at present
implementing an impressive number of projects which include
resettlement of internally displaced persons and assistance
to host communities, rehabilitation of provision of basic
physical infrastructure such as roads, irrigation
programmes, power, and communication facilities as well as
rebuilding of social and community services such as health,
education, sanitation and judicial services. The CFA has
also enabled the return of a large number of refugees mainly
from India.
Consequent to the Ceasefire Agreement, a
comprehensive programme for demining is being coordinated
and implemented by the GOSL during the last 2 years with the
objective of having a �Mine Free Sri Lanka�. Assistance from
the USA has been a notable feature of this programme.
Perhaps as a direct result of these efforts, GDP in the
Northern and the Eastern Province has shown remarkable
growth. According to research done by the Economic Affairs
division of my office, the highest GDP growth rates during
the post-CFA period are in the Northern Province (12.6% per
annum) and in the Eastern Province (10.1% per annum.), in
contrast to other provinces in Sri Lanka. The engine of
growth in the North and the East during the post-CFA has
been the agricultural sector with the industrial and service
sectors also making useful contributions; rice production in
the North and the East has reached pre-conflict levels and
recorded a surplus during the last harvest. Unemployment in
the Northern Province is also the lowest in Sri Lanka at
5.8%, whereas the national average is 8.9%. In the Eastern
Province the rate is 8.4%.
The GOSL is looking to
further support these developments, through investment
promotion strategies specific to the conflict-affected
areas. Attracting private-sector investment in troubled
areas is never easy and the government is negotiating a
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) facility to
promote investment in the North and the East. MIGA is the
political risk insurance arm of the World Bank which
promotes foreign direct investment in developing countries
by insuring against political risk and by providing
technical assistance.
Secondly, despite changes in the political
leadership, government policy in relation to the peace
process has remained fairly stable in the last few years.
The present peace process could be said to have been
initiated by H.E. the President. The United National Front
government headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe
consolidated it in 2002 with the CFA. The United People�s
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government which came into office in
April 2004, again pledged to respect the CFA, and continue
facilitation by Norwegians to resume peace talks. Sri Lanka
is today at the threshold of a Presidential election to be
held later this year, when the Presidency will change after
a period of eleven (11) years. I am confident that whichever
candidate comes to office, this process will be continued.
It must.
Thirdly, despite a strident and vocal anti
peace lobby, there is a strong public support base for a
peaceful settlement to the conflict. Professionally
conducted opinion polls by independent organizations in our
country have revealed the full extent of the peace
constituency in Sri Lanka especially at the grassroots. The
most recent polls reveal that 76.7% across all ethnic groups
want a permanent solution through negotiations.
Fourthly, there is a whole gamut of civil society
organizations working for peace in Sri Lanka, and involved
in a diversity of activities such as lobbying, researching
and mobilizing community level peace building. As you know,
the role of civil society in building peace cannot be
underestimated. Civil society played a significant role in
conflict resolution in a number of countries including in
South Africa, in Northern Ireland, in Colombia, and in
Chile. In Sri Lanka, civil society groups are making a
significant contribution to the peace building effort by
strengthening and supporting the peace constituency. The
establishment of a National Advisory Council for Peace and
Reconciliation last year with Political, Religious and Civil
Society Committees is intended to foster a national dialogue
on conflict resolution.
Here I would also like to
refer to the potential role that can be played by Diaspora
communities both Sinhala and Tamil, in promoting peace and
reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora comprises an estimated 700,000
people living mainly in Canada, Europe, India and Australia. The negative role
played by the Tamil Diaspora in sustaining and fuelling 20 years of conflict in
Sri Lanka through their remittances is well known and well documented. The GOSL
insists that the international community must come down hard on LTTE front
organizations which continue to fund the LTTE�s war chest through various
disguises as charitable, cultural and even religious bodies abusing host country
laws and regulations.
Fifthly the interest and commitment of the
international community, bodes well for peace in Sri Lanka. The international
influence and support to the peace process in Sri Lanka has taken multiple forms
be it at the �Track 1� level of facilitation and monitoring of the CFA,
diplomacy and international pressure, or economic assistance for humanitarian
and development work. Key actors have been countries such as Norway, USA, EU,
Japan and India, as well as multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank and the UNDP. While outside actors cannot enforce peace,
external assistance, support, pressure and sanctions where necessary will be
vital to bring a negotiated end to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Norway will
continue as facilitator and the SLMM will remain as CFA monitors. Their roles
can be forcefully supplemented by others such as by the UN in the human rights
field.
I would like to conclude on an optimistic note. Despite the daily
sights and sounds of conflict which fill our newspapers and television screens
worldwide, researchers are now saying that the prospects for peace in the world
today may be higher than it has ever been and that war itself may be in decline.
This is in part due to the enormous international effort that is going into
peacemaking from international facilitation, mediation, to multilateral peace
keeping missions to international support for a multitude of other peace
building activities at various levels of the community.
There is an
emerging concept in international relations on the shared responsibility of the
world community to protect civilians wherever their welfare is threatened.
The sovereign right and legal obligation of the democratically -elected Sri
Lanka Government to protect national security and her citizens from terrorism
and human rights violations by non-state actors like the LTTE is primary and
indisputable. But it requires the assistance of the international community at
this point of time. The discussions going on at the United Nations show that the
condemnation of terrorism is universal and that acts of terrorism cannot be
justified or legitimized by any cause or grievance. There is one norm to judge
terrorism wherever it may occur in the world.
Intra-state conflicts like the Sri Lankan
conflict have international linkages in today�s globalized
world. Financial flows help purchase arms and ammunition in
foreign countries to be smuggled in to Sri Lanka and thwart
the peace process. If the security consensus to be endorsed
by the 60th UN Anniversary Summit in New York this week,
emphasizing the interlinking of development, peace, security
and human rights, is to be implemented in Sri Lanka,
international cooperation is vital for the peace process to
be strengthened.
Peace is indeed a process, not a
static goal. It is a dynamic, complex and difficult process.
The recent Peace Agreement that was signed by the government
of Indonesia and the rebel Free Aceh Movement, came after
twenty-nine (29) years of conflict. The historic declaration
made by the IRA in July this year, to disarm and work for a
united Ireland through peaceful means, came after thirty six
(36) years of waging war.
In both countries, there have been many
failed attempts at peace before, and the future yet remains
to be determined. It is not unlikely that good news of a
similar nature can come from my own country with the right
political will and the right decisions made by the parties
to the conflict. John Paul Lederach, the acclaimed
peace-builder and scholar, once observed that getting out of
a conflict can take as long as it takes to get into a
conflict.
It means that those of us, who are committed
to the cause of peace, have to work a little harder and
longer before we can realize that dream. As the Chinese
adage - which I never tire of quoting - says. �The more you
sweat in peace; the less you bleed in war�. |
