Norwegian Peace Initiative
The International Community and Sri Lanka:
Playing a Modest Hand Better
Paper for Briefing sponsored by
Sri Lanka Congressional Caucus [also
in PDF]
Teresita C. Schaffer
Center for Strategic &International Studies, Washington, DC
September 8, 2005
"U.S. terrorism policies, as I indicated
above, have effectively prevented the United States from
developing any real leverage on the LTTE. U.S. laws on terrorism
would have made it impossible for the United States to
contribute to post-Tsunami relief through the P-TOMS mechanism;
a different approach might have made it easier for that
mechanism to survive. This is not the time for a major shift in
those policies. However, should the talks on revitalizing the
ceasefire get somewhere, I believe the Administration and the
Congress should consider giving the Administration some
flexibility in this area. We cannot put pressure on the LTTE if
we have no means of engagement with them."
We are meeting at a time of considerable danger in Sri Lanka the
cease-fire is nominally in place but violence is increasing on all
fronts, as we all know from the assassination of
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Ambassador Dhanapala has
made
an eloquent plea
for international support for his government's efforts to rescue a
peace process that has practically broken down.
I would like to leave you with three messages:
First, this conflict, discouraging as it is, deserves our
attention: a complete breakdown would lead to terrifying
insecurity and a huge death toll.
Second, while the U.S government is unlikely to become the
major peace broker in Sri Lanka, it can make a difference.
And third, you should consider modifying some of the rigid
rules in our terrorism policy, which have the unintended effect
of making it almost impossible for the U.S. to exercise leverage
over the LTTE.
Outside countries have tried several times to help Sri Lankans
make peace. In the 1980s, India tried on at least three occasions.
After the breakdown of the
ceasefire worked out by President Kumaratunga in 1995, which
ushered in the
bloodiest period in Sri Lanka's history, Norway sought a role as
facilitator. By early 2002, a Norwegian envoy had brokered a
ceasefire agreement,
to be implemented with the help of a regular Monitoring Mission
drawn primarily from Scandinavia.
The fact that Norway had no geopolitical interest in South Asia
made it acceptable to Sri Lanka's largest neighbor, India, and its
experience with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process gave it a
large measure of respect. Norway secured wide international backing
for its efforts. The negotiators briefed the
Indian
government at each step of the proceedings. An aid donors' group
with four co-chairs -Norway, the United States. Japan and the
European Union - became the visible manifestation of international
support.
The aid donors, including the U.S., had a modest role, and were
not involved in the actual negotiating process. Their primary
relationship was with the Sri Lankan government. The United States
had designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization. The
United Nations and some of the other aid donors had made a similar
designation, but the consequences under U.S. law and policy are more
drastic than for anyone else: no financial contributions to them or
related organizations, and no meaningful direct contact. These
restrictions have made it difficult for the United States to
exercise the kind of influence we might like to do; I will come back
to this point later.
Where are we now?
The peace process began well, but at this point. there is not
much to show for it. The last formal discussions between the LTTE
and the Sri Lankan government took place about two and a half years
ago. The Norwegians tried to find a basis for resuming discussions,
but without results. The ceasefire is nominally in place, but the
pace of killings has intensified. A series of killings right in
Colombo culminated in the assassination of the Foreign Minister. The
LTTE has denied responsibility for this event, but since no one else
had any motivation for it, they remain the most likely culprit.
What is needed now?
First, a real ceasefire needs urgently to be restored and
strengthened. The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have been
discussing where and at what level to meet to discuss this subject.
When a ceasefire breaks down in this kind of situation. violence
often breaks out at a higher rate than before. Considering the
murderous toll this conflict has taken on Sri Lanka, the killings of
ordinary people, the insecurity for all Sri Lankans, and perhaps
worst of all the death of so many of the people with the talent to
lead, this is a truly horrifying possibility.
Second, the parties need to identify an action item that they can
work on, so both sides can show that they are serious. Two efforts
of this sort have failed. The agreement to work on humanitarian
issues and de-mining fell apart when the political talks stopped two
years ago. The proposed Post-Tsunami Operations Management System,
or P -TOMS, while never intended as part of the peace process, could
have provided an opportunity to build trust in an unrelated area,
but it seems unlikely to survive the adverse decision of the Sri
Lankan Supreme Court and the political controversy it generated.
Ultimately, the parties need to find their way back to
negotiations, with an agenda defining what they should start talking
about.
This raises the question of whether the international role needs to
he revisited. There is widespread questioning of the Norwegian role
in Sri Lanka, and senior government officials have been publicly
critical of Norway. I believe Norway has handled itself with skill
and professionalism. Nonetheless, no negotiator is perfect, and
after a frustrating two years the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE
may want to reassess what they seek from the international
community. If there is to be a change, both parties need to be
involved.
I believe an international presence in the negotiating process is
very important if the parties to Sri Lanka's bloodletting are to
make real progress. Elsewhere in the world, most of the stubborn
conflicts that have been resolved have had international help. A
skilled negotiator will tailor the role to the particular conflict,
always encouraging the parties to the dispute to do as much as
possible of their own work. Terms like "facilitation" and
"mediation" are a starting point, not a full-fledged definition.
There has been much speculation in Sri Lanka about others who
might be more successful than Norway in helping the peace process
along. Here too, I would urge caution. Some in Sri Lanka hanker for
India to return to the negotiating process, but India has strong
interests of its own in Sri Lanka. India itself is not seeking a
major role, and has found recent Sri Lankan crises difficult to
manage in its internal politics.
Other countries that have taken a strong interest in Sri Lanka,
such as Canada and Australia, have significant Tamil diaspora
populations, and might find themselves the center of controversy in
Sri Lanka as a result. President Kumaratunga has been exploring the
possibility of a United Nations role.
These are all interesting ideas, but not automatic solutions.
No one has asked for a direct U.S. role. In my judgment, the U.S.
government is unlikely to take that on for a number of reasons, the
most important of which is this administration's reluctance to put
more on its already overburdened foreign policy agenda. However, the
U S. can make a difference, through quiet diplomatic support and by
helping to shore up international support for a peace process once
it resumes. U.S. experience with other peace processes also needs to
be put at the service of Sri Lanka's peacemakers.
Changing the mediator will not change the nature of the conflict,
the parties, or the issues to be discussed. There may be others who
can do the job, but this will be a function of their personal skill
and their national or institutional ability to work with the
parties, mobilize support from the parts of the international
community that are not directly involved, and stick with a
frustrating job.
The short-term prospects for moving back to cooperation or
political talks, however, seem bleak at the moment. Suspicions are
high on both sides. Sri Lanka faces presidential elections later
this year. One of the major presidential candidates is deep in
negotiations with one of Sri Lanka's leftist parties, which has
promised its support in exchange for far-reaching commitments to
reject some of the fundamental building blocks on which the peace
process is based, including significant aspects of the ceasefire
agreement and the concept of looking for a solution that provides
for some form of federalism. Political support for the idea of a
ceasefire is still strong, but political support for the compromises
necessary to make peace has been badly undermined. Worst of all,
there is a tendency to take the ceasefire - or what is left of it -
for granted.
So at this difficult time, the task for us is to examine our own
policies, and to present a clear message to the parties to the
conflict.
U.S. terrorism policies, as I indicated above, have effectively
prevented the United States from developing any real leverage on the
LTTE. U.S. laws on terrorism would have made it impossible for the
United States to contribute to post-Tsunami relief through the
P-TOMS mechanism; a different approach might have made it easier for
that mechanism to survive. This is not the time for a major shift in
those policies. However, should the talks on revitalizing the
ceasefire get somewhere, I believe the Administration and the
Congress should consider giving the Administration some flexibility
in this area. We cannot put pressure on the LTTE if we have no means
of engagement with them.
What messages should we send? First, to the LTTE: Their behavior
is unacceptable. Two years ago, we held out hope that they might be
taken off the terrorism list if they stopped assassinating internal
dissidents. Today, they need to know that they have made that goal
harder to reach. If they want to succeed in a political negotiation,
they need to demonstrate their commitment to using political means
to reach their goals.
For the Sri Lankan government, our message should be: whatever
your frustrations with the process, you need to keep your eye on the
goal, which is a Sri Lanka where all communities can live together.
This cannot he achieved without major political change. Do not throw
away your chances in the heat of the election campaign. Otherwise,
your grandchildren will still be fighting the same sterile battles. |
