"...The illusion shared by many today, that President Chandrika's devolution package is a panacea for the national conflict in Sri Lanka, is also the product of a well-orchestrated media campaign by the Sri Lankan Government. It is very sad that many "bought" the spurious package without the benefit of a detailed analysis of its contents..."

"...The long road towards peace must start by putting in place conditions that can encourage talks. Some seem already to be in place. The government must realise - as the President indeed seems to do - that it can win a military victory in Jaffna, but cannot completely defeat the LTTE militarily - at least not in the foreseeable future, and not without victimizing large populations, Tamils, Muslims as well as Sinhalese. As a hardened guerrilla movement , the LTTE can simply withdraw, bide its time and resort to low-level military attacks at the time and place of its choosing. Colombo therefore needs a political solution. The LTTE, for its part, has to realise its vulnerability..."

"...The political reality is that any meaningful attempt at conflict resolution will need to secure a win-win result. However 'win-win'  is not some modern day mantra which when repeated often enough brings peace. The Tamil claim for independence and Sri Lanka's insistence on its territorial integrity appear mutually exclusive. How then do we move towards a win-win result?..."

"..So called 'get tough' measures against terrorist groups can have unintended consequences. Trying to 'decapitate' a movement may radicalise the whole movement or some splinter faction. assassinations and military force can provoke a desire for revenge, and raids and arrests can reinforce martial images, create mythologies of martyrdom, or feed paranoia and secretiveness (which makes the movements even harder to penetrate for reasons of either understanding motivations or foiling actions).. One of the most effective strategies at governments' disposal may be to split off pragmatists from radical rejectionists. Such efforts can diminish public support for the terrorists and deny them a strong base from which to operate."

"...In a protracted conflict, there are social and psychological processes at work which exacerbate the conflict environment beyond the basic nature and immediate circumstances of the conflict itself...Intervention by a third party will bring the benefit of organization to the process. It can lead to the introduction of new guidelines for communication between the parties, and thus enable each party to appreciate the other side’s perspective. Properly structured communication would impose a certain reality check upon each party’s assumption regarding the other..."

"...It has to be said that the struggle of the Tamil people is not simply about securing peace. After all, if it was simply a matter of securing peace, the Tamil people  may have been well advised to accept the Sinhala Only Act without protest. Again, if it was simply peace that they sought, they may have been well advised to accept  Sinhala colonisation of their homeland, standardisation of admission to Universities and submit to the attacks of 1958, 1961, and 1977, without protest.  And, today, they may be well advised to support President Chandrika Kumaratunga's  genocidal 'war for peace',  accept Sinhala rule of the Tamil homeland  - and secure peace..."