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Tamilnation > Struggle for Tamil Eelam > Conflict Resolution - Tamil Eelam - Sri Lanka > Norwegian Peace Initiative > Interim Self Governing Authority & Aftermath > Peace Process? What Peace Process?

Norwegian Peace Initiative

Peace Process? What Peace Process?
13 November 2004

"...LTTE has been successfully resisting attempts to weaken its military and political strength during the peace time with the same courage and bravery it displayed during the time of war. Tamils seek a just peace and not a peace with surrender. LTTE leadership will not relent until political and social dignity is restored to the lives of Tamil people. We are not 'Vadi Kattina Mutalkal'.  "நாங்கள் வடிகட்டின முட்டால்கள் அல்ல" We are not stupid. "  Senior member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, V. Balakumaran in Oslo,  29 August 2004 

The Words of a President concerned
to negotiate in good faith with the LTTE?

"..we have to go on with the process, because one has to be knocking at the door. Even if you know that what is beyond the door could be not very pleasant, that is the only solution... for the first time  (the LTTE) has split into three. So things are changing. It is not because, I think, the personality of Prabhakaran may change... I do not expect much change from this particular leader. But movements change, other people may change, circumstances and political conjecture change. I think there is some hope.."

Comment: But Some things Never Change...President Kumaratunga in the Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Sunday Times,  20 August 1995 - "I have studied and acquired considerable knowledge on guerrilla warfare when I was a student in Paris, and we knew how they would behave. We conducted talks on the basis that the LTTE would not agree to any peaceful settlement and lay down arms."

[India News]: New Delhi, Nov 13 : Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga said in remarks published Saturday that Tamil Tiger guerrillas are still trying to kill her despite signing a truce with her government.

At the same time, Kumaratunga told The Hindu in an interview that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was changing and that it was now split into three factions.

"..many things about Sri Lankan politics that she plans to write about one day...


" - Kumaratunga 'conquers' Jaffna - and holds a medieval victory ceremony, 6 December 1995

"Q. Where do you go from here?
A. ...To defeat the LTTE you have to launch an all out attack (which would mean a lot of Tamil civilian casualties) and the place (Jaffna) will be wiped out.
Q. Is that possible? Can the Sri Lankan forces do it?
A. Ofcourse it is possible...."
President Kumaratunga - Interview with India Today, 30 April 1995

The president, who narrowly escaped an assassination attempt blamed on LTTE in 1999 losing an eye in the process, said there were many things about Sri Lankan politics that she planned to write about one day.

"That will be when I retire, if (LTTE chief Velupillai) Prabhakaran still has not got me," she said, speaking in Colombo. "He is still thinking of getting me, while holding talks with us.

"But we have to go on with the process, because one has to be knocking at the door. Even if you know that what is beyond the door could be not very pleasant, that is the only solution."

Kumaratunga said while the LTTE may be militarily hardening its stand, "for the first time (it) has split into three.

"Prabhakaran has lost his army commander, and now he is having serious problems with his navy commander. So I don't think anybody can say they are military getting stronger."
 

Colombo promoting Karuna to destroy LTTE with tacit approval of US  says US based think tank Stratfor , 14 July 2004

 "...The plan is to destabilize the Tigers, bait the group into confrontation and ultimately launch an offensive aimed at destroying the fractured Tamil movement once and for all," the analysts at Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) said quoting unnamed sources inside the Sri Lankan government....Colombo probably hopes a renewed guerrilla war will be tempered by internal struggles and that, once weakened, the Tigers can be destroyed, the US analysts said"

Her references were to the former LTTE regional commander known as Karuna who split from the group in March, creating an unprecedented crisis for the outfit. Recently, amid rumours of another break-up, Soosai, the LTTE's sea commander, flew off to Singapore citing health reasons but came some days later.

Kumaratunga spoke in some detail about Soosai.

"They (LTTE) told us he (Soosai) is very, very serious and that he has to be rushed out. And he went to Singapore and came back in three days. He did not see any doctor or go to any hospital. That we are sure of. I feel that some senior LTTEers came from other parts of the world and persuaded him to go back. Whether it's true or not I don't know, but there seems to be (a) very serious problem."

"(Pirabakaran) is having serious problems with his navy commander..?"

Political advisor of the Liberation Tigers, Mr. Anton Balasingham, arriving in Killinochchi on 9 November 2004
being welcomed by Col. Soosai, Commander of the Sea Tigers and Mr. S. P Thamilchelvan, head of the LTTE’s political division.

Kumaratunga also praised the Norwegian diplomats mediating between the LTTE and the government, saying they had played "their role well".

Kumaratunga also said that the LTTE had changed a lot.

"They have opened up. LTTE cadres go out into the world and see that there is another world outside of their dark dingy den, where they are only thinking of who they are going to murder next.

"For the first time, they have gone on with a ceasefire agreement - with violations but at least I would say 70 percent of it is adhered to - for a long period of time, nearly three years. They have at least said, whether they mean it or not, that they are willing to explore some solution other than (an independent Tamil) Eelam.

"A few years ago one could not have heard of a Karuna or a Soosai objecting to Prabhakaran and still living. The LTTE has become sensitive to its people's needs to some extent, though they were not up to now.

"So things are changing. It is not because, I think, the personality of Prabhakaran may change... I do not expect much change from this particular leader. But movements change, other people may change, circumstances and political conjecture change. I think there is some hope."

--Indo-Asian News Service


 

Dr.S.Sathananthan said it all seven months ago -
Kumaratunga Prepares to Unleash the Sinhala Army

".The current political developments and war preparations in Colombo flow naturally and logically from the Sinhala President Chandrika Kumaratunga's unparalleled anti-Tamil jingoism during her first term (1994 - 1999)...the covert intention of Kumaratunga and her international backers is to manipulate the "talks", to corner and, if necessary, coerce the LTTE and Tamils in general to settle for what ever the Sinhala government is willing to offer. Weakening the LTTE by trapping it into decommissioning weapons is an integral and essential tactic in this strategy... The LTTE is quite correct in rejecting parallel talks on "core issues" since the intention of Kumaratunga and her international backers is to link the decommissioning of weapons with the setting up of the ISGA in the NEP.. The attempt by President Kumaratunga to telescope the establishment of the ISGA into a discussion of "core issues" is an unprincipled machination to undermine the LTTE's proposal for an interim structure and to justify a return to war..."

[Action Group of Tamils Press Release]  Kotte, Sri Lanka, 15 March 2004:  The current political developments and war preparations in Colombo flow naturally and logically from the Sinhala President Chandrika Kumaratunga's unparalleled anti-Tamil jingoism during her first term (1994 - 1999).

In The Action Group Of Tamils (TAGOT) Press Release of 25 November 1999, we warned:

"During the past five years, President Kumaratunga metamorphosed from a docile 'peace dove' seeking a political solution into a grotesque 'war dragon' breathing Dharma Yuddha (Holy War). She anointed her Dharma Yuddha with a potent symbol of Buddhist worship, the Sudu Nelum (while lotus), to legitimise it as a Buddhist Holy War against the non-Buddhist Tamil people. This Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism is unprecedented in post-Independence history of the country."

However, Kumaratunga, her PA Government and her Sinhala army suffered a string of humiliating military debacles inflicted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Perhaps the most impressive operation by the LTTE was the destruction of the sprawling Elephant Pass army garrison.

We in TAGOT are absolutely certain that Kumaratunga and her SLFP are today still steeped in their anti-Tamil chauvinism and that they have not forgiven the LTTE and, by extension, Tamils for their past military defeats. They are obsessed over acute delusions of achieving military victory over the LTTE and dominating the Tamil Nation.

During March/April (this year), while the cease-fire agreement was in force, Kumaratunga and her Sinhala army (together with foreign intelligence agencies) engineered the Karuna Affair to weaken the military capabilities of the LTTE.

Almost simultaneously Kumaratunga is conspiring to disarm the LTTE. She has developed a great affection for two-track talks. She justified her insistence on parallel talks by quoting the 2003 Tokyo Declaration, although she knows very well the LTTE did not participate in the Conference and so was not a party to that Declaration.

The Declaration provides insights into the strategy crafted by the Sri Lanka Government together with its international backers. Two provisions of the Declaration are especially relevant to us. They are the following:

(a) Clause 18(d): "Parallel progress towards a final political settlement based on the principles of the Oslo Declaration." Clause 18(d) deliberately ignored LTTE's longstanding demand - a demand that the four co-chairs of the Tokyo conference are fully aware of - that the reconstruction and rehabilitation in the North East Province (NEP) must precede negotiations toward a political settlement.

(b) Clause 18(j): "Agreement by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on a phased, balanced, and verifiable de-escalation, de-militarization and normalization process at an appropriate time in the context of arriving at a political settlement." Clause 18(j) requires LTTE to decommission weapons "in the context of arriving" at a settlement. This is in stark contrast to the normal practice of decommissioning weapons after a settlement is reached. A phased decommissioning of weapons by LTTE would then be linked to a parallel phased implementation of a political settlement by the Government.

Clause 18(j) makes decommissioning of weapons by the LTTE a condition for continuing negotiations. In other words, the ploy is to reduce and eliminate LTTE's military capacity during the course of negotiations.

The British Government similarly had tried - but failed - to deceive the IRA into disarming before a lasting settlement was reached in Northern Ireland.

In Sri Lanka, TAGOT detects at least three reasons why Kumaratunga and her international backers prefer this Machiavellian strategy.

First, if the LTTE's military power is diminished as negotiations proceed then the military parity would be irretrievably eroded by the time the crucial concluding stages are reached. This would give the Sinhala army a clear military advantage over the LTTE. Kumaratunga can then freely manipulate the terms of a settlement to the Government's advantage together with the anti-Tamil Buddhist right wing.

Second, if the LTTE were to reject Kumaratunga's dictate, the army's superior military power could be unleashed to crush the organisation. Kumaratunga intends to blame the LTTE for the renewed hostilities and induce Tamils to turn against the LTTE, which is the bankrupt Sinhala tactic of divide and destroy.

Three, a confederal system is the only constitutional basis for a final and lasting settlement within a united Sri Lanka that ensures the national rights of Tamils. However, despite their rhetoric about "peace", Kumaratunga and her international backers are opposed to a confederal system. They view Tamils as a "minority" and therefore not entitled to collective, national rights.

Almost all foreign governments that are sponsoring Kumaratunga are themselves busy manipulating and controlling their own so-called "minorities". Politicians in those governments come by and large from the respective majority nation in each country. Their national interest is to defend the international system of States. They are committed to defeating any internal military challenge to any State anywhere (except of course liberation movements they support for geopolitical advantage). In Sri Lanka they naturally collude with the Sinhala politicians and support the Sinhala government to crush LTTE's military power.

So the covert intention of Kumaratunga and her international backers is to manipulate the "talks", to corner and, if necessary, coerce the LTTE and Tamils in general to settle for what the Sinhala government is willing to offer. Weakening the LTTE by trapping it into decommissioning weapons is an integral and essential tactic in this strategy.

Norway achieved precisely this objective in Palestine by neutralising the Palestinian Liberation Movement through the 1993 Oslo Accord.

The verbal diarrhoea that a political settlement in Sri Lanka would respect democratic principles and ensure human rights is the sugar coating; it is the illusory consolation offered to Tamils that constitutional safeguards would be introduced to protect them from the ravages of Sinhala domination. But such constitutional safeguards are irrelevant to securing national rights; and Tamils know how Sinhala governments neutralised even the rudimentary protection for individual rights in successive constitutions.

3. Kumaratunga is strategizing to shift the balance of military power in favour of her Sinhala army. So she wants to conclude a Defence Co-operation Agreement (DCA) with India. In early June, her Foreign Minister attended the wedding of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Deputy General Secretary MK Stalin's daughter in Chennai. The obvious tactic is to placate the DMK and pre-empt it from opposing the DCA since it is an important member of the Central Government in New Delhi. That she also welcomes the growing defence links between the Sinhala army and the United States army is well known.

The President's primary objective is to strengthen the armed forces. Because, she and her international backers plan to unleash the army when the LTTE understandably rejects the unjust demand to decommission weapons during negotiations.

Kumaratunga's immediate need is to amend the Constitution or enact a new one within the next 19 months in order to extend her political career beyond December 2005. Therefore she is very likely to attempt extra-Parliamentary manoeuvres in the name of "national security" to continue in power. Launching a military campaign in the NEP and fanning the resulting political crisis is one way to manufacture conditions that would justify the grab for further power.

Politically naive "liberals" and Kumaratunga apologists are more active than before. Many argue that it is better to allow her to make constitutional changes - invoking the Doctrine of Necessity - and stay in power rather than risk another war. These "liberals" seem to be pathetically unaware that in Pakistan Gen Zia-ul-Haq used the same Doctrine to extend and entrench his rule that led to more violence.

Others suggest that Tamils should support constitutional changes in a pragmatic bargain to win Tamil rights: Tamil parliamentarians, so the argument goes, could force President Kumaratunga to enact a federal constitution and in return for supporting her to continue in power. Anyone who knows anything about Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist politics knows this tactic is hogwash.

A bizarre twist here is the hilarious advice to the LTTE to educate the Sinhala people. "Talks on core issues" so the argument goes, "present a unique opportunity for the LTTE to enlighten the island's Sinhala community on the progressive nature of a future state structure that would be capable of accommodating Tamil self-rule and power-sharing." The unfortunate implication is that the Sinhala people are abysmally low in intelligence; that they are so unintelligent that they have been utterly unable to grasp the basic features of power-sharing although they have been widely debated for the past half a century.

We in TAGOT think otherwise. We are convinced that the Sinhala people are intelligent, that they know precisely what the issues are. And the vast majority of them are clearly opposed to power sharing as demonstrated in the 2004 parliamentary elections. We elaborated on this point in great detail in the TAGOT Press Release of 20 April 2004.

The insidious allegation behind the advice, to educate the Sinhala people, is that the LTTE and Tamils in general share the blame for Sinhala ignorance. TAGOT has no comment on the subject.

The LTTE is quite correct in rejecting parallel talks on "core issues" since the intention of Kumaratunga and her international backers is to link the decommissioning of weapons with the setting up of the ISGA in the NEP.

 But Kumaratunga apologists dishonestly allege that "the LTTE has failed to articulate a convincing case showing how parallel talks on core issues would undermine negotiation of its ISGA proposals. Indeed," their argument continues, "any sensible person will be baffled" why Kumaratunga's demand for two track talks and LTTE's insistence on the step by step approach of setting up ISGA first and then negotiating the "core issues" are "viewed as irreconcilable."

TAGOT is not at all baffled. Nor is the critical Tamil intelligentsia within and outside the country deceived by Kumaratunga's blatant duplicity.

The attempt by President Kumaratunga to telescope the establishment of the ISGA into a discussion of "core issues" is an unprincipled machination to undermine the LTTE's proposal for an interim structure and to justify a return to war.

 

 

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