Executive Summary
As part of the project of analyzing
the role of non-state actors in building human
security, this paper reviews the role of armed groups
in the protection of civilian populations in internal
armed conflicts. It addresses the need to develop
effective strategies to enhance the receptivity and
compliance of armed groups to international
standards. Various factors influencing the
receptivity of armed groups are analyzed, including
military, political, economical and cultural issues.
Strategies of building the capacity of armed groups
to protect civilians and putting pressure on armed
groups are also reviewed
Foreword
Human security has recently emerged as
an innovative approach to address in a holistic manner
the sources of insecurity affecting people worldwide.
From the human security standpoint, the security of the
individual is no longer defined exclusively within the
realm of states and as a consequence of state security.
The origins of today's insecurities are diverse,
relating among others, to social, economical,
environmental, and health factors. These insecurities
increasingly transcend state borders and have global
consequences.
The term "human security" may be new but the ideas that
inspired it have developed over the last century and a
half from the founding of the ICRC in the 1864 through
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Human security takes the
safety of people as its point of reference. For humans
to be secure, their lives must be free from pervasive
threats, violent and otherwise, to their rights and
safety. The human security approach addresses
non-traditional threats to people's security related to
economic, food, health, and environmental factors as
well as issues such as drugs, terrorism, organized
crime, landmines and gender-based violence. It does not
offer a single definition of the content of human
security but aims to bring a more diversified
perspective to security interests. Human security is
about recognizing the importance the security needs of
the people side by side with those of states,
minimizing risks and taking preventive measures to
reduce human vulnerabilities, and taking remedial
action when preventive measures fail.
Non-state actors, from armed groups to private
corporations and NGOs play a critical role in
heightening or lessening human security. The measures
required to enhance human security often call for
action from numerous non-state actors, particularly
NGOs, in addressing, for example, the needs of the
displaced populations, advocating for stronger control
of the arms trade, or assisting governments in
preserving and restoring fragile environments. Human
security can act as a platform to engage non-state
actors, along with state actors, in addressing the
causes of global insecurity.
Non-state actors are particularly well suited to
engendering human security in the new world context.
Indeed, in the case of failed states, they are the only
actors who are present to do so. During internal
conflicts, non-state actors benefit from closer
involvement with the local community and greater
potential for local capacity building than traditional
actors. Non-state actors can and do play many roles in
the protection of human security. For example,
organizations such as the ICRC or Oxfam act as relief
agencies when governments are unable to respond to
emergency needs; NGOs such as the Community of
SanEgidio facilitate negotiations between warring
parties, and media efforts aim to rebuild peace, such
as Radio Ijambo in Rwanda. The Internet community is an
emerging and original actor engaged, for example, in
the reunification of families1.
These actors function without the
constraints of a narrow foreign policy mandate of state
institutions, with increased access to areas
inaccessible to official actors. They can talk to
several parties at once without losing credibility.
They can deal directly with grassroots populations and
operate without political or public scrutiny. In
addition, non-state actors can more effectively build a
network with civil society representatives and focus
with them on longer-term perspectives. They are less
subject to complaints of outside interference or
breaches of sovereignty. In short, these actors are
often more flexible than state actors especially in
internal conflict situations.
Evidently, the term "non-state actors" amalgamates a
large number of very different actors with distinct
roles in societies in conflict. Non-state actors
include armed groups, NGOs, corporations, educational
institutions, private donors, religious organizations,
the scientific community, private individuals, the
media and, increasingly, the internet community. Their
few shared characteristics result from their distinct
"unofficial" nature as compared to state actors, their
greater flexibility and often unaccountability under
national and international laws. There is an acute need
to distinguish better the various types of non-state
actors.
We can already observe the critical role played by
non-state actors in various key areas of human
security, including the illicit trade of small arms,
the recruitment of child soldiers, and the use of
landmines. The lead taken by non-state actors in the
establishment of the International Criminal Court and
the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty on the prohibition of
anti-personnel mines are only illustrations of the
growing importance of their role. Efforts should be
devoted to understand this role better and to identify
strategies to take full advantage of their
contributions to the elaboration and implementation of
international standards.
This paper focuses on the armed groups as non-state
actors engaged in violent action. It deals specifically
with the role and responsibility of armed groups with
regard to the implementation of international
humanitarian and human rights standards in situations
of internal armed conflict. The paper is limited to
this particular type of non-state actor and these
circumstances to illustrate the requirements and
benefits of a strategy engaging non-state actors on
human security issues. It is hoped that this exercise
will inspire further attempts to develop new strategies
to engage these and other non-state actors on human
security issues.
In a first section, this paper examines strategies to
engage armed groups in adhering to humanitarian law, a
result that would greatly improve human security among
the population at risk. It then examines the complexity
and diversity of armed groups and the inherent
vagueness of international law regarding non-state
actors, analyzing the opportunities and difficulties
encountered in engaging armed groups on humanitarian
and human rights standards. In the final section, the
paper reviews the main strategies for seeking the
implementation of international standards by armed
groups.
Armed Groups in Internal Armed Conflicts
Currently, one of the most dramatic
threats to human security is internal armed conflict.
In 1998 alone, violent conflicts took place in at least
25 countries. Out of these armed conflicts, 23 were
internal, engaging one or more non-state armed groups2.
A key feature of internal conflicts is the widespread
violation of humanitarian and human rights by armed
groups, from rebel movements to private militias3.
With the proliferation of weapons,
especially small arms and land mines, and the erosion
of state control, threats to human security are
increased both as people are the direct targets of
violence, and as a result of the organized crime and
random violence which occurs in these chaotic
conditions. Armed groups are certainly not accountable
for all violence perpetrated against civilians, but
their presence among civilians plays a definite role in
blurring the dividing line between combatants and
non-combatants, the basic concept on which humanitarian
protection rests. In this context, understanding and
promoting the responsibilities of armed groups toward
civilians has become a crucial element of protection
strategies4.
Despite the increased role of non-state armed groups in
internal conflicts, international humanitarian law
(IHL) and human rights standards offer only limited
opportunities to engage armed groups toward compliance,
whereas a collection of legal instruments has been
developed to supply state actors with a comprehensive
framework guiding the conduct of their combatants in
armed conflicts. This discrepancy between state and
non-state actors reveals the extent to which the
development of humanitarian law has been subjugated to
political considerations, denying any significant
protection function to armed groups compared to state
actors. Despite the critical role of armed groups in
internal conflicts, human rights law is de jure
applicable only to state entities and IHL offers only
general principles of protection under common Article 3
of the four Geneva Conventions and some rules of
engagement in Additional Protocol II. Moreover, the
conditions for the application of IHL are often not met
in low-intensity conflicts
Most armed groups have been barred from participating
in conferences on international standards applicable to
armed conflicts and contacts with armed groups remain
under intense political pressure from many sides. The
Rome Conference on the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court provides a recent
illustration of States' reluctance to recognize the
role of non-state armed groups in the implementation of
international standards.
While hundreds of non-governmental
organizations were represented at the Rome Conference
among the more than 130 state delegations, several in
an official capacity, no representatives of armed
groups were present. The Statute adopted at the
Conference in July 1998 offers very few provisions for
engaging armed groups, imposing obligations only on
States and individuals. In particular, the Statute
confers no legal authority on non-state actors in the
prosecution of war crimes despite the fact that the
leadership of armed groups is often the only body that
could actually exert control over non-state combatants.
One can legitimately question the practical relevance
of these legal developments in situations where
governments have lost their capacity to bring non-state
criminals to trial, or have relinquished this authority
as part of a peace process, as in Sierra Leone
regarding the RUF combatants.
Arguably, most armed groups would probably be unable to
fulfill adequately their obligations under
international treaties, due to their lack of capacity
or willingness to respect these standards in their
operations. As this same observation also applies in
large part to many state actors, particularly in
complex emergencies, the opportunity to engage armed
groups actively in the protection of civilians in
situations of armed conflicts should nevertheless be
sought. Armed groups are essentially involved in the
use of force outside legal and legitimate frameworks.
Efforts to engage these groups in the respect of
national or international standards may appear at best
naive, at worst corrupted by political considerations.
Yet, the long-standing experience of humanitarian
organizations, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and other major humanitarian
organizations engaging with various armed groups has
demonstrated the potential benefits of such a dialogue
for the civilian population. From a practical
perspective, armed groups remain key actors for
protection strategies:
as de facto governments within the territory
under their control;
as military entities active in
combat;
as authorities responsible for the protection
of humanitarian operations; and,
as political entities which may
eventually be party to a peace settlement.
Strategies for Seeking the Adherence
of Armed Groups to International Standards
Many practitioners argue that one
should distinguish two basic steps in approaching armed
groups on humanitarian issues. First, one must assess
the main characteristics of the group to be approached
and make a first determination of its cohesion to
evaluate the opportunity to engage in a productive
dialogue with the group. Although this determination
may sometimes require preliminary contacts with the
group, the aim is to develop a critical outlook on the
merit of a dialogue with an armed group aside from the
stance of its leadership on humanitarian issues. Once
this preliminary determination has been made, plans to
engage the group on a humanitarian dialogue should be
elaborated, taking into account various factors
influencing the group's receptivity to international
standards
Defining the main characteristics of armed groups
Most practitioners agree that the main characteristics
of armed groups should be identified prior to
engagement. However, as armed groups differ
considerably, from Mafia-like militias to religious
movements and corporate armies, common descriptions
should not be elaborated too specifically. Furthermore,
the purpose of the definition should not be to exclude
particular groups from protection strategies but to
identify minimum organizational standards that would
make contacts worthwhile. In this context, the main
characteristics of armed groups can be described as
follows:
a) A basic command structure:
The combatants are organized according to a unitary
command structure and follow its instructions. The
commanders have at least a minimum of control over the
conduct of the combatants, particularly regarding the
group's behavior toward civilians. A dialogue on
humanitarian issues with fragmented groups and groups
with strong internal dissension are likely to be
unproductive, if not counterproductive.
b) The use of violence to achieve
political ends:
The group is engaged in a political struggle, that is,
an attempt to redefine the political and legal basis of
the society through the use of violence. Violence is
often employed not as a military tactic aiming for a
takeover, but as a means to render the political status
quo unsustainable. Violence in this context can take
innumerable forms, particularly toward civilians,
including killing, raping, kidnapping, torture,
extortion, attacks on crops or water sources, local
markets, and toward civilian infrastructures such as
attacks on schools, administrative offices, ambushes on
commercial roads, power lines, etc. Combatants often
engage in parallel criminal activities, using force to
extract resources for their own benefits, through
extortion, drug trafficking, illegal timber or diamond
trade, etc. In many conflicts, such as in Colombia or
in Myanmar, the dual character of the combatants'
activities questions the cohesion of the group as a
political entity. The extent to which combatants are
allowed to engage in independent criminal activities is
a fair indicator of the degree of control of the
leadership over the group.
c) Independence from state control:
The issue of state control is often problematic. In
some situations, it may be difficult to distinguish
between autonomous pro-government forces, such as
paramilitary groups in Colombia, and
government-controlled paramilitary forces, such as the
South Lebanese Army in Israeli-occupied Lebanon.
Government control of paramilitary groups is difficult
to assess since it is often designed in part to make
the government unaccountable for the acts committed by
these forces. Logistical support from government forces
to paramilitary groups, such as air transport, is an
important but partial indicator of government control.
The degree of the control of the leadership over the
conduct of the combatants remains a key indicator of
the independence of the group.
Practitioners generally encourage
caution with groups whose characteristics fail to meet
one or more of these criteria, particularly with the
newly created groups, which often emerge within
collapsed states. Armed groups that are unable to
command their combatants and impose restraints over
their conduct are unlikely to engage constructively in
a dialogue on humanitarian issues. Such a dialogue may
also be dangerous for those conducting it. Groups to
which this applies include irregular and disorganized
combatants, criminal-type gangs, bandits and looters.
Inevitably, the violence perpetrated by these types of
groups requires a more coercive response, which falls
primarily under the responsibility of states to restore
and maintain public order within their territory.
International actors may also be involved under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter if the national government is
unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility.
Humanitarian organizations have learned through bitter
experience the risks incurred with the presence of
these loose groups, where humanitarian personnel
represent an easy prey for predatory groups.
Similarly, some have argued that the willingness of
armed groups to abide by fundamental humanitarian
principles should also be examined before engaging in
contacts, particularly with violent armed groups
notorious for ruthless and wanton conduct toward
civilians. Contacts with these groups may only provide
them with political legitimacy without any realistic
hope of improved behavior. Others, such as the ICRC,
believe that the evaluation of this characteristic
requires at least a minimal exchange of views with the
leadership of the group and one should not forfeit from
the outset any opportunity to seek compliance to
humanitarian standards from armed groups from this
consideration alone.
Evaluating the receptivity of armed groups to
international standards
Once an armed group has been selected
to be approached for a dialogue on humanitarian issues,
the success of the strategy depends largely on a
thorough analysis of the group's receptivity to
humanitarian and human rights standards. The group's
receptivity appears to be contingent on military,
political, economic, social and cultural factors.
Understanding the dynamic of the group in each of these
areas is essential for an evaluation of the willingness
and capacity of the group to abide by humanitarian and
human rights standards.
Military factors
Beyond the organizational characteristics of the groups
mentioned in the preceding section, there are
additional military factors to be considered, in
particular relating to the military and tactical
position of the group in the field.
From a military perspective, the principle that
combatants should be separated from civilians often
makes little sense to non-state armed groups. On the
contrary, non-state armed groups rely heavily on their
proximity to civilian populations:
to avert attacks from other parties
(e.g. Sri Lanka);
to sustain themselves in economic and human terms
(e.g. Sierra Leone, Sudan);
to consolidate their control over a territory and its
resources; (e.g. Colombia, Myanmar); and/or,
to exert pressure on the adverse party, by
terrorizing and displacing populations (e.g. DRC,
Burundi, Uganda)
Arguably, the receptivity of armed
groups to humanitarian standards in military terms
involves a capacity to dissociate to some extent the
groups' combatants from the surrounding civilian
population. This capacity depends on factors
including:
the vulnerability of the group to
attacks, aerial or otherwise;
its dependency on domestic resources as opposed to
foreign support (e.g. human resources from refugee
camps in border areas rather than local
villages);
the group's control over a territory; and,
the military advantages to be gained from displacing
large populations.
Humanitarian organizations and other
actors seeking the adherence of armed groups to
international standards may not be in a position to
influence these factors significantly. However, an
analysis of the military position of the group within
these parameters facilitates the planning of
negotiations with armed groups. Humanitarian
organizations can hardly expect armed groups under
strong pressure in the field to make landmark
concessions regarding their distance from the civilian
population. However, armed groups may be inclined to
consider practical measures to sustain the population
in time of crises to prevent forced displacements of
population by government forces. The extent to which
humanitarian organizations should consider or even
participate in such operations is always controversial.
Engagement with armed groups should always proceed with
full awareness of the military reality. Humanitarian
organizations should be prepared to propose innovative
arrangements (e.g. "humanitarian zones", "zone of
tranquility", humanitarian corridors, etc.) when
engaging with these groups to avert the worst abuses of
principles of humanitarian assistance by the parties to
the conflict
Political factors
The receptivity of armed groups to international
standards also depends on their organizational
structure. Armed groups can hardly be designated as a
single political category considering the extreme
diversity of their objectives and modus operandi.
Interestingly, the willingness of armed groups to
engage on humanitarian issues depends partly on the
internal political dynamic of the group. More
sophisticated groups tend to be more inclined toward
standards and codes of conduct whereas groups with
vaguer political objectives are more reluctant to
engage on standards they find counterintuitive. Some
groups have clear political objectives (e.g.: FARC or
ELN in Colombia), whereas others are filling a
political vacuum left by disintegrated states (e.g.
Somalia, Afghanistan). A critical aspect of efforts to
promote the protection of civilians is the extent to
which armed groups are seeking to gain and maintain
basic political legitimacy within their constituency
such as tribal area, ethnic or social group, region, or
within the international community.
Some would argue that the political legitimacy of armed
groups depends on their respect for certain norms of
behavior and the conformity of their action to societal
values, including basic humanitarian values. This
legitimacy is likely to be harmed by the brutal
behavior of the group's combatants against civilians.
To enhance their political stance, some groups will
seek to develop humanitarian and social services for
the population and refrain from attacking civilian
targets. This explains the PLO's change of strategy
after the deposition of its signature of the four
Geneva Conventions in 1989. Other groups, such as the
RUF in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola, to the
contrary, entirely disregard issues of legitimacy and
focus solely on access to natural resources for their
sustainability.
Finally, the receptivity of armed groups to
international standards relies to a certain extent on
the structure of their leadership. Armed groups with a
single cult-like leader, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka,
are unlikely to engage in a dialogue on humanitarian
standards whereas armed groups with a broader political
leadership are more likely to be willing to comply such
as the FARC in Colombia or SPLA in Sudan. Leaders who
are authoritarian in their treatment of their own
members often behave in a similarly suppressive fashion
toward the civilian population under their control.
Conversely, a group with a broadly democratic
leadership structure, which aspires to be a viable
political entity, will be more open to reform and
dialogue on the conduct of its combatants.
Humanitarian organizations can have a significant
influence on the political dynamic of an armed group.
They can maintain and nourish contacts within more
progressive segments of the group. They may favor the
establishment of internal processes for dialogue on
humanitarian issues5. In this context, one might
consider encouraging armed groups to establish a
"humanitarian wing" to serve as the basis of a group's
"health and social services" with which a dialogue on
technical matters could be engaged. Such a dialogue may
promote stricter compliance to international standards
within the ranks of the group
Economic factors
Although their influence seems evident, little
attention has been given by humanitarian organizations
to the economic motives of armed groups. The reason for
this is that wars have been traditionally approached as
tragic events, described in terms of human and economic
costs. To understand and develop protection strategies
on the basis of the economic motives of armed groups
requires a singularly different perspective on war,
where not only costs but also benefits are
acknowledged. Evidently, many humanitarian
organizations are not comfortable with this type of
calculation.
The prevalence of economic motives challenges the
traditional assumption that wars are conducted
primarily to defeat the enemy. In many cases such as
Sierra Leone, DRC and Angola, winning the war by
defeating the enemy has become a secondary goal. Wars,
and internal wars in particular, have become lucrative
enterprises where combatants are more likely to survive
and prosper than civilians. Understanding the political
economy of civil wars becomes as critical to the
planning of protection activities as understanding
political and military motives.
Fortunately, governments and international
organizations can interfere substantially in the
cost/benefit analysis of armed groups in support of
protection strategies through, for example, the
imposition of trade embargoes or financial sanctions.
Threats of coercive economic measures by the group's
sponsors may also provide considerable leverage on the
conduct of the group's combatants. The increasing
interaction between governments, the private sector and
humanitarian and human rights organizations may also
provide indications of practical measures to seek a
greater compliance of armed groups to international
standards based on their economic and commercial
affiliation.
Social and cultural factors
Armed groups are inherently social entities and their
existence has to be understood within their social
environment. A critical objective of protection
strategies is to embark armed groups on a path of
compliance based on their social and cultural values,
without interfering with the political issue at
conflict: their recognition as legitimate political
actors. For example, although Taliban fighters and
Northern Alliances forces in Afghanistan have been
fighting each other for years on ideological and
religious grounds, they are far closer to each other in
social and cultural terms than with any other groups or
entities in the world. Understanding the social and
cultural nature of armed groups is undoubtedly the most
important asset of protection strategies. To exert
influence on the perception of armed groups of their
obligations under international law, humanitarian
organizations, and the international community in
general, must be in a position to appreciate the social
and cultural environment of these groups. In many
situations, the basic principles of protection
strategies can be presented to armed groups in a way
that makes sense in social and cultural terms.
Interpreting international standards in social and
cultural terms does not require their perversion. On
the contrary, it may provide numerous ways of enticing
armed groups toward compliance. In these terms,
compliance to international standards involves:
saving the life and preserving the
dignity of civilians as an essential aspect of the
long-term accomplishment of the armed group;
improving the social stability in the zones under
their control and promote peaceful behaviors;
improving the effectiveness and cohesiveness of the
armed group as a social organization and reinforce
its social cohesion;
improving the group's legitimacy as a political actor
at the regional, national and international
level.
Some organizations, particularly human
rights NGOs, tend to oppose tactics that emphasize the
social and cultural perspectives of armed groups,
especially when this perspective contravenes
fundamental human rights standards. Although a
constructive dialogue on humanitarian issues should
allow all parties to express their perspective and
explain their position, humanitarian organizations
should remain cautious when engaging armed groups on
cultural grounds and avoid providing legitimacy to
practices that are considered illegal under
international law. Agreements signed with armed groups
should always recall from the outset the prevalence of
international standards.
Ensuring respect for international standards by armed
groups.
Strategies to gain the adherence of
armed groups to basic humanitarian standards must
include a series of practical steps for all parties to
ensure compliance to these standards. The real test of
the compliance of armed groups takes place in the
field. Without mechanisms to follow-up and monitor a
group's commitments, most of the provisions of
humanitarian agreements are likely to remain lettres
mortes. The most complex and underdeveloped aspect of
these strategies pertains to the actual implementation
of humanitarian standards by armed groups.
Similarly to interactions with governments,
humanitarian and human rights organizations can proceed
on the basis of two distinct approaches to the
implementation of international standards by armed
groups. Once the armed groups have agreed to comply
with international standards:
They can engage in a dialogue with
the armed groups and assist them in building their
capacity to respect humanitarian and human rights
norms; or,
They can aim at building pressure on armed groups by
shaming them in front of the international public and
their own constituency for violations of
international standards.
Each of these approaches has its
protagonists and its own record of proven successes and
deplorable failures. The two approaches differ with
respect to their perception of the main obstacles to
the implementation of international standards. The
first considers the main problem to be a lack of
capacity to ensure respect for international standard
which requires buttressing; the latter considers a lack
of willingness as the obstacle, indicating the need for
the exertion of political pressure to obtain respect
for the rules. Shaming an armed group that is unable to
implement the rules of IHL, for example because of
ignorance of the rules by the combatants, will serve no
useful purpose. Assistance to a group that is unwilling
to respect these rules, for example by providing
dissemination services to the combatants, will be used
only by the group only for its political value.
Therefore, a careful analysis of the most promising
path (building capacity vs. building pressure) should
be made at the outset.
Building capacity
Practically, responsibility for the instruction and
supervision of field commanders lies with the political
leadership of each group. Equally, responsibility for
the enforcement of the rules and the prosecution of
violators also lies with this leadership. This
responsibility is the basis for the group's
accountability for the respect of international
standards. It involves the ability to investigate the
alleged violations and the capacity to impose
corrective measures, including the prosecution and
punishment of accused violators. The participation of
the group's leadership in this effort helps re-enforce
its sense of accountability.
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
provides a practical framework for this type of
exercise. It calls on all parties to internal armed
conflicts to take part in the implementation of the
fundamental provisions of IHL with no influence on "the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict". Under
Common Article 3, an organized armed group is
considered a full Party to the implementation of the
fundamental provisions of IHL and an equal stakeholder
to States with regard to humanitarian issues, without
being conferred full legal status under international
law. Armed groups can sign official agreements under
IHL with international actors, such as the ICRC or UN
humanitarian agencies, and engage their responsibility
on humanitarian issues, providing some international
legitimacy as far as humanitarian issues are concerned.
More recent examples of this approach can be found in
various agreements and memorandums of understanding
with armed groups on humanitarian standards7.
Strategies to build the capacity of armed groups to
implement international standards begin with the
establishment of a dialogue with the leadership.
Personal links with the leadership and the development
of contacts over time are often required to build at
least a minimum of trust. Third parties, such as
members of the Diaspora, churches, political parties,
or NGOs, may provide useful assistance in establishing
these contacts. This process must be clear in its
objectives and principles of engagement both in
relation to the armed group, and with respect to the
international community that may raise doubts or set
obstacles to such endeavors. Building the capacity of
armed groups to respect international norms requires
the ability of the international community to deliver
such assistance. An organization should avoid promising
support it cannot afford. In this context, for example,
the demobilization of child soldiers requires not only
withdrawing their weapons, but the provision of
educational and nutritional programs for years to
come.
Building pressure
International public pressure ("name and shame") is a
preferred tool among human rights NGOs. Shaming armed
groups essentially questions their legitimacy within
their own constituency or domestic support group, their
Diaspora and the international community in general.
This action may have a significant impact on the
behavior of groups that are particularly dependent on
international support for their war efforts such as the
Rebel movements in Southern Sudan and their support
from the US government and American Christian support
groups. It has a much more limited impact on groups
that rely on local constituencies that are not
responsive to international public opinion such as the
Taliban Movement. Some have argued that the
indiscriminate use of shaming may be counterproductive
and encourage armed groups to rely increasingly on
forms of local extortion for their sustainability
(e.g.: LTTE in Sri Lanka, RUF in Sierra
Leone).
Human rights organizations and humanitarian agencies
are in fact complementary in their approach. Without
the pressure of advocacy groups, most offers of
humanitarian agencies to engage with armed groups would
have little impact, or this impact would quickly erode
in the face of military, political and economic factors
previously mentioned. To ensure that both strategies
are used in an optimal manner, efforts should be made
to distinguish humanitarian organizations from advocacy
groups, in terms of institution and mandate. The
establishment of a dialogue with armed groups is a long
and tedious operation. Any reference made to shaming
acts in this context by similar organizations only
complicates the work of humanitarian organizations
engaging into this process.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to elaborate a set of strategies to
engage armed groups in the implementation of
humanitarian and human rights standards. These
strategies will remain largely experimental as the type
of situations and armed groups evolve constantly.
Therefore, these observations should not be seen as a
recipe for engaging armed groups, but rather as a
series of reflections from practitioners on their own
experience.
However, engaging armed groups on humanitarian issues
should not be considered an experience of limited
value. On the contrary, establishing a concrete and
sustainable dialogue with armed groups on the
protection of civilians may well represent the most
important challenge facing human security. Among all
sources of insecurity, the threats posed by internal
armed conflict to civilians are the most tangible
problem to be addressed, far simpler than issues
related to poverty, global warming, or the arms trade.
It is because of the tangible and humane character of
the benefits of this engagement that we are summoned to
approach armed groups with a new perspective on people
security.
Several strategies are available to engage armed groups
on humanitarian issues, from building pressure on the
groups as political entities to building their capacity
as administrative organizations. Each of these
strategies requires a careful analysis of the
vulnerabilities of armed groups and their receptiveness
to international standards. More importantly, they
require serious efforts in coordinating the actions of
the international community to avoid neutralizing each
others' progress with respect to armed groups. The
international community is unlikely to adhere to such a
comprehensive agenda in a concerted manner. Ultimately,
the effectiveness of such action relies on the
professionalism of state and non-state actors in the
field.
