�Conquering Kilinochchi�: Military delusions that ruin Sri Lanka

�Conquering Kilinochchi�: Military delusions that ruin Sri Lanka
Vasantha Raja in Lanka Eye, 11 January 2009
"If the LTTE succeeds in developing a political strategy to unite the Tamils under a united front and approach the southern mass movement in a productive way, the situation can change in totally unexpected ways. The Sinhala mass movement also should realize that an alliance with the Tamil side would be crucial for their own emancipation in the oncoming economic demise of the island. In other words, Sinhala and Tamil liberation are inseparably linked, and they merely reflect two sides of the same coin... Since Independence anti-Tamil racism has been an effective weapon in the hands of the rulers to split Sri Lankan masses along communalist lines and protect the status-quo. This has happened before. Predictably, it will happen again - next time on a far wider scale. Right now this may seem unrealistic. But soon it won't; global credit crunch will make sure of that..."
Comment by tamilnation.org

See also Nadarajah Thangathurai's Dock Statement, 1983 - and that was 25 years ago -

"You must not run away with the thought that our sole objective is to establish Tamil Eelam. Tamil Eelam certainly remains an objective because we have learnt through bitter experience over the past several years that it is only by establishing a State of Tamil Eelam can Tamils live with self respect. But our vision is broader than that. Our vision is global. Wherever there is oppression, wherever there is violation of human dignity, whether in Africa or in Latin America, we are prepared to link hands with the oppressed and the under dog. When our vision is so global how can it fail to take into account the future good of the Sinhala people?... There is nothing that prevents two neighbouring nations living in co-operation. Even nations with differing policies get together for common economic good and for the purpose of common security. Does that mean that those nations give up their distinctive characteristics or sovereignty? .. Believe me our freedom is an assured fact and will come. Once that happens your law books and terrorist laws cannot touch us. Thereafter you will be the sole 'beneficiaries' of the very laws that oppress us now..."

There may also be a need to reflect on the views of those like Benedict Anderson and V.Kiernan - (see also, generally - What is a nation? and On Civic Nationalism & Ethno Nationalism)

"Nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and precisely for that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted. How else to account for the use, for over a century of the concept of the 'national bourgeoisie' without any serious attempt to justify theoretically the relevance of the adjective? Why is this segmentation of the bourgeoisie - a world class in so far as it is defined in terms of the relations of productions - theoretically significant?" (*Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities - Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism )

"'A nation is not merely a historical category , but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism.' Stalin's formula appears in many ways close to the mark, but it applies much better to the handful of original nation states in the West than to their imitations further a field; it applies far less well still to the majority of nationalist movements as distinct from nations. Marxism has often slurred over the distinction between these two things, and made modern nationalism, as well as the classical nation state, an alter ego of capitalism... Like religion,.. or any other great emotive force, nationalism is ambivalent, and can escape very completely from a prescribed political channel. Even in its origins, it was a complex phenomenon, deriving both from the solidarity and from the divisions of society. It would have astonished Marx to see socialism owing so much to partnerships with nationalism in Afro-Asia and in the Soviet Union during the second world war... " (V.Kiernan - 'Nationalist Movements and Social Classes' in Anthony D Smith (Ed): Nationalist Movements)

And, there may be a need to reflect carefully on the views of those like Alex Salmond and Sean Connery on the Scottish national question -

"The 18th-century Union (of England and Scotland) is past its sell-by date. It's gone stale for both our nations. What we both need now are the political and economic powers to make our nations work, to tailor policies to suit our different circumstances, and to speak for ourselves in Europe and the wider world -while acting together where our interests converge... As our world has become more complex and inter-connected, the need for nations to be independent with a direct say in regional and global affairs has become more important - not less. In 1945, there were only 51 members of the new United Nations. In our new century, there are nearly 200 independent UN members - and more than 30 of these have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Thus in the modern world, the processes of independence and interdependence are mutually supportive and reinforcing. The political imperative to share the same state for reasons of building a large domestic market, or great power projection, is a fundamentally outdated 19th-and 20th-century concept. In the self-determination stakes, the people of Scotland are ahead of the game both in thought and deed. But I suspect that the people of England are beginning to catch up. .." On Scotland and the "English Question" - Alex Salmond, Scottish National Party Leader, 20 March 2007
"..My politics come from a simple belief: that my country, Scotland, should have equal status with the nearly 200 other independent countries around the world." Sean Connery, in Making History in Scotland, Dawn 28 May 2007

The assassination of Lasantha Wickramatunga, the editor of 'Sunday Leader' - undoubtedly the most effective critic of the Rajapaksa administration - marked the climax of hunting down several political journalists during the past few years. Just three days back gunmen with grenades attacked the biggest private TV station in the country, and the event is widely seen as part of the present administration's effort to suppress dissent.

Killings of influential 'anti-war' journalists, however, may also be linked to right-wing nationalist formations among extremist Sinhala-Buddhist circles too - no doubt, with military, political and underworld links. [Apparently, a "state within the state" with fascist leanings is taking form behind the scenes, as some claim] Amidst rising military euphoria, continuation of attacks on media critical of the war is likely to come from such secret organisations rather than individual politicians, I think.

However, the government's intensifying efforts to bridle free media must not be underestimated on that account at all. But, the question is this: why would an immensely popular government amongst the Sinhalese majority ruthlessly stifle the media? Does the government want to hide something? Is the military picture in the north and the state of the economy not as rosy as what the government wants us to believe?

In fact, a sober appraisal of the military and the economic situation in the country does raise some questions. Let me explain:

Clearly, the overwhelming majority of Sri Lanka's army is now stretched to its limits in Tamil areas. SL Army consists of 13 Divisions; out of which 12 divisions are now occupying North & East under 3 Operational Commands in Jaffna peninsula, Vanni districts and the East. Only one division left in Colombo [Panagoda] to protect the entire south, including Colombo.

Thus, over 100,000 soldiers are occupying Tamil areas - primarily as garrisons concentrated mainly in tiny towns surrounded by the jungle. They are virtually all ethnically Sinhalese soldiers stuck in the midst of a hostile population that perceive the troops as aliens and enemies.

In contrast, Vanni jungles - from where Tigers would operate guerrilla attacks - stretch from the east coast to the west coast of the island's north covering vast regions like a buffer zone separating the Jaffna peninsula from the south. Obviously, the jungles are inaccessible to conventional forces in the normal way.

Tigers know the thick forests of Vanni like the back of their hands, whereas the Sinhala soldiers are only limited to the few available roads, like the A9, and the towns. Thus, the logistics and supply routes become crucial. The military has to provide regular supplies from the south to maintain the garrisons; and the supply routes will constantly be under the threat of guerrilla attacks.

Quite apart from the supply routes' vulnerability, this is going to be a hugely expensive task. Under the present economic circumstances, this could amount to a virtual nightmare, to say the least.

Vanni region is ideal for guerrilla forces, but not so for conventional forces. The might of Sri Lanka's army and the air-force will have to be limited to the towns. Tigers know this.

Tigers and the civilians left the Tiger capital - razed to the ground by aerial bombing - before the end of December. That was the sign that they had on the whole resumed a guerrilla mode of existence, leaving the army to stretch themselves to the maximum.

If this ends up as a long-term military occupation surrounded by a sophisticated guerrilla force nurtured by the Tamil community, the implications would be ominous.

Although Tigers' similar tactical transformations have happened before, this time round there are two new significant factors: Firstly, this is the first time Sri Lanka's army is almost entirely mobilized to occupy the entire north & east. Secondly, Sri Lanka's economic circumstances have never been so dangerously vulnerable.

In particular, one must not underestimate the fact that this is happening at a time when the deepening global recession and the impact of the credit crunch are about to hit Sri Lanka's economy really hard. Social unrest in the south seems unavoidable. If the Sinhala majority's high hopes to see LTTE's demise soon end up in disillusionment, the consequences could be terrible. The government must be fully conscious of this eventuality and it knows the presently rising support could quickly turn into anger. Clearly, the government wants a media that somehow help keep the delusion intact - particularly at a time when the SL Army is bogged down in the Tamil-dominated war zone.

In my view, southern political establishment will be doomed, unless they come up with a political solution that is unambiguously appealing to the Tamils, and negotiate that with the LTTE. However, judging from what is happening now - such as banning the LTTE, media attacks and fast rising supremacism among the Sinhalese etc. - a convincingly attractive political package for Tamils' consumption is unlikely, to say the least. Gullible journalists who swallowed the military interpretation of the war have now convinced the Sinhala people of their leaders' ability to impose their own 'solution' on the Tamils.

Amazingly, most local and foreign journalists saw the capture of Kilinochchi as a major defeat for the Tigers; the truth is it is only a symbolic defeat, and certainly of immense propaganda value to the government. The real significance of the Kilinochchi battle is that it has convinced the Tigers it's time to forget the mini-state and resume guerrilla war.

Realistically, guerrilla warfare is more effective and useful for them than the conventional form. It was probably Tigers' separatist ideology that pushed them to have their mini-state. But, defending it militarily against the SL forces is not a viable proposition at all - even if it has clearly demonstrated the LTTE's organizational skills and the commitment. Financially, it has been a huge burden on the LTTE and the Tamil people. In terms of human lives and peoples' misery it has been a disaster.

Ironically, the Rajapaksa regime has unwittingly taught a valuable lesson to the Tigers: that the Colombo administration will not leave any town within Tamil regions for the Tigers to build mini-states. But, in doing so the government has forced the LTTE to resort to guerrilla warfare. Consequently, Sri Lankan government will now have a far more dangerous situation in its hands than ever before.

Tigers' statelet was useful for the LTTE to show the world that they can run a state smoothly as responsible statesmen. But what has the global leaders done to promote their case? Bitter experiences so far have proved that the energy spent on maintaining a mini-state is a waste of time, money and lives. What is needed is to intervene politically - backed by a guerrilla army of course - to unite the people under a common banner and foster links with the southern mass movement.

Paradoxically, the Rajapaksa brothers' ruthless war has forced the Tigers to see the truth, and I think, before long the SL government will realise that it has committed a big blunder by 'educating' the Tigers and pitching its "entire" army in the midst of a massive jungle, a refined guerrilla force and a hostile population.

If the LTTE succeeds in developing a political strategy to unite the Tamils under a united front and approach the southern mass movement in a productive way, the situation can change in totally unexpected ways. The Sinhala mass movement also should realize that an alliance with the Tamil side would be crucial for their own emancipation in the oncoming economic demise of the island. In other words, Sinhala and Tamil liberation are inseparably linked, and they merely reflect two sides of the same coin.

Since Independence anti-Tamil racism has been an effective weapon in the hands of the rulers to split Sri Lankan masses along communalist lines and protect the status-quo. This has happened before. Predictably, it will happen again - next time on a far wider scale. Right now this may seem unrealistic. But soon it won't; global credit crunch will make sure of that.