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Nato, Kosovo
& Tamil Eelam
24 April 1999
"...The coming months
will show the fate in store for the Kosovars. The truth
is that in so far as Kosovo is concerned, Milosovich's
Yugoslavia and NATO are not that far apart. They are
both opposed to the creation of an independent Kosovo.
Neither of them want a Muslim Greater Albania in the
heart of Europe. They both proclaim their support for a
multi ethnic Kosovo within a multi ethnic Yugoslavia.
They both wish to retain the existing territorial
boundaries of Yugoslavia. The degree of autonomy is
a matter of
emphasis.
Milosovich fears that
greater autonomy will lead to secession. NATO fears
that repression will lead to an increase in extra
regional Muslim influence and in that way to secession.
Milosovich believes that he can put down Kosovar
resistance if NATO stays out. But NATO fears that even
if Milosovich succeeds, this will strengthen the
Yugoslav-Russia-Belraus link with far reaching
implications for the future of the European
Union.
..Many years ago, in
the early 1980's, a US diplomat in Washington
reflecting on India's support for the Tamil militants,
remarked that India was not a super power and should
not try to behave like one. Today, NATO is seeking to
demonstrate to both Yugoslavia and Russia (and to the
world) that Russia is not a super power and that
the time has come for both Russia and Yugoslavia to
recognise the lead role of NATO in Europe.
Unsurprisingly, it has been announced that the US and
the European Union stand ready to introduce a mini
'Marshall Plan' to rehabilitate war torn Yugoslavia
after the cessation of hostilities..."
 All war is
based on deception...
NATO
intervention in Kosovo a case in point....
Why
did NATO launch its air attacks on
Yugoslavia...
Countries go to war to
protect their national interests...
NATO's
two strategic objectives...
Coming
months will show the fate in store for the
Kosovars...
[see also Understanding
Kosovo - Nadesan Satyendra, 31 October 1998]
All war
is based on deception...
A thousand years ago, Sun Tzu remarked
that all war is based on deception. Today, liberal
democracies who go to war, extend that deception to
their own people as well. Faced with the need to secure
the consent of their people, they set about
manufacturing it. Partial truths, and on occasion,
outright falsehoods are put out for public consumption
so that public opinion will be supportive of the action
taken by the ruler.
Usually, many years after a war is
over, classified documents are released into the public
domain - and journalists and historians dig up the
facts. The cynicism of real politick is then admitted,
and even condemned - until, ofcourse, the next time.
It was some years after the fiasco of
the Suez invasion in 1956, that the conspiracy between
Great Britain, France and Israel was revealed. The
three countries had agreed that Israel should invade
Egypt and that France and Great Britain would then
land troops in the Suez 'to keep the peace' between
Israel and Egypt! The true objective of the invasion
was to reverse Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez
Canal.
The first bombing of North Viet Nam by
the US in 1964, was justified as a response to an
alleged 'torpedo attack' by Viet Nam on two US
destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf. It later transpired that
the torpedo attack was fabricated to secure public
support for the escalation of the conflict. Such
examples can be multiplied ad nauseam.
NATO
intervention in Kosovo a case in
point....
The continuing NATO intervention in
Kosovo is a current case in point. The stated reason
for the intervention is the need to save the Kosovo
Albanians from the oppression of Slobadan
Milosovich's Yugoslavia. Television, the media and
commentators are full of their concern for the
humanitarian tragedy faced by the Kosovo Albanians.
Well meaning non governmental organisations are
mobilised to organise relief - and millions of people
contribute, and in this way NATO secures broad based
support for its 'just, humane and self less'
intervention.
But if the intervention was dictated
simply by humanitarian considerations, why was there no
intervention, for instance, in South Africa during
decades of oppression by white supremacists? Again in
more recent times, the suffering in Rwanda and Somalia
was arguably even greater - but there was no
intervention.
It is then contended that Kosovo is in
the heart of Europe and therefore cannot be ignored.
But hundreds of thousands of Serbs were forced to flee
Croatia a few years ago, but that did not result in
armed intervention by NATO.
It is urged that Albanians fleeing
repression in Kosovo would cause a refugee crisis and
that that would destabilise the region. But if this be
the reason, did not NATO foresee the real likelihood
(if not, the certainty) that NATO air attacks, would
leave the Kosovo Albanians at the receiving end of
retaliatory attacks by the Yugoslav armed forces and
para military - and result in even more hundreds of
thousands of Kosovo Albanians seeking refuge in
adjoining countries?
It cannot be that what was obvious to
journalists and commentators around the world, somehow
escaped the attention of NATO. For NATO Foreign
Ministers to assert glibly that they had not
anticipated the refugee exodus is to put their
credibility seriously in doubt.
Again, it will be naive to suggest, as
some have, that NATO had not thought all this through.
The presumption must be that NATO had in fact, thought
it through, and that it did recognise that the attack
would in all likelihood result in a massive refugee
crisis. NATO was not unaware that air attacks on
Yugoslavia would not provide a 'quick fix' to the
conflict. The examples of London and Bremen during the
Second World War and the more recent carpet bombing of
North Viet Nam were not unknown to NATO.
Why did NATO
launch its air attacks on
Yugoslavia...
Why then did NATO launch its air
attacks on Yugoslavia? When confronted with this
question, NATO spokesmen assert that in the face of
Slobadan Milosovich's refusal to sign the Ramboulliet
Accord (which was intended to protect the Kosovars)
they had no other option. But is that right?
If NATO was concerned to protect the
Kosovars from attack by the Milosovich regime, why did
not NATO pay heed to the views of Albanians such as
Professor Qosja who, in recent years has become a
father figure of the Albanian nation:
"...The international
community, the European Union and the United States,
still think they can solve the question of Kosovo by
ensuring human rights and autonomy
within Serbia. This shows that they do not
understand the issue involved and approach the
problem of Kosovo in a superficial manner. If they
understand the essence of the issue, they would
realise that public order, peace and justice can
never be established in Kosovo until it is united with Albania..."
(Interview with Rexhep Qosja quoted in
Kosovo : In the Heart of the Powder Keg - East
European Monographs, No 478 - compiled
and Edited by Robert Elsie, distributed by the
Columbia University Press, 1997)
Why was NATO unwilling to recognise
that public order, peace and justice can never be
established in Kosovo until it is united with Albania?
Why was NATO willing to launch air attacks against the
sovereign state of Yugoslavia to 'save the Kosovars',
but was unwilling to create a union of Kosovo and
Albania where the Kosovars may live with the security
afforded by their own armed forces? If the answer is
that NATO was unwilling to countenance the
dismemberment of a sovereign state, why were NATO
countries only too willing to recognise the separation
of Croatia from Yugoslavia a few years ago? What did
NATO have in mind?
Countries go to war to
protect their national interests...
Countries go to war to protect their
national interests. NATO is no exception. NATO's
intervention was directed to secure its perceived
strategic interests. What, then, were those interests
that made the suffering of hundreds of thousands of
Kosovars, as well as the destruction of Yugoslavia, a
price worth paying? A price worth paying - because,
NATO cannot pretend that the real risk of that
suffering and that destruction was not foreseen.
To understand why NATO launched its air
attacks, it will be instructive to ask: what is it that
would have happened if NATO had not intervened?
President Milosovich, faced with
demands by Kosovo Albanians for independence and union
with Albania, would have continued with his effort to
crush Kosovar resistance - in the same way as President
J.R.Jayawardene unleashed Genocide'83 on
the Tamil people in the island of Sri Lanka.
President Milosovich who had labelled
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) a terrorist
organisation, would have set about annihilating it - in
the same way as President J.R.Jayawardene who had
declared the LTTE a terrorist organisation, sent his
Army commander to ruthlessly annihilate
Tamil resistance in 1979.
Again, the KLA had established links
with radical Muslim organisations in the Middle East
and Afghanistan - in the same way that Tamil militant
organisations had established links with the PLO and
Libya in the 1980s. To do nothing and permit Slobadan
Milosovich to clamp down on Kosovo resistance, may have
led to the KLA receiving increased support from its
natural allies in the Muslim world.
NATO was concerned
that if President Milosovich continued his onslaught on
the Kosovars, that over time, extra regional Muslim
influence may grow and a Greater Albanian Muslim state
may emerge in the heart of Europe - a Greater Albania
which may have found support from Albanians in
Macedonia as well.
NATO's concerns were
not dissimilar to those of India (in the late 1970s
and early 1980s) that an independent Tamil Eelam, with
extra regional support, may lead to the establishment
of a Greater Tamil state.
Additionally (and
equally importantly) if NATO had not
intervened, Milosovich may have been encouraged to
strengthen Yugoslavia's eastward stance and the links
with Russia. The recent decision of the Yugoslav
Parliament to seek a political union of Russia, Belarus
and Yugoslavia reflects Yugoslav's attempt to set a
course different to that of a European Union
underpinned by NATO.
NATO's concerns were not dissimilar to
the concerns that Indira Gandhi had about President
J.R.Jayawardene's west leaning government. Indira
Gandhi sought to use the Tamil militant movement to
destabilise Sri Lanka, and in this way apply pressure
to move Sri Lanka away from the west, and thereby
exclude extra regional forces from the Indian
region.
If President J.R.Jayawardene was not
persuaded, Indira Gandhi was willing to commit ground
troops to 'save the Tamils' and bring about a change in
government with her friend from non-alignment days,
Mrs.Bandaranaike, in power in the South - in the same
way as NATO may now be willing to commit ground troops
to overthrow Milosovich, and put in place an
'acceptable' Yugoslav leadership.
Again, in the same way as there were
clear limits to the extent to which India was willing
to arm the Tamil militant movement in the early 1980s,
there were clear limits to the extent to which NATO
would arm the KLA.
Indira Gandhi had no intention of
setting up an independent Tamil Eelam, though Indian
agencies encouraged groups such as TELO to believe that
Tamil Eelam was round the corner. NATO, too, was not
in the business of creating a strong and independent
Kosova Liberation Army which would not compromise on
its demand for an independent Kosovo and union with
Albania.
In addition, NATO would not have
been unmindful of the fate suffered by Bangladesh,
which was brought into existence with the assistance of
Indira Gandhi's India. The Indian armed forces helped
to install Mujib Rahman as President of Bangladesh. The
Indian army not only rid Bangladesh of the Pakistani
armed forces but also annihilated the indigenous
Bangladeshi Mukti Bhani resistance movement. India
believed that in this way, it would secure a more
pliable and friendly neighbour. However, the honeymoon
was short-lived and ended with the overthrow of Mujib
Rahman, a few years later. NATO may have been concerned
that an independent Muslim Kosovo united with Albania
may not, for long, remain a 'client' state indebted to
those who may have helped to establish it.
NATO's
two strategic objectives...
Sufficient, perhaps has been said, to
render NATO's strategic interests clear. The conclusion
is inescapable that the Ramboulliet Accord and NATO
intervention to enforce that Accord, were intended to
achieve two major objectives. On the one hand, NATO
was concerned with the longer term implications of a
Muslim state in the heart of Europe, particularly in
the context of US policy towards Iraq, Sudan,
Afghanistan, and Israel. On the other hand, NATO was
concerned to secure its dominance in Europe and prevent
a consolidation of a relatively independent
Russia-Belraus-Yugoslav union of the Slav people.
NATO's preferred option was to give
limited support to the KLA, push Slobadan Milosovich to
adopt a more conciliatory approach, grant 'autonomy'
and then strike a deal with the Kosovo 'moderates' and
this way marginalise the KLA. Hence, the Ramboulliet
Accord and the attempt to compel Slobadan Milosovich to
sign up not only to 'autonomy' but also to a NATO
peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The peace keeping force
was not simply to protect the Kosovar's from the Serbs.
It was also to prevent the KLA from seeking assistance
from outside Muslim agencies and eventually leading a
campaign for a Greater Albania.
In 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force
was welcomed by the Tamil people as their
'protectors'. But the IPKF had come not to protect the
Tamil people from the Sinhala army but to enforce
the
'autonomy' provided by the 13th Amendment to the Sri
Lanka Constitution. And
India sought to rely on so called 'moderate' Tamil
parties, such as the TULF and the EPRLF to push forward
its agenda.
NATO too has been at pains to cultivate
Kosovar 'moderates' who can play Amirthalingam's role
in any future accord. In 1992, though the Kosovo
Albanian Parliament declared a so called Republic of
Kosovo, no government, not even the Albanian government
recognised it. Significantly, the 'seat' of the
'Government of the Republic of Kosovo' was stated to be
in Bonn in Germany. Professor Qosja has
remarked:
"How can I recognise a national
'government' which calls itself a government while
under Serbian occupation?... How can I recognise a
(Kosovan) President, a Member of parliament or a
Minister who travels through the country carrying a
Serbian I.D., who crosses the border of Kosovo using
a Serbian Passport and who fulfils all his duties as
a citizen of Serbia?... It is a tragi-comedy staged
in order to smother resistance...." (Interview
with Rexhep Qosja quoted in
Kosovo : In the Heart of the Powder Keg - East
European Monographs, No 478 - compiled
and Edited by Robert Elsie, distributed by the
Columbia University Press, 1997)
Eelam Tamils may see some
parallels with the tragi-comedy played out by the TULF
leader, Appapillai Amirthalingam, whilst being a guest
of the Government of India in 1980s.
Coming
months will show the fate in store for the
Kosovars...
The coming months will show the fate in
store for the Kosovars. The truth is that in so far as
Kosovo is concerned, Milosovich's Yugoslavia and NATO
are not that far apart. They are both opposed to the
creation of an independent Kosovo. Neither of them want
a Muslim Greater Albania in the heart of Europe. They
both proclaim their support for a multi ethnic Kosovo
within a multi ethnic Yugoslavia. They both wish to
retain the existing territorial boundaries of
Yugoslavia.
The degree of autonomy is a matter of
emphasis.
Milosovich fears that greater autonomy
will lead to secession. NATO fears that repression will
lead to an increase in extra regional Muslim influence
and in that way to secession. Milosovich believes that
he can put down Kosovar resistance if NATO stays out.
But NATO fears that even if Milosovich succeeds, this
will strengthen the Yugoslav-Russia-Belraus link with
far reaching implications for the future of the
European Union. NATO seeks to use the Kosovo resistance
to destabilise Milosovich and to move Yugolslavia away
from Russia and towards West.
As for the Kosovars, hundreds of
thousands may be rendered homeless, thousands may also
die and the KLA may be effectively annihilated. In the
end, a deal may be struck with Yugoslavia, not
dissimilar to the 1987 Indo
Sri Lanka Accord, and 'moderate' Kosovar leaders
will welcome the grant of 'autonomy' within Yugoslavia
with an 'international' peace keeping force that will
secure NATOs dominance in Europe. Here, the question is
not whether Russian troops will be a part of that peace
keeping force or not, but under whose
command the force will function. After all, in
the broader picture, Russia too has a role to play - so
long as it recognises the dominant role of the world's
sole super power.
Many years ago, in the early 1980's, a
US diplomat in Washington reflecting on India's support
for the Tamil militants, remarked that India was not a
super power and should not try to behave like one.
Today, NATO is seeking to demonstrate to both
Yugoslavia and Russia (and to the world) that Russia
is not a super power and that the time has come for
both Russia and Yugoslavia to recognise the lead role
of NATO in Europe. Unsurprisingly, it has been
announced that the US and the European Union stand
ready to introduce a mini 'Marshall Plan' to
rehabilitate war torn Yugoslavia after the cessation of
hostilities.
Here, there may be a need for the US to
recognise that the old style 'command - control' method
of leadership will yield diminishing returns in an
increasingly 'politically awakened' world. Hierarchical
authority may secure a measure of compliance in the
short term but it will fail to foster genuine
commitment and stability. If the US aspires to world
leadership, it will need to recognise that
leadership will not come simply by the display of
military might and economic power.
To lead you need to serve. If the
United States seeks to lead the world, it will need to
look beyond its own narrow national interests. To lead
the world, it will need to serve the interests of the
peoples of the world - and the Fourth
World is a part of today's enduring political
reality.
Kosovo represents, in part,
the unfinished business of the dismantling of the
Ottoman empire. The
significance of Prishtina to the Serb people should
not be (and cannot be) ignored. Ottomon rule left
behind artificial territorial boundaries which had
little to do with securing the national identities of
the peoples on whom rule had been imposed. The task of
restructuring existing state boundaries may be complex
and fraught with difficulty but there may be no other
way of securing stability and peace. There may be a
need for the United States to pay more attention to
that which Bernard
Q. Nietschmann said as long ago as 1985:
"Most of the world's conflicts are between states
and nations, yet almost
all international efforts to prevent and contain war
and to promote peace are directed to state against
state conflicts. With 168 states asserting the right
and power to impose sovereignty and allegiance upon
more than 3000 nations, conflicts occur that cannot
be contained or hidden, nor resolved on a
state-to-state basis...
....Increasingly, the Fourth World is emerging as
a new force in international politics because in the
common defense of their nations, many indigenous
peoples do not accept being mere subjects of
international law and state sovereignty and
trusteeship bureaucracies. Instead, they are
organizing and exerting their own participation and
policies as sovereign
peoples and nations..."
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