The Norwegian peace initiative
was not only fated to fail but was stillborn
because it had excluded other parties, says a
Norwegian professor who is widely regarded as
the founder of the academic discipline of peace
research.
Prof Johan Galtung was in Sri Lanka earlier
this month to deliver a talk on the peace
process. In a subsequent email interview with
The Island, Galtung said there had been "no real
peace process, no real track, only meetings
centered on the CFA". Excerpts:
Q: You have expressed the opinion that the
Norwegian peace initiative in Sri Lanka was a
failure and that this had been predictable due
to the methodology of the Norwegians. Could you
please elaborate? A: Let us start with a distinction
between ceasefire talks and peace talk. They
are not the same thing. For a ceasefire you
obviously have to engage the two belligerent
parties, in this case LTTE and GoSL. But you
also need excellent contacts with other
parties. Any party left out of such
important matters may easily turn against
any accord: "We were not consulted? You will
be hearing from us". In the Basque case, in
Spain, it was a major mistake not to involve
the opposition, and not to involve Basques
opposed to ETA. Multi-layered talks may be
one approach. And in Sri Lanka, the
cohabitation system might easily lead a
Chandrika to oppose whatever a Ranil has
signed, or vise versa. Any focus on two
parties only will dialectically lead to a
flourishing of conflicts, with an
opposition, with a JVP, a JHU here, and or
Karuna there. Their views have to be
reflected from early on. For peace talks,
this is absolutely crucial. At least three
from the south, among them Government of Sri
Lanka, three Tamil groups, among them LTTE,
and the Muslims�seven as a minimum. Q: You have also
said that Norway had failed in the Mideast peace
process due to the same unsuccessful methods
that they had applied to Sri Lanka. What do you
mean? A: Norway initiated a process between
Arafat-PLO and Rabin-Labour. I do not think
it was very difficult to predict the
reaction of right wing Israel and left wing
Palestine, both excluded. Rabin was
murdered, and Hamas started suicide bombing.
The idea of making peace in the middle and
let it spread to the wings of the spectrum
makes sense in Norwegian domestic politics,
maybe excluding only five to 10%. If you
exclude more than 50%, the failure is
imminent. The process did not die, it was
still born. But I would like to add a
point: Please don�t see this as something
particularly Norwegian. The focus on two
parties trying to make a deal is a part of
an unfortunate diplomatic tradition. The
desire to broker a deal is so high, for all
kinds of reasons, that third parties are
easily blackmailed: "If you invite those
people forget about any facilitation." Q: How do you
think the Norwegians could have done this
differently? The Norwegians issued a statement
recently saying they had tried without success
to broad-base the peace process. Is it,
therefore, more the fault of the main parties
rather than the Norwegians that the scope was so
narrow? A: Do not always go for the top people.
Try it out at lower levels. Grassroots
people are often much more reasonable. The
leaders may be leaders precisely because
they have very strong views. But they may
also change them to keep the leadership
position, being unpredictable. Let 1000
local dialogues among people blossom, listen
carefully for ideas, let the GNIP�Gross
National Idea Product�grow. This is what
happened in Northern Ireland with the help
of women and clergy from both sides. The
"silent majority", 85% unnoticed by
explosion-hungry media, was mobilized. But
they also had important political talents on
the Sinn Fein side. Something is
personality. And something in Sri Lanka is
politicking, not politics. However, if you
bring in more views then a situation may
look even worse. Much creativity is needed
to reconcile, say, Indians, Pakistanis and
Kashmiris over that issue�and they all have
legitimate points, like the parties in Sri
Lanka. It is tempting to limit a process to
two parties for intellectual ease. Q: There is
considerable criticism about the cease-fire
agreement drafted by the Norwegians. Even die
hard peace activists concede that it is too much
in the LTTE�s favour. Would you agree and, if
so, did this have an impact on Sri Lanka�s peace
process? What can the Norwegians do now? A: I see the
CFA more as a technical matter. The
critique is well known, but I do not find
CFA that biased. What worried me was the
PTOMS (Post Tsunami Operational Management
Structure). Here, the two-party model from
the CFA was brought into a totally different
context, putting LTTE on par with Government
of Sri Lanka. I understand fully that the
Supreme Court threw it out. The PTOMS
came close to endorsing the Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), itself an
independence declaration. The LTTE must
learn to relate to parties in the south
directly. There was, and is, enormous
suffering everywhere. They should all have
reached out in compassion for each other,
with the government together with the
international donor and UN community
coordinating it all. Had Mr P (Prabhakaran)
in the north and Madam K (Kumaratunga) in
the south grasped this opportunity to bring
help together to all victims, then their
pattern of cooperation would in itself have
been peace�and they might have shared the
2005 Nobel peace prize. We were close. But
we also know this was not the road that was
traveled. Q: The Rajapakse
regime believes that terrorism must be defeated
militarily. We see the war-for-peace strategy
again. Will this work? Has it worked in other
conflicts? A: Yes, there is talk about a winnable
war�like from the South African and the
Israeli apartheid government. That approach
did not succeed in the former, nor will it
in the latter. In Sri Lanka, both parties
have soldiers in uniform pitted against each
other in war. The Government of Sri Lanka
has, in addition, state terrorism, bombing,
killing civilians and the LTTE has
terrorism. The LTTE also has a guerilla
capacity. It looks to me as if both have the
capacity to deny the other victory. But
imagine it happens: Killinochchi is
flattened, Mr P is dead, LTTE dissolved.
Will the Tamil dream of a Tamil Eelam die?
Of course not. It will be revived, and new
cycles of violence will occur. And probably
new CFAs. And possibly the same mistake,
confusing ceasefire with peace, using it as
a sleeping pillow to do nothing. Q: Then again,
have peace processes been more successful? Can a
peace process be successful in Sri Lanka, given
the nature of the LTTE? A: And of the South, for symmetry. Yes, I
think so. Imagine, just imagine, that the
following could happen:
[1] the LTTE finds devolution with high
autonomy palatable. They redraft the ISGA in
that direction�of course, sharing coastline
and the sea and state lands with the rest of
Sri Lanka. They insist on Tamil Eelam as the
name�nobody gives their life for a province
called "North" with a part of
"East"�partitioned after de-merger and
referendum, for instance. The name has to be
in it. The soul is in the name.
[2] There are excellent points in the
Majority expert report. I had the honor of
meeting with some of these highly competent
people. And the base-line is not some
European federation but your somewhat big
and close neighbour: India, its linguistic
federalism being a brilliant success, making
Sri Lanka look like the non-success in that
union, Assam (and LTTE like Naga-land).
Look at the Indian boom now that all that
pent-up energy used for conflict has been
liberated for something constructive. The
same will happen to Sri Lanka which is not a
failed state but a stagnant state, bogged
down since 1983 at least by the conflict.
So, here is the point: If New Delhi could
stomach a Tamil Nadu, watching the
independence movement wither away with that
name, then for sure Colombo could one day
have a province named Tamil Eelam. Soon it
would become T.E. for short. You would get
used to it after a month or two. And Sri
Lanka would blossom. And discover that the
world continues even if T.E. should have
consulates in Chennai and wherever there are
sizable Tamil diasporas. Embassy is for the
Sri Lankan state, with proportionate
power-sharing. Q: There is now
a fear in Sri Lanka that the international
community is conspiring against Sinhala
Buddhists. As opposed to the Ranil
Wickremesinghe regime, the southern polity is
encouraging the majority of people to look upon
the international community with distrust and
dislike. What is the reaction of the
international community, as you perceive it? A: The international community has
simplified complex matters. Some pick up the
idea of suppressed linguistic minority
fighting for its liberation, some pick up
terrorism as strategy, some pick LTTE
suppressing other Tamils. They are all right
and all wrong as they see only one aspect,
I can understand skepticism toward the
international community. And that the
international community brought much of this
upon themselves by being insensitive to
complexities. Yes, I think one can talk
about a fallout from an
over-internationalization of the conflict. I
only hope I myself and my excellent Austrian
partners Gudrun Kramer and Wilfried Graf are
not victims of the same. We try our best,
stimulating dialogue with prominent Sri
Lankans, and doing conflict sensitive
reconstruction in tsunami-hit areas in the
East. Incidentally, I come and go. I am on
call. And I am called. Q: When foreign
diplomats ask the question "what can we do to
help put the Sri Lankan peace process back on
track", do you think they are being naive? And
what can the international community
realistically do to put the peace process back
on track? A: There was no real peace process, no
real track, only meetings centered on the
CFA. Only recently something new happened
and not from the international community:
the Majority expert opinion. Put it next to
ISGA and let the documents merge, I see lots
of possibilities within the Rajapakse
formula of maximum devolution within a
unitary state. But if the international
community should be involved I am not so
sure states are the best mediators. They may
have skeletons in their closets. And those
who call for the USA as a successor to
Norway should have a look at the US track
record, in Iraq for instance. How about
involving international personalities? A
Carter, a Gorbachev, a Tutu, a de Klerk, a
Mary Robinson? Talking with all the parties
on a one-on-one basis because a room with
all seven or so around those tables
diplomats that love might become a little
too hot for comfort. For sure, ideas will
emerge, building on the GNIP above, on 1000
dialogues. Q: Where do you
think the Sri Lankan conflict will end up in the
short term, medium term and long term? A: OK, let me try. In the short term, the
"winnable war" strategy till there is some
major LTTE counter-attack. Then the
discourse switches again from war back to
peace; and once again not very clear what
peace means. There will probably be a CFA or
a revival of the dormant one. And if again
nothing happens to peace, then violence will
break out. In the medium term, serious
negotiations, involving more parties, in
complex rounds, using the space offered by
the majority created in the parliament. The
Oslo formula: federalism-devolution is
explored, is taken seriously. Indian
expertise and experience enter, with its
councils of chief ministers, linkage to
panchayat systems, etc. Give it some years.
It will succeed. The South is now cohering.
Maybe we do not even need the short term.
The long term, the blossoming of Sri Lanka,
and don�t be so modest that you think only
in economic terms and "dividends" and
tourism. Social growth, new bridges across
community divides. Cultural growth: let the
faiths come even close together, no ganging
up against Buddhists, they are so much of
the soul of the country�I myself am actually
one�but this incredibly rich island has many
souls. Let them play together. The sky is
the limit.