News on New Delhi's foreign policy has recently been among the
top stories in the media. On April 11, 2005, India started a
strategic partnership with China, and, on June 29, 2005, signed a
10-year defense agreement with the United States. Western observers,
however, have paid less attention to an ambitious Indian move in the
military field: Project Seabird.
Birds Eye View of Project Seabird
This plan -- with origins from the mid-1980s -- is to be assessed
in light of two geopolitical triangles juxtaposing on the Indian
Ocean's background: U.S.-India-China relations and
China-Pakistan-India relations. In this complicated geopolitical
configuration, New Delhi is not simply a partner of China or the
United States: India is emerging as a major power that follows its
own grand strategy in order to enhance its power and interests.
India's New Diplomacy
India is emerging as a decisive player in U.S.- China bilateral
relations, often regarded as the real landmark of this decade's
geopolitics. New Delhi launched a potentially revolutionary
"strategic partnership for peace and prosperity" with China on April
11, 2005. The move was aimed at ending the Sino-Indian border
dispute on Aksai-Chin (existing since 1962), and at boosting mutual
trade and economic ties. Prospects for a more cooperative
relationship between the two Asian giants are to be read in light of
regional powers' ambition to reshape world order along the
guidelines of a balanced multipolarity -- a goal already expressed
by China, France and Russia, among other states.
However, in order to rise as a great power, India needs more than
economic assets and a strong military; "infusions of U.S. technology
and investments in infrastructure," as former Indian envoy Lalit
Mansingh told the press on July 14, are necessary for India to
"become a major global player." These Indian needs -- along with
concerns over the Indian Ocean's security -- form the context that
led New Delhi on June 29 to sign a 10-year defense agreement with
Washington.
Strategic partnerships are not intended to challenge the
U.S. directly, but rather to obtain economic, technological and
military power rapidly. Thus, India's strategy is not contradictory.
On the contrary, it is a sophisticated policy whose endeavor is to
create the necessary balance of power in its geostrategic
environment in order to concentrate on economic, technological and
military matters indispensable to its emergence as a true great
power. [See:
"Great and Medium Powers in the Age of Unipolarity"]
Interestingly, as the Wall Street Journal reports, U.S. President
George W. Bush clearly said that the United States is involved in
helping India "become a world power" -- which could be a sign of
Washington's gradual acceptance of an embryonic multipolarity in
Asia. However, U.S. fundamental interests in developing better
relations with India are the necessary containment of China, and New
Delhi's help in the war against militant Islamic groups -- a need
that is growing stronger due to the unstable political landscape in
Pakistan. [See:
"India: A Rising Power"]
Project Seabird
Such a political and diplomatic framework is the background of
India's ambitious Project Seabird, which consists of the Karwar
naval base, an air force station, a naval armament depot, and
missile silos all to be realized in the next five years.
Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee said on May 31 that the
naval base INS Kadamba in Karwar, Karnataka state will protect the
country's Arabian Sea maritime routes. Kadamba will become
India's third operational naval base, after Mumbai and
Visakhapatnam.
Six frontline Indian naval ships, including frigates
and destroyers, took part in the commissioning. Kadamba extends over
11,200 acres of land, along a 26-km stretch of sea front, and it
will be the first base exclusively controlled by India's navy.
Eleven ships can be berthed at Kadamba once the first phase of it is
achieved; 22 ships after the second phase of construction will be
completed around 2007, according to INS Kadamba's first Commanding
Officer Commodore K.P. Ramachandran as reported in the international
media. Moreover, the new harbor is designed to berth ultimately
42 ships and submarines once completed.
The geopolitics of the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean
largely explain India's determination in such an $8.13 billion
enterprise. The China-Pakistan-India triangle is more than
ever the Arabian Sea's decisive geostrategic setting.
For the Chinese, this trilateral relationship is crucial for
two reasons: from the point of view of energy security, the
Arabian Sea and Pakistan are Beijing's access points to the
oil-rich Middle East; from the perspective of military security,
Pakistan provides China an effective counter-balancing partner
in front of India's ambitions.
Therefore, faced with geographic constraints, the Chinese
successfully proposed to Islamabad back in 2001 the sharing of the
Gwadar naval base. This latter serves the Chinese purposes in
three ways:
first, it serves as a tool to secure Beijing's access to the
Gulf's resources;
second, it is a useful military base to counter Washington's
influence in Central and South Asia: in fact, the Sino-Pakistani
agreement came into being just four months after U.S. troops
entered Kabul in 2001;
third, Gwadar functions as an excellent wedge between India
and the Middle East and as an offset against India's naval
power.
Sino-Pakistani cooperation has contributed to accelerating
India's plans to regain the upper hand in the Western Indian Ocean.
India and U.S.-China Competition
The slowly escalating competition between the U.S. and China has
helped to create a fertile environment for India's ambition to gain
status as a great regional power. Cooperation with China has become
one of the most discussed issues in India's business community for a
number of reasons, but the loudest talk has been the opportunities
based in combining India's "software" economy with China's
"hardware" economy. There are also geopolitical motivations for
India to align itself with China. Both countries favor multipolarity:
for Beijing, this trend will help to weaken U.S. influence in its
sphere of influence; for New Delhi, this shift creates an
environment for it to gain influence over its near-abroad.
However, there are drawbacks for India to aligning too closely
with either power. Washington has often touted the "natural
alliance" between the two expansive, multi-ethnic democracies, but
it is on military issues that India would most like to develop its
relationship with the U.S. During the recent tsunami relief effort,
the two states' navies worked together, which helped to cement their
budding military-to-military ties. The U.S. would like for India's
navy to serve as a bulwark against China as Beijing becomes more
active in the Indian Ocean. Also, there are some areas where the
U.S. Navy cannot operate, such as the Malacca Straits, where India's
presence might be seen as less threatening than that of the U.S.
However, there are drawbacks to aligning too closely with either
power for India. On energy security, India and China have found
cooperation to be easy in Iran, but, as finding new sources of oil
becomes more difficult, there are bound to be areas of friction. For
example, China views the Andaman Sea off Myanmar's coast as an
important source of oil to fuel the economic expansion of China's
western provinces. However, New Delhi sees building a port at
Dawei, Myanmar as a major component to its future security strategy
for the region. China's presence in the area is an unwelcome
development for India.
Washington's relationship with two of India's neighbors, Iran and
Pakistan, is the major sticking point in their relationship. The
U.S. prefers to starve out the current government in Iran, but India
sees the country as an important source of energy for its expanding
economy. Washington's support of Pakistan's military since September
11, 2001, has been protested loudly and repeatedly by India.
However, the U.S. is unlikely to abandon this support because the
Central Asian countries aligned with China in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.) have recently signaled that they
favor a U.S. withdrawal from the region. Because of this, the U.S.
will now need Pakistan's support even more for the success of its
operations in Afghanistan.
Even though Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush
announced on July 18 a new agreement for the U.S. to cooperate with
India's civilian nuclear industry in return for international
oversight and a continued moratorium on nuclear weapons testing,
Washington's support for New Delhi's nuclear industry will continue
to be tempered by India's unwillingness to sign the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
In this environment, India has been very successful in using
strategic partnerships with both Washington and Beijing to further
its interests on the Indian Peninsula and Indian Ocean. For the near
term, New Delhi can be expected to emphasize points of agreement
with China and the U.S., while looking to gain better positioning
for itself in the region.
Another Interested Player: Russia
India's increasing ambitions in the Western Indian Ocean and the
Persian Gulf will most likely draw in actors other than the U.S.,
China and Pakistan. The Russian Federation will no doubt assume
greater importance for India as a major source of military hardware
that is currently fueling India's drive for a blue water navy.
Since the flagship of Karwar, INS Kadamba is a
Russian-built aircraft carrier with Russian-designed Mig-29
aircraft, India will rely on Moscow for a major portion of spare
parts and maintenance in the short and medium run.
India's growing naval ambitions represent an expanding area of
interest for Russian manufacturers. Currently, China is a major
customer for Russian-made submarines, surface ships and
surface-to-surface weapons systems that are adding to Beijing's
growing naval strength. Since Karwar, INS Kadamba is expected to
accommodate an increasing number of military ships, India may
augment its indigenous production capacity with ever-growing numbers
of Russian-made vessels.
This may spark a naval race in the Western Indian Ocean if China
places its most advanced vessels in Pakistan's Gwadar Port. The two
countries have much to gain from cooperation in the business and
trade sphere, and an outright military clash between their navies is
unlikely. However, the two could be drawn into a confrontation if
the vessels of other navies, aligned to either state, get involved
in a conflict.
If more political and military problems develop between India and
Pakistan, then even a growing rapprochement with China may not
prevent a dangerous escalation for New Delhi. Washington may find
itself powerless to act in this case, as it will be unwilling to
compromise both its tactical relationship with Islamabad and its
growing "alliance of need" with New Delhi. On the other hand, Russia
may well benefit from such a scenario, as it has experience in
supplying two belligerents fighting each other at the same time.
Moscow sold weapons to both Iraq and Iran in the 1980s when the two
countries were at war. Presently, Russia will be content in selling
naval ships and technology to both India and China, even as the two
states may be inching towards competition in the strategically
important Western Indian Ocean.
There is much to gain from cooperation for India and China when it
comes to shipments of oil from the Persian Gulf. A major disruption
of such flow -- whether from an intentional military escalation by
the two states or even from a combination of factors having less to
do with both countries, such as an Iranian military action or a
terrorist attack -- will have negative consequences for the
economies of both countries. Peaceful shipments of oil and gas are
in everyone's interests. Still, the construction and use of both
Karwar and Gwadar will certainly invite some form of competition, as
India and China may view each other's minor advancements in naval
technology, number of vessels or any other technical factor as a
less-than-benign show of strength.
The dynamics of the region still call for a balance of power
approach rather than a straight alliance. China-Pakistan
cooperation will figure prominently for Indian decision-makers, just
as India's warming relationship with Washington may be a concern for
China's People Liberation Army planners. The construction of both
Karwar and Gwadar may signal both India's and China's readiness to
upgrade their naval strength from brown water to blue water
capability, but cordial relations between both states may be no
guarantee of the peaceful use of the Western Indian Ocean.
Relying more and more on advanced military technology that is not
currently indigenously produced by both states, India may turn to
Russia to supplement its increasing naval needs. This may enhance
Moscow's status in the region, as well as offer the possibility of
countering Washington's current undisputed naval primacy in that
part of the world.
Conclusion
The rise of India as a major power, coupled with the better-known --
and frequently analyzed -- Chinese rise, is changing the structure
of the world system. Not only is U.S. "unipolar" hegemony in the
Indian Ocean facing a challenge, but the strategic triad
U.S.-Western Europe-Japan, which has ruled the international
political economy for the past few decades, is now also under
question. Nonetheless, when confronting the new reality,
Washington seems eager to help India rise in order to counter
Beijing's growing influence. Moreover, India's increasing power is
also a part in the process of a major shift occurring in
international relations, from U.S.-based unipolarity to a
"multifaceted multipolarity," which could be the prelude of a new
multipolar order. [See:
"The Coming World Realignment"]
In this transition phase, the Indian Ocean's security will be a
crucial issue. Massive military build-ups have already started, and
the risks of miscalculations by the traditional and new great powers
are getting higher. We can expect the South Asian region to be one
of the system's key areas to be watched in the next decade.
Report Drafted By:
Adam Wolfe, Yevgeny Bendersky, Dr. Federico Bordonaro |