"There are many different kinds of arguments that
are intended to justify the view that national identity
should be given institutional recognition by the state
and the international state-system...
In the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, many writers assumed a close
relationship between national independence and
democracy. The basis of this assumption seemed to be an
association between the ideas of national and
democratic sovereignty, internal and external
self-determination. This is evident in Ernest Renan's
(1887) definition of the nation as 'un plebiscite de
tous les fours', which suggests the consensual and
democratic basis of national communities. In seeming
support of this view, many nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century nationalists were committed to
democratic governance. The potential for divergence
between nationalism and democracy was not evident, as
nationalists/democrats (often the same people)
organised to fight the anti-democratic states of
Russia, Austria and Turkey.
In J.S.Mill's discussion 'On
nationality' in *Considerations on Representative
Government, he argues that democracy can only
flourish where 'the boundaries of government coincide
in the main with those of nationality' (Mill 1993: 394). His
argument in support of this contention is based on an
analysis of the necessary conditions for a flourishing
democracy: 'Among a people without fellow-feeling,
especially if they read and speak different languages,
the united public opinion necessary to the workings of
representative institutions cannot exist'
(ibid.: 392)...
Here, I argue in favour of the
mutually supporting relationship that Mill points to
between national identity and democracy.
The strong version of this argument,
as put forward by Michael Lind, holds that far from
being a threat to democracy, nationalism - the
correspondence of cultural nation and state - is a
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
democracy in most places today' (Lind 1994: 94). Lind
supports his claim by listing the various
linguistically and culturally divided societies in
which democracy has not worked well: Cyprus, Lebanon,
Sri
Lanka, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia are all examples of failed multinational
states; and he explores the precarious nature of the
three 'successes': Canada, Belgium and
Switzerland...
The weaker version of this argument,
which I advance in this article, claims that democracy
may be possible in multinational states, usually by
ensuring inclusive power-sharing or consociational
arrangements, or by forging an overarching political
identity. However. I argue that a shared national
identity is sometimes important to a well-functioning
democracy, because the relations of trust engendered by
a shared national identity facilitate vertical dialogue
between representative and constituent, and
participation in political institutions...
"Nineteen ninety eight is the
50th year of Sri Lanka's independence from
British rule. It is perhaps, an appropriate
occasion to ask a simple question:
Q. Why is it that in Sri
Lanka, for five long decades since
'independence', we have always had a Sinhala
Buddhist as the executive head of
government?
... During the past 50 years
and more, ethnic identity has in fact determined the way in
which both the Sinhala people and the Tamil
people have exercised their political right of
universal franchise. In this period, no Tamil
has ever been elected to a predominantly
Sinhala electorate and no Sinhalese has ever
been elected to a predominantly Tamil
electorate - apart, that is, from multi member
constituencies. The political reality is that
the practice of 'democracy' within the confines
of an unitary state has led to rule by a
permanent Sinhala majority. A Tamil 'however
much he may try' cannot become the executive
head of government in Sri Lanka." - Nadesan Satyendra in 'A Simple
Question', May 1998
|
....One of the most pressing
problems in societies with severe divisions and this
may be true of ethnic, linguistic, religious, national
or ideological divisions is the problems that they pose for normal
electoral (democratic) politics. The majority-vote
rule that confers legitimacy in democratic regimes may
function as a mechanism of exclusion. Moreover, I will
argue, attempts to construct different democratic
arrangements (beyond simple majority vote) to take into
account the divisions in the state are extremely
fragile or problematic.
Let us take, as an example, a state
with two main groups: A, which is the largest (or
majority) group; and B, which is the minority group. In
a case where these different national communities
consistently vote for nationally aligned parties (A
vote for the party of As and Bs for the party of Bs),
then elections proceed like a census, and the minority
group is consistently excluded from power and the
majority group consistently holds the reins of
power.
Moreover, because the governing
party only needs to retain the support of the majority
As and any attempt to attract Bs to the party is likely
to result in a loss of As support (because these are
two mutually antagonistic communities), there is little
prospect of changing that alignment. There may be some
movement at elections, of course but not of the desired
kind - that is, not across national lines. Frequently,
a change in electoral support results if group A has
two parties competing for the votes of As and group B,
while a minority, only fields one candidate (in a
first-past-the-post system), then a representative of
group B may get a seat, even though Bs are a minority
in that riding.
| "...The question
is not even whether Sinhala rule was oppressive
(though, in fact it was). If the
question was 'oppressive
Sinhala rule', the answer would be benevolent
Sinhala rule. There may have been some who
regarded British rule as benevolent, but this did
not prevent the struggle for freedom from alien
rule. It is as a free people, that the
togetherness of the Tamil people rooted in an
ancient heritage and a rich
language will find vibrant expression. It is
as a free people that they will be able to
nurture the growth of their children and their
children's children to the fullness of their
potential. The bottom line is that the struggle
of the Tamil people is about their democratic
right to rule themselves - and it is this right
that they seek to protect. If democracy means the
rule of the people, by the people and for people,
then equally, no one people may rule another..."
- Nadesan Satyendra in 'Sri
Lanka, Tamil Eelam: Getting to Yes', May
2000 |
The problem with this situation has
nothing to do with preference-satisfaction, or with the minority
Bs being upset because 'they don't get what they
want'. The problem is the permanent exclusion of
one segment of the population from a role in making
rules that govern the state in which they live.
In this situation, the basic
conditions for responsible democracy are not met. In
Democracy in America, Tocqueville (1961: 212) argued that, in
a wellfunctioning democracy, the outvoted
minority will respect the majority decision in the
expectation that, at some later time, they will be part
of a winning coalition and will require minority
compliance. The reverse would also seem to hold true -
though Tocqueville did not spell this out that a
majority will tend to refrain from upsetting the
minority because they anticipate that they will
be in need of majority self-restraint when they are
converted to minority status (Holmes 1993: 30, 44-5). This dynamic
does not occur in a state in which different national
communities consistently vote for nationally aligned
parties there is no outlet for minority disaffection;
there is no moderating influence on minority demands;
and no mechanisms, at least internal to the democratic
system, to prevent the majority from oppressing the
minority.
This cycle of majority domination
and minority exclusion is, of course, a disaster from a
representation standpoint. On the majority-rule system
of democracy, the legitimate representatives of
community B are permanently excluded from a share of
governing. Moreover, in this kind of divided society,
there is so little trust between As and Bs that the
members of the minority community are extremely
reluctant to address their problems and concerns to
representatives of the government of the day, for these
are themselves As, and are almost exclusively elected
by As (and know that re-election depends on the support
of As). Vertical dialogue between the minority
community and the governing majority is therefore
almost nonexistent...
This result poses difficulties for
the most persuasive intrinsic and instrumental
justificatory arguments for democratic institutions.
Instrumental defences tend to argue in terms of the
good consequences of democratic governance. The most
persuasive of these argue that democracy is the form of
government most likely to respect human rights, rules
of justice, and allow people some measure of control or
autonomy over their own lives. In this context,
however, minorities have no influence on the
government; they are alienated from the political
process; and there is no restraint on majority
oppression. It is disturbing also for one of the most
persuasive intrinsic justifications of autonomy, namely
the argument that democracy is intrinsically fair, and
that at its heart is a neutral procedure that allows
all individuals to have an equal effect in determining
outcomes. Viewed in one way, of course, this defence
still holds true: each person has a vote and the
procedure (narrowly considered) treats each voter in
the same way. But, in these circumstances, the majority
rule for deciding 'winner' and 'loser' is not a neutral
rule for arriving at collective decisions in the face
of competing claims, for everyone knows who is in the
majority and who is in the minority...
....This does not mean, of course,
that there are no mechanisms available to try to treat
national identities fairly. Complex power-sharing
arrangements may be helpful in such situations,
especially if these are accompanied by substantial
self-government. Power-sharing is a possible solution
to the problem of minority exclusion, especially in
non-nationally divided societies, although one that is
very difficult to achieve: notable failures include
Lebanon and Cyprus, although in the case of Lebanon the
power-sharing regime did last for thirty-two years (and
so could be considered a success).
Donald Horowitz, among others, has
complained that the problem with Lijphart's famous
system of consociational (power-sharing) democracy is
that it only works in moderately divided societies,
such as the Netherlands, Belgium and, to some extent,
Canada (Horowitz
1985: 568-76). In seriously divided societies,
there is insufficient trust between the two communities
even to permit power-sharing. In nationally divided
societies, there may be particular problems attached to
the level at which power-sharing takes place, and also
to the boundaries of the power-sharing unit. By this, I
mean that power-sharing may be adequate in ethnically
or religiously divided societies, where disputes are
mainly connected to the kinds of symbols with which the
state is identified, but in a nationally divided
society, where the national groups are strongly
mobilised in favour of collective selfgovernment,
mere inclusion in the centre is insufficient, and must
be accompanied by some form of devolved power in a
federation or other kind of autonomy arrangement.
In some cases, even this is insufficient. This may
be because the relations between the two groups are so
bad, and the identities are so mutually antagonistic,
that any kind of political arrangement within the
state is unthinkable for the minority...
|
"...A
meaningful negotiating process will need to
address the question of working out a legal
framework for two free and independent peoples
to co-exist - a legal framework where they may
pool their sovereignty in certain agreed areas,
so that they may co-exist in peace. The
demand for Tamil Eelam is not negotiable. But
an independent Tamil Eelam will
negotiate...A meaningful negotiating
process will need to telescope two stages in
the Singer continuum - independence and
beyond independence.
Yes, beyond
independence. - Nadesan Satyendra in the Singer
Error, March 2001
|
...The problem in nationally divided societies is
that the different groups have different
political identities, and, in cases where the
identities are mutually exclusive (not nested), these
groups see themselves as forming distinct political
communities. In this situation, the options available
to represent these distinct identities are very
limited, because any solution at the state level is
inclined to be biased in favour of one kind of identity
over another. That is to say, if the minority group
seeks to be self-governing, or to secede from the
larger state, increased representation at the centre
will not be satisfactory. The problem in this case is
that the group does not identify with the centre, or
want to be part of that political community. Of course,
from the point of view of marginalised national groups,
increased representation may be better than the status
quo even if only because it provides a forum in which
minority representatives can press the case for what
they really want, which is often some form of
collective self-government...
Conclusion
This article has argued that there
is some validity to contemporary normative defences of
nationalism. First, the essay considered the argument
that liberal values, and especially the value of social
justice, will best be promoted in states whose members
share a common national identity. In its strong form,
this argument is vulnerable to counter-instances. A
weaker version, which claims that, in states divided in
terms of national identities, social justice may be
precarious over the long term, is more plausible. The
second part of the essay argued that there is a close
relationship between democracy and national identity.
This is commonly accepted, and indeed is almost always
supported by reference to J. S. Mill's rather quick
argument in Considerations on Representative
Government. This section tries to spell out
precisely how a common national identity is needed both
for representative institutions to function properly
and for widespread participation on the part of
ordinary citizens.
What are the implications of this
analysis for the ethics of secession?
One conclusion that can be drawn,
especially from the discussion of nationally divided
societies .. is that, in some cases,
secession/partition of the two communities, where
that option is available, is the best outcome
overall.
In cases where a state has two
groups with competing, mutually antagonistic national
identities, where people consistently, in opinion polls
and, most crucially, elections, vote for
nationally aligned parties, then the
representatives of these groups are not co-operating on
the practice of deliberation that is important to
democratic governance. Institutional design to ensure
moderate elites and power-sharing government may result
in very little participation on the part of ordinary
citizens.
There may, of course, be reasons why
secession is not a practical option: the groups may
overlap on the same territory; or their identities may
not be incompatible and some form of recognition within
the existing state may be the best outcome. However, in
some cases, it follows that recognising national
identity and rights to self-determination may be
necessary to secure the basic conditions for a
well-functioning (that is, responsible, representative
and participatory) democracy."
