Introduction
The impact of the regional and international activity
of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents on the national
security of Sri Lanka has not received adequate attention
by the domestic security, intelligence and foreign
service community. The wider threat posed to regional and
international security by Tamil insurgents - by the
enhanced ideological, technological and financial
interaction with overseas insurgent groups - has also
escaped their close attention. Therefore, an
understanding of the international infrastructure of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as well as their
relationship with the Tamil Diaspora, is vital for
improving Sri Lankan, South Asian and global stability
and security.
Although, I have been engaged in research and writing
on the Sri Lankan Tamil and Sinhala insurgencies during
the past decade, I had the opportunity to focus on their
international operations, only during the past two years.
I conducted most of my research while resident at two
research institutions in the US: the Office of Arms
Control, Disarmament and International Security at the
University of Illinois in 1994 and at the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of
Maryland in 1995. At Illinois, I had the opportunity of
working with Professor Stephen Cohen, a US expert on
South Asian security, and at Maryland, with Admiral
Stansfield Turner, one time head of the US intelligence
community.
My presentation is organized into three areas:
- First, a brief history of the Tamil insurgents and
the origins of their international network.
- Second, a description of the international network
and its operation.
- Third, the impact and the implications of the
network, both on the security of Sri Lanka and the
world at large.
History of Insurgency
Contrary to popular perception, Tamil insurgency
originated in northern Sri Lanka in the early 1970s,
during the United Front government, a coalition of the
SLFP, LSSP and CP. From 1970 onwards, there were a number
of acts of terrorism in the Jaffna peninsula. In
February 1971, bombs were thrown at the residence of the
Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duraiappah. On March 11, a bomb was
placed in his car. On August 27, 1972, Velupillai
Pirabaharan, the current leader of the LTTE, who was only
18 years of age, lobbed bombs at a carnival organized by
the mayor in the stadium in Jaffna. Once again bombs were
thrown at the stadium on September 17, and at the mayor's
residence on December 19, 1972. On July 27, 1975,
Duraiappah, who visited the Krishnan temple at Ponnalai
in his car, was assassinated by Pirabaharan and two
others. The mayor was the representative of the then
United Front government in Jaffna. His elimination was
symbolic of the contempt the Tamil insurgents had over
the rule of Jaffna by a representative from Colombo.
In their literature, the LTTE, the most formidable of
Sri Lankan insurgent groups, claim that they originated
in 1972. However, they did not begin to operate as an
organization - the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) - until 1974.
The leader was Chetti Tanabalasingham, a common criminal.
Pirabaharan, who was politically motivated from his
younger days, developed the military organization of the
TNT and later the LTTE. Three early secretive linkages
the LTTE enjoyed with other Tamil political - militant
organizations helped the LTTE to develop its
international component. They were tactical and not
enduring relationships.
Origins of the Network
The LTTE link with the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF) arose even before the TULF obtained a formal
mandate from the Tamil people for a separate Tamil State
in 1977. In the mid 1970s, the TULF leader Appapillai
Amirthalingam clandestinely supported the LTTE.
Amirthalingam believed that his position as the political
leader of the Tamil people would be enhanced if he could
exercise control over the Tamil insurgent groups. The
TULF helped the LTTE to emerge as a powerful force. Two
of its prominent youth wing members, Uma Maheswaran,
joined the LTTE as its chairman, and Urmila Kandiah, as
its first female member. On government stationary,
Amirthalingam, as leader of the parliamentary opposition,
provided letters of reference to the LTTE and to other
Tamil insurgent groups to raise funds. Amirthalingam,
also introduced N.S. Krishnan, to Pirabaharan.
Pirabaharan, who later became the first LTTE
international representative, laid the foundation for
LTTE overseas activity [1]. Interestingly, it was Krishnan who
introduced the current LTTE theoretician and ideologue
Anton Balasingham to Pirabaharan. Balasingham, a former
Tamil journalist and a translator at the British High
Commission in Colombo, was then a Ph.D. candidate writing
his dissertation on the psychology of Marxism at the
South Bank Polytechnic. The tutors at the polytechnic,
(now known as the South Bank University) still remember
him as a bright but unusual student. Balasingham's first
Jaffna Tamil wife, whom he loved very much, died of
kidney failure in London. Balasingham's current wife
Adele, an Australian citizen and a nurse by professional
training, is a prominent member of the women's wing of
the LTTE.
Another TULF parliamentarian that supported the LTTE
was the then Chavakachcheri MP V.N. Navaratnam, who was
an executive committee member of the Inter Parliamentary
Union (IPU). Navaratnam introduced many influential and
wealthy Tamils living overseas to Tamil insurgent
leaders. In one of the first meetings in Oslo, Norway,
Navaratnam, introduced the Polisario representative to
the LTTE. Polisario, a Moroccan insurgent group was ready
to cooperate with the LTTE.
The second organization that helped the LTTE to
develop its international component was the Eelam
Revolutionary Organizers (EROS), erroneously and better
known as the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
founded by Eliyathamby Ratnasabapathy [2]. Like most ideologues,
Ratnasabapathy too was a Marxist-Leninist. In Sri Lanka,
he had lived both in the north and in the plantations of
the central hills and was a LSSP supporter and a JVP
sympathizer. After taking up residence in London, he
also formed the General Union of Eelam Students (GUES),
modeled on the General Union of Palestinian Students
(GUPS). While GUES was the student wing, EROS was the
principal group. As a supporter of the Palestinian cause,
he had developed excellent relations with Sayed Hamami,
the PLO representative in London. Before Sayed was
assassinated by Israeli operatives, he helped
Ratnasabapathy to develop links with Fatah, the military
wing of the PLO. Fatah offered a training opportunity to
EROS. This was a time when the insurgent groups shared
their expertise and resources. EROS shared the training
offer with the LTTE. As a result in early 1977,
Vichweshwaran alias Visu of EROS (later LTTE) and Uma
Maheswaran of LTTE (later PLOTE), traveled to Lebanon and
trained with Fatah.
The third organization that helped the LTTE to develop
its international component was the Tamil Liberation
Front, the precursor of the Tamil Liberation Organization
(TLO) [3]. The
TLO, distinct from the Tamil Eelam Liberation
Organization (TELO), originated in London in the
mid-1970s. The dynamic leadership of TLO made it a
powerful organization within a short period of time. TLO
organized a number of demonstrations, rallies and protest
marches opposing the Government of Sri Lanka. During the
second half of the 1970s, TLO was gradually absorbed by
the LTTE. TLO began to function as the international arm
of the LTTE.
Rationale for the Network
The powerful presence of an international link was a
major morale boost for the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka.
It was a form of recognition of their struggle both
domestically and internationally. The international
component enhances domestic survival and contributes to
the resilience of an organization. Although there was
limited financial assistance until the ethnic riots of
July 1983, there were many Tamils who were sympathetic
towards the Tamil cause and waiting for an opportunity to
make a contribution for the advancement of Tamil
nationalistic aspirations and goals. The ethnic riots
deeply wounded the sentiments and galvanized the Tamils
as a community. Past tragedies were brought to light and
kept alive by the political leaders on both sides.
The injustices upon the minority as a community by the
successive majority dominated Colombo governments were
rectified by two pacts - the Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam
in 1957 and the Senanayake - Chelvanayakam in 1965. But
under pressure from sections of the majority community,
the pacts were abrogated. A series of ethnic riots -
1956, 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983 -
scarred the memories of a substantial segment Tamils.
Many who left Sri Lanka as victims of the riots were made
to believe by Tamil politicians that only a separate
Tamil state can and would ensure permanent protection.
The TULF and several other Tamil political and insurgent
groups kept the campaign alive by bringing back bitter
memories. The incessant waves of riots that destroyed
lives and property of the Tamils were highlighted.
Sinhala Sri, Sinhala Only Act, Sinhala colonization and
standardization of education that had antagonized the
Tamils formed the basis of the conflict. [4]
Prior to July 1983, all efforts by Tamil insurgent
groups and their representatives to raise money overseas
to sustain a war had been unsuccessful. It was only after
July 1983, with the exodus of over 100,000 Tamil refugees
and another equal number of displaced persons that gave
birth to a distinct Tamil Diaspora [5]. By the end of 1983, there
were over 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu alone
and this number would swell up to nearly 200,000 with the
escalation of the conflict. The exodus to the West was
equally intense. Many countries in the West, sympathetic
to the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils would revise their
immigration and emigration policies vis-à-vis Sri
Lanka. As a consequence, the number of refugees, mostly
economic but in the guise of political asylum seekers,
would bring the totality of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora
to over 450,000.
Mid-1983 to mid-1987 witnessed Sri Lanka's
international image at its lowest ebb. Despite having an
open economy, a model democracy and a major tourist
destination, Sri Lanka's international image suffered
irreversibly. TULF propaganda branded Sri Lanka as a
state guilty of discrimination and perpetrating genocide
against its minority. Sri Lanka harped on the fact that
six of its top Ambassadors including those to the United
Kingdom, France and West Germany were Tamils. Colombo
also said that the Inspector General of Police, at least
four Deputy Inspector Generals of Police, and the Chief
Justice were Tamils. But, no attempt was made by the
government to turn the events that would dampen the
formation or hamper the operation of the network. Counter
propaganda by Sri Lankan missions overseas and
associations heightened the ethnic tensions overseas and
polarized the communities further. Sections of the Tamils
marginally involved or disinterested in communal politics
were dragged into the center of a conflict in the
making.
Formation of the Network
Although the TULF politicians spearheaded this
anti-Sinhala and anti-government drive, it was not the
TULF that reaped the benefits of their international and
domestic campaign to politicize and mobilize the Sri
Lanka Tamils. It was the Tamil insurgent groups that
raised funds from a TULF - politicized and mobilized
Tamil Diaspora to fund their war effort for an
independent Tamil Eelam. Of the Tamil groups, the only
group that developed consistency in conducting
propaganda against the government and the Sinhala
majority community and later even against the Government
of India was the LTTE. It was also the LTTE that
developed the systematic organization to collect money
and use it with a high degree of honesty and efficiency
to further their political and military goals. The LTTE
has displayed mastery in generating funds from the Sri
Lankan Tamil Diaspora spread over 50 countries. Soon
after the July riots of 1983, the LTTE international
representative K. Balasekeram, a radiographer working in
a London hospital, convened a meeting under the banner of
the Eelam Solidarity Campaign. After many speakers had
aired their views, the voices from the audience asked,
"What can we do?" Balasekeram said, "Those who want to do
something about the plight of the Tamil people in Sri
Lanka may leave your name and phone number."[6] From that night,
Balasekeram called many of the committed Tamils who had
come for the London meeting. After soliciting funds,
Balasekeram developed a system to follow up on the
contributions pledged by the community. Afterwards, he
appointed a coordinator for each area and set out
guidelines to develop a state of the art finance
generation operation throughout the UK. His policy was
not to request or receive a large donation at once, but
to socialize the Tamils to donating a small amount of
money every month. This became the first instance the
LTTE collected money from a large public gathering. The
LTTE firmly believed in compartmentalization to secure
the vital element of secrecy.
Attempts prior to 1983 had failed to raise funds from
the Tamils as a community although individuals did
contribute to procure weaponry [7]. Pre 1983 period witnessed the
politicizing of the Tamils at a low level. The first
public organization of the Sri Lankan Tamil community to
generate funds had been formed in London in 1978. TULF's
Amirthalingam who was on a world tour, together with a
London based Eelam activist S.K. Vaikundavasan, formed
the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC). [8] The TCC was later used by
the LTTE as a front organization to carry out propaganda
as well as to generate finance.
The UK Net
The UK has always been the heart of LTTE overseas
political activity. Since the riots of July 1983, the
LTTE has expanded into Europe from London. To make its
position secure, the LTTE has either established,
absorbed, or infiltrated a number of LTTE, LTTE front or
pro-LTTE organizations in the UK. Some of them are the
Tamil Information Center at Tamil House in Romford Road
in London, The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization in
Walthamstow in London, and the International Federation
of Tamils (IFT) in Birchiew Close in Surrey. From IFT,
LTTE legal advisor N. Satyendran, a Cambridge academic
and son of the late S Nadesan Q.C., edits Network. IFT
also publishes a Tamil journal Kalathil. Among the other
LTTE publications are Viduthalai Puligal and Tamil Land.
Other Tamil newspapers are Tamil Nation published from
Croydon, Surrey and Thamilan from Undine Street in
London. More recently, an LTTE front in London, publishes
Hot Spring, a journal hitherto published in the
peninsula. The LTTE International Secretariat located at
St. Katherine Road has functioned continuously since its
establishment in 1984. Among the other organizations
through which the LTTE operate are the London Tamil
Mandram and the World Saiva Council. The latter uses an
address care of the London Meikandaar Adheenam on King
Edward Road. The LTTE also maintains an information
center in Albany Street, London, where the latest news
from Sri Lanka is provided to any caller. The Tamil Eelam
British Branch, providing this service could be accessed
by calling 0171 387 4339. There are similar news services
in a number of countries from Germany to the US.
From the UK, the LTTE feeds propaganda to its offices
and cells throughout Europe, North America and elsewhere.
In turn the funds collected are transferred to a number
of LTTE and cover bank accounts. In charge of the LTTE
propaganda and fund raising is John Christian Chrysostom
alias Lawrence Tilagar, the international representative
of the LTTE [9]. With him, dedicated LTTE leaders
from Shanthan, Shegar and Ramasar in London, Murali in
Geneva, Rudrakumaran in New York and Suresh in Toronto
work day and night. The LTTE propaganda and fund raising
network is superior to other extant networks such as
Hamas, Hezbollah, Kashmiris, or the Basques. Today, in
the North Atlantic countries alone, there are over 40 Sri
Lankan Tamil newspapers, of which over 80% are either
managed by the LTTE or their front organizations. If the
LTTE is unable to infiltrate a Sri Lankan Tamil
newspaper, it would call the stores that sell the
newspaper not to sell it or would call the Tamil public
to boycott it. In mid 1996, the LTTE decided to kill
Manchari, a Tamil newspaper edited by D.B.S. Jeyaraj in
Canada. Therefore, the writ of the LTTE extends beyond
the LTTE dominated areas in Sri Lanka, into distant
theaters where they have made a significant political,
economic and a militant presence.
Dynamics of the Network
To build support for their domestic struggle as well
as to consolidate their position overseas, the LTTE has
developed relationships clandestine with foreign
insurgent groups. By studying how other revolutionary
groups operate overseas, the LTTE learnt the importance
of propaganda material. London, the hub of revolutionary
representatives, cells and offices, helped the LTTE to
realize this dimension. In 1978, the LTTE produced its
first leaflet for international distribution - it was for
a conference in Cuba where a large group of revolutionary
leaders would meet. In 1978, a Sri Lankan delegation left
to attend the 11th World Youth Conference in Havana,
Cuba. The three member TULF delegation was joined by a
LTTE representative who had hitherto studied in the
Soviet Union. Hoping to join them, the then UK based LTTE
international representative N.S. Krishnan traveled with
LTTE literature from London to Madrid in Spain to obtain
a visa for Cuba. The visa was not granted and Krishnan
had to return to London. However, he managed to courier
the propaganda material to Havana, in time for the
meeting.
From 1977 onwards the LTTE international network made
inroads to countries where there was a Tamil presence.
From the mid-1970s onwards, the Tamil militant structures
steadily grew in the West, with its nucleus in London.
The linkages were mostly confined to the Middle East, for
military development, and to Europe and elsewhere like
Nigeria, Yemen and Zambia for financial assistance. By
the 1980s, Tamil militant representatives had traveled
far and wide. The Arab and Islamic world was important
but so were countries where Tamils lived, worked and
earned in substantial number. They were Libya, Iraq,
Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey and Yemen.
They also had substantial contacts with Cyprus and
Greece. The government in Colombo failed to keep track of
Tamil political activities overseas. The United National
Party government of J.R. Jayewardene that came to power
in 1977 reorganized the intelligence apparatus and as a
consequence, intelligence and data collection and
analysis on Tamil insurgency suffered. In 1984, one year
after the riots of 1983, when the seasoned operatives
were called back, Tamil network overseas by then had
grown substantially [10]. Very few in the national
security apparatus at that time realized the importance
of monitoring activities of the Tamil insurgents
overseas, including the vibrant Tamil Diaspora -
insurgent link.
Although a number of Tamils left Sri Lanka in the
aftermath of the 1977 riots, they were not sufficiently
politicized or mobilized to make financial contributions
to the LTTE but this dynamic changed after mid-1983. The
expansion of the LTTE network after 1983 was meteoric.
The LTTE focused not only in developing relationships
with neighboring India, Tamil communities overseas, but
other revolutionary groups. But unlike other Tamil
groups, the LTTE was mindful in every step they took both
domestically and internationally. Even in their
relationship with India, the LTTE ensured that their
other relationships did not suffer. While the LTTE
developed new contacts, they also managed to keep the old
contacts alive. Until late 1986, Pirabaharan did not wish
to antagonize India but neither did he wish to rely on
India totally. This led the LTTE to develop alliances
with other groups outside India and thereby not become
totally dependent on India. However, many of the
alliances the LTTE developed during the early years, just
like those developed in the subsequent years, were not
permanent friendships. They were temporary and tactical
relationships, very similar in content and context
developed with India from 1983 to 1987 and with the
Premadasa Administration from 1989 to 1990. Pirabaharan
never compromised his avowed dream of Tamil Eelam.
Pirabaharan's primary task and primary goal was to
advance his objectives and reach his goal. So, the
alliances would not last for more than a few years.
LTTE Foreign Policy
Having established political links with revolutionary
regimes and revolutionary groups quite early in their
history, the LTTE realized the importance of such
linkages. Gaddhafi, Assad, and Khomeni were their heros
in a series of anti-US and anti-Israeli demonstrations in
the peninsula in the mid 1980s. These regimes had pledged
support to LTTE representatives while maintaining a
relationship with Colombo [11]. However, the LTTE was cautious
not to have contacts with organizations for the mere sake
of establishing links because that would draw the
attention of foreign security and intelligence agencies.
Therefore, if ever the LTTE established links, it was
based either on advancing mutual interests or for
military, political, economic or diplomatic gain.
Every insurgent group passes through a critical phase
where they require either an external sanctuary and or
external assistance to survive. The LTTE was no
exception. Geopolitics as well as domestic compulsions
led India to support the Tamil insurgents of Sri Lanka.
Geographically, India is only 22 miles away from the
Jaffna peninsula. It is one hour by speed boat. Although
Tamil insurgents benefited from this natural external
base from the early 1970s, it was not until the riots of
July 1983 that India became an active base for the Tamil
groups to grow in number, strength and operational
capability and capacity.
The India - Sri Lanka Tamil insurgency relationship
has its origins in the 1970s. The initial contact between
the Tamil Nadu government and Sri Lankan Tamil activists
was established in 1972. A delegation from the Tamil
Manavi Peravi, a group of Tamil students who believed in
the armed struggle and committed towards securing an
independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka, traveled to Madras
and met E.V.R. Periya, the then Tamil Nadu leader
[12]. Periya
told the four man delegation, "If you are unhappy in Sri
Lanka come to South India. We will give you enough land
to cultivate." During the 1970s, Tamil youth activists
used Tamil Nadu as a sanctuary to evade arrest from the
Sri Lanka police - this included Pirabaharan and many
other politically as well as criminally active youth.
Relationship with India
From the late 1970s, the LTTE developed links with a
number of Tamil Nadu political groups - they were
comparatively small in organization and membership. The
most significant of them were Dravida Kazhagam headed by
Veramani, the Kamraj Congress headed by Nedumaran and the
Pure Tamil Movement headed by Perinchintanarayanan. To
date, the leaders as well as cadres remain strong
supporters of the LTTE. Veeramani called a meeting of
all his key party organizers throughout Tamil Nadu and
asked them to support the LTTE. Nedumaran wrote a
biography of Pirabaharan. Perinchintanarayanan gave his
property for the use of the LTTE. Thereafter, the LTTE
developed excellent relations with M.G. Ramachandran and
M. Karunanidhi, who succeeded each other as chief
ministers.
Although Tamil insurgents had established a few
training camps in Tamil Nadu in 1982, there was no
official assistance from the Central Government of India
prior to August 1983. In the eyes of many Indian
hard-liners, Sri Lanka since 1977 had stepped out of the
non aligned orbit and had become an ally of the West.
There were Israeli intelligence operatives, British
counter insurgency experts, South African mercenaries,
and rumors about offering Trincomalee, one of the finest
deep water harbors to the US navy. Sri Lanka had good
relations with Pakistan and China, two countries that had
fought border wars with India and they were in the
process of stepping up military assistance to Colombo.
Further, President J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka did not
enjoy with Premier Indira Gandhi the same warm
relationship he had with her father, Premier Jawaharlal
Nehru. After Premier Indira Gandhi, also the leader of
the powerful Congress (I) Party, took a policy decision
to support Sri Lankan northern insurgency from August
1983.
The need to have leverage over Colombo was adequately
demonstrated by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the
agency also responsible for advancing India's secret
foreign policy goals. Within her inner circle, the
decision was justified. Geopolitics and domestic
compulsions validated the rationale. The Third Agency of
RAW, a supra intelligence outfit, was entrusted with the
task. Within a year, the number of Sri Lanka Tamil
training camps in Tamil Nadu mushroomed to 32. By mid
1987, over 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents had been
provided sanctuary, finance, training and weapons either
by the central government, state government of Tamil Nadu
or by the insurgent groups themselves. While most of the
initial training was confined to Indian military and
paramilitary camps in Uttara Pradesh, specialized
training were imparted by the Indian instructors attached
to RAW to Sri Lankan insurgents in New Delhi, Bombay and
Vishakhapatnam [13]. The most secretive
training was conducted in Chakrata, north of Dehra Dun,
India's premier military academy for training service
personnel, where RAW had also imparted training to
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Tibetan dissidents [14].
With the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, RAW
assistance culminated. Rajiv Gandhi ordered the Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the LTTE, when it
went back on its pledge to surrender its weapons. The
LTTE-IPKF war, apparently deprived the LTTE of its
invaluable base, India. But, Tamil Nadu assistance to the
LTTE continued even after M.G. Ramachandran's death in
December 1987. Tamil Nadu State assistance under the
Karunanidhi Administration, despite the presence of the
IPKF, continued for the LTTE. Although the LTTE was at
war with India, Tamil Nadu still remained LTTE's main
source of supplies.
The Indian Net
Throughout the IPKF episode and until Rajiv Gandhi
assassination in 1991, the LTTE continued to maintain a
substantial presence in India. When the law enforcement
agencies stepped up surveillance, the LTTE moved a bulk
of its cadres from Tamil Nadu to other towns such as
Mysore, Bangalore and Bombay. Even at the height of the
IPKF - LTTE confrontation, the LTTE had twelve sections
in India to manage:
(1) Intelligence
(2) Communications
(3) Arms Production
(4) Procurement of explosives
(5) Propaganda
(6) Political work
(7) Food and essential supplies
(8) Medicines
(9) Fuel supplies
(10) Clothing
(11) Transport
(12) Finance and currency conversion
The LTTE had also converted Madras, the capital of
Tamil Nadu, and nine other Tamil Nadu districts, into
centers for war supplies to the LTTE. Each center was
linked by a sophisticated wireless network. Individual
units carried sanyo walkie talkie sets. The centers of
war supplies and other activities were [15]:
(1) Dharmapuri: Procurement of explosives
(2) Coimbatore: Arms and ammunition manufacturing
(3) Salem: Explosives manufacturing and military clothing
manufacturing.
(4) Periya (Erode) Military clothing manufacturing
(5) Vedaraniym: Coastal area from where supplies were
dispatched for the LTTE
(6) Madurai: Transit area
(7) Thanjavur; Communications center
(8) Nagapattnam: Landing area for supplies from LTTE deep
sea going ships
(9) Rameswaram: Refugee arriving area and recruitment
(10) Tiruchi: Treatment of wounded LTTE cadres
(11) Tutocorin: LTTE trade in gold, silver, narcotics and
other merchandise goods.
(12) Madras: Liaison with Tamil Nadu political
leaders.
Implications for India
The LTTE-India nexus did not secure the geopolitical
security New Delhi needed from Sri Lanka. It weakened
Indian as well as Sri Lankan domestic security. In many
ways, the presence of a foreign military strengthened the
fighting spirit of LTTE and weakened the anti-terrorist
capability of the Sri Lankan forces, then engaged in an
anti-subversive campaign in the South [16]. The organization gained
mastery of guerrilla warfare by fighting the fourth
largest military in the world. The LTTE suffered heavy
causalities but replenished their ranks and gained a
confidence paralleled by the Viet Cong and the Afghan
mujahidin. LTTE also innovated new weapons, mostly
projectiles and mines. Johnny mine, the anti-personnel
mine invented by Pirabaharan, has at least claimed 5,000
Indian and Sri Lankan war causalities. Many Tamil Nadu
political leaders from Nedumaran to Gopalasamy and
Ramakrishnan visited the LTTE jungle base - known as the
one four base complex over the years - and expressed
solidarity with Pirabaharan.
The role of the IPKF in Sri Lanka became a politically
sensitive issue. When the IPKF returned to India, under
the National Front government of V.P. Singh, the then
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi did not visit
the port of Madras to welcome the Indian soldier. Even
after the IPKF departed the LTTE continued to maintain
excellent relations with Tamil Nadu politicians. The LTTE
had managed to preserve Tamil Nadu as a critical base by
retaining the goodwill of the Tamil Nadu leaders.
In fact, when the LTTE hit teams under the one eyed
Jack Sivarasan assassinated the anti-LTTE EPRLF leader
Padmanabha and his colleagues in Tamil Nadu, chief
minister Karunanidhi asked the Tamil Nadu police and the
state agencies to turn a blind eye. A few months later,
the LTTE used the very same infrastructure of the LTTE in
Tamil Nadu to kill Rajiv Gandhi [17]. The LTTE penetration of the
Tamil Nadu polity was so good that a decision reached at
a high level meeting comprising intelligence agencies in
New Delhi about anti-LTTE operations was conveyed to the
LTTE within 24 hours. Investigations revealed that the
culprit was the then Tamil Nadu Home Secretary and at the
instruction of Karunanidhi. The dismissal of Karunanidhi
did not prevent the LTTE from continuing to operate in
Tamil Nadu. The LTTE made a statement during the
subsequent Jayalalitha Administration, "If the Tamil Nadu
leadership cannot support the LTTE, at least we expect
them to be neutral to the LTTE." This meant that LTTE
operations should continue unhindered in the state of
Tamil Nadu.
In retrospect, the LTTE - India relationship has been
one of love and hate. It is a relationship that will have
its ups and downs but a relationship that will
nevertheless continue. Despite the fact that the LTTE
eliminated Rajiv Gandhi, the last of the Gandhi-Nehru
dynasty, there will always be a segment of the Tamil Nadu
leaders and people that will support the LTTE. The
contradiction stems from India's own structure - the
diversity within India, particularly, the disparity in
culture between the Indian Tamils and the rest of India's
polity. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was imperative
for the LTTE. If the LTTE did not, the IPKF that withdrew
would have returned heralding another period of bloody
fighting. Pirabaharan's calculus was right. As a leader,
he had done his duty by his rank and file. By
assassinating Rajiv Gandhi, he prevented the
reintroduction of the IPKF to Sri Lanka [18]. Even for Pirabaharan, it
would have been a painful decision. Antagonizing India at
the southernmost point of peninsular India meant the
permanent closure of the door for creating Tamil Eelam
and Pirabaharan becoming its ruler.
Non-LTTE Actors
While the LTTE international network grew from
strength to strength, the activities of other Tamil
insurgent groups such as PLOTE, TELO, EPRLF and EROS
dwindled. There were three reasons for it.
First, their ideology was strictly not Tamil
nationalism but a mixture of Marxist-Leninism
[19]. The
LTTE had made the transition from Marxist Leninism to
Tamil nationalism despite the fact that Anton Balasingham
was a confirmed Marxist-Leninist and had extensively
written and published on the subject. Whipping up Tamil
nationalism and fighting the Sri Lankan security forces
appealed to sections of the Tamil community over
ideological indoctrination and limited or no action with
only visions of a mass revolution.
Second, with the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 and
the introduction of 100,000 Indian peace keeping troops
to Sri Lanka, all the Tamil insurgent groups entered the
political mainstream except the LTTE. Although at first
it appeared unrealistic to fight India, segments of the
Tamil Diaspora were committed to supporting the armed
struggle of the LTTE against the IPKF. Through concerted
propaganda, the LTTE had projected into the minds of the
Tamil Diaspora, that the LTTE could even fight India.
Prior to mid 1987, the LTTE was the only group that
projected itself both militarily and politically as
capable of delivering an independent Tamil Eelam.
Although many Tamils detested the IPKF - LTTE
confrontation (because India had been a traditional ally
of Sri Lankan Tamils) IPKF civilian killings highlighted
by the LTTE international propaganda machinery generated
resentment against India and the pro-Indian Sri Lankan
Tamil groups and generated support for the LTTE.
Third, LTTE was the only group that systematically
lobbied for Tamil Diaspora assistance and developed the
organization to sustain international activity. When the
fighting against the IPKF resumed, the network was
already in place. Although the proposition was
unrealistic to many, the Tamil Diaspora could not refuse
the LTTE it had been supporting and funding for years.
The rival Tamil groups such as PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO, EROS
and ENDLF did not have the international
organization.
It must be recalled that PLOTE started its
international activities with a bang soon after the riots
of July 1983. In fact, they purchased the first ship,
Palavan. In 1984, a PLOTE delegation visited Mauritius
and received a red carpet welcome from the government of
Androo Jauganath. On that delegation with Uma Maheswaran
was Dharmalingam Siddharthan, the son of a TULF
parliamentarian, and currently the leader of PLOTE.
Further, PLOTE had the largest number of cadres living in
India. According to modest estimates, there were at least
10,000 PLOTE cadres in Tamil Nadu alone. Initially, TELO
enjoyed greater patronage than the LTTE in India. TELO
also had better training facilities at the beginning. But
the LTTE checkmated all these groups by keeping their
numbers small and a tight control to maintain discipline.
Ruthlessness and efficiency forced the LTTE to ban all
the other Tamil groups and hunt their leaders and cadres
from 1984 onwards. Today, the LTTE claims that they are
the sole representatives of the Tamil people, not only
domestically but internationally, thereby dampening even
the activities of rival Tamil groups overseas. Coercion
is not an uncommon tool among the LTTE cadres operating
overseas vis-à-vis Tamil civilians. These
international developments demonstrated the ever changing
dynamic between LTTE domestic policy and its impact on
their international activity.
Finance Generation
Modern insurgent groups are developing the ability to
raise funds in one theater, operate in another and fight
in a third theater. Although the international
intelligence and security community has yet to focus on
the LTTE finance generation, the LTTE is the archetype
[20]. By late
1995, 40% of LTTE war budget was generated from overseas
[21]. Since
the loss of Jaffna peninsula in early 1996, 60% of the
LTTE war budget is being generated from overseas. The
LTTE has been engaged in a number of ventures that
continue to bring them a massive revenue. It is likely
that funds generated this way will surpass the funds
generated domestically or internationally from the Tamil
Diaspora. This is not a trend confined to the LTTE but to
other transnational groups as well. But the LTTE is a
trendsetter in this arena. The LTTE has invested in stock
and money markets, real estate and in restaurants
throughout the West and East. Starting with restaurants
in Tamil Nadu and Paris in 1983, the LTTE developed its
business acumen. Thereafter, restaurants sprang up from
London to Toronto and Cambodia. Today, the LTTE has a
large number of shops in a number of capitals, cities and
towns. They sell LTTE videos, newspapers and Asian spice.
LTTE has also invested in a number of farms, finance
companies and in other high profit ventures.
Trading in gold, laundering money and trafficking
narcotics bring the LTTE substantial revenue that is
needed to procure sophisticated weaponry [22]. The SAM missiles
procured from Cambodia cost the LTTE US $ 1 million a
piece [23].
The gold that is collected in Jaffna - initially two
sovereigns from each family for the war budget - is
melted and ingots are formed and transported across the
Palk Straits to Tamil Nadu. The ingots are sold by LTTE
male and female couriers in Tiruchi, Coimbatore and
Bombay markets. With the help of Thanjavur smugglers, the
money is ploughed back to procure war materials. Supplies
purchased in India are smuggled back to Sri Lanka from
the Ramanathapuram to Thanjavur coastline to Jaffna and
Talaimannar. The LTTE money laundering activities is not
very different to the systems used by the Latin American
narcotics cartels [24]. Money is invested in legitimate
ventures that makes it difficult for security and
intelligence agencies to monitor their investments,
accounts, transfers and investments. Although, the LTTE
narcotic trafficking operations remain highly secretive,
Western and Asian security and intelligence agencies have
since recently made some significant detection's from
the Philippines to Germany and from Italy to Canada. It
is believed that the LTTE transports heroin on board LTTE
owned ships from Myanmar to Europe [25]. The LTTE also has their
own fleet of vehicles in many countries from Tamil Nadu
to Ontario. They also play a role in providing passports,
other papers, and also engage in human smuggling.
Like the Middle Eastern groups, notably the Hamas and
the Hezbollah, the illegal and the legal components of
the LTTE operation for the generation of finances
overlap. Today, when money is collected by the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), the rehabilitation
wing of the LTTE, it is well known among the donors that
the money is in fact spent not only on rehabilitation but
also to procure weapons [26]. It is an unwritten understanding
both among the collectors and donors. During their early
years, almost all the Tamil insurgent groups were totally
dependent on robberies, extortion (they use the term
expropriation) and donations. Later the Tamil groups
developed a taste for soliciting funds overseas from
individuals and organizations. They were effective in
organizing food festivals, film shows or other cultural
activities. From LTTE controlled and dominated areas,
they also began to levy a tax. The LTTE profit
considerably from businesses and trade. They also tax
through immigration and emigration, transportation of
commodities to and from the northeast and wherever money
changes hands in substantial quantity and frequency.
Karikalan, the head of the political wing for the Eastern
province, earned a reputation among Colombo-based foreign
missions and development-oriented International Non
Governmental Organizations (INGOs) working in the
northeast for having approached their field
representatives to make donations. At one point, the TRO,
received a substantial donation from the Government of
Germany [27].
Thereafter, Karikalan would take a special interest in
demanding for contributions from either the Colombo-based
missions or INGOs.
Shipping Network
LTTE overseas department for clandestine operations,
headed by Kumaran Padmanathan, is also responsible for
managing the highly secretive shipping network
[28].
Padmanathan, a product of the Jaffna campus, uses over 20
aliases and an equal number of passports. This organ of
the LTTE, also known as the KP department, has mostly
militarily untrained cadres. Even Padmanathan has not
been trained militarily. This makes the operation of
their department much easier. There are virtually no
records of members of this department in the files of
domestic and foreign security and intelligence agencies.
But they are trained in other skills from forging to gun
running, secret communication to investing. KP department
is also responsible for managing the LTTE shipping
network. The LTTE shipping network, that has reached a
high degree of proficiency, is a model for other
insurgent groups.
Except for the PLO and the IRA, the LTTE is the only
insurgent group that owns and operates a fleet of deep
sea going ships [29]. Equipped with sophisticated
radar and inmarsat for communication, the LTTE built its
fleet from small beginnings. Today, the LTTE ships
communicate with a land based inmarsat in Sri Lanka. The
LTTE ships play a vital role in supplying explosives,
arms, ammunition and other war related material to the
theater of war.
The LTTE deep sea going operations began in 1984 after
the purchase of Cholan from Singapore. Hitherto, the LTTE
had only a naval capability to shuttle between India and
Sri Lanka and a capacity to charter vessels. To finalize
the Cholan purchase, Pirabaharan personally visited
Singapore and Malaysia. During this period, the LTTE was
also building a vessel called Kadalpura on the Kerala
coast [30].
Soranalingam, a double engineer, with expertise in
aircraft/airframe and marine engineering supervised the
construction [31]. From 1985 onwards, the LTTE
developed its fleet rapidly by actively purchasing
vessels. Tamil insurgents had decided to purchase their
own vessels after experiencing difficulties of chartering
vessels. From 1983 to 1985, they lost into the hands of
authorities, three vessels carrying significant
consignments. In Salonika, Greece, a Liberian registered
plane with a load of arms, in Ras Garib, Egypt, the ship
IVYB with two and a half tonnes of armaments ran aground,
and in Madras, Palavan was seized with Chinese weapons
sold out of Hong Kong by Alexander Urban, a Czech born
Australian operating out of Singapore.
Tamil militants have purchased explosives and weapons
from a wide variety of sources - governments, from North
Korea to Myanmar and the Ukraine, and from middlemen
operating from Europe to Asia and the Middle East.
Intelligence agencies with a global reach continue to
monitor LTTE shipping activity quite closely but
operationally could detect or prevent less than 20% of
the weapon consignments from reaching the target. In
fact, Illyana, an LTTE ship that unloaded weapons off
Mulativu in October 1987, was monitored by Indian vessels
entering the Rangoon harbor. Similarly Indian submarines,
ships and aircraft's have tracked LTTE ships over the
years. Aware of this, LTTE has yet managed to keep most
of its shipping fleet intact. The deceptive shipping
operations, indigenously developed, avoids detection and
surveillance. Yahata transporting weapons and explosives
changed its name to Ahat by painting off the first and
the last letters of the ship's name upon nearing the
South Asian wars.
After the LTTE lost Tamil Nadu as a semi-covert base
in late 1987, the LTTE established a permanent naval base
in Twante, an island off Myanmar, until late 1995. This
was vital, because a transshipment point, determines
sound logistics to security. While operating out of
Myanmar, the LTTE also used Thailand, particularly the
Pukhet area, as a back up base. Today, a bulk of LTTE
shipping activity is carried out of South East Asia. The
LTTE will always need a naval base in South Asia or South
East Asia for its operations in the Central Indian Ocean
Region.
For generating revenue, the ships also transports
fertilizer, timber, flour, rice paddy, sugar, cement and
other commercial goods [32]. During the PA-LTTE peace talks,
there were three shipments. The ship Sweene transported
50 tons of TNT and 10 tons of RDX purchased from a
chemical plant from Nicholave, a Black Sea port in the
Ukraine. Only 300 to 400 kg of this quantity was used in
early 1996 to devastate the heart of Colombo's financial
district by the LTTE. Similarly, a consignment of SAM-7s
procured from Cambodia via Thailand reached Sri Lanka.
This was the most expensive military cargo, the LTTE had
ever transported. On board was Padmanathan himself. The
details of the third consignment are not yet known. To
save high registration costs, the ships are registered in
the flag giver countries of Panama, Honduras and Liberia,
affectionately known as "Pan-ho-lib."
The unchecked expansion of the LTTE fleet has
implications for regional and international security.
From late 1983 to mid 1987, it was a belief shared by Sri
Lankan defense, security and intelligence official that
as long as India was used as an external base by the Sri
Lankan Tamil militant groups, it would be impossible to
destroy let alone pressurize the LTTE [33]. During that formative
period, the LTTE, was dependent largely on Tamil Nadu for
its supplies to northern Sri Lanka. After the decline of
official support from India, the LTTE has successfully
replicated that network internationally. Instead of an
hour long speed boat across the Palk Straits, deep sea
going ships transport supplies procured throughout the
world for the LTTE.
Evolution of the LTTE
With the expansion of the LTTE network overseas, the
LTTE domestic structure has grown in strength and
sophistication [34]. But, some features of the LTTE
never changed. Despite several offers for international
mediation and attractive propositions both by India and
Sri Lanka to resolve the political question, the LTTE
remained rigid in its stand on Tamil Eelam.
In many ways, the LTTE did not evolve but revolved. At
the heart of it was Pirabaharan, an innovative,
calculating and a ruthless military genius. Although, he
subsequently developed political sophistication, he never
compromised his faith in violence as a means to reach a
political goal. Unlike most other groups, the LTTE began
as a military organization but in time developed the
political structures. Like most revolutionary movements
of today, the LTTE is not a political organization that
developed a military capability. History has shown that
it is a near impossibility for organizations that are
inherently militant to enter the political mainstream.
The leadership of such organizations think and act
primarily militarily and secondarily politically. By
virtue of their structural compulsions, such
organizations prefer to fight continuously and win
militarily. Such organizations feel uncomfortable to
compete in a political environment.
At leadership level, Pirabaharan maintains tight
control. He is the final authority on each and every
major issue. Pirabaharan's decision has always gone
unchallenged. If Pirabaharan is killed, will the LTTE
die? Examining similar organizations, particularly the
capability of their middle level leadership, after the
death or arrest of their senior leaders, provide a vital
clue. Did the JVP or the Sendero Luminoso die after the
death of Wijeweera or the capture of Guzman?
[35]
Although the death of Pirabaharan will be a massive
blow to the LTTE, the middle level leadership of the LTTE
is equally or more motivated than its senior level
leadership. History shows that organizations like the
LTTE cannot be easily eradicated. Despite their
inability to meet their avowed goals and the massive
suffering they have brought upon the Tamil public,
segments of the Tamil people still believe in them and
support them. For some, particularly for those who had
lost a loved one during an ethnic riot or killed by a
soldier, Pirabaharan is a demi-god.
As much as the moderate Tamil politicians have failed,
successive governments in Colombo have not done their
best for Sri Lanka. Even the best of Sri Lankan leaders
have faltered. Colombo has failed to understand the
aspirations of the Tamil people, the equation between the
Tamil insurgents and the Tamil public, and finally, the
importance of non military dimensions of counter
insurgency. These dynamics have also impeded the
government from dampening the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent
- Diaspora link. Governments have miserably failed to
develop and implement non-military strategies primarily
counter propaganda among the Diaspora and in the LTTE
dominated areas of the northeast. To what degree has the
Diaspora helped the LTTE to become resilient? The
expansion of the Diaspora, the backbone of LTTE finance
generation, has helped the LTTE to develop its range of
contacts for procuring weapons too. What will be the
outcome of allowing a Diaspora to expand and root in this
manner? Will the LTTE become more confident and less
amenable towards negotiation?
The expansion of the LTTE network overseas has brought
them closer in contact with other insurgent groups. The
LTTE has developed ideological, financial and
technological linkages with other insurgent groups.
Technologically, the LTTE has established links with the
Assamese ULFA, Punjabi Sikh insurgents, Andhara Peoples
War Group, the Kashmir mujahidin and several groups
within and outside the region. Such groups exchange and
purchase weaponry from diverse sources thereby
contravening the established international arms control
conventions and agreements. As insurgent group develop
their structures to raise funds in one location, operate
from another location and fight in a third location, law
enforcement agencies of governments are constrained from
conducting extra-territorial operations.
Destabilizing Force?
Is the LTTE a destabilizing force in South Asia? Does
LTTE interaction with foreign insurgent groups contribute
to the instability and insecurity of nation-states beyond
Sri Lanka? The region is fed from West, Central and South
East Asia and Europe by small arms. In 1994, 50 tones of
TNT and 10 tones of RDX were sold by a chemical plant in
Ukraine to the LTTE. Did the LTTE share a fraction of
these explosives with their South East Asian and South
Asian counterparts? In 1995, a consignment of Chinese
manufactured Surface to Air Missiles were sold by a group
of corrupt Cambodian generals across the Cambodian - Thai
border with the knowledge of a section of the corrupt
Thai military. The LTTE as well as Khun Sa's Mong Tai
Army had access to the sophisticated Thai and Cambodian
arms markets. While the arms pipeline of the semi-covert
multi-national anti-Soviet Afghan campaign continues to
feed South Asia the LTTE has established relations with
Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hezbi-Islami [36]. The solidarity between
insurgent groups was best expressed when a Sikh insurgent
group in Germany collected money for the family of Dhanu,
the assassin of Rajiv Gandhi. The Sikh's claimed openly,
"We have killed the mother, and you the son." The LTTE
has also established links with at least 21 Tamil Nadu
separatist groups. Although, these groups have only an
electoral base of three million out of 60 million Tamils
in India, if members of these groups are sufficiently
motivated, politically and militarily trained, the damage
they could do in Tamil Nadu is significant. Some of these
groups are [37]:
(1) Tamil National Retrieval Force
(2) Peoples War Group
(3) Liberation Cuckoos
(4) Peasants and Peoples Party
(5) MGR Anna Dravida Munethra Kalaham of
Thirunavakarasu
(6) Tamil National Movement of Nedumaran
(7) Indian Peoples Party
(8) Center for the Campaign of Tamil Education
(9) Thaliai Nagar Tamil Society
(10) Movement of the Educated Front
(11) Tamil Nadu Peoples Movement
(12) Thileepan Society
(13) Peoples Education Center
(14) Tamil Nadu Socialist Party
(15) Republic Party of India
(16) Peoples Democratic Youth Front
(17) Liberation Organization of the Oppressed People
(18) World Peoples Progressive Front
(19) Human Rights Organization
(20) Organization for Social History
(21) Marxist Periyar Socialist Party
Today, the LTTE is looking beyond India and South
Asia. But the links established by the LTTE in Asia is
not fully known. The security and intelligence
cooperation between the Sri Lankan and other agencies in
the region has not been adequately developed. In 1995,
western intelligence and security agencies received
information that the LTTE had established links with FARC
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), a powerful
Colombian insurgent group dealing in narcotics. In fact,
it was believed that for the first time the LTTE had
purchased vessels that could cross the Atlantic or the
Pacific and reach Latin America. Although the LTTE has
exchanged and procured weapons from a number of insurgent
groups including the Khmer Rough and maintained links
with South Africa's ANCL, Namibia's SWAPO and
Eritira-Ethiopia's EPLF and TPLF, very little is known
about its Middle Eastern connections, except for the fact
that Tamil insurgents had trained at least in Lebanon
with Fatah, the militant wing of the PLO and in the
Syrian controlled Bekka Valley with PFLP. At these
training camps, Tamil groups came into contact with a
number of other groups, including the Japanese Red Army
and the Kurdish PKK operating from Turkey.
The LTTE has also the potential to develop close
operational cooperation with the Brotherhood through its
links with the Afghan mujahidin and the Kashmiri
mujahidin, two groups with which LTTE has had substantial
technological links. Interestingly, the Muslim
Brotherhood and its South Asian counter part Jamaati
Islami sponsor wars of Islamic revival from Algeria to
Egypt, Sudan to Saudi Arabia, Bosnia to Chechnya,
Afghanistan to Kashmir, and Central Asia to Mindanao in
the Philippines.
International Security Implications
Internationally, the LTTE has not only been active
politically and economically. Their extensive political
and economic presence has enabled them to be militarily
active as well. The LTTE understood quite early that in
order to expand their political and economic powerbase,
they will have to strengthen their legal as well as
extralegal capability outside Sri Lanka. Although small
in number, the LTTE has assassinated Tamils in Europe,
North America and in South Asia. Today, at least the law
enforcement agencies of three European governments
particularly prohibit Sri Lankan Tamils from carrying
weapons on themselves.
Today, the main centers of LTTE activity are in London
and Paris for Europe and New Jersey and Toronto for North
America. The key propaganda centers using computers
primarily the information super highway are in Texas
(USA) and Norway. Although the LTTE has an international
secretariat located on Katherine Road in London, the LTTE
has decentralized much of its international activities
and operations since 1991. The decentralization was due
to the pressure placed on the LTTE by Britain soon after
the Rajiv Gandhi assassination in May 1991. After the
assassination, RAW stepped up surveillance on LTTE
international operations. Aggressive lobbying by
diplomats of the Indian foreign office and operatives of
the RAW, India's premier external intelligence agency,
led to the deportation of Sathasivam Krishnaswamy alias
Kittu, the charismatic one legged one time Jaffna
commander from London to Switzerland. The stepping up of
surveillance by European security and intelligence
agencies particularly at the request of the US on
insurgent groups from the Middle East and the Kurdish PKK
has made it difficult for the LTTE to sustain many of its
operations in the West. As a consequence, the LTTE
shifted most of its activities out of Britain. When
Indian foreign service and intelligence service personnel
began to mount pressure on the western government, the
LTTE began to spread into Asia.
Network's Implications
Today, the LTTE has established offices and cells in
over 38 countries, the latest being in Japan, South
Africa and Botswana. For the survival of the LTTE, it is
necessary for them to expand globally, because the LTTE
had lost its most important external base of Tamil Nadu
after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Instead of LTTE
speed boats shuttling between India and Sri Lanka for its
supplies, today the LTTE ships navigate internationally
bringing supplies to feed its fighting machinery. In many
ways, the network developed by the LTTE over the years in
India has been replicated, developed and sustained
globally.
From about 1992, the LTTE has been shifting its
international operations from Western Europe to
Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and to South East Asia. From
about 1995, based on information that Western operatives
had gathered, the LTTE operations in the US as well as
Canada has come under close scrutiny. While shifting
their activities out of the North Atlantic area, the LTTE
has also made attempts to win over key individuals in
Western governments. As North America and Europe is so
vital to the LTTE, they have hired some of the best
lawyers, public relations agencies and lobbied political
leaders into supporting them. In Canada when the LTTE
leader Suresh was arrested for extortion and collecting
money to procure weapons, the LTTE hired some of the
finest lawyers and arranged for Western academics who
sympathized with their cause to justify before the
Canadian court that the LTTE is not a terrorist but a
liberation movement. When the US was moving the
anti-terrorism legislation that will affect LTTE
activities in the US, a reputed public relations firm in
the US was consulted by the LTTE to counter lobby the
bill. LTTE manipulated Tamil communities from Canada to
Australia have campaigned for host country political
leaders with the hope that they will support the Tamil
cause once in power.
The shift from West to East, particularly to South
East Asia and the Far East has enabled the LTTE to grow
in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to the naval base
in Twante, the LTTE also trained members of the Tamil
National Retrieval Force, a high profile Indian Tamil
secessionist group, and dispatched them to India. Under
pressure from the Sri Lankan government, the military
junta in Myanmar forced the LTTE to vacate Twante by
January 1996. The LTTE also developed difficulties of
continuing their training in an island off Malaysia. This
training, carried out in absolute secrecy, called
"Singapore training" had helped the LTTE to compliment
the RAW training in Vishakhapattnam. The LTTE had hired
former Norwegian naval personnel to train LTTE cadres in
underwater activities in the diving school. Meanwhile,
the LTTE also developed a base in an island off Pukhet in
Thailand. Surveillance in this area by RAW led an
Indian submarine to mount surveillance on an LTTE ship
Horizon operating under the name of Julex Comex 3
transporting weapons to Sri Lanka via Pukhet. Julex Comex
3 was destroyed near the Sri Lankan coast of Mualtivu in
early 1996.
Fighting the network
Government of Sri Lanka has neither developed a
systematic plan nor the organization to cripple the
backbone of this network. The backbone, which is
political propaganda, is aimed at building support for
the creation of a separate state, the LTTE as an
organization and Pirabaharan as its leader.
Since mid 1986, the government has begun to reflect on
the network and fight the network. Strategically, LTTE
procurement operations can be restrained by generating an
excellent counter propaganda network. Tactically, counter
propaganda should be conducted with the support of Sri
Lankans living overseas (individually or through their
associations) by the Sri Lankan foreign missions
[38]. For
this, Sri Lanka's classical foreign policy role of
liaison with governments must change. Sri Lanka must aim
for an innovative foreign policy to meet the current
challenges and future threats. At least 40% of the
foreign policy budget and 40 % of the time of Sri Lankan
diplomats should be geared to fighting LTTE propaganda
and building support among Sri Lankan and foreign
governments against the LTTE. This has not happened
primarily due to two reasons.
First, policy and decision makers of the Government of
Sri Lanka has not fully recognised the LTTE threat
stemming from overseas. Many are not even aware that one
out of every five Sri Lankan Tamils, live overseas. Even,
well traveled Sri Lankan diplomats see only a part of
that threat. They see it individually and not
collectively - often country wise, at best by region,
very few the bigger global picture. It is because the
Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has not yet conducted a comprehensive study on the LTTE
international network and developed a corresponding
counter strategy. Towards this end an interministerial
committee for defence and foreign affairs has been
proposed [39].
The committee, if formed will (a) assess the threat, (b)
review government progress, and (c) task relevant
agencies to produce and disseminate counter propaganda
[40].
Creating an interministerial operations room to monitor
and rapidly respond to LTTE international procurement,
funding, and propaganda has also been proposed
[41].
Second, Sri Lankan diplomats have not been trained to
conduct counter propaganda by personnel drawn from the
Directorate of Military Intelligence and the National
Intelligence Bureau. Although proposed, the Bandaranaike
International Diplomatic Training Institute, established
in early 1996, has yet to educate Sri Lankan diplomats on
the LTTE history, organization, and operation. Most Sri
Lankan diplomats are not aware that EROS has two
factions. The EROS Raji Shankar faction support the
government and the EROS Balkumar faction work with the
LTTE. Sri Lankan diplomats cannot be expected to play a
critical role without a thorough grounding in terrorism.
If this is accomplished, Sri Lankan diplomats can play a
leading role in building international support to fight
terrorism, not only in South Asia but, throughout the
word.
Government Response
The lack of international and regional interagency and
security cooperation has brought about this predicament.
Sri Lankan agencies have been weak in their efforts to
develop frontline intelligence on the LTTE international
as well as the domestic operations. The lack of political
commitment to embark on high risk operations both
overseas and domestic is seen as a major impediment to
weakening the LTTE.
At a military level, the government forces continue to
fight an unconventional war, in a conventional mode. The
need to transform the national security doctrine,
training and weaponry to meet the growing internal threat
has been long felt. But, to date a bulk of Sri Lankan
troops are being trained to fight across clear battle
lines. The pace at which, the counter insurgency
component is being developed, is slow and inadequate to
meet the growing threat.
Further, the government continues to chase the
military option. Government has failed to expand its
activities in the non-military counter-insurgency
spectrum. The government has failed to develop the
political, socio-economic and international dimensions of
counter insurgency. This has been largely due to the
inability of the national security apparatus to integrate
the military and non-military dimensions of insurgency.
The development of an integrated and a unified strategy
is seen as a major requirement.
Bringing the civilian and military branches to work
together in the recently recovered Jaffna peninsula has
met with internal difficulties. Many believe that the
postings to the north of public officials are based on
political colour or as a punishment transfer. On the
contrary, the most able and the most dedicated public
officials must be posted to the north. The militarily
recovered north will be lost if the support of the Tamil
public cannot be secured politically and economically.
The half a million Tamils in the peninsula influence at
least two hundred thousand Tamiils living overseas.
At a political level, the government has failed to
develop and implement political strategies to provide an
alternative path to the Tamil people from being sucked
into the gun culture. The package is attractive to many
Tamils but even they question whether it will see the
light of day? What is required is not grand plans but
immediate measures to alleviate the suffering of the
people of the northeast.
The domestic Tamils continuously grade the genuine
sincerity of the government's attitude towards resolving
the current ethnic crisis. The international Tamil
community reacts both according to the response of their
kith and kin in Sri Lanka and to the plea of the LTTE.
These are the very dynamics the government has failed to
shift. As long as the staus-quo remain, the exodus of the
Tamils from Sri Lanka should come as no surprise. If the
insurgency continues more people will join the exodus.
The alternative is an unhappy one, often a traumatic one.
One generation has already seen and become influenced by
nothing but war, anti-government and pro-LTTE propaganda,
and anti-Sinhala and pro-Tamil nationalist views. A boy
or a girl who was born in 1970, would have heard only of
violence against the Tamils since he was ten years old.
By the age of 15, he would have witnessed violence. By
the time he reached 25, he or a member of his immediate
or greater family would have experienced violence. Had
the compulsions not driven him towards insurgency by that
time, he would have actively or passively suffered from
the day to day consequences of Eelam War I, II and III.
One generation, has been completely wasted by war. The
Sri Lankan political leaders and the bureaucrats have not
done their best to end war in Sri Lanka.
Domestic Response
There has been no marked response of the
non-governmental community to the internationalization of
the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict. It has been, more or less,
an extension of their attitude to the domestic
developments. Some question whether they have been numbed
by war. Others characterize this as a very Sri Lankan
attitude.
The non-governmental community - commercial, social
and religious leaders, and academics, scholars and media
personnel - has not realized that they have a major role
to play when the security of their country is at stake.
Economic diplomacy as a tool in conflict resolution is
gathering momentum throughout the world. Economics can
build broken bridges. Economics cut across ethnicity and
religiosity. For ethnic and religious based conflicts,
military solutions are increasingly seen as temporary
solutions. Economics offer permanent solutions.
Entrepreneurs and other business leaders can pressurize
governments, communities and even groups committed to
violence to end war. Most leaders of this category in Sri
Lanka have decided to play a marginal or non role either
in the prosecution of the war or in the peace and
reconciliation process.
In the Sri Lankan context, social and religious
leaders have either not asserted their rights or they
have chosen sides. They must be above ethnic
polarization. What has adversely affected ethnic and
religious communities are the very campaigns to advance
their interests. A closer look at the plight of both the
Tamil and the Sinhala communities demonstrate this fact.
The era of working for "my community" is gone. From
Bosnia to Jaffna, religious and ethnic nationalisms have
devastated people and their interests beyond
comprehension. Social and religious leaders, must
generate the will to rise above ethnicity and
religiosity, in their endeavor to serve their people and
their countries. There has been no effort by any of
these leaders to address the Tamil Diaspora and lobby
them into generating a negotiated settlement.
A majority of Sri Lankan scholars and academics live
in their ivory towers. They have not ventured out to
capture the tragedy and trauma of the intermittent
insurrections and analyze their causes. A vast majority
of them have not made any in put to government policy.
There is a dire need to fully assess the impact of the
activities of the Sri Lankan Diaspora on the national
security of Sri Lanka. This has escaped the minds of even
the best of Sri Lankan scholars and academics. It is
research that should be best conducted by independent
academics and scholars because they would have greater
insight into the Diaspora. Research in a nation like Sri
Lanka, torn apart by conflict, must focus on dampening
violence. The scholars and academics have a major
obligation to contribute to the national harmony of their
country if not the region and the world.
Sinhalese and Tamil dons in particular, have not
focused on the international implication of a domestic
insurgency or the impact of the Diaspora on the domestic
situation. Instead, many of them have continued to pursue
their traditional disciplines of research and writing.
Sri Lankan scholars and academics, instead of working on
subjects that have no or little application to the
national development of Sri Lanka, must conduct frontline
research both on the ethnic conflict and its vicious
byproduct - the insurgency. They must learn from other
countries. Scholars and academics in the developed
countries would work closely with the government. They
will be formally and informally advising the government
on the modifications required in their national policies
to govern better and more effectively. Working in
isolation with data generated from newspaper accounts and
published reports cannot produce first rate research.
Field research is critical for penetrating analyses.
While, departing from this monotonous tradition of
working strictly in their disciplines and confined to
their homes, libraries, departments and conferences, Sri
Lankan scholars and academics must begin to explore ways
and means of becoming more useful to the country. Some of
the best minds in the government in the developed world
are academics and scholars. They are not classical
bureaucrats unable to meet the emerging challenges. They
are innovative in their approach, multidisciplinary in
their thinking and cross culturally amenable.
The mass media in Sri Lanka has improved dramatically
in the recent years. They have been able to write
accurate accounts of developments in the northeast and
overseas on the ethnic issue. However, they have to move
beyond reporting to analysis and advocacy. Although,
media is not expected to take a rigid position and only
report events as they occur, the media in a developing
country has a more responsible role to play. The Sri
Lankan media barons must reflect on this need .
Sri Lankan news media has failed to educate the Sri
Lankan public on terrorism. The average Sri Lankan is not
alert to the destruction of terrorism. A civilian will
often not be sensitized to alerting a law enforcement
official to an unclaimed parcel in a public place.
Similarly, the media has failed to educate them on the
range of tools available in conflict management. The
military option is only one road to combating rebellion.
There are so many rebellions that have been resolved by
negotiations. They have to be brought to light as well.
The media, at the turn of the twentieth century, has role
to guide leaders and lobby the public.
Peace Process
Organizations committed to peace have mushroomed in
Colombo in the recent decade. Unfortunately, the focus of
the peace industry has been "peace out of context." The
leaders and members of these organizations have virtually
no knowledge of the developments in the northeast.
Therefore, they are vulnerable to manipulation by agents
of insurgents or by insurgent propaganda. Many of these
organizations have been infiltrated by other interest
groups too. To retain their credibility, these groups
must be politically neutral. To project their sincerity
and commitment, they must work at the source of
violence.
Those leaders and members who are truly committed to
peace must realize that being a peace activist is as
risky as being a law enforcement officer. In context, the
peace activists, have to venture out of Colombo and work
in the war-zone, in the border villages, and in areas
vulnerable to disruption. Staging demonstrations,
rallies, marches and conferences, in the capital of
Colombo, will not help. It will only make the government
harden their stand towards war and advocate war as a
strategy towards peace. Genuinely committed peace
activists have to travel and live in the war zone, meet
insurgent leaders and stress the importance of peace to
them. They have to meet the parents, whose children have
been committed to violence, to dissuade them from doing
so. Similarly, they should campaign to move the
government into bringing about policies of equality. The
bravest of the peace activists must play a role on the
ground. They could facilitate prisoner exchange. They
could dissuade combatants on both sides from refraining
from fighting in build up areas that produce civilian
casualties.
The macro view of peace is broader. Peace groups
should be able to bring the government and the LTTE to
the negotiating table. They should be able to pressurize
governments that permit the LTTE to function in their
countries, to exercise pressure on the LTTE to negotiate.
Peace groups must reinforce the dialogue and the
commitment of both parties to peace by participation.
International Community's Response
The International community's response to
transnational insurgency has been weak. The LTTE along
with several other insurgent groups have established
offices and cells throughout the world. Most of these
offices engage in disseminating propaganda and collecting
money. In most countries the LTTE would collect money
for the purchase of armaments under the guise of
supporting rehabilitation. The LTTE has organized over 30
rallies and demonstrations in 1994 and 1995 in the West,
including in front of the White House in Washington DC
and the UN in New York. Ironically, the placards hoisted
included photographs of Pirabaharan, who has taken the
lives of two heads of government.
The US has played a leading role in the Middle East
and since recently in Latin America to dampen terrorist
activity. However, the US has played a key role only when
it directly affected US security interests. Due to US
interests in Turkey, Washington lobbied its European
allies to close down Kurdish PKK offices in Europe,
particularly after PKK firebombed Turkish diplomatic and
tourist offices. Similarly, the US extended assistance to
the government in Peru after Sendero Luminoso began to
deal in narcotics in a big way. The US, despite the poor
human rights record of the Myanmar military junta,
started supporting the military regime to fight the drug
lords engaged in producing narcotics that is threatening
US interests. US assistance to fight the LTTE has been
small - the Sri Lankan government too has not lobbied the
US government substantially to secure a high degree of US
military, security and intelligence cooperation.
However, the US has realized the emerging dangers of
transnational terrorism. The Western world as a whole has
suffered as a consequence of conflicts in the Middle
East. With the recent developments in the Middle East,
governments of the developing world are attaching a high
priority to security. In the years ahead, anti-terrorism
legislation in countries of the developed world will make
it difficult for groups like the LTTE to operate under
the cover of political offices. However, the nature of
terrorism is such that insurgent groups like the LTTE
will develop new methods of operation to evade
arrest.
The political dimension of insurgent groups have been
equally hard to fight. How does a domestic government
stop an insurgent group from transferring funds from a
bank in Singapore to Dresden to buy explosives or from
Westpack in Australia to a Swiss account to pay for an
arms consignment? Modern insurgent groups are beginning
to operate like multinational firms or like intelligence
agencies with a global reach. Recent evidence confirm
that the LTTE has manipulated a number of human rights
groups in the West to supporting them. The LTTE has
poured in money and requested its supporters to campaign
for certain candidates in countries like Australia,
England, India and Canada so that in the event they come
into power, the LTTE could use them to advance LTTE
goals. NGOs have been manipulated by the LTTE and their
front organizations to pressurize the government. The
LTTE has lobbied for the appointment of certain
individuals who are pro LTTE to head the Sri Lanka NGO
consortium. Further, the LTTE has developed relationships
with officials who determine the yearly aid package from
Sri Lanka. The Paris Aid Group meeting has become a forum
to lobby for and against aid in Sri Lanka both by the
LTTE and government lobbyists. LTTE has also secured the
support of a number of intellectuals in the West like
Peter Schalk of Uppsala University and human rights
lawyers like Karen Parker to support them. Many of them
have expressed their support to the LTTE at several
meetings. The LTTE has also gained excellent access to
media organizations from the newspapers in Canada to the
BBC in London. The LTTE has also gained access to some
world leaders through powerful business friends and other
connections.
In the legislative and legal fronts, the international
community is preparing to develop frameworks to regulate
and dampen activities of groups like the LTTE. Individual
governments are realizing and they ought to take action,
either to step up surveillance or ban organizations with
a transnational reach like the LTTE.
Despite the fact that the LTTE is not a banned
organization in Sri Lanka, the LTTE has been proscribed
by two governments - India renewed its two yearly ban in
May of 1996, and Malaysia indefinitely. In Switzerland
and in at least another two European countries, LTTE
activity has led governments to ban Sri Lankans from
carrying weapons on them. Australia came close to banning
the LTTE in 1995, but the unwillingness of Colombo to ban
the LTTE in Sri Lanka, precluded the Canberra government
from moving in that direction. This is a security paradox
- the government in Colombo has to leave its doors open
for the LTTE to enter the mainstream while fighting them.
Several countries have revised their anti-terrorist
legislation and others are in the process of reviewing
their legislative loop holes. The line between political
action and military activity is very thin - this is a
phenomenon that most political leaders both in the East
and West have failed to understand.
Many of the modern conflicts are ethnic or
religion-oriented. Often they cannot be resolved
militarily. Third party mediation is required because
such culturally based conflicts are deep rooted and
protracted. Is peace making a line in the non political
spectrum of counter insurgency? Peace is the absence of
war but interludes of peace as a strategy has been used
both by the insurgents to regroup, rearm and retrain
themselves and take on the state exploiting the element
of surprise.
Governments in the Asia-Pacific region believe that
the LTTE is emerging as a major destabilizing force. As a
group, the LTTE is at the cutting edge of technology. In
Sri Lanka, the first rocket propelled grenade launcher
was recovered from a LTTE camp. Similarly, night vision
glasses were used for the first time in the Sri Lankan
battlefield by the LTTE. The LTTE, at the forefront of
insurgent technological innovation, has gained mastery in
the use of dual technology. Before the Sri Lankan
military, the LTTE purchased Global Positioning Satellite
systems, to accurately target its projectiles. The LTTE
also used a land based satellite system to communicate
with its overseas cadres. The LTTE has used the world
wide web and the internet to establish a sophisticated
state-of-the-art propaganda as well as a communication
system within its members and supporters. LTTE suicide
bombers have been trained both in France and in Britain
to fly light aircraft. These ultralights do not carry
sufficient metal for radar detection. Further, they could
take off from a short runway. It is likely that these
aircraft laden with explosives will be used to take vital
economic, political and military targets, reminiscent of
the Kamikazis [42].
In many ways, the technology generated by the LTTE has
been a model for many other groups. There has been
technology transfer or technology emulation. Today,
suicide bomb technology is used by the Hamas, Algerian
FIS, Kurdish PKK and the Punjabi Sikh insurgents. The
LTTE body suit is more advanced than the body suits used
by any of the other groups. The Western agencies watch a
possible transfer of suicide technology from the LTTE
particularly to the Middle Eastern groups, where the
suicide bomb technology is still very rudimentary
compared to their South Asian counterparts. Can the LTTE
conduct a suicide strike for another militant group for
ideological or financial reasons?
Although the LTTE has not conducted significant
military strikes outside Sri Lanka and India, it has the
potential to do so. The LTTE has a worldwide reach and a
worldwide presence. The LTTE has assassinated a handful
of opponents in Switzerland, France, Germany, Britain and
in Canada. Although it has not yet conducted
transnational terrorist strikes to the scale of the
Palestinian, Armenian, Kurdish and other Middle Eastern
groups, it has the potential to do so. The LTTE arms
purchasing operations to finance generation projects can
become the model for some groups. To combat groups like
the LTTE new security structures will have to be
developed. The idea of developing transnational forces to
combat transnational terrorism is fast becoming one of
the post-Cold war security imperatives. Considering the
recent organizational and operational developments, is
the LTTE a destabilizing force in the South Asian region?
Is the LTTE a destabilizing force in the rest of Asia
Pacific? Is the LTTE a destabilizing force
internationally ?
Although the international community will never allow
a major interstate war, the international community
should realize that intrastate wars have significant
spill-over effects that can complicate regional and
international security to a very high degree. The 21st
century insurgent groups will be very different from the
twentieth century insurgents. Until recently, technology
doubled every 25 years. Today, technology doubles every
year. If not regulated and controlled, insurgents
empowered by subnational groups will begin to use
technology the same way governments use them. After the
end of the Cold War, the porosity of the boundaries has
transformed the international system dramatically.
Countries cannot live in isolation any more. What will
ensure the security of a nation-state is not only
internal stability but the stability of one's neighbor
and the region. Therefore, security of the 21st century
will have to be cooperative and collective and not
isolationist and individual.
Rohan Gunaratna, British Chevening Scholar UK was
previously Hesburgh Scholar, Institute for International
Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Foreign Policy
Fellow at the Center for International and Security
Studies, University of Maryland and a Visiting Research
Scholar at the Office of Arms Control, Disarmament and
International Security, University of Illinois, Champaign -
Urbana. He is a Council Member of the Asia - Pacific Peace
Research Association, Japan, Fellow of the Institute of
Strategic Studies, Pakistan, Member of the Regional Center
for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka, and a guest lecturer at
many US and Asian universities and institutions.
In Sri Lanka, he served as a USAID/ISTI Consultant to
the Mahaweli Authority, Member of the Research Advisory
Council of the World Bank Poverty Alleviation Trust Fund,
and in the Office of the Science Advisor to the
President.
He is the author and editor of 6 books and is a
contributor to the American Encyclopedia on terrorism.
