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Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam
Jane's Editor interviewed by
Australian Broadcasting Corporation
on Intelligence Report on LTTE
Presenter - Corinne Podger
Speaker - Jane's Intelligence Review editor Christian
LeMiere
ABC Radio Australia, 25 July 2007
[also  audio]
"..The most
significant number of arms (for the LTTE) comes from
the Sri Lankan armed forces themselves and raids on Sri
Lankan armed forces bases... LTTE has demonstrated in
the past that it's very strategically able and has
surprised many observers by coming back from what
people may have thought was almost certain defeat...
The funding (200-300 million dollars a year) almost
exclusively comes from the overseas diaspora of which
there are 600-800,000 Sri Lankan Tamils overseas...
"
[see also 
USD200
million profit margins maintain sophisticated Tamil
Tiger war - Janes Intelligence Review, 19 July 2007
and Velupillai Pirabakaran Press
Conference at Killinochi, Tamil Eelam, 14 April
2002 "Q: Is the LTTE using the ceasefire as an
opportunity to re-arm? A: It is during the armed
conflict that we were able to amass a large quantity of
weapons and it is during peace time that we are
deprived of that opportunity. During the battle of
Elephant Pass we were able to acquire a large quantity
of arms worth millions of rupees and also ammunition in
large amounts. It is during the peace process that we
are deprived of this opportunity.]
LEMIERE: Well the report really outlines not that there
is a significant flow of weapons from Cambodia to Sri
Lanka on an annual basis but that Cambodia has in the
past been the second most significant source of arms for
Sri Lanka, approximately five to ten per cent of the arms
held by the LTTE are of Cambodian origin in terms of
their supplier country. The most significant number of
arms comes from the Sri Lankan armed forces themselves
and raids on Sri Lankan armed forces bases. But the
instability in Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s has helped
fuel a black small arms market that has greatly aided the
Tamil Tigers.
PODGER: Cambodia's Interior Ministry has said in response
to your report that it is doing everything it can to
prevent the movement of weapons. Is that an assessment
that you would share?
LEMIERE: I think given the resources available for the
Cambodian government there has been a concerted effort
and they have been fairly successful in stymieing the use
and the flow of small arms coming from Cambodia. The
death by small arms in violent crime in Cambodia has
fallen significantly over the last five to ten years. But
it's a slow process. The Cambodian government is still
aware that it's dragging its feet on the Khmer Rouge
trial for instance because it doesn't wish to upset any
Khmer Rouge that may still exist within the country. So
there's only so much the Cambodian government can do.
While it may have good intentions its lack of resources
means that the process is somewhat slow.
PODGER: Why is the Cambodian government having difficulty
in fully eradicating the movement of weapons?
LEMIERE: The Cambodian government is still not entirely
in control of all areas of Cambodia, there are still
areas where there are autonomous administrators if you
will in areas of the country and it's a very difficult
country in which to exert full control from the centre.
There's not a complete monopoly of control by the
government and so it's unable to force its will
everywhere. The borders are fairly porous and there's
still large numbers of small arms in rural communities
around the country.
PODGER: Your report also says the Tamil Tigers have an
income of around two to three hundred million US dollars
a year, funding capabilities which now include a
rudimentary airforce. How's that income being
generated?
LEMIERE: The funding almost exclusively comes from the
overseas diaspora of which there are 600-800,000 Sri
Lankan Tamils overseas. Although there are some funds in
fact raised within Sri Lanka within Tamil-held areas. But
the majority of it will come from overseas communities.
And there seems to be more of a trend now to use agents
rather than direct Tamil representatives within countries
to raise funds, and in particular international agents
who are not necessarily ethnic Tamils. There is one
particular case that involves a Singaporean and two
Indonesians who have pleaded guilty to attempting to
illegally export arms in January this year on behalf of
the LTTE.
PODGER: There are also suggestions in your report that
some of the Tamil Tiger income comes from human
trafficking?
LEMIERE: Yes I mean it's difficult to confirm figures and
numbers when dealing with the LTTE, for obvious reasons,
but it has been estimated by the government - and Tamil
diaspora sources have confirmed - that there may be some
funds that are tracked from illegal activities including
human trafficking.
PODGER: The Sri Lankan government's capture of a key
rebel bastion in the east of the island, is that likely
to affect the rebel's activities do you think?
LEMIERE: The fall of the east the Sri Lanka government
would like to have two direct effects on the LTTE; one is
obviously a clear sign of its lack of influence in the
east and its seemingly poor thrust militarily speaking,
which has been driven very rapidly out of an area that it
previously controlled to a greater extent.
The other is that it no longer has much
control or freedom of movement in the coastal areas of
the east which previously could have been utilised for
smuggling, maybe of arms, perhaps of humans and even of
cash as well. So it will affect both the ability of the
LTTE to move goods into the island and outside of the
island, but also its ability to stash naval equipment
near the coast and to operate in the east.
Whether it will mean the defeat of the
LTTE is far from certain because it still holds a
significant area in the north of Sri Lanka and the LTTE
has demonstrated in the past that it's very strategically
able and has surprised many observers by coming back from
what people may have thought was almost certain defeat in
the past.
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