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Selected
Writings by Sachi Sri Kantha
1982 Presidential
Candidacy of G.G.(Kumar) Ponnambalam Jr. Revisited
12 August 2008
[see also
Mamanithar G.G.
(Kumar) Ponnambalam Jr]
 Had
he been living, G.G. (Kumar) Ponnambalam Jr. (1938-2000) would be 70
on August 12th.
As a tribute to his memory, I opted to present vignettes from his
1982 Presidential candidacy. It was the first executive Presidential
election to be held in the blessed island. Since then four more
presidential elections have been held in 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005.
But none of these featured a Tamil candidate. Thus, Kumar
Ponnambalam�s 1982 presidential candidacy turned out to be the first
and the last of its kind for an Eelam Tamil.
What Kumar Ponnambalam achieved by contesting that presidential
election has been chronicled by two ranking journalists of that era,
namely S.P.Amarasingam (for the Tribune) and Mervyn de Silva
(for the Lanka Guardian). In this anthology, I also
incorporate two of Kumar Ponnambalam�s contributions to the Lanka
Guardian
in 1982.
Eelam Tamil voters in 1982 were evenly divided on Kumar
Ponnambalam�s decision to contest the 1982 presidential election.
The TULF, then led by A. Amirthalingam, attempted to portray Kumar
Ponnambalam�s interest in contesting the 1982 Presidential election
as nothing but a �cheap stunt� for personal glory. Some Left-leaning
Tamils pondered that Kumar Ponnambalam was a �sham candidate�
standing on behalf of the President J.R. Jayewardene to siphon off
the anti-UNP vote among the Tamils.
The Tamil daily Dinapathi, Colombo of August 1, 1982 reported
that in a statement issued by the General Secretary of the
All Ceylon Tamil Congress, Mr.Kumar Ponnambalam has stated that the
TULF should contest the Presidential elections to fulfill the
ambitions of the Tamil-speaking people in this country and in order
that such a contest could be considered as a referendum.
Four days later, Eelanadu, the regional Tamil daily from
Jaffna, of August 5, 1982 reported that the Working Committee
of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress held a meeting at Jaffna on Aug.4,
1982 and unanimously decided to nominate its General Secretary
Mr.Kumar Ponnambalam as the candidate to contest the Presidential
election scheduled in October 1982.
Following day, the government�s mouthpiece, Ceylon Daily
News, Colombo (August 6, 1982) informed the readers that the
TULF General Secretary A.Amirthalingam, when asked whether the TULF
would field a candidate for the presidency had quipped that, �The
Tamil United Liberation Front will not resort to cheap stunts and
put forward candidates to contest the Presidential election; our
objectives are known and we will work towards achieving our goal
Eelam�.
A week later, S.P.Amarasingam noted the stance taken by Kumar
Ponnambalam as follows: �All non-UNP parties, except the JVP and
TULF, have so far gone on record that it would be necessary to field
a single anti-UNP candidate if J.R.Jayewardene is to be defeated.
The Tamil Congress however wants a Tamil candidate to give an
opportunity to make a case for the Tamil desire to be recognized as
a separate nation. But what this means is that the TC wants to
out-Eelam the cry of the TULF at a time when the latter is more
concerned with the DDCs. But Kumar Ponnambalam wants an agreed
common Tamil candidate.� [Tribune, Colombo, Aug. 14, 1982,
p.1].
The Lanka Guardian magazine, edited by Mervyn de Silva,
carried Kumar Ponnambalam�s statement on the 1982 Presidential
election. It was a critique on the ambiguous, waffling politics
practised by the then TULF leadership in the early 1980s. The full
text of this manifesto is as follows:
�Sovereignty of the Tamils, the Constitution and the
Presidential Elections� [G.G.Ponnambalam Jr.: Lanka Guardian,
Colombo, August 15, 1982, pp.11-12]
The important question of the sovereignty of the Tamils of this
island has again arisen with the holding of the
Convention in New York on �Tamil Eelam� recently. Where
indeed lies the sovereignty of the Tamil people of this island
at the moment?
The 1972 Constitution: At the 1970 General
Elections, the manifesto of the United Front contained the
undertaking that, if a mandate is given, a new constitution
would be drafted and adopted to make Ceylon a free, sovereign
and independent Republic. Whilst the United Front received such
a mandate, it cannot be said that the vast majority of the Tamil
people had given a mandate for the making of such a
constitution. Yet, the Tamil United Front (TUF) members of
Parliament, knowing full well that the adoption of the
constitution would result in the break in legal continuity with
the British Parliament, attended the deliberations of the
Constituent Assembly, and voted unanimously in favour of the
first basic resolution making �Sri Lanka a free, sovereign and
independent republic�. This resolution was passed on the 15th
March 1971. By having voted thus, were not the TUF MPs prepared
to accept Sri Lanka as one polity? By having voted for this
resolution, TUF MPs conceded that sovereignty resided with the
people of that one polity taken together? Having done so from
the 28th of June 1971 the representatives of the TUF
boycotted further deliberations in the Constituent Assembly till
the very end.
The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) now argue that with the
adoption of the new constitution on the 22nd of May
1972 that there has been a break in the legal continuity with
England and the British Parliament with the abandoning of the
Soulbury Constitution. With the break in legal continuity, argue
the TULF, the sovereignty of the people in the 3 kingdoms of
Kotte, Kandy and Jaffna revived and were restored once again.
The date being 22.5.72 to be exact.
The TULF also argue that because most Tamil MPs did not vote for
the adoption of the 1972 Constitution, it did not bind the Tamil
people or a vast majority of them. But very soon thereafter all
the Tamil MPs took the oath of allegiance to the constitution
and compromised not only themselves but also the vast majority
of the Tamils. Having done this, to say now that most of the
Tamil MPs had not accepted the 1972 constitution because they
publicly burnt copies of that constitution, is taking the Tamils
for a ride because the TULF are arrogant in their belief that
the Tamils will not or cannot open their eyes. The wording of
the oath under the 1972 constitution is significant � �will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to the Republic of Sri Lanka
and that I will uphold the constitution of Sri Lanka�.
The TULF Election Manifesto of 1977: If it is the
TULF�s argument that the sovereignty of the Tamil Nation was
revived and restored with the break in legal continuity with
Britain on 22.5.72, and if it is their position that there is
neither legal continuity in the consent of the Tamil Nation to
the 1972 constitution, and if it is their stand that the Sinhala
Nation has not taken over the sovereignty of the Tamil Nation
through legal continuity or by consent or by the right of
conquest, on what reasoning did they �ask for a mandate from the
Tamil Nation to re-establish the independence and sovereignty of
the State of Tamil Eelam, the expression of the sovereignty of
the Tamil Nation�?
Or is it that the TULF realized the treachery they had
perpetrated on the Tamil Nation by acquiescing in handing over
sovereignty to the people of the independent republic of Sri
Lanka by voting for the basic resolution one and therefore they
sought a mandate to win back that sovereignty? If this is so,
should not the TULF be blamed �for the amalgamation of the two
states�? If the Tamils appreciate this and resent this, then
they must rise up in arms against the TULF.
The 1978 Constitution: Having realized that
they had been traitors to their own cause, in attending the
Constituent Assembly proceedings, the TULF completely boycotted
the deliberations of the Select-Committee on the Constitution,
and Amirthalingam in giving their reasons for the boycott of the
debate on the Constitution adopts the argument that with the
break in legal continuity the sovereignty of the inhabitants of
the island resurfaced and hence the sovereignty of the Tamil
Nation revived (Hansard, of 3.8.78). But once the
constitution was passed the TULF promptly took their oath �to
uphold and defend the constitution of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka�!
Regarding the taking of the oath, another of those arguments
advanced by the TULF is that the LSSP which had not accepted the
Soulbury Constitution permitted its MPs to take the oath of
allegiance to that Constitution. This reminds me of the defence
put forward by a son to his irate father who questioned him
about his failure at an examination. His defence was �John
failed; Jeremiah failed; why not I fail?� The LSSP said they
belonged to Ceylon. They wanted to go to the Parliament of
Ceylon in order to agitate to enact another Constitution which
would truly reflect the independence of Ceylon. Therefore they
had to take the oath. But the TULF say they do not belong to Sri
Lanka because this island is composed of two States � those of
Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam, and of two nations � the Sinhala
Nation and the Tamil Nation. But it suits their logic to take
their oaths and sit in the Sri Lanka Parliament in spite of the
fact that they had in their 1977 General Election manifesto
promised the Tamils to convene a Constituent Assembly and draft
a constitution for the Tamils and then declare Tamil Eelam
within a definite boundary if they received a mandate. They say
they have indeed received such a mandate.
In the meantime, Article 5 of the constitution says that the
territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka shall consist of the 24
administrative districts. Is it that the 24 districts together
go to make up Sri Lanka? If that is so, certainly the people of
the Northern Province consisting of 4 districts have given no
mandate to draft, adopt and operate a new constitution, nor did
they empower their representatives to constitute Sri Lanka into
a Democratic Socialist Republic. Is there then a lack of
constitutional validity for the administrative authority in
these areas? If so, is there not a requirement that the
constitution should be validated in respect of the Tamil
Districts of the North? Should not a referendum be held in these
districts to ascertain whether the people in these areas accept
the constitution in view of the fact that their representatives
have consistently said that they have nothing to do with the
constitution? Is this not a matter of national importance?
It serves every person in this island to know without any
further delay whether the polity of Sri Lanka has been
constituted without proper democratic base, namely, without the
consent of the Tamils. Perhaps the Presidential election will be
a very convenient way by which an answer to this question could
be obtained. The Tamil Nation will also be given a good
opportunity to give a mandate to any Tamil candidate for the
rejection of the Constitution.
Therefore we request the TULF to reconsider its decision not to
contest the Presidential election. We urge the TULF to contest
the Presidential elections as it is the major Tamil party. This
election would be an ideal opportunity to show Tamil solidarity
on an all island basis. With the support of the 90% of the
Ceylon Tamils the TULF claims it enjoys, and with the support of
the hill country Tamils and the Muslims which will be
forthcoming in ample measure if a Tamil-speaking candidate stood
for election on certain specific but limited issues, there is
every expectation that it will be possible to show the strength
of the Tamil-speaking people.
Let there be no fear amongst the Tamils that if a Tamil contests
the Presidential election that there will be violence. Let there
be no illusion in the minds of the Sinhalese that the
Presidential elections must necessarily be very much a home and
home affair. If indeed there is the slightest racial crises it
will mean that the Sinhalese do not want the Tamils to be in one
body politic with them. In short, if the Sinhalese want this
island to be one polity, not only must there be urgent
rethinking on the Tamil Question but they must also decide to
keep the peace.
It is not a question of winning the Presidential stakes, it is
the vital question of Tamil identity.
During September 1982, S.P. Amarasingam, in his editorial
commentaries, made the following two observations:
�The TULF has so far said it will not put forward a candidate.
The Eelamites want the elections boycotted. A few bombs at
booths may disrupt voting in Jaffna. Mr.Kumar Ponnambalam wants
to run for President on the ACTC ticket if there is no TULF
candidate. Such are the perspectives on the eve of the first
presidential elections in Sri Lanka.� [Tribune, Sept. 4,
1982, p.1]
�The TULF at a General Council meeting held on August 28 at
Trincomalee decided not to put forward a candidate for the post
of President. It also decided not to support Kumar Ponnambalam
if he came forward as a nominee of the ACTC. He has now paid in
his deposit of Rs. 50,000 being the first to do so. The hardline
pro-Eelam group wanted the TULF to call for a boycott of the
elections, but no decision was taken, the consensus being that
the matter should be reviewed after all the nominations were
received on September 17. There is also a trend of thinking that
the TULF should permit individual Tamils to vote or abstain as
it pleased them � a conscience vote.� [Tribune, Sept.11,
1982, p.2]
Pre-election analyses by Mervyn de Silva and Amarasingam
Mervyn de Silva provided a succinct analysis on the dilemma faced by
the then TULF leadership, under the caption �Tamils and Polls � Amir
as Arafat�. To quote,
�Those are the dilemmas of leadership. And that�s where
Mr.Amirthalingam and the TULF high command find themselves.
Their diplomatic moves, directly and through intermediaries
(Dr.A.J.Wilson from New Brunswick) would have been hailed as
personal and political triumphs if they had �delivered�
something tangible, something worthwhile to the Tamil
constituency in the north. They must deliver the goods � DDC
powers, army and police presence, home guards, varsity
admissions, jobs, colonization etc. Not everything, but
something that will satisfy the �moderate majority�.
If they had done so, the ground would have been cut under the
feet of Mr.Chandrahasan, Dr.Dharmalingam, Mr.Mahesan (Sutantiran
editor), Mr.Eelavenden etc. It is their evident failure after
protracted and tortuous negotiationsto present any tangible
gains to the northern province Tamils that has encouraged the
restive ranks of the TULF, and strengthened the hand of the
anti-leadership dissidents.
Since the TULF leaders are experienced politicians, it would be
a mistake to believe that they are the victims of their own
incredible naivete. To be fair, time worked against the TULF
leaders. Once the President started thinking about elections,
concessions to the TULF became unthinkable. No (Sinhala)
President or Premier, would grant concessions, especially on the
DDCs (an issue with a long history beginning with the Regional
Councils of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact) to a Tamil
party on the eve of elections unless of course he was secretly
contemplating his early exit from politics.
Now the TULF leadership has been pushed from �non-participation�
to �virtual boycott�. Even Mr.Kumar Ponnambalam has played a
hand. Once a major factor in Tamil politics, the TC of GG.
Ponnambalam was rapidly eclipsed by Mr. Chelvanayakam�s FP,
later TULF. The TULF may regard Mr.Kumar Ponnambalam�s entry
into the presidential battle a quixotic gesture but it served
its purpose of embarrassing the TULF. And in a strange
paradoxical way, it gave more strength to Mr. Chandrahasan�s
elbow � and elbow he has plainly thrust into the soft underbelly
of the TULF bosses. (Ponnambalam Jr. has thus helped
Chelvanayakam Jr.)
Mr. Chandrahasan, the rising star of the North, has assets other
than the fact that he is Chelvanayakam�s son. He has some of his
father�s virtues, including his integrity. He is a hard worker
and has had the courage to appear for every young Tamil snatched
by the police or army. He was in the committee that drafted the
TULF�s General Council statement of 19th. Although it
may be imprecise in its �boycott� call, Mr. Amirthalingam has
explained with a nice gift for ambiguity: �We will not ask the
people to vote, we have left it at that.� The Jaffna district
has nearly half a million registered voters. What percentage
will go to the polls?� [Lanka Guardian, Colombo, October
1, 1982, pp.4 & 6]
S.P. Amarasingam, for his share, contributed the following two brief
commentaries relating to how Kumar Ponnambalam would fare on October
20, 1982. Please note that the sentences in italics, wherever they
appear, are as in the original texts.
�The general consensus in political circles is that the UNP�s
J.R.Jayewardene is ahead of all other contestants with Hector
Kobbekaduwa running second. Dr.Colvin R.de Silva and Rohana
Wijeweera are said to be fighting for the third place with
Vasudeva Nanayakkara and Kumar Ponnambalam bringing up the rear.
Ponnambalam is not concerned about being the President. He
only wants a mandate for his leadership of the Tamils � and his
slogan is Eelam. With this he hopes to bypass the boycott
demanded by the terrorists (how can you refuse to vote to give a
mandate for Eelam?) and to discredit the TULF leadership.� [Tribune,
October 9, 1982, p.2]
�Kumar Ponnambalam seems to be a lone ranger seeking only Tamil
votes not to be President but to get a mandate from the Tamils.
His ACTC is not a formidable organization and the more powerful
and widespread TULF has asked people not to vote for Kumar. No
other organization or party has backed him. But he has chosen on
an election cry which will put the TULF, TELF,
expatriate-inspired Eelam groups and the terrorists into a
dilemma. He wants a mandate, not for himself personally or as
the chief of the ACTC, but as a Tamil, for Eelam. How can
they refuse to vote for him? How can they boycott the polls? If
they do, they are by implication rejecting Eelam or at least
refusing to give a mandate to a Tamil who says he has come
forward only because no one else was willing to come forward to
provide the Tamils with an opportunity in this presidential
election to reiterate once again their desire to have Eelam.
In 1977, Kumar says, the TULF obtained such an Eelam mandate but
which it has now thrust into cold storage. How far can Kumar
Ponnambalam break the non-participation or boycott of the TULF,
the TELF and the terrorist groups is yet to be seen. To the
TULF, at least, the non-participation strategy in the
Presidential election is only a tactic to prepare for the
parliamentary elections. Kumar Ponnambalam is challenging the
TULF and is seeking to exploit the sympathies for Eelam among
the extremist youth. Many say that he will find it difficult to
save his deposit, but he is not concerned about t. He only wants
a political foothold among the Tamils.� [Tribune, October
16, 1982, p.2]
Post-Election Impressions of Amarasingam and Mervyn de Silva
I provide below the text of Amarasingam�s analysis on Kumar
Ponnambalam�s performance in the 1982 Presidential election and how
the Eelam voters in the North and East choose to express their
political rights. Amarasingam summed up with the inference, �On the
votes he obtained in Jaffna and elsewhere in the Tamil areas,
Ponnambalam becomes a force in Tamil politics � unless he is removed
by assassination.� Here is the complete text of Amarasingam�s
analysis that appeared in the Tribune of Oct.23, 1982.
�Colombo, October 22: The country was virtually on holiday the
whole week, and all work, except election work, was at a
standstill, especially from Tuesday, the 19th.
Everything went off quietly and peacefully, on polling day,
October 20. But a state of emergency was declared by 6 pm that
evening. Information had been piling up that in certain areas
well-known racial chauvinists had issued threats of violence to
certain groups of citizens who openly supported the UNP to stop
them from going to the polls. There is no doubt that in such
areas (not in the boycott-ridden North), the polling was low
(very low) because of these threats. In Colombo, too, such
threats had been uttered in whispers and a large number who
normally would have exercised their franchise did not do so. The
currents and under-currents of this racialist war against
decency and communal harmony will be examined in the coming
weeks. But even more disturbing were stories that a coup had
been planned to take over all strategic positions no sooner the
election results were announced that Kobbekaduwa had been
elected. More of this later.
It must be admitted Rupavahini did the country grand in the way
the elections, the counting and the final results were flashed
to the nation. The Radio too did a great job, but the visual in
television cannot be easily matched. And coupled with the verbal
telecast announcements, TV information got across with an impact
that was truly staggering. The first result (Moneragala) came in
around 6:30am on Thursday, October 21, and the last (Kurunegala)
was around 5:30pm in the evening. Everyone was glued to the TV
or the Radio during the whole day and it was an undeclared
all-island holiday. Though the Election Commissioner had
indicated that the first announcement would be after 5am on the
21st, some had kept up the whole of the previous
night not wanting to miss any announcement. After all the
results of the 22 electoral districts had come in, the Elections
Commissioner announced the final figures:
J.R.Jayewardene � 3,450,811 votes (52.91%)
Hector Kobbekaduwa � 2,548,438 votes (39.07%)
Rohana Wijeweera � 273,428 votes (4.19%)
Kumar Ponnambalam � 173,934 votes (2.67%)
Colvin R.de Silva � 58,531 votes (0.90%)
Vasudeva Nanayakara � 17,006 votes (0.26%)
Valid votes � 6,522,147; Majority � 902,373; Total rejects �
80,470; Total polled � 6,602,617; Registered voters � 8,145,015;
Voter turn-out 81.06%
One matter that has drawn comment is that J.R.Jayewardene won 21
out of 22 districts with 52.8 percent (which is the highest ever
recorded by any party in an all-island poll). The district where
he came a poor third was Jaffna where the results were as
follows:
Kumar Ponnambalam � 87,263 votes (40.03%)
Hector Kobbekaduwa � 77,300 votes (35.46%)
J.R.Jayewardene � 44,780 votes (20.54%)
Colvin R.de Silva � 3,376 votes (1.55%)
Rohana Wijeweera � 3,098 votes (1.42%)
Vasudeva Nanayakkara � 2,186 votes (1.00%)
Valid votes � 218,003; Rejects � 10,610; Majority � 9,963; Total
votes polled � 228,613; Total registered votes � 493,706; Voter
turn-out 44.16%.
The TULF had called for non-participation in the elections by
all Tamils. The TELF had called for a boycott. The ACTC had
wanted the maximum voting by Tamils to give its candidate
G.G.(Kumar) Ponnambalam a fresh mandate for Eelam. These three
parties have influence only among the Ceylon Tamils and not
among the Indian Tamils or the Tamil-speaking Muslims. In Jaffna
where the TULF and TELF have maximum punch, the polling was
44.16%.
In the Wanni-consisting of three mainly Tamil areas of Mannar,
Mullaitivu and Vavuniya, the polling was as follows:
J.R.Jayewardene � 32,834 votes (46.42%)
Hector Kobbekaduwa � 23,221 votes (32.83%)
Kumar Ponnambalam � 11,521 votes (16.28%)
Rohana Wijeweera � 2,286 votes (3.23%)
Colvin R.de Silva � 584 votes (0.83%)
Vasudeva Nanayakkara � 293 votes (0.41%)
Valid votes � 70,739; Rejects � 2,447; Majority � 9,613; Total
votes polled � 73,186; Total registered votes � 119,093; Voter
turn-out 59.40%.
And in Batticaloa, it was:
J.R.Jayewardene � 48,094 votes (40.05%)
Kumar Ponnambalam � 47,095 votes (39.22%)
Hector Kobbekaduwa � 21,688 votes (18.05%)
Colvin R.de Silva � 1,294 votes (1.08%)
Rohana Wijeweera � 1,287 votes (1.07%)
Vasudeva Nanayakkara � 618 votes (0.51%)
Valid votes � 120,076; Rejects � 2,879; Majority � 999; Total
votes polled � 122,955; Total registered votes � 172,480; Voter
turn-out 69.62%.
In Trincomalee, another Tamil majority area, the voting was:
J.R.Jayewardene � 45,522 votes (48.64%)
Hector Kobbekaduwa � 31,700 votes (33.87%)
Kumar Ponnambalam � 10,068 votes (10.75%)
Rohana Wijeweera � 5,395 votes (5.76%)
Colvin R.de Silva � 635 votes (0.68%)
Vasudeva Nanayakkara � 276 votes (0.29%)
Valid votes � 93,596; Rejects � 1,795; Majority � 13,822; Total
votes polled � 95,391; Total registered votes � 133,646; Voter
turn-out 70.03%.
The net result is that in the Ceylon Tamil areas the percentage
of voting was 60.97 percent. It falls short of the national
average of 81.063 percent poll on October 20.
In all other (Ceylon) Tamil districts (Wanni, Trincomalee and
Batticaloa), J.R. had obtained the highest number of votes but
in Jaffna he had been a poor third � and it is likely that he
got some of his votes from the Kilinochchi area which is likely
to be a separate district soon and may be attached to the Wanni
electoral district. Admittedly, there is a great demand among
all sections in Kilinochchi for the separation of Kilinochchi
from Jaffna and the campaign for such separation is led by the
MP Anandasangari who was elected on the TULF ticket. The High
Command of the TULF had vigorously opposed this and because of
this the government was slow to move in the matter. But recent
developments indicate that the Government is likely to consider
the Kilinochchi demand favourably.
There has been a great deal of speculation as to how Kobbekaduwa
got his 77,300 votes in Jaffna. Had Jaffna forgotten, among
other matters, the Sinhala Only, the 1972 Constitution where
language rights were not enshrined in the Constitution and the
infamous scheme of standardization of marks which openly
discriminated against Tamil students? Various guesses have been
made and continue to be made as to how the SLFP got votes they
never did before. Among the reasons given are:
(1) Kobbekaduwa got a chilli and onion vote � the Jaffna farmers
(like other farmers) have a grievance that imports made by the
UNP had depressed prices. But many ask could chilli prices alone
make people in Jaffna forget Sinhala Only or Standardisation?
Kobbekaduwa had promised to stop chilli imports to enable Jaffna
farmers to get Rs.40 for a pound of chillies. Was this alone
enough to give him 77,300 votes?
(2) Another grievance against the UNP in Jaffna is the continued
military presence and the allegations of �atrocities� on
civilian population. But others ask, was there not a military
presence in Jaffna since the Satyagraha of 1961? Greater
violence, murders, terrorism and robberies, it is being pointed
out, had erupted during the UNP regime and the confrontation had
become greater. Can this be remedied by casting votes for the
SLFP which was the root cause of the Tamil problem with its 1956
Sinhala Only?
(3) It is also said that Kobbekaduwa had promised a pardon to
free Kuttimani and the other youth now held in death row. �If JR
can release Wijeweera why can�t I release Kuttimani?� Did this
make the TELF to relax its boycott and make an effort to bolster
Kobbekaduwa�s national vote by piling it high for him in Jaffna?
(4) It is also on record that Kobbekaduwa had promised to revive
the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact and grant the Tamils
regional autonomy. Knowledgeable observers ask whether the
Jaffna man (who is credited with acumen and intelligence) sat
back to consider whether Kobbekaduwa, already precariously
perched on one limb of a four-faction SLFP, could resurrent the
B-C Pact which S.W.R.D.[B] himself could not invest with life?
Was the TULF willing to risk throwing away the DDCs (a bird in
hand) to seek whatever the greener pastures of the dead B-C Pact
long lost in the oblivion of time?
But these four points, individually and/or collectively, cannot
explain the gift of 77,300 votes of Kobbekaduwa. A perceptive
reader of Tribune who came into Colombo from Jaffna after
the polling says that the stampede was the result of whirlwind
whisper that a Kobbekaduwa tidal-wave had swept everything
before it, including JR and the UNP and the Jaffna should make a
symbolic gesture to jump into the Kobbekaduwa bandwagon. This
the 77,300 votes were hustled in by both the TULF and TELF
mainly in the afternoon of the 20th. It was
also intended, said our informant, to minimize the impact of the
heavy poll G.G.Ponnambalam was evidently getting. We will come
back to the GG poll later, but this 77,300 votes for
Kobbekaduwa, it is said, was the result of an understanding
between Kobbekaduwa�s political brokers and some agents of the
TULF and the TELF. Tribune has no independent
confirmation about such a secret understanding, but this story
is going the rounds.
Anyone or any party is entitled to vote for anyone or any party
even in pursuance of a secret understanding. But what is in
question is the wisdom of jumping on bandwagons on bogus
information furnished by interested election campaigners. Some
of Kobbekaduwa�s close supporters had started a widespread
whisper campaign all over the island to say that in the last
week�the tide has turned in favour of the SLFP�that the UNP was
being submerged by their immense upsurge in favour of the
SLFP�that Kobbekaduwa�s victory was assured�that foreign
diplomats and missions were certain of JR�s defeat and were
hastening to woo the Kobbekaduwa camp�that the BBC (The World
Today and Commentary) had predicted that Kobbekaduwa would
overtake JR at the winning post�
These elements in Jaffna, it is said, were persuaded that JR was
out of the picture already and that the October 20 polling would
confirm the end of the JR era. The whispers had also claimed
that Kobbekaduwa will not give time to the UNP to file election
petitions or take other constitutional steps to prevent his
being sworn in, but will stage a coup and install with his
private army and police all the key positions in the Government
and the administration. The whisper campaign was spread
throughout the island, but seems to have had some impact in
Jaffna. There is no doubt that the negative boycott politics
pursued by Jaffna has tended to cut it away even from the
mainstream of Tamil politics in the island. The Indian origin
Tamils are now in a world apart and this came about owing to the
segregationist and separatist politics of Jaffna. Earlier,
Jaffna had cut itself from the Tamil-speaking world of the
Muslims. And with this election, it is well on the road to
distancing itself from the Wanni, Trincomalee and Batticaloa
Tamils, unless it changes the course of its politics to meet
current realities.
The isolation of the Jaffna politician has been brought home by
the voting for G.G.Ponnambalam. He chose a slogan with which the
TULF, the TELF and the expatriate moneybags in the USA and UK
cannot quarrel. Their own political imperatives placed them
under a compulsion to support any cry for Eelam. But the TULF
and expatriate organizations wanted Tamil voters not to vote for
Ponnambalam even if they wanted to exercise their franchise. The
TELF wanted a boycott of the elections. But in spite of these
bans, G.G.Ponnambalam Jnr. Got many more votes than many
(including ourselves) had anticipated. On the votes he obtained
in Jaffna and elsewhere in the Tamil areas, Ponnambalam becomes
a force in Tamil politics � unless he is removed by
assassination. But he has not aligned himself with any Sinhala
party as Thuraiappah had done with the SLFP. He was assassinated
because he had joined the SLFP, but now 77,300 persons have
voted for the SLFP. Thiyagarajah was murdered because he had
joined the UNP. But J.R. polled more votes than the UNP has done
previously in Jaffna. But can anyone justify an attempt to
assassinate challenger Ponnambalam who blackguards all Sinhala
parties with equal fervour and wants a mandate for Eelam? These
questions are some of the imponderables of the politics of
Jaffna. But the Government has a great deal of rethinking to do
about the way it should deal with the problem of Ceylon Tamils
in Jaffna, the Wanni, the East Coast and elsewhere in the
island.�
Compared to
Amarasingam�s descriptive analysis, Mervyn de Silva provided a
snappy sum-up on Kumar Ponnambalam�s performance, under an
attractive caption �The Lone Guerrilla�. The entire text was printed
in italics, probably for emphasis. To quote,
�The Lone Guerrilla�
[Mervyn de Silva: Lanka Guardian, Colombo, November 1, 1982,
p.1]
�Having seized the day to give the near-extinct Tamil Congress a
new lease of life, Mr.Kumar Ponnambalam (or better still
G.G.Ponnambalam Jr.) is making maximum use of the fact that he
came first in the Jaffna district to embarrass the TULF
leadership. �They did not have the guts to hold public meetings
and tell the people their stand. Instead they held some
so-called seminars in private homes and in back gardens� sneers
Mr.Ponnambalam.
Mr.Ponnambalam speaks with the authority of 170,000 votes, while
the TULF finds solace in the well below 50% poll.
While some make sly use of figures to claim Mr.Ponnambalam in
fact helped the UNP, Mr.Ponnambalam argues that the TULF ensured
a first count win for Mr.Jayewardene. What goes on in the mind
of the Tamil voter in the north? Perhaps only a general election
will provide an answer.
In �Tigerland�, Kumar is the lone guerrilla.�
The Lanka Guardian
magazine also carried a post-election analysis by V.I.S.Jeyapalan,
on the topic of Tamil vote. The relevant portion is reproduced
below. Sentences in the bold font are as in the original.
�Presidential Elections �82 and the Tamil Vote�
[V.I.S.Jeyapalan: Lanka Guardian, Colombo, November 15, 1982,
p.12 & 15]
Behaviour of the Tamil voters � Northern Province, Jaffna and
Vanni Districts:
During the Presidential election, the Tamil speaking people who
are supporting the self-determination of the Tamil speaking
people of Eelam, were confused by the behaviour of several
forces who had accepted or tactically utilized the �Cry for
Eelam�. Several radical organizations with a sector of TULF, who
considered the mandate for Eelam was already obtained in 1977
General Election, called for a boycott in the name of Eelam.
Meanwhile Kumar Ponnambalam of the Tamil Congress, who had never
accepted the right of self-determination of the Tamil people,
used the Eelam cry as the main trump card in the campaign. In
Batticaloa and in other areas, while a considerable section of
the TULF worked for Kumar Ponnambalam, a section of the TULF
notables worked for the UNP too. �Thamilar Suyadchi Kazhagam� of
V.Navaratnam, one of the Eelam parties, openly campaigned for
Hector Kobbekaduwa on economic and tactical grounds. In this
confused and confounded situation, Tamil voters have acted in
the following manner:
In the Jaffna District, while 53.69% of the registered voters
had refrained from voting, 17.67% of the registered voters cast
their votes for Kumar Ponnambalam. The total percentage of
the people who had refrained from voting and who had cast their
votes for the Tamil Congress, which used the Eelam cry as their
trump card in the Northern Province, was 66.86% while this
percentage in Jaffna District was 71.36% (10,610) in the Jaffna
District. It also appears that a good number of the rejected
votes carried Eelam slogans. The above trend could reasonably be
interpreted as an expression of support for the call for Eelam
or its numerous variants.
The voting pattern of the Vanni District and some parts of
Jaffna District were affected by the CWC activities and those of
Mr.S.Thondaman who has been deeply involved in UNP election
campaign, because of the fact that the participation of the
recently migrated Up-country Tamils is not yet solicited by the
mainstream Tamil politics.
Another important point to mark here, is the rejection by
Kilinochchi voters of the mandate called for granting of a
district status to Kilinochchi. In the Kilinochchi electorate,
among the voters who have not boycotted this election, only
3,616 people had voted for Jayewardene while 9.822 voted for
Ponnambalam and 4,188 voted for Kobbekaduwa. Another
important aspect is the rejection of the JVP after their
expensive and hard political work since 1979 because of their
double standards on the National Question. They have obtained
only 0.6% of the total registered votes in Jaffna District and
0.8% of that of Northern Province.
Tentatively analyzing the Eastern Province based on overall data
is not easy because of the following reasons: (1) The
homogeneity of this province of the Tamil-speaking people has
been highly affected by the state-sponsored Sinhalese
colonization (apart from Batticaloa district). (2) The
non-homogenous population pattern of Tamil-speaking people
itself.
Kumar Ponnambalam contributed the following rebuttal to
V.I.S.Jeyapalan�s analysis.
�Tamil Vote� [G.G.Ponnambalam Jr.: Lanka Guardian, Colombo,
December 15, 1982, pp.1-2 & 15]
�I refer to the article �Presidential Elections �82 and the
Tamil Vote� in your issue dated 15.11.82 by V.I.S.Jeyapalan. I
wish to put the record straight on one or two matters.
(1) The mandate for Tamil Eelam was not obtained at the General
Elections of 1977. According to the late S.J.V.Chelvanayakam,
this mandate was given on 6.2.75 with his victory at the
K.K.S.[Kankesanthurai] by-election. (Vide the speech he read out
immediately after the results were announced and a motion filed
in Parliament by TUF MPs including the late Chelvanayakam on
4.2.76 reiterating the same position).
(2) It is quite wrong to say that I had never accepted the right
of self determination of the Tamil people. The party to which I
belong and I have always accepted the right of
self-determination of the Tamils. What the ACTC and I say is
that the right of self determination of the Tamils in this
island is inalienable and does not depend on anybody accepting
or recognizing it. It is inalienable because the Tamils of
Ceylon satisfy the five prerequisites of statehood.
(3) I am surprised that the writer says that 53.69% of the
voters in the Jaffna District refrained from voting? Did they
all refrain from voting? Was there ever a 100% turn out? Of the
53.69% who did not vote, how many were dead, away from the
Jaffna district, ill in homes and hospitals, people of other
races? The writer seems to have equated this 53.69% as those who
had heeded the call for a boycott or non-participation.
(4) I am very happy to hear that the writer has information that
a number of the rejected votes carried Tamil Eelam slogans.
After the results I have been ceaselessly taunted by interested
parties that something was radically wrong with the Tamils of
the Jaffna District because the number of votes spoilt were over
an astronomical 10,000, whereas in the other parts of the
country it was nothing like that. At least now we can defend
ourselves!�
Coda:
Sixteen years later, (after the deaths of Amirthalingam,
J.R.Jayewardene and Premadasa), Prof. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson
revealed a �secret� on why the TULF leader opted not to contest
the 1982 Presidential election. To quote, �despite pressure from
his TULF, Amir decided not to come forward as a presidential
candidate at the 1982 presidential election. JRJ and Premadasa
appealed to him and persuaded him to stand down. Amir hoped that
JRJ would then, if elected deliver on the DDCs, only to be
disillusioned.� [�The JRJ � Amir Relationship�, Island,
Colombo, November 29, 1998]
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