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The reasons for international involvement in the
conflict in Sri Lanka with Norway playing the role of the
facilitator and the EU, US and Japan taking on a direct role as �co
chairs� to the peace process include the following:
�The role of the
Americans is dictated by their new strategy based on their
changed interests in Asia. During 2004-05 America reduced
its military presence in Japan and South Korea. To
compensate for this they will now increase their influence
in the Indian Ocean. China has increased its presence in
these same oceans, as has India. The background for them all
is the wish for control of the sea routes from the west,
through the Malacca Strait into the South China Sea. In this
picture Sri Lanka with its geographic location takes a
central place. The east coast of the island with the harbour
city of Trincomalee and the Batticaloa lagoon offers
extremely important sea-strategic possibilities both for the
Indian Navy and the USA 5th fleet. This also forms the
background for the improved military cooperation between USA
and India, and adds to the more warmer political climate
that has developed between these powers�
comment by
tamilnation.org
The 'warmer political climate' may have to
considered in the context of the remarks by
PINR on Project Seabird: "..This
plan - with origins from the mid-1980s - is to be
assessed in light of two geopolitical
triangles juxtaposing on the Indian Ocean's
background: U.S. -India-China relations and
China-Pakistan-India relations. In this complicated
geopolitical configuration, New Delhi is not simply a
partner of China or the United States: India is
emerging as a major power that follows its own grand
strategy in order to enhance its power and interests...
The geopolitics of the Arabian Sea and the Western
Indian Ocean largely explain India's determination in
such an $8.13 billion enterprise. The
China-Pakistan-India triangle is more than ever the
Arabian Sea's decisive geo strategic setting..."
"the west and the United States in particular
know that each new state is the vehicle through which one
more nation acquires a place on the world stage. They fear
that each such nation could then make and enforce its
demands, for a more equitable distribution of resources and
wealth in the international arena and through the United
Nations in particular. It is, therefore, in the
self-interest of the �wealthier nations� to prevent
stateless nations from establishing their own states. The
aim is to put a ceiling on the number of nations represented
by their states and thereby limit the demands for justice in
the international arena."
[i]
comment by
tamilnation.org
The
self-interest of the �wealthier nations� did not prevent the
emergence of Croatia, East Timor (and for that matter,
Ukraine, Lativia, Estonia etc) as independent states - on
the contrary, 'self interest' encouraged the formation of
these states. Our understanding will not be furthered by
asserting a generalised statist disdain for non state
actors. Indeed that approach may well divert our
attention from the real issues involved.
The strategy employed
to realise these goals is best described as the 'strategy of
containment' and has been referred to as such by several well
informed commentators and observers.
This strategy is
based on the notion that by preventing a complete breakdown of the
cease-fire and by delivering 'normalcy' to the Tamil population
affected by the war, the Tamil people could be weaned away from
pursuing their right of self determination. Hence, the introduction
of the concepts of 'internal self determination' and support for
joint mechanisms to deliver humanitarian aid. This strategy required
the Sinhala political establishment to cooperate by agreeing to
restore normalcy. Although, Ranil Wikramasinghe, the co signatory to
the CFA appeared willing to go along with this strategy, he was
unable to deliver on the promise of restoring normalcy. Despite this
he was able to retain international support by blaming it on the
then President Kumaratunge, whose own antipathy to the CFA was
transparent. The LTTE on the other hand sought to expose the
reluctance of the Sinhala political establishment to even agree on
restoring normalcy as grounds to gain international legitimacy for
self-determination as stipulated in the UN Charter.
[This was, however,
a right that the international community had hitherto primarily
reserved for the former Western (salt water) colonies and
selectively thereafter to be exercised only in situations that
suited its own interests]
comment by
tamilnation.org
The political reality is
that the
international law of self determination followed
upon the success of struggles for freedom from colonial rule -
and not the other way around. International law itself is
largely dependent on
state practice. After all, for many centuries,
international law had denied the right of a colonial people to
freedom. Eventually, colonial rulers weakened by two world
wars (significantly enough, wars between themselves), were no
longer able to impose their rule and the political principle of
self determination began to gain reluctant recognition in
international law. The truth is that even
Mahatma
Gandhi did not found India's struggle for freedom on the
'international law principle' of the (sea water) right to self
determination. If he had, he may have been met with the
objection (in the 1930s) that no such general principle existed
in international law.
Although Sri Lankan
political establishment's behavior since the signing of the CFA has
been characterised by intransigency (Kumaratunge and Rajapakse) and
duplicity (Ranil Wickramasinghe), the international community has
not changed its strategy. On the contrary, it has sharpened its
criticism of the LTTE and taken the extar-ordinary steps of treating
it as the unequal party to the CFA. The banning of the LTTE by the
UK and EU being the prime examples of this conduct by the
international community.
comment by
tamilnation.org
Here it may be helpful to ask why?
Why is it
that "athough Sri Lankan political
establishment's behavior since the signing of the CFA has been
characterised by intransigency" the international community has
not changed its strategy? The answer lies in the end
goals that the 'international community' seek to achieve. The
members of the international community are not disinterested
good Samaritans. Each member of the international community is
concerned with stabilising Sri Lanka in such a way as to
secure its own strategic interest in the Indian region and the
Indian Ocean. And it is those strategic interests which may
need to examined in depth - and addressed.
Meanwhile, emboldened
by the EU ban and motivated by his commitment to a unitary stand,
Rajapakse had taken bold measures to retake the defacto state. It is
in this context that Rajapakse's 'excesses' had come under the
scrutiny of the UNHCR (at its sessions in Geneva in September to
October 2006) which had shown a renewed interest in castigating the
Sri Lanka regime for the culture of impunity surrounding human
rights violations. The international community fears that should
Rajapakse continue in this path, it would further alienate the Tamil
people and precipitate a full blown war. These actions on the part
of the international community too are therefore part of its
strategy of containment which require the Sri Lanka regime to help
maintain the 'no war no peace' situation.
comment by
tamilnation.org
We may need to examine further the question
as to whether the
international community's real fear is that
"should Rajapakse continue in
this path, it would further alienate the Tamil people and
precipitate a full blown war". After all US ambassador
Lumpstead famously remarked
on
9 January 2006, that the US wanted the "cost of a
return to war to be high," in Sri Lanka. On that occasion
Lumstead resisted accusing the
Sri Lankan Armed forces for the escalation of the violence,
and declared that the US wanted it to be clear that if the
Tigers chose to "abandon peace," they will face a "stronger,
more capable and more determined" Sri Lankan military.
Clearly, in the immediate aftermath of President Rajapakse
assuming power, the US took the view that the way to
influence and direct affairs in the Indian region was to extend
overt support for President Rajapakse. So what if anything has
changed since January 2006?
Here, we may need to
differentiate the interests of the three major international
actors - US, India and China. Each is concerned to secure
that when the conflict is resolved, it is resolved in such a way
that its own (and differing) strategic interest in the
Indian Ocean region is preserved. We may want to remind
ourselves that it was, after all, President Jayawardenes's
westard shift
which impelled New Delhi to arm and train Tamil militants in the
early 1980s. Today, we need to recognise the political
reality of the 'two
geopolitical triangles' in the Indian Ocean: U.S. - India
- China relations and
China - Pakistan - India relations. China is an
important supplier of arms to Sri Lanka and
its presence in Hambantota is evidence of its continuing
interest in the island - and the Arabian Sea. Again, at the time
of the JVP insurrection in 1971, one of the first acts of the
Srimavo Bandaranaike government was to close down the North
Korean embassy and detain the Ceylon Communist Party (Mao)
leader, N.Sanmugathasan.
What has changed
since January 2006, is that Sri Lanka President Rajapakse has
increasingly sought to use the political space provided by the
two geopolitical triangles in the Indian Ocean: U.S. -
India - China relations and China - Pakistan - India relations
to advance his own agenda. And both US and New Delhi are
concerned that President Rajapakse's actions (and his covert
reliance on the JVP) may threaten each of their own (and
different) strategic interests. Hence the attempts by US (NGOs
and the UN Human Rights Council) and India (Ananda
Sangaree, Karuna but
without the UN Human Rights Council) to reign in President
Rajapakse - and also neutralise the JVP.
It appears that the
international community now believes that simply maintaining a 'no
war no peace� with some minor concessions alone may tire out the
Tamil population (the Diaspora and the local Tamils) and undermine
support to the LTTE .As Professor Neelson puts it
'Fatigue sets in when a cease-fire is
prolonged without any apparent timeframe or a lasting settlement
or when the fruits of peace remain insufficiently forthcoming
[ii]
However, this
strategy of the international community is bound to fail because it
rests on the basic assumption that the Sri Lankan regime may be
persuaded to cooperate by conceding at least minor concessions. This
is unlikely for several reasons.
Firstly because,
apart from a handful of peace activists, there are no strong
advocates amongst the Sinhalese for a peace lobby that can help
deliver these concessions.
Secondly because
of the misconception that there is a moderate and hard line
divide within the Sinhala polity, the international community
operates on the premise that the 'moderates' can be persuaded to
play a role in conceding at least concessions to the Tamil
people.
Thirdly, the
Colombo regime is driven by class interests which actually
promote war. This class includes those related to the arms
industry and others who have benefited from the war. It also
provides the regime with the excuse to use the 'Tamil threat' as
a cohesive social force in retaining its hold on power.
Fourthly, there
is a strong school of thought within the Sinhala political
establishment that the defection of Karuna, the effects of
tsunami and the fatigue brought about by the 'no war no peace�
scenario have sufficiently weakened the LTTE to impose a
military solution.
Fifthly, there
are committed unitarists within the Sinhala political
establishment who look upon the destruction of the defacto state
as a necessary step as it would otherwise make their claims for
a 'solution' under a unitary constitution untenable.
It is, however,
possible for the international community to realise its goals
without compromising on the aspirations of the Tamil and Sinhala
nations by actively promoting the transformation of the Island into
a union of two states. Professor John Neelson, has in fact
recommended such a solution in his paper
'New Trajectories for Peace in Sri Lanka-Re-Envisioning Sri Lanka�
by citing Europe which is
" trying to
integrate a great number of states in a single union which
differ not only in size, in wealth, and in culture, proves that
in today�s highly unequal world of countries and a market
dominated by multinational companies national sovereignty is no
longer an absolute value. Only the pooling of resources holds
the promise of maintaining and improving wealth and status. The
example of France and Germany illustrate in particular that
centuries of warfare and enmity can be overcome, that
integration and cooperation is the best guarantee for each to
survive precisely as a nation. It is an experience the peoples
of the island may want to contemplate[iii]".
comment by
tamilnation.org
Here, there may be a need to examine yet again:
what are the 'real' goals of the international community in
relation to the conflict in the island of Sri Lanka? What
if the aspirations of the Tamil people are seen to be contrary
to the strategic interests of one of the three
international actors - US, India and China? The example of
France and Germany does illustrate that centuries
of warfare and enmity can be overcome. But at the same time
we must remember that it was the strategic interest of the US (
expressed through
the Marshall Aid Plan and underpinned by
Nato) which made the European Union possible.
Why would the international community support a solution based
on a union of two states? We may need to address, up front, the
strategic interests which leads the
US to oppose the emergence of an independent Tamil Eelam.
We may also
need to address up front the strategic interests which
leads New Delhi to oppose the emergence of
an independent Tamil Eelam. And the reasons which impel
each are
different (and do not flow from a generalised statist
disdain for non state actors). We may then take
the next step of showing that a union of two states in the
island of Sri Lanka will not be against the strategic interests
of any of the three international actors - and that it is a
refusal to progress such a solution which will work against
those strategic interests. The idea of an independent Tamil
state has taken root in the hearts and minds of millions of
Tamils
living in
many lands - and
ideas do
have a material force. Velupillai Pirabakaran's words in
1993 bear repetition yet again -
"We are fully
aware that the world is not rotating on the axis of human
justice.
Every country in this world advances its own interests.
Economic and
trade interests determine the order of the present world,
not the
moral
law of justice nor the rights of people. International
relations and diplomacy between countries are determined by
such interests. Therefore we cannot expect an immediate
recognition of
the moral legitimacy of our cause by the international
community...
In reality, the success of our struggle depends on us,
not on the world. Our success depends on our own efforts, on
our own strength, on our own determination."
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