Tracking the Norwegian
Conflict Resolution Initiative
Oslo Talks - June 2006
LTTE Communiqué
9 June 2006 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam issued a
Communiqué on Friday, 9 June 2006 after concluding meetings begun two days
previously with Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and the Norwegian
facilitators in Oslo.
Communique June 9, 2006
Oslo, Norway
The de facto
State of Tamil Eelam exercising jurisdiction over 70 percent of the Tamil
Homeland, with control over the seas appurtenant there, with its own laws,
independent judiciary, police force and full administrative apparatus; the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), being the authentic representative of
the Tamil Nation and its sole interlocutor in the current peace process
facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government; the LTTE acting as the sole
defender and protector of the Tamil Nation, its People and the State
institutions with its modern defence forces;
Noting that the Tamil Nation's peaceful
resistances over a period of three decades by non-violent means were
brutally crushed by the Sinhala Nation;
Noting that such brutal crushing was due primarily to the absence of balance of
power;
Noting the reality that in international relations, it is the balance of power
which would ensure a democratic relationship between parties to the conflict
that would ensure a just and equitable resolution of national conflicts;
Noting that the LTTE wanting just peace and normalcy for the suffering People of
the Tamil Nation declared a
unilateral ceasefire December 2000;
Noting that when
the GoSL dismissed the LTTE's positive gesture in declaring a unilateral
ceasefire and initiated the Agnikela battle, the LTTE again
demonstrated the balance of power and opened the door for peace once again
by declaring a unilateral ceasefire in December 2001, which with the
facilitation of the Royal Norwegian Government resulted in the
Ceasefire Agreement signed on
February 22, 2002;
Noting that the Ceasefire Agreement was entered into outside the scope of the
Constitution of the Sinhala Nation;
Noting that prior to the commencement of peace talks the LTTE repeatedly stated
that the immediate goal of the talks was the establishment of an interim
administration for the purpose of addressing the urgent humanitarian problems of
the people of the northeast, including displaced persons from the High Security
Zones;
Noting that during the war children were traumatized with the presence of the
army in schools and the Ceasefire Agreement required their removal from schools;
Noting that the Sinhala political party that won the parliamentary election in
2002 ran on a platform of establishing an interim administration in the
northeast;
Noting that when the Sinhala political party that represented the GoSL at that
time indicated that if it entered into talks on the proposed interim
administration it would be removed from power by the Sri Lankan President, the
LTTE showed flexibility and dropped its call for an interim administration,
because it did not want the negotiating process to break down;
Noting that the mechanisms agreed on by the GoSL and the LTTE in lieu of the
interim administration of a joint task force and subcommittees did not
materialize due to delays and obstruction by the GoSL;
Noting that even though the purview of the above mentioned mechanism was the
northeast, the LTTE accommodated an equal membership of the GoSL and thereby
gave the GoSL veto power on the affairs of the northeast;
Noting the reneging of the GoSL pledge to seek funds for the development as
equal partner with the LTTE by convening a donor conference in Washington prior
to the Tokyo conference, without the participation of the Tamil Nation, and
attempting to isolate it in the international arena resulting in the non-
participation of the Tamil Nation at the Tokyo Conference of donor countries;
Noting the failure of the GoSL armed forces to vacate civilian homes, schools
and places of worship in accordance with the CFA and humanitarian laws, thereby
preventing many thousands of Tamil refugees and internally displaced persons
from returning to their homes in the High Security Zones;
Noting the failure of the GoSL to avoid traumatization and mental torture of
children in schools by not removing their armed forces' presence from the
schools and in fact by increasing their presence in schools with combat-ready
weapons and body searches including girls in the presence of male armed
personnel;
Noting that the objective of the CFA is to preserve the status-quo and the
balance of power, and donor countries including the Co-Chairs have assisted the
government in providing military equipment and assistance that could result in a
shift in the balance of military power;
Noting the repeated assertions of the GoSL that it has established a
"international safety net" against the LTTE and the International Community's
failure to repudiate them;
Noting that in view of the above developments, the LTTE suspended talks to make
the GoSL move on to the next stage in a meaningful manner and to exert pressure
on the GoSL to fulfill the pledges it made;
Noting that in three separate incidents at sea in 2003 the lives of 26 LTTE
members were taken and the LTTE's merchant vessels were sunk in international
waters, and the restraint shown by the LTTE;
Noting that several proposals for interim administration made by the GoSL did
not meet the legitimate expectations of the Tamil Nation and would have resulted
in the same ineffectiveness of the previous mechanisms;
Noting the submission of the Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) by the LTTE incorporating democratic
principles, elections, independent judiciary, independent human rights
commission, transparency and accountability;
Noting that the representatives of the Muslim Community have the right to
participate in formulation of their role in the ISGA and protection of the
interest of northeastern Muslims in accordance with international human rights
norms;
Noting that when the GoSL agreed to recommence talks on the basis of the ISGA,
the President at the time dissolved parliament on February 7, 2004;
Noting the landslide victory of the Tamil National Alliance comprising TULF,
ACTC, TELO and EPRLF(Suresh faction), which contended in general election on the
mandate that LTTE was the sole representative of the Tamils;
Noting the suspension of the facilitation by the Norwegian government due to the
confusion and lack of clarity created by the GoSL;
Noting the devastation of the island by the tsunami irrespective of race or
religion;
Noting the international community's commitment to provide relief in a just and
equitable manner to the victims of the tsunami in the northeast and south;
Noting that the tsunami washed away the livelihood of the Tamils already
devastated by the 20-year war;
Noting the GoSL's prevention of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's planned
humanitarian visit to the tsunami-affected areas in the northeast;
Noting the proposal for establishment of a post-tsunami operational management
structure (P-TOMS) by the Royal Norwegian Government;
Noting the LTTE's flexibility in accepting the P-TOMS and its hopes that the
spirit of cooperation would compensate the lack of political power and
structural infirmity of the P-TOMS;
Noting the scuttling of the P-TOMS by the judicial branch of the GoSL;
Noting that as a result of the scuttling by the judiciary, the massive aid
pledged by the international community did not reach the tsunami victims of the
northeast;
Noting that in the island of Sri Lanka, due to pervasive racism, the ethnic
majority always constitutes a political majority and has acted in denying the
fundamental rights and legitimate aspirations of Tamils;
Noting the presidential election held in 2005 between the candidates who ran on
the platform of negation of the accepted fundamental principles and the other
who failed to implement the pledges made during the peace process and who
campaigned on the basis of having engineered a division of the Tamil Nation, as
a consequence of which the Tamils exercised their democratic right and boycotted
the election;
Noting the victory of the candidate who espoused the Sinhala Buddhist hegemony
and rejected any kind of power sharing outside the unitary framework;
Noting the present president of Sri Lanka's duplicity, for while airing policies
of peace to the international community, he has adopted policies moving towards
a military solution on the other side
by engaging
in a shadow war using various paramilitary groups directed by the Sri Lankan
army and its intelligence unit with a intention of weakening the Tamil Nation,
in violation of Article 1.8 of the CFA;
Noting that these paramilitaries and the Sinhala armed forces are behind the
killing of Tamil parliamentary leaders, intellectuals, journalists, students and
innocent civilians and thereby have made the Tamil Homeland into a killing
field;
Noting that the present GoSL is amassing troops in the Tamil Homeland and is
rehearsing for a major war, placing embargoes on fuel and building materials,
restricting the freedom of movement of the people and intensifying existing
restrictions on fishing;
Noting the refusal to make travel arrangements as agreed in the CFA and the
obstruction of the LTTE political cadres in the SLA-controlled territory in
Tamil Homeland attacks on the LTTE front defence lines and the indiscriminate
aerial bombing and shelling of civilian settlements;
Noting the rapidly deteriorating situation while the Geneva talks were held to
examine the proper implementation of the CFA and the agreement of the GoSL to
disarm the paramilitaries and the halting of violence against Tamil civilians;
Noting the killing of 207 civilians and 20 LTTE members since the Geneva talks;
Noting the failure to comply with the most important agreement in the Geneva
Talks to disarm the paramilitary groups and now the denial of their very
existence despite confirmation by the international community, the SLMM and
international media;
Noting the false propaganda by the GoSL that LTTE attacked a passenger ship
carrying unarmed troops while the SLMM monitor was present on the ship, but in
reality the LTTE while carrying on its naval exercises was attacked by four
Dvora gunboats. LTTE retaliated in self-defence, resulting in the sinking of one
Dvora boat without being aware of the presence of another SLMM member in one of
the Dvora boats. Immediately upon receiving notification from the Kilinochi SLMM
office of the presence of an SLMM member in one of the Dora boats, LTTE ceased
retaliation and allowed the Dvora boats to leave the area; the LTTE neither
intended to attack the ship carrying the troops nor to endanger the lives of
SLMM members;
Noting the existence of Sea Tigers, which was acknowledged by the SLMM as the
LTTE's de facto naval force on April 24, 2003;
Noting that in the CFA the LTTE and the GoSL are treated in an identical fashion
with equal rights and responsibilities consistent with the overall principle of
parity, reflecting a common guiding principle in the foundation of many other
ceasefire agreements;
Noting that the GoSL's armed forces should not and cannot be allowed to realize
military objectives that they were unable to achieve during times of war;
Noting that based on law and fact, sovereignty over and under the sea
appurtenant to the northeast and over the air belongs to the people of the
northeast;
Noting the creation of a situation obstructing the LTTE's Eastern Commanders
meeting in the Vanni to decide on important matters pertaining to Geneva–II, and
thereby derailing it;
Noting that while unleashing violence and creating an atmosphere of war, the
GoSL placed the entire blame on the LTTE as war mongers and terrorists and
continued the GoSL's long-standing foreign policy of isolating them within the
international community;
Noting that the European Union, accepting this false propaganda, punished the
victims of state terror and
branded the LTTE as a "terrorist organisation" without considering the
realities of the ground situation;
Noting that the LTTE has always accepted the nomination of SLMM monitors by the
Royal Norwegian Government;
Noting that the European Union's recent actions taken with respect to the LTTE
have regrettably created serious apprehension regarding the impartiality, or at
least a perception of the lack of impartiality, of the representatives from
those countries that are members of the EU: "Justice must not only be done but
also seen to be done;"
Noting that the CFA need not be amended to address the LTTE's concerns;
Noting that the LTTE accepted the Royal Norwegian Government's invitation and
came to Oslo in good faith to discuss ways and means to ensure the safety and
security of the SLMM monitors;
Noting that the team sent by the GoSL to Oslo was described by the GoSL itself
as "third-level";
Noting that the SLMM's monitors' safety and the LTTE's concerns could be met
without amending the CFA coupled with the proper protocol of the level of the
negotiating teams, the LTTE's proposed bilateral talks with the SLMM and the
facilitators in Oslo;
Noting that when the GoSL opposed the modalities of talks suggested by the LTTE,
the LTTE proposed negotiations between the secretary general of the LTTE's Peace
Secretariat and his counterpart of similar status, following the proper protocol
for negotiations;
Noting that the talks agreed on in Oslo were not to be Geneva Talks II, which
require a prior meeting of the central committee of the LTTE and compliance with
the Geneva I agreements; these prerequisites have not been satisfied due to the
continued intransigence of the GoSL;
Noting that the international community's insistence that the solution should be
found within a united Sri Lanka coupled with the military threat against the
LTTE will not only disrupt the power equilibrium but also remove the incentive
for the GoSL to seek a negotiated settlement;
Noting that the International Community's recent misguided attempt to
differentiate the Tamil Nation from the LTTE, the sole interlocutor of the
former in the negotiations, is injurious to the peace process;
Noting that Sri Lanka has achieved the status of being
25th in the index of failed states, and is demonstrating its lack of will
and ability to enter into a just and equitable negotiated settlement;
Reaffirms its policy of finding a solution to the Tamil national question based
on the realisation of its right to self-determination.
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