"Under Article 2 of the
agreement captioned "Measures to restore normalcy," the GOSL
agreed to several important conditions. Namely, to vacate
all school buildings and return them for the intended use;
the return of all other public buildings to their intended
use; to review the security measures and set-up of
checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and
towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent
harassment of the civilian population; to lift all
restrictions on day and night fishing except in certain
designated areas. To date, the GOSL is yet to comply with
these provisions despite three and a half years having
lapsed since the signing of the CFA. As a result, hundreds
of thousands of civilians are unable to resettle and
continue to languish as refugees in camps under miserable
condition, and are unable to freely pursue their
livelihood... In the meantime, the disarming of paramilitary
forces as mandated by the Article 1.8 of the CFA by the GOSL
did not take place.Political events since the commencement
of the peace process have amply demonstrated yet again that
the Sri Lankan State neither has the will nor the ability to
engage the Tamils in a collaborate effort, whether it is to
address the urgent humanitarian needs of the Tamil people or
the larger peace process."
The first step in the peace process in Sri Lanka, in
what was agreed to be a step by step process, commenced with the
signing of a
ceasefire agreement (CFA)
between the then United National Front (UNF) government of Sri Lanka
(GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the 22nd
of February 2002. A cessation of hostilities coupled with the
imperative need to create conditions of normalcy was the corner
stones of the CFA. In this regard the preamble to the CFA states as
follows:
"The GOSL and LTTE recognize the importance of bringing an end to
the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all
inhabitants affected by the conflict."
Under Article 2 of the agreement captioned
"Measures to restore normalcy," the GOSL agreed to several
important conditions. Namely, to vacate all school buildings and
return them for the intended use; the return of all other public
buildings to their intended use; to review the security measures
and set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated
cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will
prevent harassment of the civilian population; to lift all
restrictions on day and night fishing except in certain
designated areas. To date, the GOSL is yet to
comply with these provisions despite three and a half years
having lapsed since the signing of the CFA. As a result,
hundreds of thousands of civilians are unable to resettle and
continue to languish as refugees in camps under miserable
condition, and are unable to freely pursue their livelihood.
Despite the parties agreeing to a step-by-step
process of which the CFA being the first, the LTTE agreed to proceed
to the next step of face-to-face talks, even though the GOSL had
failed to fully implement these crucial provisions of the CFA
regarding the restoration of conditions of normalcy to the war
affected inhabitants.
Even when formal talks were to commence, it was agreed to set up an
interim administration for the war affected North East as a
forerunner to negotiations on a final lasting solution to the
conflict. The envisaged interim administration was to find solutions
to the burning day-to-day existential problems faced by the hundreds
of thousands of suffering people of the North East, and addresses
the enormous task of resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction
and development. However despite this understanding, on a suggestion
made by the then UNF government citing certain political
difficulties that it faced, the LTTE agreed to a compromise formula
of setting up of Joint Task Forces, which eventually gave way to
Sub-Committees instead of the original interim administration.
Despite these Sub-Committees functioning for several months, the
GOSL failed to expeditiously implement the decisions that were
taken, and on some occasions took up positions that effectively made
them defunct.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs coupled with the GOSL
organizing in Washington DC, USA a donor conference that
marginalized the Tamil people by the exclusion of the LTTE, led to
the LTTE in April 2003, without withdrawing from the negotiation
process, to suspend its participation in the peace talks. The LTTE
continued to be in contact with the facilitator, The Government of
Norway and through the facilitator with the UNF government.
In consequence thereof, the LTTE put forward proposals in writing
for the setting up of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). On
31 October 2003 simultaneously, the LTTE requested that dates be
fixed for the commencement of talks on this said proposals. It
should be noted that this was the first time the LTTE had submitted
written proposals in the course of a peace process.
On 4 November 2003, within four days of the LTTE's ISGA proposals,
the President who did not belong to the UNF government, took over
from the UNF government which enjoyed a majority in parliament, the
Ministries of Defense, Interior and media, which were directly
linked to the peace process, and assigned the said portfolios either
to herself or to her nominees from within her own party.
The action of the President resulted in the facilitator, the
Norwegian Government suspending its role in November 2003 in view of
lack of clarity in regard to who was responsible for the peace
process. The ensuing stalemate resulted in the dismissal of the UNF
government, the dissolution of parliament and the installation of a
new Government after the General Elections held in April 2004.
President Kumaratunge headed the new United Peoples Freedom Alliance
(UPFA) government which was an alliance of the President's own
People's Alliance (PA) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). That
the JVP campaigned and continues to campaign against the peace
process in well known.
The alliance resulted in the hardening of the position against the
LTTE's ISGA proposals and against the peace process. The inability
to take the peace process forward was clearly attributable to this
situation. It is significant to note that the main opposition party
the United National Party (UNP) had urged the government to commence
talks on the ISGA proposals and had publicly stated that it will
support any agreement that was arrived at between the government and
the LTTE after such discussion.
The LTTE had repeatedly stated that it was eagerly awaiting the
recommencement of talks on the basis of the ISGA proposals, and that
when the talks commence, any proposals the government may bring to
the negotiating table in regard to the ISGA could also be discussed.
The lack of clarity, the contradictions within the government
coalition partners, and the government's inability apart from making
pious pronouncements to take definite action to commence talks were
the main stumbling blocks to the recommencement of the peace
process. It is pertinent to point out, that in the context of the
LTTE's request for dates to be fixed to commence talks when it
submitted its ISGA proposals on 31 October 2003, talks would have
recommenced in November 2003 itself but for the actions taken by the
President on 4 November. This most unsatisfactory stalemate
continues to date.
In the meantime, the disarming of paramilitary forces as mandated by
the Article 1.8 of the CFA by the GOSL did not take place. On the
contrary, the Sri Lankan armed forces have been protecting and
promoting new paramilitary forces. This has resulted in killings and
grave incidents that are seriously jeopardizing the CFA. These
incidents continue to date.
It was at a time where seemed very little hops of the resumption of
negotiations, and the CFA itself becoming increasingly unstable that
the tsunami struck with approximately two-thirds of the total
casualties and over 60% of the destruction being sustained in the
North East. The result was a serious humanitarian crisis for a
people had suffered immensely during the last two decades of war
that had already destroyed the entire infrastructure and economy of
the North East.
Despite the tremendous human tragedy that the tsunami created, it
was hoped that something positive would come out of the catastrophe.
The international community correctly recognized that the tsunami
had created some space for the GOSL and the LTTE to work together.
Space that previously did not exist.
The international community proposed that a joint mechanism
involving the GOSL and the LTTE be created for the North East, which
would contribute to the creation of conducive environment for the
resumption of the peace process. After much procrastination the GOSL
agreed to conclude the Post-Tsunami Operations Management Structure
(P-TOMS) agreement, which had the explicit backing of the
international community.
The concluding of the P-TOMS, which was a simple administrative
mechanism with very limited powers to handle relief work in a 2 km
area from the seacoast, resulted in the JVP leaving the UPFA
government. Consequently, the JVP resorted to petitioning the
Supreme Court, which by granting a preliminary injunction against
some key provisions of the P-TOMS agreement has effectively made it
defunct. It has been nearly nine months since the tsunami struck the
North East, and the suffering of the affected people continues
unabated. It must be seriously noted that the P-TOMS agreement has
no significance as far as the Tamil people's political aspirations
vis-vis a solution to the Tamil national question is concerned.
Recently, since the announcement that presidential election will be
held before the end of 2005, the ruling party has elected Prime
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse as its candidate. In a bid to rally
support for his candidature the prime Minister has concluded
memoranda of
understandings with the JVP
and the
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). These memoranda of understandings
have received wide publicity. The crux of these understandings has
been on the basis of the following, amongst others:
Upholding of the unitary structure of the State
The rejection of concepts of
power sharing,
federalism and
self-determination
Refusal to recognize the areas of
historical habitation of the Tamil speaking people
The complete rejection of the
LTTE's ISGA proposals
Abandoning of the
P-TOMS agreement
A complete overhaul of the
CFA, and
A reassessment of the
Government of Norway's role as facilitator.
There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that the
cumulative effect of these policies will be to shut the door on any
possibility of finding a negotiated solution to the Tamil national
question.
Political events since the commencement of the peace process have
amply demonstrated yet again that the Sri Lankan State neither has
the will nor the ability to engage the Tamils in a collaborate
effort, whether it is to address the urgent humanitarian needs of
the Tamil people or the larger peace process. Instead of negotiating
with the LTTE in good faith, the Sri Lankan State continues to
undermine the collective will the Tamil people.
This situation places the Tamil people in a state of utter
desperation. The Tamil people earnestly desire a peaceful resolution
of the Tamil national question in a manner commensurate with the
suffering they have long endured, and which satisfy their legitimate
aspirations in a just and durable manner. The Tamil people earnestly
appeal to the international community to use their good offices to
ensure such a solution. If the Sri Lankan State continues to be
intransigent regarding the resolution of the Tamil national
question, the Tamil people will have no other alternative but to
urge the international community to explicitly endorse the Tamil
people's struggle for self-determination.
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