"...Whereas to the international community and
the island�s minorities, federalism is not division, to the
Sinhala ultra-nationalists bearing him aloft, it most certainly
is. Even if Ranil Wickremesinghe wins � an increasingly unlikely
proposition � the Sinhala nationalists will yet undermine the
peace process. The ignominious fate of the Post-Tsunami
Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) is likely to befall
every advance in the peace process..."
The major international players in Sri Lanka � the
United States, European Union, Japan and Norway � this week issued
a stark assessment of
prospects for peace in the island. Describing the Norwegian
peace process as facing its �most serious challenge� since the
Ceasefire Agreement
(CFA) came into force in February 2002, the Co-Chairs of Sri
Lanka�s donors also expressed their displeasure over the prevailing
situation. Both the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government
were criticised for their respective roles in the ongoing cycle of
violence. Whilst their extraordinary meeting on Monday was prompted
by the violence, especially the assassination of Foreign Minister
Lakshman Kadirgamar, the Co-Chairs also expressed justifiable
concern over the wider political developments in Sri Lanka.
The international community�s sentiments over the ongoing violence
are understandable. Their reiterated call for Sri Lanka to honour
the CFA clauses pertaining to the disarming of Tamil paramilitaries
is particularly welcome. This is a crucial step towards breaking the
cycle and the process of stabilising the truce. The LTTE has
reiterated this week that it is prepared to hold immediate talks
with the Sri Lankan government. But it insists the discussions must
be held either in its controlled areas or a neutral foreign
territory.
The LTTE�s security concerns were underscored by the
Co-Chairs themselves, when they deplored the activities of
Army-backed paramilitaries this week. Sri Lanka�s excuse that talks
in a foreign location would give the LTTE legitimacy is both puerile
and duplicitous. To begin with, it is questionable what this
�legitimacy� might entail beyond recognition of the simple truth
that the LTTE is a party to the conflict. Secondly, if Sri Lanka is
so preoccupied by dubious questions of legitimacy that it is
prepared to allow the disintegration of the CFA (the �essential
anchor� to the peace process as the Co-Chairs put it), then what
hope is there for negotiations on a political solution?
Meanwhile, the imbroglio over the talks - and the debate over the
validity or otherwise of the LTTE position - has clouded a more
fundamental issue: the cycle of violence will simply not stop until
the paramilitaries no longer operate in the Northeast. In other
words, even if both sides were to sit across a table, as long as Sri
Lanka continues to deny its covert role in fuelling the shadow war,
negotiations will achieve nothing. Both sides are expected to meet
next month with the former head of the truce monitors, Major General
Tronde Furuhovde, who returns as a Norwegian envoy. But given
Colombo�s emphatic denial that its military is sponsoring the Karuna
Group and other paramilitaries, there is little room for optimism.
The impasse over the venue is an effort by Sri Lanka to avoid the
engaging with the issue of its covert support. The international
community must therefore back its call for Sri Lanka to disarm the
paramilitary groups with pressure to ensure it is followed through.
Political events in Sri Lanka are meanwhile overtaking the
international peace initiative. Inevitably, there are varying
opinions as to which of the two candidates will win November�s
election. But it is quite clear that in any case, Sinhala
ultra-nationalists have become a powerful political force that, as
we have argued before, both Sri Lanka�s minorities and the
international community will be compelled to confront them on the
road to peace. The battle lines can already be discerned. The
Co-Chairs have reiterated their commitment to a federal solution to
end Sri Lanka�s protracted conflict. But Mahinda Rajapakse�s
campaign hinges on his
opposition to any �division of the country.�
Whereas to the international community and the
island�s minorities, federalism is not division, to the Sinhala
ultra-nationalists bearing him aloft, it most certainly is. Even if
Ranil Wickremesinghe wins � an increasingly unlikely proposition �
the Sinhala nationalists will yet undermine the peace process. The
ignominious fate of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS) is likely to befall every advance in the peace
process.
The international community has played an unwitting role in the
ascendancy of the Sinhala nationalist forces in Sri Lanka. There is
no compelling reason for these extremists to heed international
sentiment, even when in power. In the recent past, donors have
unilaterally and collectively breached the aid conditionality they
themselves imposed. And whereas little aid has reached the hundreds
of thousands of displaced people in the Northeast, the south
continues to benefit substantially, not only from aid flows but
indirect benefits such as investment flows. In other words, with
their political constituency reaping the substantial benefits of
peace already, why should Sinhala leaders compromise on the ethnic
question?
This week the hardline monks of the JHU � now reversing the argument
the Tigers have been expanding their military during the ceasefire �
declared that southern leaders are over-estimating the potency of
the LTTE. A new war could be won in short order they argue. The
Tamils � and we suggest the international community, too � should
brace themselves. It is inevitable that Sri Lanka will attempt a
military solution again.
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