A unique experiment in peace-keeping has been underway in Sri Lanka over the past year. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was formed as a result of the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signing a Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002.

Who are these monitors and what and how do they monitor? Are they referees or umpires? Sinhala Sri Lanka Government PRIU�s Ranjit J. Perera interviewed SLMM Head, Trond Furuhovde, February 20, 2003.

Interview in Full

Q:

How would you articulate the mandate of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission? What is your role as you see it?

A:

Let me put it this way. First of all, it is important that we follow the actual wording of the Ceasefire Agreement. And we will follow it and we will control the implementation. So that is the first part of the mission. That�s the implementation.

The second part will be, when it first is implemented, we have to control, (to ensure) that what is implemented is followed up. And we also have to control that the parties will keep the Ceasefire Agreement � what they have agreed on. And that we do by just practicing it. We go into it and we practice and we check everyday what kind of� and through the complaints, which we will have, is again making us review this agreement.

Q:

What do you mean by �practice�?

A:

To �practice it� is just to� actually following up every part of it. First of all the separation of forces, the link to international standards, laws and regulations their reporting to us, their relationship to us as an organisation which is an important part of this agreement. So this will be perhaps the most important part of it. But it will also as the parties will agree on more things during their negotiations and discussions, we will also add that to the Ceasefire Agreement as far as it is linked to the Ceasefire Agreement. So this will be in very general terms what it is all about.

Then of course to control it and to practice it, we have to be accessible, we have to be visible. And, we certainly also have to be available to the population. And that is of course, this last part of it tells also that we have to communicate, both with the parties and with the population. And of course, cooperate with the parties. We have to discuss with them, and we certainly have to discuss with and communicate with the population. So, on that background we add also, and we are more or less semi-active as you understand, I think that we are involved in disputes and we will try to help the parties to solve disputes how and when its possible. We will also be semi-active in that sense that when we see a situation coming up which can lead to difficulties, we will report that to the parties and if we can see some possible solution, we will also present that to them, just to avoid clashes.

Q:

To do that how well are you organised? What is the structure that you have to implement this?

A:

Well, we have a headquarters and finally, we chose to remain in the headquarters in Colombo for many reasons. And we have six district offices one each in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. So these six offices have an average number and type of people present all the time, equipped with radio equipment, vehicles, telephone equipment, data system linked to the internet and we also use cellphones and also satellite telephones. So we have a very good communication system, so wherever my monitors are, we will have contact with them. That is extremely important for the simple reason that when we are supposed to be available, we should have contact. Altogether we are forty-seven.

And we are all from Nordic countries. And that�s far away. And we are small nations and none of the countries has any agenda in this part of the world. We are actually a very homogenous group of people. That means that our views on values in general will be more or less the same. That makes it homogenous and easy to lead. Also I feel that it�s easier to adhere to us. That is also very important.

Q:

Are the numbers sufficient, forty-seven people?

A:

So far it is sufficient. What we are doing now is to look into it, that we might have a slight increase, not much, but a slight increase. It is a point in itself that it�s a small number. Because of that it will be very easy to communicate from me to the single monitors out in the field. I know them very well and they know me very well and we can react very quickly with a small and compact organisation. That is actually a point in itself.

It has been brought up by a couple of countries that they would like to participate in this Group. But I said no thank you very much for the simple reason that these are coming form different cultures. There are differences. For instance Canadians although they are Nordic or from the Northern hemisphere they are different from the Nordic countries.

Q :

Right. Some people are saying that others also may be included�

A :

Yes, they have asked about that but I don�t think that�s a good idea.

Q :

Now, the decisions that you take, are they binding on the two sides?

A : Yes.

Q : They are?

A :

Yes. According to the Ceasefire Agreement, I will be their last authority to interpret the text. So, if there are differences in the view of what the text is suppose to mean I would be the last authority to do that. I�ve done that several times and the partners have been very loyal to those decisions.

Q :

So, you are able to make a decision and then they will abide by it?

A :

Yes, that�s right.

Q :

Who are the key parties with whom you regularly interact?

A :

The Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. And normally the daily contact is to SCOPP, to the Defence Department and to the (LTTE) political headquarters in Kilinochchi on the other side. And for that we have of course daily contacts with the parties on the ground through these head offices. So, we have very close and direct contact on both the top level and on the ground. And it is important to keep contact on both levels simultaneously so that we can then offer it in parallel. The political level will always be informed about the details on the ground. And we can from the highest level also go directly down to affect what is going on here on�.

Q :

Who can make complaints to you and who normally makes complaints?

A :

It is everybody. It is everybody.

Q : No restrictions?

A :

There is no restriction. We talk to young people parents, we talk to all people, farmers, fishermen, we talk to soldiers, officers, we talk to officials, the area representatives� we have the whole spectrum. The whole spectrum. We are contacting police, magistrates; we are talking to hospitals� so we have contacts with the complete society.

Q :

February 22 will mark one year since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement and the formation of the SLMM. How do you see the past year? What are the gains and what are the losses?

A :

Well, yes in general I would say that� I think it has been a good year. It has been very stressing and it has been very hard work over this first year. And to be honest with you I feel quite exhausted. What we have gained is - what I think is important � killing has stopped and I think that is perhaps the most important part of it. We do not lose lives as we did earlier. People have been at war for 20 years, but now they are actually talking about the future and they are discussing how to live together. And that is, I think, a very positive sign. Thirdly I would say that these facts have created interest and has created confidence in the international society, which is one of the major steps forward for the country.

But at the same time it is also difficult to see ahead of us. There will be a challenge I think to keep on talking. And I think the parties need to be encouraged, supported internally first of all by the people, that the people will be encouraged to take part in this progress.

But I also think that there are threats around the corner. I have several times pointed at the threat from the criminal activities.

I think that a country like Sri Lanka would hopefully have a bright future with possibilities, with natural resources; with clever people and at the same time we are in a very weak position. We are about to end the war and we are now trying to build the future, and in this situation I find it that international criminal networks easily can get foothold.

Therefore I say that its important to have a modern police established as quickly as possible because the police force which we have now has to live in the shadow of the armed forces during the war and the armed forces have taken care of law and order. And now to bring� to enter into a peaceful period the police has to be in place, well trained to take over the law and order and to protect the values, first of all the population.

But there is also political instability which I think can disrupt and disturb the development. I think that is also important for the political society to be aware of also within the framework of the democratic system to support it and understand also how fragile the situation is.

But of course also extremists. We find extremists on both sides. Within the LTTE we have seen the extremists very much like to undermine what is going on as it is also of course on the governmental side. You would always find extremists who�ll rock the boat and fight to undermine what�s going on.

Q :

So, what in your opinion should each one do to ensure that the Ceasefire holds?

A :

Well, it is very difficult to present a formula here. But first of all I think it is important to strengthen self-confidence. Because I think self-confidence is the key to find practical solutions in which they can live together and find solutions for the future.

Q : Self-confidence in all the people?

A :

Self-confidence first of all among the leadership and also in the people. This is something that has to grow in the people. I don�t think that people today will just forgive and forget. I think that is impossible. I think that is it na�ve to believe that. So therefore I underline that I am talking about the self-confidence. To be sure that the self-confidence is very important to control the uncertainty, to control the fear for turning back to war, turning back to the bad times. So when I try to work on these it is with a very clear vision that the self-confidence has to come back and we have to strengthen the self-confidence.

Q :

So how would that be done? I mean, what measures should be taken to strengthen the self-confidence?

A :

Well, I think that can be done in many many ways but you have to dare. And I think there is no other medicine than to take risks. When you take risks, and you do it openly, you will find that you will test the other side. And when it holds, you will build self-confidence and you will find out that the method you are doing is working together with the other part. So, that is the way to do it. I�ve been also in other situations where I think that taking risks is actually the test of self-confidence and how to live and work with your enemies, or your former enemies (now we call them partners).

Q :

In the past year, has the balance of power between the two sides shifted?

A :

This is a rather complicated question. But let me try to make it simple. First of all, when we are talking about power, we are talking about military power. And we have to keep in mind that the war has been an asymmetric war. On one side we have� we have had regular� or we have regular armed forces. Regular armed forces operating according to AirLand Battle Doctrine. On the other side we have a guerrilla force which is� the bottom line is... out numbered. However, they have balanced out forces during the combat situations. So, in this case when we are talking about balance of power, we have to keep this in mind. So, we cannot go directly and compare them numerically.

Q :

How about on the basis of the Ceasefire Agreement? How is it laid out in that?

A :

It is not at all mentioned there. This is a militarily technical question� an operational question. And you have to do military assumptions and you have to have experience in doing military assumptions when you compare forces. Because then we are talking about combat capabilities. And that has to do with training standard. Of course the numbers is a training standard, the weapon systems and the capability to use the weapon systems, the command structure, the communication systems, the intelligence� so this is a very complicated question.

Q :

How is the situation with regard to the specific provisions in the Ceasefire Agreement where each side was to maintain its positions and where there were no positions demarcated or where it was fluid that the SLMM would demarcate� to what extent have you been able to sort that out?

A :

At this point we have two different aspects. In the North, In the Jaffna Peninsula we have a clear-cut south-line as we also have a south in London. There it is easier to define it. In the East its more difficult because there the guerrillas � the LTTE � are operating within an area and there are areas which are separated from each other with the Governmental armed forces in between. So in those areas we are talking about disputed areas.

According to the CFA we are supposed to assist the parties in drawing lines where it is necessary. And we have done so in areas where it has been absolutely necessary to do it - to control movement and to be sure that we can avoid clashes. So that has been done, but there are big areas where we have not been into. We will now� we have planned to go into an area in Mannar to have a closer look there too to be sure that we can tell the parties where the line goes, where does the limitation of the movement of the LTTE versus the possessions of the Governmental troops.

So, this is something we do, but we do it in corporation with the parties. And we are very careful on this, and we are only supporting the parties on this. Why this is so important is that, the territorial question is highly political. So when it comes to that point to decide exactly border lines, if that�ll be the question somewhere along the line in the future this has to be decided on a political basis.

For instance, in connection with the federal theme, solution or whatever it might be, then they have to draw some lines on the map. And we cannot do this today without close cooperation with the parties and through them the commanders on the ground. Therefore I say that when the commanders on the ground and the parties do not have a problem, I don�t have a problem.

So, when they raise these questions we will be there immediately. And we will listen to the parties and evolve a rule how to behave in these areas, but not as a permanent solution. The point is to underline that this is a temporary solution. Everything during a ceasefire period is temporary until the political decision has been taken. So, I have to be very careful not to go too far and in the rulings concerning territorial questions.

Q :

You were quoted last July as saying in a Press Release, �In some cases the timetable put forward in the Ceasefire Agreement has been quite optimistic. SLMM has during the last month accepted delays in implementation of certain issues and it is good to see that both parties have shown mutual understanding for that and are still moving forward.�

Are there still delays?

A :

I would say, that to some extent they still are working with the problems raised within the first 160 days. That was the time frame.

Let me take one example, as I recall it� the opening of A-9 contained also political questions concerning the traffic � who can traffic this road? And there was a dispute and I say that my ruling at that time was that, well, I lay down only technical demands. It should be technically possible to drive along the road and no regulations concerning who is going to transport the passengers and goods. That was I believe, to a later decision between the partners because it is political. In that case I said, �I will give you another thirty days�. Thirty days have gone and they have still not solved their problem because it is so closely linked to the economic development. So in this case I said, okay, I will then postpone with an open end, realising the fact that they have to solve their financial problems first and they also have to do a lot with the role. They have too many accidents and there is also then a question then about the insurance for the best companies so on and so forth. Its quite complicated and we don�t want to go into that. But we will say that according to the ceasefire these issues should have been fixed long time ago. The Government come up with some suggestions and the LTTE also and I say,

�No, wait! You will not have the possibility to solve all this because that takes long discussions and it is a part of, actually, the peace talks�, and they adhere to that. So they accepted my rulings. So, that is one example. There are also of course many others, but I don�t think we need to go into them.

Q :

Are there areas in the Ceasefire Agreement which you feel need revision or updating?

A :

Not actually. I think so far, from my point of view, it will always be very difficult. And I think as long as (according to 3.2 I think it is) I am the last authority to interpret it I will manage. With what I think should have been better covered in this Agreement, I would say is the sea territory. That could have been more clearly stated because, we are talking about an island state where the sea territory is very important. And the control of the sea territory is resting on the naval � the national navy. The national navy here has also as an integral part of its work to function as a coast guard and control everything within this territory. The fact that the LTTE also has a unit, a naval unit, within the national water has created problems. And we have tried to solve that as an interim solution until the final political decision. But that is a problematic area and daily I have to keep an eye on that.

Q :

The incident that occurred on the seventh. There was a report suggesting that there was a delay on the part of the monitoring mission. How would you respond to that?

A :

It�s very simple to respond to that. First of all, after the first incident which we had � the first Delft incident � when two of our monitors were held back by the LTTE on board a ship, we had to revise our guidelines on how to act. In the sense that we would not board a ship for control. We will stay on board the naval ship and the naval officers will do the examination and the controller of the investigation will board the ship, trawler or whatever it is and then we will verify their findings. But not go in there together with them, because that is a risk to take.

In this particular case (the 7th), they threatened to commit suicide. So, the naval officers, they didn�t go on board just not to risk that they commit suicide. So they asked if we can go on board and do their job. Now to that I said �No!� because then the SLMM would take over some of the national authorities, responsibilities. But I said I can do it on one condition that I get the permission from the Government and that it will not make any precedence. And second, that both parties (which at that point were gathered in Berlin), the two parties, shall agree on giving me that permission to go on board and do the investigation. So they did. This was late at night, late in the evening. So I said that I will give the orders that two of my monitors board the ship and do this investigation but not until first daylight. So just by saying that we had several hours of delay. But that didn�t change anything of the actual findings. We had full control over the situation but I didn�t want to risk my two monitors going on board the ship after dark and doing their inspection during the dark hours, when we knew that these people on board had threatened with suicide. So it is very easy to explain all this. So I take all criticism very easily. It is very simple to imagine there was bad weather, rough sea, we had rain, it was dark and difficult for the Navy to do anything � to give support to the two monitors. In that kind of a situation it is very easy for me to delay the whole thing. Everything was under control but I like people criticising me and I take it easy.

Q :

Okay, onto something else. Is the freedom of movement - now these are certain things that are in the agreement � normal in the affected areas?

A :

We have been denied access to areas and that disturbs me. Especially if we are denied access by lower ranks and with no explanation. The last time we were denied access by LTTE, with the explanation that they have their High Security Zone in that area. To me that is not good enough. So I complained to the LTTE leadership that I want to have absolute freedom of movement. Of course even in Government controlled areas, there are certain points where we are not supposed to have access. And that is also� naturally because all, all fighting units will have certain points where they don�t want to have anyone except special authorized people to have access. That calls even for their countrymen, that only a few people will have access to these points. So, that is natural and that is something that we on a professional basis just accept. That�s how it is. But when we are talking about the areas I don�t accept it; for the simple reason that it has to be transparent. We have to be given access to all parts. I think this has moved in the right direction slowly. And this also has to with their self-confidence (also part of that question as we have discussed earlier).

Q :

What about the civilian population? Movement of the civilian population, are they generally free?

A :

Yeah, I feel. But again, there are certain� you know, people know the exact rules but there is not that open free movement of people which I hope to see. But there are also limitations linked to financial� economy and practical things like mine fields� we have to clear areas of mines so they can move in, there are also registrations - who is the owner, how is this area now and so on and so forth, how much does it cost to what is the price to go from one part of the country to another part of the country�. All these administrative bits and pieces is also necessary to have in place before people can go. So I usually say that there must be an overall plan made up by the Government and also the LTTE to make it easy for the people to go, to move. And also the security that they feel safe when they come into the new areas or back home.

Q :

The mine operations; to what extent are you involved in it?
A :

Actually not at all. Not at all. We know about it and we are informed by those organisations who are involved in it, and also the two parties. So they inform us about it and when we are moving, if we are moving into a terrain with mine-fields they will always call us. Both the LTTE and the Governmental troops.

Q :

What about the freedom of expression and freedom to engage in political activities?

A :

We don�t interfere in that. Not at all.

Q :

Your monitors, do they have military experience?

A :

A little more than 60% of the monitors have military background.

Q :

So they are able to recognise military equipment and..

A :

So a little more than 60% has military background, the rest is civilian. We have� the average age is rather high and that is� well on the strong side. We have sufficient life experience and we have a broad variety of professions and we have also experiences from all conflicts here and in the rest of the world. So, we have been in Asia, the Middle-East, Africa, Europe American continent� so we have more or less been all over the world and we have experienced violence but that doesn�t say we compare. On the contrary this conflict is to us unique. And we are only working with this and with these parties. And we are looking for the solution for Sri Lanka. So when people say we have experience, that means that we have seen similar problems or we have been engaged and confronted very difficult and dangerous problems and situations, so we know a lot about ourselves, how we are reacting ourselves. And we have also seen how parties have reacted in difficult and dangerous situations other places in the world.

Q :

So, do you believe that a safe environment exists for your monitors?

A :

We are never asking for a guarantee for our safety. But so far I feel that the parties have done what they can do to reduce the risks when we are working. And I�m very grateful for that and that is also very encouraging for us, because then we understand that they care about our work and they appreciate our work.

Q :

I believe you have met all key persons involved in the peace process in SL. You also have the unique experience of heading the SLMM in the first year of the Ceasefire Agreement. How optimistic are you?

A :

I�m a pragmatic person but I�m an optimist and I am an optimistic realist. That means I am looking for the possibilities. But at the same time I am aware of the difficulties, I am aware that we are moving in a mine field, but I also see the changes in this country - positive and constructive changes. So I would say that I am optimistic and I am certainly aware of all the difficulties that you have ahead but I am convinced that you will find a solution, which will benefit these people who deserve peace and prosperous development. But certainly we will have difficulties and we have to strengthen our will and we have to strengthen our ability to find a solution. And I am quite sure that, that you will find a good solution for the future for the next generation.

Q :

Just one more question, that�s off the news report today saying that the Government has asked the Monitoring Mission to take more action about the incidents � the violations and in particular reference to some buses being taken away.

A :

I think this is the letter from the Defence Secretary to me about the bus incident.

We are taking firm steps. We are taking and reacting quickly on the more or less all the incidents. However we have to keep in mind two major factors. First of all, we do not have any power in this country. The power is the government and the capability to do something lies also with the LTTE. So what we do is put lights on what is wrong and what is reported to us and we urge the authorities to take action, because they have the tool to take action.

The second part is that when things are reported to us we cannot just immediately react on it. We have to do some inquiries. We have to be sure, we have to be sure that what we are talking about is the right thing and that we also understand the problem correctly. In that case and with that background we will first of all, protect our integrity and second, our credibility. But that we are reacting firmly� there is no doubt about that. I can assure you that I will never ever accept that we do not act firmly and as quickly as the situation allows us to operate. In emergencies� in emergency situations we are reacting in minutes all over the country. And I think that will be also our hallmark � to be able to react quickly. [END]