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Chandrika - LTTE Talks: 1994/95 

Sri Lanka Deputy Defence Minister
to LTTE leader

7 December 1994

Mr. V. Pirabaharan
LTTE Headquarters
Jaffna

Dear Mr. Pirabhakaran

I write with reference to your letter dated 25 November 1994.

First, I wish to recall the sequence of events which have underlined the efforts of our government to open up and carry forward the peace process.

Within two weeks of our party taking over the reigns of government, in August 1994, the Hon. Prime Minister, Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge, decided to lift the embargo on 28 items. She addressed a letter to you immediately afterwards commencing a dialogue which continued through several letters written by her and replies sent by you, eventually leading to the visit of our government’s peace delegation to Jaffna on 13 and 14 of October. The warm and cordial reception of the delegation by the people and the LTTE was appreciated by us.

As you know, the first round of talks dealt only with the reconstruction and repair of the war torn areas in the northeast, the opening up of a route to and from Jaffna, etc.

The LTTE gave us specific requests regarding priorities for reconstruction. At the second round of talks, our delegation was to present to the LTTE, details of projects the government would undertake. This included most of your requests.

The assassination of the leader of the opposition and the opposition’s main candidate for the then ongoing presidential campaign, just six hours before the departure of our delegation to Jaffna for the second round of talks, obliged us to postpone the event.

I suppose you are also aware that soon after this, we were fully involved in the presidential election and urgent attendant matters of state.

It is during this time that we learnt that the LTTE had, on your instructions, declared a cessation of hostilities for one week starting from 12 November, the day Mrs. Kumaratunge took oaths as the President of Sri Lanka.

In the absence of any official intimation by the LTTE of a rumoured cessation of hostilities, the government sought clarification through the ICRC, and was informed that there actually was a cessation of hostilities only on the evening of the 16th of October, just one day before you called it off. I wish to inform you once again that the government cannot respond to hearsay or informal information - it can only respond to official knowledge.

In response to your declaration of the cessation of hostilities, we wrote to you on the 19 November, proposing a cessation of hostilities for an initial period of two weeks, provided the LTTE would agree to cease hostilities on their part.

You replied that you would inform us of your decision regarding our proposal for a cessation of hostilities after the government investigation into the unfortunate incident at Nedunkerni, where LTTE commander Arundan was killed by the army.

We received your letter dated 20 November on 22 November and replied on the same day indicating that we had appointed a military court of inquiry to investigate the incident at Nedunkerni.

You replied on 25 November, which we received on 26 November, expressing your pleasure at our decision. You also stated therein that ‘the matter of cessation of armed hostilities and the modalities for it should be given detailed discussion at the negotiating table , before making an official announcement’.

We are in agreement to discuss the modalities of a cessation of hostilities, but we would like to obtain your views about certain fundamental matters, without which discussing details about a cessation of hostilities would be meaningless.

I set these out briefly:

1. Whether the LTTE agrees in principle to a cessation of hostilities.
   
2. We see a cessation of hostilities as a direct prelude to commencing negotiations between the government and the LTTE in order to end the armed conflict and to arrive at political solutions to the problems that caused the war.
   
3. A cessation of hostilities should not be confused with a ceasefire. The former could be a prelude to the latter.
   
   A cessation of hostilities is less formal and binding than a ceasefire. During a cessation of hostilities both parties remain frozen in their positions as at present, while remaining fully armed and alert.
   
   Neutral observers may be invited to monitor the process if both sides so desire.
   
   Details regarding the effective implementation of a cessation could be agreed upon across a negotiating table, once agreement is reached re. the above points.
   
4. During the entire peace process, the LTTE must refrain from all political assassinations anywhere in the island.
   
5. We hope we will be able to arrive at an agreement about the cessation of hostilities within the next two weeks and then commence the actual peace negotiations soon after.
   
6. We are ready to commence some of the reconstruction work and the opening of a roadway to Jaffna as discussed with you. We shall send a detailed report of same to you by the end of this week and shall be glad to receive your response soon.

In concluding my letter, it is opportune to mention that a massive effort to stir up racial hatred was set in motion by some elements within the UNP and our other opponents, stating the fact that it was our government’s commencement of the peace process which gave the LTTE the possibility of assassinating Sinhala leaders, etc., etc.

The personal credibility of our leader, Mrs Kumaratunge, was put directly into question before the entire nation. The major and almost exclusive election platform of the UNP and several other candidates was the issue that Mrs Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge was being too lenient with the LTTE which was shown up as the organisation responsible for systematically massacring all the leaders of the Sinhala people, in addition to all the Tamil leaders who opposed the LTTE. The PA government was said to betray the Sinhala people by talking to the LTTE. It is to the credit of our government that we withstood all pressures to halt the peace process. We possess a clear and unshaking vision of peace for our country - yours and mine and a lasting desire to build a nation where all our peoples could live in freedom, dignity, equality, coupled with the sincerity and courage to implement it, in the face of all obstacles.

We took the grave risk, politically and personally, of continuously stating that we had only temporarily suspended the talks, but that the peace process would continue. It is to the eternal credit of the Sinhala people that they did not succumb to the many racist pressures. They have given our government and our president a massive mandate against racial hatred and discrimination and for peace.

The Sinhala people, together with the Tamils and Muslims of Sri Lanka, have in one voice called upon our government and have placed their faith in us to solve the problems of the north and east.

Within three weeks after the suspension of the talks, due to the tensions that ensued after the assassination of 55 persons on the night of 23 October, our government had the courage to reopen a dialogue with yourself and the LTTE, fully aware of the immense political risk that may await us. This is because we are committed to the cause of peace. We sincerely hope that your commitment is of the same order and that together we could end this tragic war and establish peace and prosperity for our peoples.

Thanking you,
With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Col. Anuruddha Ratwatte
Deputy Defence Minister

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