Home > Struggle for Tamil Eelam > Sri Lanka Accused at United Nations > UN Commission on Human Rights 1991 > Report by the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
47TH SESSIONS FEBRUARY 1991

• Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. S. Amos Wako, on Summary or Arbitrary Executions - Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1990/51 of 6 March 1990, E/CN.4/1991/36 - submitted 4 February 1991

---

Sri Lanka

465. On 8 June 1990, a cable was sent to the Government of Sri Lanka concerning Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu, mother of Richard de Zoysa, and Batty Weerakoon, the lawyer representing her at the magisterial inquiry into the abduction and killing of her son in February 1990, who received death threats demanding that they stop pursuing the case. According to the information, on 1 June 1990, Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu had informed the Moratuwa magistrate's court that she had identified one of the abductors of her son as a senior superintendent of police in Colombo, who had subsequently been arrested.

466. In view of several recent cases where lawyers and witnesses involved in cases brought against members of the security forces had been threatened and subsequently killed, the Special Rapporteur expressed serious concern for the safety of Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu and Batty Weerakoon, and appealed to the Government of Sri Lanka to take all necessary measures to ensure that their right to life was protected. He also requested information about the investigation into these cases of death threats as well as the case of the killing of Richard de Zoysa, and, in particular, on the measures taken by the Government to protect the safety of the above-mentioned two persons.

467. On 11 July 1990, another cable was sent to the Government of Sri Lanka referring to the above mentioned cable of 8 June 1990 and stating that, according to further information, the two policemen currently guarding Batty Weerakoon's house had received death threats on 22 June 1990 in two letters addressed to them by name. As the names of the police officers had reportedly not been publicized, the fear was expressed that there might be accomplices inside the police force.

468. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur reiterated his serious concern for the life of the two police guards and of the two persons referred to in his previous cable and appealed again to the Government of Sri Lanka to take all necessary measures to ensure that their right to life was protected, and requested information concerning the investigation into these cases of death threats as well as on the measures taken by the Government to protect the safety of the above-mentioned four persons.

469. On 28 November 1990, a letter was sent to the Government of Sri Lanka transmitting allegations that during the 32 months of the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the north eastern part of the country under the Indo Sri Lanka accord signed in July 1987, a large number of unarmed civilians were killed in a summary manner by members of the IPKF, or by Tainil groups allied to the IPKF and acting with their acquiescence.

470. In addition to the alleged incidents of killings by the IPKF already transmitted to the Government, the following incident was reported: On 2 August 1989 in Valvettitturai, 52 persons were shot dead by IPKF soldiers when they rampaged through the town, shot at residents and set fire to houses and other properties. The victims included Vengadasalam Subramaniam, aged 60, S. Illayaperumal, aged 70, Rajaguru Javanaraj, aged 11, Aathy Sundareswaran, aged 11. The attack was said to be the reprisal for the LTTE Valvettitturai market ambush on an IPKF patrol in which six soldiers were killed.

471. In June 1990, after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) reportedly had taken effective control of the north eastern part of the country, following the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in March 1990, heavy fighting was said to have resumed between the Sri Lankan Government forces and the LTTE, causing a large number of deaths among the civilian population in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. During the fighting a large number of civilians were reportedly killed in a summary manner by both sides. While allegations of summary or arbitrary killings by the LTTE were numerous, including the killings in the eastern part of hundreds of policemen who had surrendered and incidents of killing of Muslims i,n August 1990, reports were received of killing in a summary manner of hundreds of civilians by Government forces after they regained control of the areas held by the LTTE. Several of the victims were said to have been killed summarily after they had been detained. The following were among such incidents of killings:

(a) On 14 June 1990, in Vavuniya, Batticaloa district, Government forces shot and killed unarmed civilians, including Anthony Pillai, a public health inspector, his wife and son, after they had recaptured Vavuniya police station from the LTTE. About 15 bodies were found on the road;

(b) In the last week of June 1990, in Vellavelli village, Batticaloa district, 15 civilians, including a school teacher, were killed by army and police personnel;

(c) After the town of Kalmunai was recaptured by Government forces from the LTTE on 21 June 1990, soldiers shot residents in their homes, including Thiyagarajah. On 22 and 23 June, soldiers rounded up men between the ages of 16 and 30, lined them up blindfolded and either shot them or stabbed them to death with bayonets. The bodies were then thrown into shops owned by Tamils and were set on fire. Over 30 bodies were found in one burnt-out shop, including the body of 23 year old Chandrikumar.

472. Furthermore, it was alleged that Government forces carried out indiscriminate air bombardment and shelling on residential and non-military targets, including schools and hospitals. The following were reported to be among the numerous deaths resulting from indiscriminate bombings:

(a) On 13 June 1990, at Amparai Central Camp Tamil Village, 100 persons, including women and children, were killed;

(b) On 16 June 1990, in Kalavanchikuddi, 10 patients were killed when the hospital was hit by a bomb;

(c) On 26 June 1990, in Kokkuvil, seven civilians were killed;

(d) On 28 June 1990, in Kilinochi district, eight students were killed when their school came under attack;

(e) On 30 June 1990, in Pulmottai area, Trincomalee, 40 Tamil displaced persons were killed by gunfire from a Sri Lankan navy vessel.

473. In addition, in the southern and central parts of the country, killings and death threats directed at suspected supporters of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front, JVP), opposition members of Parliament and other suspected opponents of the Government allegedly continued to occur, although there were fewer reports of such occurrences compared to the period from August 1989 to February 1990. The following such cases were reported:

(a) On 18 December 1989, Lalith Warushahennadi, aged 24, a student of agriculture at Peradeniya University, was found dead in Tellabur after having been detained by army personnel on 12 December at the Yakkalamalla Army Camp in Galle district;

(b) Following the Government's "shoot on sight" orders to police reportedly issued on 8 July 1990 in the southern provinces, scores of bodies were found dumped in places such as Diyagama, Gampaha district; Bandaragama, Kalutara district; Embilipitiya, Ratnapura district; Suriyawewa and Beliatta, Hambantota district.

474. With regard to the case of Richard de Zoysa, which was referred to in the Special Rapporteur 's cables of 8 June and 11 July 1990 to the Government, it was reported that the magisterial inquiry into his death was discontinued on 30 August 1990 and that the Attorney General decided to take no action against the senior police officer named by de Zoysa's mother as having been among those who abducted her son in February 1990. According to the information received, the case was being investigated by police, although police officers were alleged to have been involved in the abduction and killing of de Zoysa.

475. On 17 January 1990, a reply was received from the Government of Sri Lanka to the Special Rapporteur's letter of 30 October 1989 (see E/CN.4/l990/22, paras. 386 to 388) and to his cable dated 9 November 1989 (see E/CN.4/1990/22, paras. 389 to 392), commenting on the following cases:

(a) Charitha Lankapura: According to police investigations, two unidentified persons had on 7 July 1989 entered the house where Mr. Lankapura was boarded and shot him dead. A magisterial inquest was held into this incident and a verdict of "murder by shooting" was returned by the magistrate who ordered the police to conduct further investigations;

(b) Kanchana Abeypala: Investigations revealed that he was killed by an unknown gunman who had entered the house on 20 August 1989. Mr. Abeypala's father was also injured in the incident. A magisterial inquest was held and the magistrate ordered the police to conduct further investigations. The police have reported that those living at Mr. Abeypala's house who had seen the gunman failed to co-operate and that this has hindered investigations. No suspect had yet been arrested in connection with this murder and the police investigation was continuing;

(c) Sarath Karaliyadda: The investigation revealed that on 26 October 1989, eight armed persons dressed in civilian clothes entered Mr. Karaliyadda's house in Teldeniya police area. These persons had ransacked the house and removed jewellery and cash. They led Mr. Karaliyadcla away from the house, and his dead body was subsequently found about a quarter of a mile away. A magisterial inquest was held by the Teldeniya magistrate and was to be resumed after further investigations.

476. The reply also stated the following on the situation in Sri Lanka:

(a) Unsettled security conditions in the northern, eastern and southern parts of Sri Lanka due to the-escalation of violence remained a matter of serious concern to the Government. These incidents posed a serious problem for law enforcement authorities in that normal investigations into these activities proved extremely difficult; where investigations had been initiated and judicial inquiries held these could not be completed due to the tact that the law enforcement authorities had to cope with an unprecedented situation in maintaining law and order in the context of conditions prevailing at that time. The judicial authorities, however, continue to investigate reported incidents under the normal laws, including under habeas corpus procedure which was available even under the emergency regulations;

(b) In the northern and eastern parts of the country where the IPKF was present the security situation was not conducive to normal investigations. Despite the IPKF presence militant Tamil groups in the area had not been disarmed as envisaged. The introduction of more weapons, the existence of illegal armed groups and the resulting internecine clashes between rival militant groups have placed serious impediments in the way of the efforts of restoring peace and normalcy in the areas concerned as well as on the conduct of normal investigations into reported violent incidents. To overcome these, the Government took a number of steps:

(i) Implementing the provisions of the Provincial Council Act in the areas of law and order;
(ii) Facilitating negotiations between the Government and the one militant group (LTTE) which had hitherto remained outside the democratic process;

(iii) Secured agreement with the Government of India to complete the withdrawal of the IPKF by 31 March 1990. The Government was also working towards securing a cease-fire among the rival groups who were engaged in violence;

(iv) To expedite the ICRC's access to the northern and eastern parts of the country;

(c) With regard to incidents reported in areas other than the north and east, constraints on investigations also existed. However, the situation improved consequent to measures taken by the Government:

(i) The Government convened an All Party Conference (APC) to find a consensus among democratic political parties with a view to restoring peace and normalcy, and to address and resolve the crucial national issues which underlie the problems the country has been facing;

(ii) The Government was seriously concerned about reports concerning violence by militant groups in the south which did not accept political negotiations as well as about reported acts of violence by other unidentified groups. The Government ordered the security forces and the police to identify and disband any illegal paramilitary groups in all parts of the country. It also gave clear instructions to law enforcement agencies that such groups, if they existed, should be treated as terrorists. An independent investigation unit comprising senior civilian and police officials was set up to investigate this alleged phenomenon and to make recommendations for the disbandment of such groups, if any should exist. The public was requested to provide information to this unit;

(iii) The Government invited the ICRC to exercise its traditional humanitarian functions in the country;

(iv) The Government also appointed an independent commission to go into all aspects of the youth unrest and make recommendations on possible courses of action to address the rootcauses of the present problems;

(d) Whilst the Government was deeply concerned about the acts of violence ~committed in the country in the past, it was nevertheless hopeful that the political efforts being undertaken on a broad front would restore democratic institutions and the functioning of normal law and order machinery.

477. On 28 December 1990, a reply was received from the Government of Sri Lanka to the Special Rapporteur's letter of 28 November 1990, providing information on the efforts made by the Government with regard to the situations in the north and east of Sri Lanka as well as in the southern and central parts of the country. It also provided a brief account on the progress of the investigation into the case of Richard de Zoysa.

478. With regard to the situation in the north and east of the country, the reply stated that the Government persisted in its efforts to resolve the socio-political issues involved, through negotiations with all parties irrespective of their ethnic origin, with a view to the devolution of governmental authority; that in pursuit of this endeavour to find a compromise acceptable to all parties, regional power sharing structures in the form of provincial councils were formed by the adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution; that as a result, all political parties and groups, including the Tamil parties representing the population of the north and east, entered the democrat!~ political process and that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the only group which refused to do so.

According to the reply, the LTTE refused to participate in both provincial and national elections, while simultaneously continuing their acts of terror and intimidation against the people of the north and east and against LTTE's political rivals belonging to the Tamil community. It was stated that with a view to persuading the group to renounce violence, the Government had initiated and engaged in a dialogue with the LTTE for over one year. All possible concrete measures were taken to enable them to feel confidence in the negotiating processes including the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in March 1990, and the dissolution of the North East Provincial Council and the holding of new elections in those areas, thus providing an opportunity for the LTTE to participate, which the LTTE refused to do.

479. It was further stated that the process of devolution of power to the Councils was further expedited, that the presence of the Government security forces in the area after the withdrawal of the IPKF was substantially reduced, that the remaining security forces were confined to their barracks and that action was taken to create a provincial police force representing the ethnic ratio of the respective areas. It was also stated that the security forces were instructed not to do anything which might be seen as jeopardizing the ongoing dialogue with the LTTE.

480. However, according to the reply, the LTTE resorted to unilateral and unprovoked violence on 10 June 1990, on police stations in the north and east. It was stated that these police stations were manned mainly by Tamil policemen and had even been set up at the request of the LTTE; that a large ~urriber of policemen were abducted, and that some were brutally killed. It was also stated that two cease-fires offered by the Government were totally disregarded by the LTTE.

The Government could not ignore the violent and unprovoked attacks initiated by the LTTE, which had flouted all attempts at a negotiated settlement and had systematically murdered most of the Tamil political leaders who had advocated the path of democracy and negotiations.

With regard to allegations of indiscriminate bombing by the security forces of civilian targets, the reply emphasized that the actions which the security forces were forced to undertake against the LTTE were directed not against civilians but against the terrorism of the LTTE, and that in fact the security forces refrained from taking action against the LTTE in certain areas such as the Manner area, even at the expense of conclusive military action, as the LTTE deliberately took refuge behind civilians.

It was also stated that the Government remained committed to a negotiated solution to the problems and continued to negotiate with all other Tamil parties and others within the framework of the All Party Conference convened for this purpose.

481. According to the reply, over a million persons of all communities have been forced to flee their homes for other parts of the country and even overseas because of forced conscription, extortion and robberies committed by the LTTE; that civilian administration and transport have been disrupted as a result of acts of sabotage by the LTTE; that atrocities were committed by the LTTE not only against Tamil and Sinhalese civilians but also against Muslims in the north and east, including the gruesome massacres at a Muslim mosque in 1990 and the forced expulsion of over 40,000 Muslims at one time from their homes in the Mannar area.

482. In its reply, the Government of Sri Lanka acknowledged that any situation of conflict where security forces were called upon to take action against terrorists who merge with the local population could pose hardships for civilians and operational constraints. It was stated that great care was exercised to avoid civilian areas and that advance notice was given to civilians when operations were undertaken to relieve soldiers besieged by the LTTE terrorists.

483. With regard to the situation in the southern and central parts of the country, the reply stated that normality had been restored, although there were reports concerning some residual violence as a result of unidentified groups reportedly taking revenge on those believed to be responsible for killings attributed to subversive elements during a period of escalating violence in 1990. It was stated that the Government was seriously concerned over such acts, which are illegal under the laws of Sri Lanka, and was taking severe measures against those responsible for exceeding their legitimate duties.

It was further stated that in order to investigate all such reported illegal activities, an independent committee headed by two retired judges of the Supreme Court identified this problem last year and the Presidential Commission on youth unrest also made reference to this issue; that a mechanism was already worked out to receive information from the public regarding the activities of such groups; and that clear and unequivocal instructions had been given to law enforcement authorities to identify, disarm and disband all such groups.

484. With regard to the case of Richard de Zoysa referred to in the Special Rapporteur's communications, it was stated that investigations were continuing with a view to identifying and prosecuting the offenders in accordance with the laws of the country. It was also stated that the magisterial inquest was inconclusive as to the identity of the suspected offenders, as insufficient evidence was available against the police officer named by the victim's mother. With regard to the observation that the police are being entrusted with investigations into allegations involving police officers themselves, the reply pointed out that the law enforcement authorities had to depend on the investigative arm of the police to obtain legally valid evidence to support prosecutions, and that there had been other similar instances involving police officers which had eventually resulted in their detention. It was stated that while the authorities continued to pursue investigations, the Sri Lankan Parliament would shortly debate a motion calling for a commission of inquiry into this case.

Mail Us

Copyright 1998/2009 All Rights Reserved

Home