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Who benefits from instability and communal tension between Tamils
and Muslims and who does not?
An ever present component of the ongoing tensions in Sri Lanka�s
restive east is the relationship between the island�s Muslim
community and the Tamils � more specifically the Liberation Tigers.
To many critics of the LTTE, the organisation is essentially hostile
to the Muslim community to the point of chauvinism, a baseline
assumption that is one of many underpinning the claim that its
values are at odds with those espousing liberal democratic ones.
Critics and opponents frequently point to the sometimes volatile
relationship between the LTTE and the non-Tamil minorities residing
within the Northeast to argue that the Tigers are not fit to govern.
Sri Lankan propaganda routinely lays the blame for friction between
Muslims and Tamils on LTTE provocations. The LTTE instigates
communal violence, the argument goes, to advance its ethno-centric
agenda.
A closer inspection of the relationships between the LTTE, Tamils
and Muslim communities of the Northeast suggests this line of
thought is an inaccurate representation of ongoing dynamics. If
analysts approach the Tamil-Muslim question without a prejudicial
assumption of inflexible LTTE hostility to the Muslims, then an
alternative hypothesis becomes increasingly plausible. The dynamics
around the Tamil-Muslim question in Sri Lanka has, for a long time,
been insufficiently examined. And this has, in a perverse paradox,
fuelled violence and communal tension.
Undeniably, relations between the Tamil and Muslim communities have
been strained over the past few decades. The worst inter-communal
animosity existed in the early to mid-nineties. The state created
armed Muslim paramilitary groups which it utilized to fuel communal
violence and open a third front in the bloody war. The LTTE�s
counter-violence led to a spiral which devastated the fabric of
communal relations. In a particular low point of communal relations,
the LTTE expelled several thousand Muslims from Jaffna. The movement
has since apologised for this infamous action and urged Muslims to
resettle without fear. However there are other vested interests
preventing this, a point returned to below.
One central � albeit changing and changeable - aspect of
Tamil-Muslim relations that is often ignored amidst the critical and
narrow focus on the Tigers are the sentiments of ordinary Tamils and
Muslims towards each other. Communal animosities pre-date the LTTE
and have continued separately, though clearly not independently, of
the LTTE�s armed struggle. Apart from conflict-related violence,
local resource competitions, state-sponsored (and violent)
colonisation in the Northeast, and discrepancies in economic and
other opportunities have all contributed to communal hostilities.
However, the fundamental question invoked today ought to be who,
exactly, benefits from instability and communal tension between the
two communities, and who does not.
To begin with, the LTTE�s interests, not least given its undisguised
ambitions to govern the Northeast, lie in promoting stability and
winning legitimacy amongst the residents of the region it is
aspiring to administer. Efforts to fit the LTTE within the role of
�conflict entrepreneur� is no longer compatible with the
organization�s position as one of the two state-like actors on the
island. If it was a conflict entrepreneur as is argued, LTTE would
unleash violence to promote instability and tensions to compel
(Tamil) victims of the resultant turmoil to rally to the
organization for protection. However a counter supposition could be
the organization has grown to state like functionality and its
imminent ambitions to govern means it prefers cultivate legitimacy
to its rule in the target area. A close examination of the conduct
of the LTTE and its associated organisations since the February 2002
ceasefire reveals a sustained effort in this regard to rebuild
bridges with the Muslim community.
The most revealing � and undeniably most important � aspect is the
LTTE�s response to outbreaks of communal violence. Senior LTTE
political wing officials meet promptly with Muslim community and
religious leaders to discuss and resolve the issue and to jointly
urge calm and restraint on all sides. Contrary to the emotive and
provocative rhetoric deployed by government officials and some
Muslim political leaders, LTTE officials strive to avoid
exacerbating tensions.
On a wider note, Tamil charitable organizations such as the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) also engage in projects in
predominantly Muslim areas. The TRO, for example, has been involved
in post-tsunami building shelters and homes in Muslim dominated
parts of Amparai, Pottuvil and Kalmunai. There are also stirrings of
cross-ethnic civil society relations: the TRO has donated computers
and other material to Muslim Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
for example. This is not merely a question of assimilating
Tamil-speaking Muslims. A notable effort has been to encourage the
Muslim religion and identity in the Northeast. The TRO, for example,
stepped in to fund the reconstruction of Ladies Arabic College, even
as the Sri Lankan state ignored the destruction of the iconic
institution.
In many ways, last year�s tsunami was an acid test for the LTTE�s
conduct towards other communities within its areas of control � as
was the Sri Lankan state�s. The results have been visible to both
international and domestic audiences � and have been starkly
different for both actors � but are frequently discounted by
analysts who begin by assuming ongoing hostility and then setting
out to find the evidence to fit, ignoring that which does not. It is
not clear why, for example, the LTTE media (local and especially
Diaspora) saw fit to highlight the acute damage in Amparai when
raising the case for Northeastern suffering � as opposed to the
state which blanked out the Northeast and concentrated on
highlighting the south.
Within three days of the tsunami � even as Colombo blocked aid from
reaching the Northeast - the Liberation Tigers sent six lorries to
Amparai from Kilinochchi with emergency supplies and a lorry load of
medicine along with fifty doctors for relief operations. As the
death toll in that coastal areas rose steeply, LTTE cadres crossed
enmasse into government-controlled areas to undertake relief
efforts. As the LTTE�s top commander in the region, Colonel Banu
told the gathered Tamil press, �we are not looking at this disaster
in terms of Tamils, Muslims or Sinhalese. Our concern is only with
people hit by the tsunami.�
Compare the speed and scale of the LTTE�s response to the tsunami
with that of the Sri Lankan state which is unproblematically taken,
in contrast to the LTTE, to be seeking to build communal harmony.
Two months after the waves struck thousands of Muslims demonstrated
in the main coastal towns of the Amparai against the government for
denying them tsunami aid.
A close examination of the conduct of the state and its institutions
also challenges the assumption the state unquestioningly prefers
communal harmony. Its role in resource competition is a case in
point. The diversion of water from the Kantalai tank in Trincomalee
away from Tamil and Muslim farmers toward Sinhalese farmers is a
typical instance of resource manipulation undertaken with the
knowledge that communal tensions would emerge and last. Tolerance of
the provocative erection of unauthorised Buddhist statues in
Trincomalee earlier this year and the subsequent civil unrest are
further evidence state acceptance of communal antagonism in
multi-ethnic regions. (The resulting civil strife provided the
government with the cover to re-induct 2,000 troops into the port
town under the guise of maintaining the peace, even though the
ceasefire explicitly forbade such repositioning).
The pressing question now is however, who benefits from the violence
and terror being stoked between Tamils and Muslims in the east? If
the LTTE�s ambitions to govern the Northeast compel conduct to
garner local and international legitimacy, then those opposed to the
LTTE�s ambitions undoubtedly benefit from the frustration of its
efforts to secure legitimacy.
Undoubtedly the overwhelmingly Sinhala armed forces are amongst
those who do so. Apart from the regular redeployment of troops
�compelled� by potential communal clashes, the provocative
construction of new bases are rationalised on the same basis: rising
violence against the Muslim community in Batticaloa has, for
example, been put forward as the justification of the establishment
of the Navy�s first base in that district.
A glimpse into the role of the armed forces in instigating communal
violence emerged last month when two cadres of an Army-backed
paramilitary group defected to the LTTE. What was particularly
revealing was the role of three ministers � an anti-LTTE Tamil, a
Muslim and a Sinhalese � in arranging support and logistics for the
Karuna Group.
On the other hand, there is the Muslim political leadership. Critics
of the LTTE in the region often give credence to the inflammatory
rhetoric of Muslim politicians � without subjecting the latter�s
objectives and actions to the same critical scrutiny as the
former�s.
At once stage, as part of its efforts to build communal stability
and harmony, the LTTE briefly attempted to collaborate with the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in the mistaken assumption that the
party and its leader, Rauf Hakeem, would both be able to speak
unequivocally for his community and enjoy its confidence. However,
it subsequently became increasingly apparent that the Muslim polity
was deeply divided and embroiled in the patron-client politics and
the SLMC-LTTE pact disintegrated, helped on the way by a relentless
anti-LTTE tirade from Mr. Hakeem, around whom the SLMC, once the
island�s largest Muslim party, was coming apart under internal
tensions.
The LTTE has also been criticized by other Muslim political leader
such as Mr. M. S. S Hisbullah and Ms. Ferial Ashraff. However, in a
stark indication of their concern for communal harmony, both opted
to share a platform with the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP) and the Buddhist supremacist Jathika Hela Urumaya
(JHU).
Interestingly, almost all leading Muslim politicians have opted to
either back or remain silent on state-backing for the Karuna
paramilitary group in the East - despite the fact that many of the
hardships they vociferously accuse the LTTE of inflicting on the
Muslim people having been inflicted during Karuna�s unusually long
(17 years) term as LTTE commander of Batticaloa-Amparai.
A number of the major Muslim politicians have also been implicated
in the misuse of tsunami rehabilitation funds. The Auditor General�s
report criticized both state and local bureaucracies for widespread
misappropriation of funds and the incompetence. Evidently Muslim
leaders associated with the state, much like Tamil paramilitary
organizations with political veneers, rely on patron-client networks
developed through the (mis) use of state funds and resources to
maintain their standing.
Conversely, the LTTE its efforts to assist the Muslim community have
resulted in a productive network of alliances with local community
leaders. A number of them have rallied round the organization over
the past few months in the face of vehement accusations of
anti-Muslim chauvinism. �Some sinister forces are spreading
unfounded allegation in the South that LTTE is obstructing
resettlement,� said Moulavi L. Shakil of the Muslim People�s Office
in Jaffna, last month.
More pointedly, the Jaffna Masjid Mohamedia Jumma Mosque Committee
declared in a press statement released a couple of months earlier:
�we publicly appeal to the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leadership not
to use the resettled Muslim internally displaced families as pawns
for its political purposes. If SLMC attempts to hold their general
meeting in Jaffna we will launch a protest campaign on the same
day.�
The point is simple: continuing Tamil-Muslim violence provides some
Muslim political parties, including the SLMC, with a convenient
bete-noir (the LTTE � and the Tamils) against which they can rally
Muslim sentiments. In particular such violence and antagonism allows
these actors to step forward as self-appointed defenders of Muslim
interests against the �chauvinistic� Tigers.
The theme has been appropriated by the Sri Lankan state and
inadvertently boosted by the international community in demanding
the inclusion of a �third� negotiating panel at Norwegian-brokered
talks to resolve the island�s ethnic conflict. The LTTE�s argument
that Muslim interests must be catered for when substantive issues of
representation are taken up and that would be a suitable point to
ethnicise the talks was summarily rejected without consideration �
again on the unquestioned assumption the movement is inherently
chauvinistic.
However, there are inescapable signs, even if many analysts choose
to ignore them, that this tension is becoming harder to sustain. The
most promising sign of improving inter-communal relations between
Tamils and Muslims and, in particular, the LTTE and Muslims, was the
Centre for Policy Alternative�s survey last week which suggested
that over fifty percent of Muslim respondents to their poll backed
the establishment of the LTTE�s Interim Self-Governing
Administration (ISGA) in the North-East.
In summary, the argument that the LTTE is determined to maintaining
a state of tension in order to garner further support from Tamil
community is incompatible with the organisation�s actions and
policies and with unfolding dynamics. Were these to be reassessed
against the LTTE�s political ambitions, its policies are
demonstrably far more coherent in terms of building and improving
Tamil-Muslim relations. The strategic value to the opponents of the
LTTE of disrupting its efforts is also clearly apparent. The primary
threat from state-sponsored paramilitaries is not their ability to
threaten the LTTE militarily, but rather their capability to
destabilize communal relations in the areas in which they are
operating and thus derail this central pin in LTTE�s political
ambition
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