Introduction
If you want to be politically marginalised in a
western society, then suggest establishing a new state with a new political
system. And preferably, suggest it should be on an artificial island, and write
the constitution yourself. On the other hand, if you suggest establishing a new nation state, for an
existing but oppressed ethnic group, you will not be treated as a crank. You
might be called a traitor, or even executed for treason. But if you survive that
phase, you might end your life as president of the new state - with airports,
streets, and mountains named after you. And they might even let you write the
Constitution.
This is the paradox of secession which deserves attention from
political theory. Looking at history, national secessionist movements are
relatively successful. Not all of them achieved their aim, but considering the
magnitude of their demands, the vehemence of opposition, and the bloodshed they
usually engender, they seem a successful type of political movement. Yet in the
same historical perspective, non-national (non-ethnic) secessionist movements
are a total flop.
It seems no great mystery. If anyone can secede at any time, that means the
end of the state, the government, on the usual definitions. And not just of
tyrannies and gulags, but also of 'nice' democratic governments. The explanation
might be simply the fear of bloodshed and chaos - anarchy in the most negative
sense. In relation to both nationalism and democracy, I quoted a famous
rejection of secession by Abraham Lincoln at the start of the American Civil
War:
It presents the question,
whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administration
... can always... break up their Government, and thus practically put an end
to free government upon the earth. [see
Genocide,
world order and state formation]
However, this still does not explain why national secession has been
relatively successful, and why it is accepted. After all, Lincoln was himself
President of a secessionist state: the USA came into existence in a War of
Independence. It is possible to take an ethical position that "all secession is
wrong", but evidently very few people do. Distinctions are made, and conditions
are set, but some secessions are accepted.
So the 'ethics of secession' here means both the claims made about secession,
and the question of whether these claims are right (or even consistent).
Democracy relies on a prohibition of
secession
Democracy relies on a prohibition of
secession. A democratic regime assumes a 'demos' - a unit of political
decision-making which is constant between decisions. If every dissident minority
secedes after every opposed decision, then there is no democratic regime. (There
would be no political regime at all - at least not for standard political
theory).
But what conclusion have democrats drawn from this? They have concluded, like
Lincoln, that secession must be suppressed. Democratic political theory is not
particularly overt about this: repression undermines the peace-loving image of
democracy. And since modern democracies are nation states, secession is now
treated as an issue of national unity, and national identity. Lincoln was one of
the last politicians who had to address secession as a classic political issue.
Today he would talk about culture and identity - like the revived southern
secessionist movement in the United States.
Democrats no longer advocate force
to preserve the demos, because nationalists do it for them. The nationalists
advocate force to preserve the territorial integrity of the nation, which
coincidentally is also the demos, the political unit.
In this way, the nationalists get the bad publicity, not the democrats. But
the logic of a democratic political regime is clear: it must suppress unlimited
secession. Logically, those who advocate democracy are also advocating, that at
some point secession be suppressed. And almost inevitably, that implies the use
of force - military force.
You can not be a democrat unless you are prepared
to kill. An entirely pacifist democracy might work for small homogenous
groups, but not for large states with hundreds of millions of inhabitants. A
large democratic state, with no armed forces, would be overwhelmed by secession.
India is a prime example: its army is permanently engaged in anti-secessionist
wars.
One democratic theorist who represents this darker side of democracy is Lea
Brilmayer. Her essay on secession and self-determination is a charter for
anti-secessionist force (and therefore inevitably for anti-secessionist
atrocities).
Despite the rhetoric of
liberal democracy, actual consent is not necessary to political
legitimacy...Separatists cannot base their arguments on a right to opt out
because no such right exists in democratic theory. Government by the
consent of the governed does not necessarily encompass a right to opt out. It
only requires that within the existing political unit a right to participate
through electoral processes be available. Moreover participatory rights do not
entail a right to secede. [Lea Brilmayer (1991) Secession and
self-determination: a territorial interpretation. Yale Journal of
International Law 16, 177-202, p.184-185.]
Lea Brilmayer's concluding argument is that any secessionist claim is simply
a claim for land, and that there is no reason why any such claim should be
granted. That is somewhat different from the claims quoted above, but her ethic
of democracy is clear: "we let you participate in the demos, therefore we are
entitled to keep you in it".
Is there a right to prevent
secession?
The implicit claim is that
democracies have a right to prevent secession, at least under some
circumstances. But it is equally possible to reverse the approach, and ask if
there is ever a right to prevent secession - regardless of the political
regime. More specifically, if there is a right to prevent the formation of a new
state, by secession.
Political philosophy generally ignores this issue, which
can also be formulated as a question about how many states there should be. At
present there are 180 to 200 'states', depending on exact definitions. And for
liberal-democratic political philosophy, that seems to be enough. Lea Brilmayer
puts it like this:
When a group seeks to secede,
it is claiming a right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily
inquire into why it is entitled to that particular piece of land, as opposed
to some other piece of land - or no land at all. (Lea Brilmayer (1991)
Secession and self-determination: a territorial interpretation. Yale
Journal of International Law 16, 177-202, p.201.)
This is not an accurate picture of the present geopolitical reality. A
non-ethnic secessionist group might not claim any particular piece of land, but
just some land, somewhere. The reason for such claims is extremely simple: there
are no more undiscovered, uninhabited islands, at least not of any habitable
size. Since about 1950, all land area is claimed by some nation state (or
several nation states). This is why artificial islands have such a
disproportionate prominence in neo-secessionist proposals. However no
large-scale proposals of this type were ever implemented. Secession is the
only real method of new state formation, and a prohibition of secession is
equivalent to a veto on new states. There is no moral justification for such
a veto. As a general principle every state-forming secession is
legitimate, unless there are specific reasons to reject it. These could be
ethical objections to the state itself, or to the means of state formation,
especially population transfers.
Note on Libertarian secession proposals
Recent proposals for
non-ethnic secession usually come from libertarians. Libertarianism itself is a
primarily Anglo-American political ideology: it derives from the English
tradition of anti-state 'protective liberalism'. Although the idea seems to be
going out of fashion, US libertarians especially have proposed new states on
artificial islands. Sometimes these are misleadingly called 'new nations',
although there is no pre-existing national community.
These should not be confused with projects for new structures in sea, as a
form of property development. These projects are essentially a form of land
reclamation. (In the Netherlands there are several plans for new islands and
peninsulas along the coast, replacing the traditional form of reclamation by
enclosure dike). Such projects do not have the intention of creating a new
state: they fall under the sovereign territory of an existing state. They may be
explicitly designed to fall within a particular sovereignty, as in Monaco and
Macau. Both of these semi-sovereign territories have run out of land for
development: that is the only reason for expensive construction in sea.
These property developments are real construction projects, with real
investors, and using available technology. In contrast, the libertarian projects
are political proposals. In the case of ocean islands - necessary to evade the
200-mile economic zones of existing states - the construction technology is not
yet developed. Although the projects are justified with general libertarian
arguments of individual sovereignty and limited government, one factor stands
out. Libertarian 'new state' proposals are primarily intended for tax
avoidance.
There is a thin line between tax avoidance and tax evasion: the proposals
evoke the semi-criminal image of existing tax havens. Some artificial-island
proposals may be no more than investor scams: the financial logic is absent. Why
build a floating Liechtenstein, when there is a non-floating version available
already? And if international fiscal pressure is eroding the traditional
sovereign tax havens, why would it stop at an artificial island?
The libertarian proposals have been unable to present any other economic
logic for new island states. For most industrial or service activities, they
would far more expensive than a land location. Leaving aside the tax-avoidance
aspect, the free market will not lead to the construction of such projects. (And
of course libertarians would be horrified by the suggestion, that the government
should raise extra taxes to pay for their construction). So although some legal
issues concerning sovereignty of new island states have been discussed, they
will not be tested in the near future.
In terms of self determination
and state formation, results can be drawn from two general lines of thought.
First of all, in extent to general rights and principles, especially expressed
in U.N. Resolution 1514, Paragraph 2 and Resolution 2625, the rights of
communities of people to self determination are quite clear, and as such the
formation of a self governing colony of 'peoples' would be quite
legal....Conversely, one could argue that there are no objective
qualifications of the group of colonists. There would be no shared history,
traditions, religions, ethnicities, or cultures on which to base this new
'nation'....
The second line of reason, follows from the Montevideo qualifications,
objective but yet abstract general principles of state formation. As argued
the proposed model would theoretically fulfil of these conditions; territory,
population and sovereign control. Yet, arguably the most contentious
condition, recognition by other states, is difficult to predict and would be
subject to various political manoeuvring of other states. (Rene Kardol
(1999) Proposed Inhabited Artificial
Islands in International Waters: International Law Analysis in Regards to
Resource Use, Law of the Sea and Norms of Self-Determination and State
Recognition - MA Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam)
The proposal in this case is fictitious - an artificial island of 100,000
inhabitants. No real project of this magnitude will be built in the near future.
The standard method of new state formation will continue to be the secession of
existing territory.
Is oppression necessary before
secession?
Some theorists
explicitly say that no secession is legitimate, except in response to oppression
or injustice. Here is a very general formulation of this principle, from an
author who goes further than others in accepting secession:
The members of a political
minority have the non-positive right to self-government if and only if they
have good reasons not to agree with the existing laws and the majority refuses
to change them. Good reasons to reject existing laws are....the facts that
they unnecessarily and unequally restrict the freedom of members of the
minority. (Gerhard Seel (1999) How to
justify the rights of political minorities)
Once again, the underlying logic is that new states are somehow a bad thing -
something which can only be justified to avoid another great evil. Most
liberal-democratic theorists go further than Seel, requiring an actual policy of
oppression by the majority community. They give the impression that you are only
justified in thinking about secession, when the Gestapo is already knocking at
the door. If only impending atrocities could justify secession, then it would
indeed be something horrifying. But what exactly is so horrifying about it? An
interesting question for political science: where and when did this attitude
arise? I will return to this question later.
Underlying pattern is of
anti-secessionist co-operation between states...
If the dominant political philosophy
(western liberal-democracy) is anti-secessionist, then you would expect to see
that reflected in geopolitics. It is: the underlying pattern is of
anti-secessionist co-operation between states, and some anti-secessionist
interventionism. Here too, nationalism is a parallel explanation for this
pattern. Historically, nation states act together with other nation states, to
promote the nation state as form of state. The United Nations, as the name
implies, is a reasonably successful product of this co-operation: there is no
United Empires.
It is true that nation states sometimes support secessionist movements in
other states. That attracts all the attention, but the reality is that new state
formation is rare. The net long-term average, since the European nationalist
uprisings of 1848, is about one new nation state per year. It could have been
far more. It also seems, at first sight, that anti-secession interventions are
rare, for example the UN attempt to preserve a unitary Somali state. But Africa
is the wrong place to look for the examples.
A better example is the NATO, which has an implicit function as a de facto
anti-secession league. That may seem a strange interpretation, after the
western role in the break-up of Yugoslavia. It is true that the NATO in Kosovo
has clearly captured that territory from Serbia, and created a protectorate. But
the point is, that the NATO does not treat its own members like that. The
structure of the NATO assumes the permanent existence and permanent legitimacy
of its member states, and it has the treaty authorisation to preserve them. That
would apply especially to attempted non-ethnic secession from these member
states, which would qualify as 'aggression'.
The European Union also has a stabilising role on the system of states in
Europe. It does not have a specific secession prohibition, although it does
requires candidate members to resolve their border disputes. But the
geopolitical reality is that the EU has also 'frozen' the number of nation
states in western Europe, and it is doing so among its candidate members in
eastern Europe. Any new non-ethnic state in Europe is out of the question, in
this geopolitical order. Other macro-regional organisations of states, such as
the OAU (Africa) or ASEAN (South-East Asia) can not match the success of the EU
in this respect. However none of them accept non-ethnic secession.
Democratic theory seems to treat it as a general principle that
the 'demos' should be maintained, in its present form - if necessary by
force, and that includes immigration controls..
Democracy also relies on a
prohibition of what could be called 'incession'. That is, the forced inclusion
in a demos of a previously external population. The word 'accession' is
generally used when the transfer is agreed by both sides, as in the accession of
the western states to the United States of America.
Potential 'incession' was not important in western political theory - the
last unwanted mass migration in western Europe was the Viking raids. However,
immigration has made it an issue for political ethics. In the older standard
view, repressive regimes had walls to keep their citizens in, and democracies
had open borders. Now however, democracies have walls to keep new citizens out.
Modern democratic theory was formulated in the 18th and 19th century. It was
not then a serious proposition that millions of people from Africa could
emigrate to Europe, against the opposition of European governments. Despite the
experience in the United States, democratic theory in general assumed low
immigration rates, and a culturally stable 'demos'. In Europe, by the 1960's,
the scale of post-war immigration was becoming clear. Potentially, the new
population could politically dominate the old, simply by force of numbers. The
fear of being "swamped" (as Margaret Thatcher put) facilitated the growth of
anti-immigration parties. The 'defence of democracy' is one argument they have
deployed.
Democratic theorists don't like to be associated with people like Jean-Marie
Le Pen or Jörg Haider, but they are generally as hostile to 'incession' as
secession. Democratic theory seems to treat it as a general principle that
the 'demos' should be maintained, in its present form. If necessary by
force, and that includes immigration controls. In the light of recent estimates
that Europe may need to admit hundreds of millions of immigrants, the tone is
getting harsher. In the future, anti-incession arguments will probably be more
prominent in democratic theory.
Both democracy theory and nationalism
tolerate some secession...
Nationalism also relies on a
prohibition of secession, despite the fact that secessionist groups are often
nationalist. It is a mistake to equate 'nationalist' with 'secessionist'.
Emphasis on national unity and the indivisibility of the nation is central to
nationalist ideology and rhetoric. (Nationalist anti-immigration propaganda is
also directed primarily at the 'non-belonging' of the immigrant, at the cultural
differences).
Both democracy theory and nationalism
allow the possibility of secession of a recognised unit. For democracy, a
'demos', for nationalists a 'people'. Both ideologies are related, and are
borrowing from each other - although democrats may not want to admit that.
Democrats speak of a 'legitimate demos' - entitled to secede, even from a
democracy. But their definition overlaps with the nationalists' definition of a
nation. It relies heavily on unity of culture, language and descent, and
historical links to a particular territory. In practice, the consensus is
greatest with respect to overseas colonies, where a clear national majority is
oppressed by foreign imperial powers. (Ironically, of all the African colonies,
Somalia most fitted this description).
It is easy to understand why nationalists give nations priority in state
formation. However, there is no reason why these units must form the demos of
any new democracy. There is no logical ground for their special privilege when
it comes to secession. Democratic theory can not ethically justify its alliance
with nationalsim on this issue.
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz did attempt to do that, by listing six
characteristics of groups which made them candidates for self-determination (or
not). However, the list restates characteristics of nations, without explaining
why these characteristics justify privilege.
What is it that makes peoples
particularly suited to self-determination?.... we may gain insight by comparing
them with groups, e.g. the fiction-reading public or Tottenham Football Club
supporters, which obviously do not enjoy such a right. Reflection on such
examples suggests six characteristics that in combination are relevant to a
case for self-determination.
1. The group has a common character and a common culture....
2.
...people growing up among members of the group will acquire the group
culture, will be marked by its character.
3. Membership of the group is, in
part, a matter of mutual recognition.
4. ...groups membership of which is
one of the primary clues for people generally in interpreting the conduct of
others.
5. Membership is a matter of belonging, not of achievement.
6.
The groups concerned are not small face-to-face groups, members of which are
generally known to all other members. They are anonymous groups where where
mutual recognition is secured by the possession of general characteristics....
(Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz (1990) National self-determination.
Journal of Philosophy LXXXVII, 9, 439-46,
p.443-447.)
The question is then: who fits these criteria? And this is the most
politicised issue, since it affects the claims of existing secessionist
movements. In the overall ethical context of secession, it is a question of
detail, but it accounts for the bulk of discussion on secessionism.
This
category, for instance, includes all the detailed assessments of the proposed
secession of Quebec from Canada. Nationalists approach secession with a similar
bias: they will discuss which group is a nation, and what is its territory. If
nationalists are agreed that a minority is a separate nation with its own
distinct territory, they will concede secession: in practice this is very rare.
Defining certain groups as 'non-demos'
gives a democratic
government a licence for repression of that group...
There is apparent agreement among
democratic philosophers that some collectivities can not be a 'demos'. This is
the reverse of the consensus on what a legitimate demos might be, for secession
purposes. I think all theorists of democracy would agree, that supporters of a
football club have no right to secede. But again there is no inherent reason for
this. The example was used by Margalit and Raz to trivialise the issue, but the
consequences are not so funny. Margalit and Raz are in effect saying that if
such a group tried to secede from a democracy, it may legitimately be opposed by
military force. Defining certain groups as 'non-demos' gives a democratic
government a licence for repression of that group. At worst, it gives a
democratic government a licence to kill them, under conditions of attempted
secession.
This is a serious problem, because most liberal-democratic theorists are
agreed that a simple political minority is not a demos. But it is also a
well-known problem. After all, the point of democratic political philosophy is
to establish that democratic government is legitimate. Legitimacy, in this
context, means that people are obliged to obey the government - even if they
disagree with it. The claim, that the government is entitled to maintain the
demos by preventing secession, is a special case of the claim that the
government is entitled to govern at all.
Why are pro-democracy political philosophers so hostile to secession?
And so to the core issue...
Why are pro-democracy political philosophers so hostile to secession? Is it
because of what secession is, or because of what secession does? Apparently the
second of these: it is not the secession itself they fear, but its effect.
Secession allows the democratic process to be circumvented or evaded, without
a direct attack on that government. In a secession, the existing government is
not overthrown, the nation is not colonised, the people are not murdered or
enslaved. Something is added, a new state. Only territory is taken away - if you
disregard nationalist claims that national unity is itself sacred.
The unwillingness to concede secession, says something about the nature of
democracy itself. If democracy was about maximising autonomy, for individuals or
groups, democratic theory would not be so hostile to secession. If democracy was
about maximising possibility and change, democratic theory would not be so
hostile either. The conclusion is unavoidable, that democracy is primarily an
innovation-minimising social structure rather than a regime of government.
Democracy is a noble form of government in the eyes its supporters. But if it
was simply a form of government, then they ought to be happy to see 10,000
democracies on this planet. However, they clearly are not. Read their literature
on secession, and you will see how unhappy they are with a multiplication of
states.
Here too is a parallel with nationalism. There are ethno-nationalists who
want to see 10,000 autonomous territories on this planet, because that is the
approximate number of 'peoples' on their definition. But the majority of
nationalists have a conception of 'the nation' which suggests a population of
several million. They would call a group of 500 people a 'tribe', even if they
had their own separate language (such small distinct ethnic groups are not
unusual). Mainstream nationalists would not concede them any territorial
autonomy, comparable to the that of nation states. And no nationalist would
concede any purely political secession.
Together, nationalism and democracy have produced a specific world order. It
is still emergent, because not all territories are nation states, and not all
states are democratic. But the character of this world order is clear. It has a
relatively limited number of states, there is no possibility to form new states,
and the internal political process in each state has a universal legitimacy
claim. To put it crudely: societies come in 200 flavours, and 200 flavours only.
Same 200 last year, same 200 this year, and same 200 next year. This is not a
favourable climate for innovation in the long term. Whoever designed this
geopolitical order did not like innovation.
Innovation is not wrong. New states are not wrong.
The 'designers' of the geopolitical order,
insofar as they exist, are the political theorists and philosophers of the
dominant political culture. The world as it is today, reflects the dominance of
western liberal-democratic ideas. A Marxist would see things the other way round
- that the underlying structures generate the philosophies. But either way, it
is possible to reject the 'design'.
If something is impossible inside a democratic society, but possible
elsewhere, then that something is not inherently wrong. A blanket prohibition,
on all social forms which are incompatible with democratic nation states, is not
morally legitimate.
The emerging geopolitical and political order does indeed generate "existence
prohibitions" of this kind. Certain innovations will conflict this order for the
reasons given above:
- a limited number of states,
- a universalising political process within each and every state (meaning in
practice, a single national-level government and legal system),
- culturally and ethically sanctioned repression, of attempts to alter these
principles of the order itself.
The ethics of secession should be
treated as part of the general assessment of these principles. In particular,
there is a need to introduce 'innovation' as an issue to be considered in
political ethics - and not just as a personal preference of some individuals.
Ethical systems often assume a static society: ethical principles are
supposed to be valid for thousands of years. In the ethics of secession, I fear
the reverse is also true: if you apply the standard principles, then the world
will stay the same for thousands of years. That is plainly wrong.
