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Home Self Determination: International Law & Practice > The Case of  Kosova:  NATO's  Colony- An Exchange of Serb Rule for European Union/NATO 'Supervision' and an European Union 'Governor'.

The Case of East Timor
Self Determination in Law and in Practise

Independence in the Brave New World Order: NATO's Kosovo Colony
 - An Exchange of Serb Rule for European Union/NATO 'Supervision'
and an European Union 'Governor'.

Comment by tamilnation.org Those Tamil groups who rushed to congratulate the current Kosovo leadership on its 'supervised independence' may want to read carefully the Deconstruction of the Kosovo  Declaration of Independence by L�vizja VET�VENDOSJE! (Kosovo Movement for Self-Determination!) as well  as the Manifesto of the Kosovo Movement for Self Determination and also Independence in the Brave New World Order: NATO's Kosovo Colony by Diana Johnstone, If we do not wish to become hostages to fortune, it is important that the Tamil people should take a principle centered approach and not an opportunistic approach to happenings in an asymmetric multi lateral world.

Kosovo

  Independence in the Brave New World Order: NATO's Kosovo Colony
Diana Johnstone, 12 February 2008

Full text of Kosovo's Declaration of 'Independence', 17 February 2008

"This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement...We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission... We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to retain the leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo... We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure Kosovo's future peace, prosperity and stability..."

Deconstruction of the Kosovo Declaration of Independence by L�vizja VET�VENDOSJE! (Kosovo Movement for Self-Determination!),  23 February 2008

"Kosova does not lack status, but our people lack freedom. This declaration will not give us freedom. In fact, it does not even represent a change in status, as we will continue to be ruled over by an anti-democratic and unaccountable international mission... The international presences here based on Resolution 1244 are not democratic nor are they promoting democracy. Instead, they are authoritarian and executive. Asking NATO to stay until Kosova is �capable� of assuming military �responsibilities� is self-devaluating. By talking about �peace, prosperity and stability� the international community�s focus on stability and peace, not freedom and progress, is revealed.... It is incorrect to say that �the world� intervened. e.g. Russia was against intervention and did not participate. To say that the intervention �removed Belgrade�s governance� and placed Kosova under UN administration makes it sound like the whole thing was no more than an administrative shift... Ahtisaari does not provide a framework for �development�, but will in fact block development, and even deprive us of the possibilities for development by perpetuating the paradigm of stability the international community in Kosova is operating within... if the Ahtisaari plan represents the �highest European standards� for good governance, how come no other European country has implemented it?  "

The Manifesto of the L�vizja VET�VENDOSJE! - Kosovo Movement for Self-Determination

"Freedom is not given. It is an unmediated right and a bare necessity. Freedom is not negotiable; it is the unhindered development of one�s possibilities. Self-determination, because it is something natural; it makes sense that we can make decisions about our own future much more effectively than anyone and everyone else who wants to decide on our behalf. Self-determination! Unconditionally! Until the final separation. Until the complete liberation of our country."

Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari  on Kosovo�s future status, 26 March 2007

"The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable...An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo."

Ahtisaari Plan

"The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement."

EU Launches Police, Justice Mission for Kosovo

One day before Kosovo said it will declare independence from Serbia, the European Union on Saturday, Feb. 16, approved sending a 2,000-strong police and justice mission to the province...Once Kosovar leaders declare independence, the EU will take over responsibility for supervising police, judicial and civil administration from the current UN mission after a 120-day transition period.Kosovo Serb leader Milan Ivanovic on Saturday called the EU's police and justice mission a form of "occupation."

[see also Kosovo Countdown: Lessons for Sri Lanka - Dayan Jayatilleka  together with * Comment by tamilnation.org  

"Kosovo's 'supervised independence' (with an European Union/NATO military force in occupation) has lessons not only for Sri Lanka but for the people of Tamil Eelam as well... The people of Tamil Eelam will learn from Kosovo's 'supervised independence' (with an European Union/NATO military force in occupation) that the machinations within the asymmetric multilateral world continue - and have not diminished. They will learn that Velupillai Pirabakaran was right when he declared in 1993 - 'The world is not rotating on the axis of justice. It is economic and trade interests that determine the order of the present world, not the moral law of justice nor the rights of people. International relations and diplomacy between countries are determined by such interests.' They will learn that the denial by international actors of their conflicting strategic interests in Sri Lanka and in the Indian ocean region has drawn a veil over the real issues that any meaningful conflict resolution process in the island will need to address. " more]


Full text of Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, signed in parliament by Speaker Jakup Krasniqi, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and President Fatmir Sejdiu:

Convened in an extraordinary meeting on February 17, 2008, in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo,

Answering the call of the people to build a society that honours human dignity and affirms the pride and purpose of its citizens,

Kosovo's parliament unanimously approved the historic declaration

Committed to confront the painful legacy of the recent past in a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness,

Dedicated to protecting, promoting and honouring the diversity of our people,

Reaffirming our wish to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies,

Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation,

Recalling the years of strife and violence in Kosovo, that disturbed the conscience of all civilized people,

Grateful that in 1999 the world intervened, thereby removing Belgrade's governance over Kosovo and placing Kosovo under United Nations interim administration,

Proud that Kosovo has since developed functional, multiethnic institutions of democracy that express freely the will of our citizens,

Recalling the years of internationally sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the question of our future political status,

Regretting that no mutually acceptable status outcome was possible, in spite of the good-faith engagement of our leaders,

Confirming that the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari provide Kosovo with a comprehensive framework for its future development and are in line with the highest European standards of human rights and good governance,

Determined to see our status resolved in order to give our people clarity about their future, move beyond the conflicts of the past and realize the full democratic potential of our society,

Honouring all the men and women who made great sacrifices to build a better future for Kosovo,

We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multiethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes.

We accept fully the obligations for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari Plan, and welcome the framework it proposes to guide Kosovo in the years ahead. We shall implement in full those obligations including through priority adoption of the legislation included in its Annex XII, particularly those that protect and promote the rights of communities and their members.

We shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution shall incorporate all relevant principles of the Ahtisaari Plan and be adopted through a democratic and deliberative process.

We welcome the international community's continued support of our democratic development through international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission.

We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to retain the leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo and to implement responsibilities assigned to it under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Ahtisaari Plan, until such time as Kosovo institutions are capable of assuming these responsibilities.

We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure Kosovo's future peace, prosperity and stability.

6. For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

7. We express our deep gratitude to the United Nations for the work it has done to help us recover and rebuild from war and build institutions of democracy. We are committed to working constructively with the United Nations as it continues its work in the period ahead.

8. With independence comes the duty of responsible membership in the international community. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, other acts of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the international legal obligations and principles of international comity that mark the relations among states. Kosovo shall have its international borders as set forth in Annex VIII of the Ahtisaari Plan, and shall fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all our neighbours. Kosovo shall also refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

9. We hereby undertake the international obligations of Kosovo, including those concluded on our behalf by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and treaty and other obligations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to which we are bound as a former constituent part, including the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. We shall cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. We intend to seek membership in international organizations, in which Kosovo shall seek to contribute to the pursuit of international peace and stability.

10. Kosovo declares its commitment to peace and stability in our region of southeast Europe. Our independence brings to an end the process of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution. While this process has been a painful one, we shall work tirelessly to contribute to a reconciliation that would allow southeast Europe to move beyond the conflicts of our past and forge new links of regional cooperation. We shall therefore work together with our neighbours to advance a common European future.

11. We express, in particular, our desire to establish good relations with all our neighbours, including the Republic of Serbia with whom we have deep historical, commercial and social ties that we seek to develop further in the near future. We shall continue our efforts to contribute to relations of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of Serbia, while promoting reconciliation among our people.

12. We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically, and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including, especially, the obligations for it under the Ahtisaari Plan. In all of these matters, we shall act consistent with principles of international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, including resolution 1244 (1999). We declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely upon this declaration, and appeal to them to extend to us their support and friendship.


Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari  on Kosovo�s future status, 26 March 2007 [S/2007/168 2 07-27223] also in PDF

United Nations S/2007/168 Security Council
Distr.: General 26 March 2007

Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51), by which the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General provide regular updates on progress in determining Kosovo�s future status, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey herewith the report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo�s future status and, in an addendum, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/Add.1) prepared by my Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari.

Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to determine Kosovo�s future status, I fully support both the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo�s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) Ban Ki-moon

Recommendation: Kosovo�s status should be independence, supervised by the international community

1. In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo�s future status.

2. Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo�s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and economic matters, conceptual differences � almost always related to the question of status � persist, and only modest progress could be achieved.

3. My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the negotiations� potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo�s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.

4. Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo�s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo�s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo�s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.

5. The time has come to resolve Kosovo�s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo�s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence.  

Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option

6. A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic�s policies of oppression � the revocation of Kosovo�s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life � Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade�s reinforced and brutal repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.

7. For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia � however notional such autonomy may be � is simply not tenable.

Continued international administration is not sustainable

8. While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo�s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration.

9. Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo�s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. Unlike many of its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any meaningful process towards the European Union � an otherwise powerful motor for reform and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital standards implementation process. Kosovo�s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide.

Independence with international supervision is the only viable option

10. Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia.

11. While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo�s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo�s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo�s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life.

12. Kosovo�s minority communities � in particular the Kosovo Serbs � continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo�s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo�s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo�s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests.

13. I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo�s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong � but focused � in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo�s current weaknesses, the international community�s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.

14. Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo�s authorities are ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.

Conclusion

15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevic�s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo�s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo�s circumstances extraordinary.

16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations administration, Kosovo�s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into account Kosovo�s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history � one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.


Annex - the Ahtisaari Plan

Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement

I. General

1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multiethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.

II. Provisions of the Settlement

2. Kosovo�s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo�s future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.

3. Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages � such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma � shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.

4. Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.

5. Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.

6. Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.

7. Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.

8. Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo�s share of Serbia�s external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.

9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.

10. Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.

11. International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.

12. European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo�s rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.

13. International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo�s institutions until such time as Kosovo�s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.

14. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.

III. Implementation

15. Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.

16. During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.

17. At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.

18. Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.


Independence in the Brave New World Order: NATO's Kosovo Colony
Diana Johnstone, 12 February 2008

Across this last weekend, the Western propaganda machine was working overtime, celebrating the latest NATO miracle: the transformation of Serbian Kosovo into Albanian Kosova. A shameless land grab by the United States, which used the Kosovo problem to install an enormous military base (Camp Bondsteel) on other people's strategically located land, is transformed by the power of the media into an edifying legend of "national liberation".

For the unhappy few who know the complicated truth about Kosovo, the words of Aldous Huxley seem most appropriate: "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall drive you mad."

Concerning Kosovo, truth is like letters written in the sand as the tsunami of propaganda comes thundering in. The truth is available--for instance in George Szamuely's thoroughly informative piece last Friday here on CounterPunch. Fragments of the truth sometimes even show up in the mainstream media, mostly in letters from readers. But hopeless as it is to try to turn back the tide of officially endorsed legend, let me examine just one drop in this unstoppable sea of propaganda: a column by Roger Cohen entitled "Europe's new state", published in the Valentine's Day edition of the International Herald Tribune.

Cohen's op ed piece is fairly typical in the dismissive way it deals with Milosevic, Russia and the Serbs. Cohen writes: "Slobodan Milosevic, the late dictator, set Serbia's murderous nationalist tide in motion on April 24, 1987, when he went to Kosovo to declare that Serbian 'ancestors would be defiled' if ethnic Albanians had their way."

I don't know where Roger Cohen got that quotation, but it is not to be found in the speech Milosevic made that day in Kosovo. And certainly, Milosevic did not go to Kosovo to declare any such thing, but to consult with local Communist League officials in the town of Kosovo Polje about the province's serious economic and social problems. Aside from the province's chronic poverty, unemployment, and mismanagement of development funds contributed from the rest of Yugoslavia, the main social problem was the constant exodus of Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants under pressure from ethnic Albanians. At the time, this problem was reported in leading Western media.

For instance, as early as July 12, 1982, Marvine Howe reported to the New York Times that Serbs were leaving Kosovo by the tens of thousands because of discrimination and intimidation on the part of the ethnic Albanian majority:

"The [Albanian] nationalists have a two-point platform," according to Beci Hoti, an executive secretary of the Communist Party of Kosovo, "first to establish what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to form a greater Albania.

Mr Hoti, an Albanian, expressed concern voer political pressures that were forcing Serbs to leave Kosovo. "What is important now," he said, "is to establish a climate of security and create confidence."

And seven months after Milosevic's visit to Kosovo, David Binder reported in the New York Times (November 1, 1987):

Ethnic Albanians in the Government [of Kosovo] have manipulated public funds and regulations to take over land belonging to Serbs. Slavic Orthodox churches have been attacked, and flags have been torn down. Wells have been poisoned and crops burned. Slavic boys have been knifed, and some young ethnic Albanians have been told by their elders to rape Serbian girls.

The goal of the radical nationals among them, one said in an interview, is an "ethnic Albania that includes western Macedonia, southern Montenegro, part of southern Serbia, Kosovo and Albania itself."

As Slavs flee the protracted violence, Kosovo is becoming what ethnic Albanian nationalists have been demanding for years, and especially strongly since the bloody rioting by ethnic Albanians in Pristina in 1981--an "ethnically pure" Albanian region

This was in fact the first instance of "ethnic cleansing" in post-World War II Yugoslavia, as reported in The New York Times and other Western media, and the victims were the Serbs. The cult of "memory" has become a contemporary religion, but some memories are more equal than others. In the 1990s, the New York Times evidently forgot completely what it had said about Kosovo in the 1980s. Why? Perhaps because meanwhile, the Soviet bloc had collapsed and the unity of independent, non-aligned Yugoslavia was no longer in the strategic interest of the United States.

Back to Milosevic in Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987. An incident occurred when local police (under an Albanian-dominated Communist League government) attacked Serbs who had gathered to protest lack of legal protection. Milosevic famously told them, spontaneously: "No one should beat you any more!" If this is "extreme nationalism", perhaps there should be more of it.

But nowhere do I find a trace of the statement attributed to Milosevic by Cohen. In his speech to local party delegates that followed, which is on the public record, Milosevic referred to the "regrettable incident" and promised an investigation. He went on to stress that "we should not allow the misfortunes of people to be exploited by nationalists, whom every honest person must combat. We must not divide people between Serbs and Albanians, but rather we should separate, on the one hand, decent people who struggle for brotherhood, unity and ethnic equality, and, on the other hand, counter-revolutionaries and nationalists."

I turn again to Aldous Huxley for comfort: "Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored."

But Huxley also said: "Great is truth, but still greater, from a practical point of view, is silence about truth. By simply not mentioning certain subjects... totalitarian propagandists have influenced opinion much more effectively than they could have by the most eloquent denunciations."

Last Tuesday in Geneva, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to convey to journalists his grave concern about the way the United States was handling the Kosovo problem.

"We are speaking here about the subversion of all the foundations and principles of international law, which have been won and established as a basis of Europe's existence at huge effort, and at the cost of pain, sacrifice and bloodletting," he said.

"Nobody can offer a clear plan of action in the case of a chain reaction [of further declarations of unilateral independence]. It turns out that they [the United States and its NATO allies] are planning to act in a hit or miss fashion on an issue of paramount importance. This is simply inadmissible and irresponsible," the Russian diplomat said. "I sincerely fail to comprehend the principles guiding our American colleagues, and those Europeans who have taken up this position," he added.

Roger Cohen dismisses such considerations in five words: "the Russian bear will growl". Russia, he adds, "will scream. But it's backed the wrong horse." There are no issues here, no principles. Just growling and gambling. "Milosevic rolled the dice of genocidal nationalism and lost", says Cohen.

This is not only a false statement, it is a grotesquely meaningless metaphor. Milosevic tried to suppress an armed secessionist movement, secretly but effectively supported by neighboring Albania, the United States and Germany, which deliberately provoked repression by murdering both Serbs and Albanians loyal to the government. Like the Americans in similar circumstances, Milosevic relied too heavily on military superiority rather than on political skill. But even the NATO-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague had to abandon any charges of "genocide" against Milosevic in Kosovo. For the simple reason that there was never a shred of evidence for such a charge.

Milosevic is no longer alive, and Russia is far away. But what about the Serbs who still live in the historic part of Serbia called Kosovo? Cohen takes care of that problem in a few words: "Some of the 120,000 Serbs in Kosovo may hit the road."

As Aldous Huxley pointed out, "The propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human."

Then you can tell them to "hit the road".

The "Unique" Case

Russia has warned that Kosovo independence will set a dangerous precedent, encouraging other ethnic minorities to follow the example of the Albanians and demand secession and an independent State. The United States has dismissed such concerns by flatly asserting that Kosovo is "unique". Well yes, Kosovo is a unique case, and is the only one recognized by the United States until the next "unique case" comes along. When legal criteria have been thrown out, we just have one "unique case" after another.

The "uniqueness" claimed by the United States is a propaganda construction. It is based on the supposed "uniqueness" of Milosevic's repression of the armed secessionist movement, which was not unique at all. It was standard operating procedure throughout history and the world over, in such circumstances. Deplorable, no doubt, but not unique. It was minor indeed compared to the similar but endless and far bloodier anti-insurgency operations in Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya, not to mention Northern Ireland, Thailand, the Philippines And unlike the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which kill incomparably more civilians, it was carried out by the legal, democratically elected government of the country, rather than by a foreign power.

The propaganda "uniqueness" is an abstraction. Like every place on earth, Kosovo is indeed unique. But in ways that have nothing to do with the U.S. pretext for taking it over and turning it into a military outpost of empire.

To know how a place is unique, you have to be interested in it.

I have not visited Kosovo since before the 1999 NATO war. On one occasion, in August 1997, I drove around the province in a failing Skoda, at my own expense, just looking. Driving in Kosovo was a bit risky, partly because of the number of dead dogs in the road, and mostly because of local drivers' habit of passing slower vehicles on hills and curves. In northern Kosovo, just outside the town of Zubin Potok, this habit produced one of its inevitable consequences: a head-on collision with serious casualties, which shut down the two-lane highway for hours while ambulances and police sorted things out.

Unable to proceed toward Pristina, I drove back to Zubin Potok to pass the time on the shaded terrace of a roadside restaurant. I was the only customer, and the lone waiter, a tall, handsome young man named Milomir, gladly accepted my invitation to sit down at my table and chat as I sipped glass after glass of delicious strawberry juice.

Milomir was happy to talk to someone familiar with the French city of Metz, which he had visited as a student and remembered fondly. He loved to read and travel, but in 1991 he got married and now had two small daughters to support. Job prospects were poor, even though he had been to university, so he had no choice but to stay in Zubin Potok. As for Europe, even if he could get a visa (impossible for Serbs anyway), he spoke no language more Western than his mother tongue, Serbo-Croatian. He had studied Russian (he loved the literature) and Albanian as his foreign languages. He learned Albanian in order to be able to communicate with the majority in Kosovo.

But such communication was difficult. Milomir was very much in favor of a bilingual society, and thought everyone in Kosovo should learn both Serbian and Albanian, but unfortunately this was not the case. The younger generation of Albanians refused to speak Serbian and learned English instead.

The town of Zubin Potok was located near the dam on the Ibar River built in the late 1970s to create hydraulic power. Coming from Novi Pazar, I had driven along the 35-kilometer-long artificial lake created by the dam, looking in vain for a nice place to stop. It seemed that there must have been villages along the Ibar River before the dam was built, and I asked Milomir about this. Yes, he said, the artificial lake had flooded a score of old villages, of ethnically mixed, but mostly Serb population. The Albanian Communist authorities in Pristina had resettled the Serbs outside of Kosovo, around the town of Kraljevo. There were about 10,000 of them.

This was a minor example of the administrative measures taken to decrease the Serb population during the period, before Milosevic, when Albanians were running the province through the local Communist League.

Milomir was not complaining, but simply answering my questions. He did not go too often (by bus--he had no car) to the nearest large city, Mitrovica, because he was afraid of being beaten by Albanians. This was just a fact of life, at a time when (according to Western media) Albanians in Kosovo were being terrorized by Serbian repression.

While we were chatting, a friend of his came along and the conversation turned to politics. There was a presidential campaign underway. The two young men wanted to know which candidate I thought would be best for Serbia in the eyes of the world. Milomir was tending toward Vuk Draskovic, and his friend was for Vojislav Kostunica. Neither would dream of voting for either Milosevic or Seselj, the nationalist leader of the Radical Party.


Zubin Potok Today

I have no idea what has become of Milomir, his wife, his two daughters, or his friend. Zubin Potok is the western-most municipality in the heavily Serb-populated north of Kosovo. From the internet I learn that the population of Zubin Potok municipality (including surrounding villages) has nearly doubled since I passed through. It now comes to approximately 14,900, including about 3,000 internally displaced Serbs (from other areas of Kosovo where the Albanian majority has driven them out), 220 Serbian refugees from Croatia and 800 Albanians. The local assembly is overwhelmingly dominated by Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, but includes two Kosovo Albanian representatives.

Up until now, schools, hospitals, and other public services, as well as the local economy, have continued to function thanks mainly to subsidies from Belgrade. The Albanian declaration of Kosovo independence will create a crisis by demanding an end to such vital subsidies--which, however, an "independent Kosovo" is unable to replace. Moreover, bands of Albanian nationalists are declaring that Zubin Potok "is Albanian" and must be "liberated from the Serbs". They can be seen on You Tube, using the Statue of Liberty as their symbol, and threatening Serbs in Albanian rap.

The European Union is moving in to provide law and order. But the "order" they claim to be protecting is the one defined by the Albanian nationalists. What does that mean to people like Milomir and his little family?

For Roger Cohen, the answer is easy: "hit the road!"

Serbia, by the way, already has the largest number of refugees in Europe, victims of "ethnic cleansing" in Croatia and Kosovo. And Serbs cannot get visas or refugee status in Western Europe. They have been labeled the "bad guys". Only their enemies can be "victims".


Before and After

Kosovo before the NATO war and occupation was, nevertheless, a multiethnic society. The accusation of "apartheid" was simply Albanian propaganda, as the Albanian nationalist leaders chose to use that heavily-charged term to describe their own boycott of Serbs and Serb institutions. Every police action against an Albanian, for whatever reason, whether for suspicion of armed rebellion or for ordinary crime, was described as a "human rights violation" by the Albanian human rights network financed by the United States government.

It was an extraordinary situation that the Serbian and Yugoslav governments allowed an illegal separatist "government of Kosovo", headed by Ibrahim Rugova, to hold shop in the center of Pristina, regularly receiving foreign journalists and regaling them with tales of how oppressed they were by the horrid Serbs.

But the laws were the same for all citizens, there were Albanians in local government and in the police, and if there were cases of police brutality (in what country are there no cases of police brutality?), the Albanians at least had nothing to fear from their Serb neighbors.

Even then, it was the Serbs who were afraid of the Albanians. Only outside Kosovo could anyone seriously believe that it was the Albanians who were under threat of "ethnic cleansing" (much less "genocide"). Such a project was simply, obviously, out of the question. It was the Serbs who were afraid, who spoke of sending their children to safety if they had the means, or who spoke bravely of remaining "no matter what".

Later, in March 1999, when NATO began to bomb Kosovo, Albanians fled by the hundreds of thousands, and their temporary flight from the war theater was presented as the justification for the bombing that caused it. The press did not bother to report on the Serbs and others who also fled the bombing at that time.

In Kosovo, in 1987, in Pristina and Pec, I observed a peculiar sort of group behavior that reminds me only of school playgrounds in Maryland in my childhood. A gang of kids get together and by various signs, body language, and a minimum of words, convey to some outsiders that they are excluded and despised. I have seen Albanians act in this way toward stray Serbs, especially old women. This variety of "mobbing" was not violent in 1987, but turned so after NATO occupied the territory. It was encouraged by the official NATO stamp of approval of Albanian hatred for Serbs, delivered by bombs in the spring of 1999.

Of course, there must have been Serbs who hated Albanians. But in my limited, chance experience, what struck me was the absence of hatred for Albanians among Serbs I met. Fear, yes, but not hatred. A great deal of perplexity. Sister Fotina at the Gracanica monastery had a very Christian explanation. We tried to help the Albanians care for their many children, she said, and yet they turn against us. This must be God's way of punishing us for turning away from Christianity during the time of Communism, she concluded. She blamed her fellow Serbs more than the Albanians.

The divine punishment has not been confined to Christians, however. In the southernmost corner of Kosovo live an ancient population called Gorani (meaning mountain people), who converted to Islam under the Ottoman Empire, like most of the Albanians. But their language is Serbian, and this is unacceptable to the Albanians. Estimates vary, but it is agreed that at least two thirds of the Gorani have left since NATO "liberation". Pressure and intimidation have taken various forms. Albanians have moved into the temporarily vacant homes of Gorani who went to Austria and Germany to earn money for their retirement. The NATO-protected Albanian authorities have found ways to deprive Gorani children of schooling in the Serbian language. In the main Gorani town of Dragash, an Albanian mob attacked the health center and caused health workers to flee. Then, last January 5, a powerful explosion destroyed the bank in Dragash. It was the only Serbian bank still allowed to operate in the south of Kosovo, and served mainly to transfer the pensions that allowed local Gorani to survive.

As usual, the crime went unpunished.

David Binder, who used to report on Yugoslavia for the New York Times, before he was excluded for knowing too much, reported last November * on a long investigation of conditions in Kosovo commissioned by the German Bundeswehr. The existence of this report is proof that the Western governments, while publicly claiming that Kosovo is "ready for independence", know quite well that this is not true. Among other things, Binder reports:

The institute authors, Mathias Jopp and Sammi Sandawi, spent six months interviewing 70 experts and mining current literature on Kosovo in preparing the study. In their analysis the political unrest and guerrilla fighting of the 1990s led to basic changes which they call a "turnabout in Kosovo-Albanian social structures." The result is a "civil war society in which those inclined to violence, ill-educated and easily influenced people could make huge social leaps in a rapidly constructed soldateska."

"It is a Mafia society" based on "capture of the state" by criminal elements.

In the authors' definition, Kosovan organized crime "consists of multimillion-Euro organizations with guerrilla experience and espionage expertise." They quote a German intelligence service report of "closest ties between leading political decision makers and the dominant criminal class" and name Ramush Haradinaj, Hashim Thaci and Xhavit Haliti as compromised leaders who are "internally protected by parliamentary immunity and abroad by international law."

They scornfully quote the UNMIK chief from 2004-2006, Soeren Jessen Petersen, calling Haradinaj "a close and personal friend." The study sharply criticizes the United States for "abetting the escape of criminals" in Kosovo as well as "preventing European investigators from working."

It notes "secret CIA detention centers" at Camp Bondsteel and assails American military training for Kosovo (Albanian) police by Dyncorp, authorized by the Pentagon.

In an aside, it quotes one unidentified official as saying of the American who is deputy chief of UNMIK, "The main task of Steve Schook is to get drunk once a week with Ramush Haradinaj."

Who Goes and Who Stays

Schook has been fired by UNMIK, but UNMIK, the nominally United Nations mission, is being taken over arbitrarily by the European Union. The EU "mission" is a sort of colonial government which, alongside NATO, plans to govern the ungovernable Albanian territory. However, already movements of armed Albanian patriots are planning their next "war of liberation" against the Europeans.

So, after the Serbs, the Roma, the Gorani, will the Europeans have to "hit the road"? Only the Americans seem sure of staying. Ensconced in their gigantic "Camp Bondsteel", they control the strategic routes from Serbia to Greece, and incidentally offer the mass of unemployed Kosovo Albanians their best-paying employment opportunities, notably by taking menial and dangerous jobs serving U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The reality of this shameless land-grab is available to all. I have written about it, Binder has written about it, Szamuely has written about it, many Germans have written about it. The Russians, the Greeks, the Rumanians, the Slovaks and many others know about it. But in the Brave New World Order, it does not exist. People don't know.

I leave the last word to Aldous Huxley:

"Most ignorance is vincible ignorance. We don't know because we don't want to know."
 


Deconstruction of the Declaration of Independence by L�vizja VET�VENDOSJE! (Kosovo Movement for Self-Determination!),  23 February 2008

"Kosova does not lack status, but our people lack freedom. This declaration will not give us freedom. In fact, it does not even represent a change in status, as we will continue to be ruled over by an anti-democratic and unaccountable international mission... The international presences here based on Resolution 1244 are not democratic nor are they promoting democracy. Instead, they are authoritarian and executive. Asking NATO to stay until Kosova is �capable� of assuming military �responsibilities� is self-devaluating. By talking about �peace, prosperity and stability� the international community�s focus on stability and peace, not freedom and progress, is revealed.... It is incorrect to say that �the world� intervened. e.g. Russia was against intervention and did not participate. To say that the intervention �removed Belgrade�s governance� and placed Kosova under UN administration makes it sound like the whole thing was no more than an administrative shift... Ahtisaari does not provide a framework for �development�, but will in fact block development, and even deprive us of the possibilities for development by perpetuating the paradigm of stability the international community in Kosova is operating within... if the Ahtisaari plan represents the �highest European standards� for good governance, how come no other European country has implemented it?  "

Comment by tamilnation.org Those Tamil groups who rushed to congratulate the current Kosovo leadership on its 'supervised independence' may want to read carefully the Deconstruction of the Kosovo  Declaration of Independence by L�vizja VET�VENDOSJE! (Kosovo Movement for Self-Determination!) as well  as the Manifesto of the Kosovo Movement for Self Determination. If we do not wish to become hostages to fortune, it is important that the Tamil people should take a principle centered approach and not an opportunistic approach to happenings in an asymmetric multi lateral world.

Preamble

Convened in an extraordinary meeting on February 17, 2008, in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo,

Answering the call of the people to build a society that honours human dignity and affirms the pride and purpose of its citizens,

�Answering the call of the people�, i.e. not their will.

Committed to confront the painful legacy of the recent past in a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness,

.. �in a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness�. This signals that Kosova is ready to forget its history � the losses and suffering, the violence and genocide from the past. This declaration is not presented as the culmination of history, but as its start. The declaration annuls history by presenting itself as a new beginning. This is a �historical act� without history.

Dedicated to protecting, promoting and honoring the diversity of our people,

Reaffirming our wish to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies,

�Reaffirming our wish� � this very vague word does not signal any intent to undertake any action to realise this wish. Will become �fully integrated�, but not necessarily as a sovereign state or a member. Indicates that Kosova will integrate into Euroatlantic structures as a democracy, but not necessarily as a state.

Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation,

The issue of Kosova is �arising from Yugoslavia�s non-consensual breakup�. The breakup was not only �non-consensual�, but violent, because of Serbia: Serbia created Yugoslavia in order to expand, and destroyed it in order to expand. The issue of Kosova�s status did not �arise�, as a secondary effect, from the breakup, but is a part of that breakup. Kosova is in fact also where the breakup started, in 1987-89. Stressing that Kosova is not a precedent is intended to signal that oppressed people elsewhere in the world will stay oppressed also after this declaration. Including this is the result of a typically colonial mindset on behalf of the international bureaucrats that have dictated this declaration: by turning colonised people against each-other, by making them not support each-other, one can prevent them turning against the colonisers.

Recalling the years of strife and violence in Kosovo, that disturbed the conscience of all civilised people,

To say that the violence in Kosova �disturbed the conscience of all civilized people� makes it sound like the wars here merely caused some emotional distress to international observers watching the events on their TV. Instead of underlining how the war violated international law and fundamental human rights, how many people lost their lives, were injured, raped and had to flee, the declaration simply points to the spiritual pain it caused �civilised people�. This phrase is also intended to imply that Serbs should not be blamed for the violence here. Talking about the violence in Kosova in this neutral way absolves Serbia of any blame for it.

Grateful that in 1999 the world intervened, thereby removing Belgrade's governance over Kosovo and placing Kosovo under United Nations interim administration,

It is incorrect to say that �the world� intervened. e.g. Russia was against intervention and did not participate. To say that the intervention �removed Belgrade�s governance� and placed Kosova under UN administration makes it sound like the whole thing was no more than an administrative shift. Besides, it was not mainly Belgrade�s governance that was removed with the intervention, but the violence of Serbia�s criminal police and military forces. Since it is not saying that Belgrade no longer has �control over� or the �right to� Kosova, all this point is saying is simply that Belgrade is not governing Kosova�s daily affairs anymore.

Proud that Kosovo has since developed functional, multi-ethnic institutions of democracy that express freely the will of our citizens,

�institutions of democracy� again does not show in any way that this refers to a sovereign independent state. This point also reduces the will of the people to the non-sovereign and corrupt local institutions in Kosova. The first time any word close to �free� is mentioned, �freely� merely refers to the freedom of expression of Kosova�s institutions, not their rights or freedoms to take action as an independent state.

Recalling the years of internationally-sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the question of our future political status,

�our future status� makes it clear that our status is not final, and that we are going from transition to transition.

Regretting that no mutually-acceptable status outcome was possible, in spite of the good-faith engagement of our leaders,

Saying that no negotiated solution was possible is nothing more than avoiding blaming Serbia�s obstructionism for the breakdown of talks.

Confirming that the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari provide Kosovo with a comprehensive framework for its future development and are in line with the highest European standards of human rights and good governance,

Ahtisaari does not provide a framework for �development�, but will in fact block development, and even deprive us of the possibilities for development by perpetuating the paradigm of stability the international community in Kosova is operating within. The plan will also separate people institutionally and territorially on an ethnic basis. The Ahtisaari plan has nothing to do with �human rights�, but demands ethnically based strong decentralisation before sovereignty, without dismantling Serbia�s parallel structures in Kosova. This will not protect human rights, but can lead to new violations. Also, if the Ahtisaari plan represents the �highest European standards� for good governance, how come no other European country has implemented it?

Determined to see our status resolved in order to give our people clarity about their future, move beyond the conflicts of the past and realise the full democratic potential of our society,

Kosova does not lack status, but our people lack freedom. This declaration will not give us freedom. In fact, it does not even represent a change in status, as we will continue to be ruled over by an anti-democratic and unaccountable international mission. About �clarity� � this declaration does not bring clarity, but entails a number of serious contradictions and ambiguities. Besides, clarity is not the point: we need freedom and dignity. In order to achieve that, the people should decide on changing of Kosova�s status through a referendum on independence. The call to �move beyond the conflicts of the past� is again a call to erase history. It is impossible to talk about �democratic potential� when we are being deprived of democracy by the people that rule over us.

Honouring all the men and women who made great sacrifices to build a better future for Kosovo,

The last point is so vague that it could refer to some people being injured while working on a construction site. Again, the vague formulation is chosen in order to erase the past and not blame Serbia for our historical tragedies.

Numbered points

1. We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

1. This point is seriously self-contradictory. Being an independent sovereign state is completely incompatible with the Ahtisaari plan and his recommendations. He does not suggest sovereignty, but an extremely supervised independence. Either the MPs do not understand what �sovreignty� means, or they want to fool us. The so-called democratically elected leaders of Kosova are neither democratically elected nor leaders. Less than 50% of the population voted at all, in an externally imposed framework and process from above having nothing to do with democracy. This declaration cannot reflect the �will of our people� when we are deprived of the right to hold a referendum.

2. We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes.

2. This declaration will not provide people equal protection under the law, but will establish an international office to rule over us, with officials completely unaccountable and immune to the laws they impose on us. This point talks about �communities�, not citizens, and confirms the international community�s ethnic fixation regarding Kosova.

3. We accept fully the obligations for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari Plan, and welcome the framework it proposes to guide Kosovo in the years ahead. We shall implement in full those obligations including through priority adoption of the legislation included in its Annex XII, particularly those that protect and promote the rights of communities and their members.

3. Again it mentions �communities� instead of citizens, and obligations instead of rights.

4. We shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution shall incorporate all relevant principles of the Ahtisaari Plan and be adopted through a democratic and deliberative process.

4. Ahtisaari�s plan is not compatible with the ECHR. In fact, in the plan, there are no human beings, but only communities, which will be more segregated and separated by the plan.

5. We welcome the international community's continued support of our democratic development through international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission. We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to retain the leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo and to implement responsibilities assigned to it under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Ahtisaari Plan, until such time as Kosovo institutions are capable of assuming these responsibilities. We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure Kosovo's future peace, prosperity and stability.

5. This point basically says that Kosova does not want to become independent. It empties even a formal independence of any meaning and substance. The international presences here based on Resolution 1244 are not democratic nor are they promoting democracy. Instead, they are authoritarian and executive. Asking NATO to stay until Kosova is �capable� of assuming military �responsibilities� is self-devaluating. By talking about �peace, prosperity and stability� the international community�s focus on stability and peace, not freedom and progress, is revealed.

6. For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

6. It should not be necessary to give �reasons� for why Kosova is European. We are. This point does not mention that Kosova intends to become an EU member as a sovereign state, but states that �our future lies with the European family�.

7. We express our deep gratitude to the United Nations for the work it has done to help us recover and rebuild from war and build institutions of democracy. We are committed to working constructively with the United Nations as it continues its work in the period ahead.

7. UNMIK has not helped our democratic development. UNMIK is anti-democratic and a failure even from the views of its own officials, and according to its self-proclaimed goals. This point also says that UNMIK will continue to stay here indefinitely. So an �independent� Kosova will be run by two international missions, not just one!

8. With independence comes the duty of responsible membership in the international community. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, other acts of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the international legal obligations and principles of international comity that mark the relations among states. Kosovo shall have its international borders as set forth in Annex VIII of the Ahtisaari Plan, and shall fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all our neighbors. Kosovo shall also refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

8. This point talks about the duty of responsible membership in international organisation, but not about rights and internationally equal relationships. This is because Kosova�s rights will continue to be in the hands of the international administration here. Ahtisaari doesn�t say anything about �international� borders in annex VIII, but he does mention in Article 3, that Kosova must adhere to the border agreement signed between Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Macedonia in February 2001 in which Macedonia got 2.500 hectares of Kosova�s land.

9. We hereby undertake the international obligations of Kosovo, including those concluded on our behalf by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and treaty and other obligations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to which we are bound as a former constituent part, including the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. We shall cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. We intend to seek membership in international organisations, in which Kosovo shall seek to contribute to the pursuit of international peace and stability.

9. While the previous point talks about duties, this point mentions Kosova�s obligations and the contributions this declaration will commit us to. Our rights and freedoms are still not being mentioned. Talks again about peace and stability, but not development, progress, prosperity.

10. Kosovo declares its commitment to peace and stability in our region of southeast Europe. Our independence brings to an end the process of Yugoslavia's violent dissolution. While this process has been a painful one, we shall work tirelessly to contribute to a reconciliation that would allow southeast Europe to move beyond the conflicts of our past and forge new links of regional cooperation. We shall therefore work together with our neighbours to advance a common European future.

10. The disintegration of Yugoslavia does not necessarily end with the independence of Kosova. By saying this, the declaration wants to discredit the efforts of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, the Albanians in the Valley of Presheva and Bosniaks in Sandjak to get out from Serbia�s rule. And again, this point emphasises reconciliation in order for the past to be forgotten.

11. We express, in particular, our desire to establish good relations with all our neighbours, including the Republic of Serbia with whom we have deep historical, commercial and social ties that we seek to develop further in the near future. We shall continue our efforts to contribute to relations of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of Serbia, while promoting reconciliation among our people.

11. This point is an attempt to neutrally describe our relation to Serbia, when everyone knows what this relation in fact meant: our exploitation, suppression and domination by Serbia.

12. We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically, and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including, especially, the obligations for it under the Ahtisaari Plan. In all of these matters, we shall act consistent with principles of international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, including resolution 1244 (1999). We declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely upon this declaration, and appeal to them to extend to us their support and friendship.

12. This important point, the last one, does not mention independence, but Ahtisaari�s plan and Resolution 1244. This point does not ask explicitly for recognition, signalling that we will understand if someone decides not to recognise us.

 

 

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