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India & the Struggle for Tamil Eelam
India and the Sri Lankan Peace Process
Lieutenant General (Retd.) V.R. Raghavan,
Director of
Delhi Policy Group
at Consultation on
the International Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Peace
Process,
Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Colombo, 8-9 July 2005
"..New Delhi needs always to be
conscious of the impact of the Sri Lankan conflict on
the Tamils in India. That political necessity and the
security risks of Tamil separatist military capabilities
impacting on Indian interests is one dimension of
India’s policy choices. The political impasse in Sri
Lanka on the Tamil question is another dimension. These
two combine to lead New Delhi in choosing to play a
carefully calibrated and restrained role in the Sri
Lanka peace process..."
Introduction
The centrality of India in the outcome of the peace process
in Sri Lanka is widely acknowledged. Most political groups
and leaders in Sri Lanka have sought an Indian role in the
ongoing peace process. The nature and scope of that role has
however not been defined. There are also differing and often
conflicting views on what India is expected to do. The peace
process has stalled and even the human tragedy of tsunami
affected consequences has not provided the much needed kick
start to the peace process. The no-war-no-peace state in Sri
Lanka continues to cause concern internationally and in
India. The Indian role cannot be either conclusive or
deterministic. The conceptual and operational contents of
India’s role will continue to evolve. Indian security
concerns and political dilemmas in the uncertain scenario in
Sri Lanka will determine its role in the peace process. The
limits and potential of that role are examined in this
paper.
Role Perspectives
The ongoing peace process has a number of role players
participating in it. Some are involved in facilitating
negotiations, while others play a role as donors in the
relief and reconstruction arrangements in peace process.
Others have been prominent in placing the LTTE in the
category of terrorist organisations. Some have played a role
only to realise that deep pockets do not help obtain
influence with the adversaries to the conflict. Others have
found that assumptions based on past experience in conflict
resolution in one part of the globe does not apply in Sri
Lanka. There are different opinions in Sri Lanka on the
success or failure of such role players, as well as on the
agendas they are attempting to obtain.
There is however a widespread consensus on the need for an
Indian role in the peace process in Sri Lanka. Prime
Minister Rajapakse stated on taking office, “ We want India
involved as soon as possible. I have always wanted India to
play a role in Sri Lanka.” Anton Balasingham is quoted as
saying, “LTTE favors India promoting the peace process.” Mr.
Kadirgamar is on record as wanting India to play a direct
role. Mr. Douglas Devananda has asked for an active role
from India. There have been calls for use of Indian
influence in the peace process. The Buddhist religious
party, Jathiya Hela Urumaya has called for an Indian
involvement in the peace process. Another analyst has called
for a positive role for India in the peace process.
All this would convey the impression that
India is both the indispensable and missing element, in what
is ultimately an internal political-ethnic-military dynamic
of Sri Lanka.
On the other hand, there are opinions critical of India’s
highhanded approach to Sri Lanka’s problem. “The charge of
hegemonism has been labeled against India in Sri Lanka since
long. It is also surprising therefore that in the face of a
careful Indian response on demands for its role in the peace
process; it is now being called a ‘reluctant hegemon.’
The nature and scope of an Indian role in the peace process
is an articulation significantly absent from the Sri Lankan
discourse. As the distinguished diplomat and Secretary
General of the Peace Process Secretariat Jayantha Dhanapala
said recently,
“ If you wish to get a feel of Sri
Lankan public opinion, sadly the local press presents a
cacophony of views.”
The Indian role in Sri Lanka has for fifty
years straddled a range of activities. These included
military equipment aid, disaster relief, political counsel,
military involvement at Sri Lanka’s invitation, incurring
large numbers of casualties to its armed forces, economic
assistance, and non interference in Sri Lanka’s turbulent
politics. The role expected from India in the peace process
would be determined primarily by its interest in the
security of Sri Lanka and itself. This could not have been
better expressed than by Mr.Kadirgamar. He stated during the
time of fierce battles around Jaffna in the year 2000,
“ Indian policy on such a sensitive
issue as the current situation in Sri Lanka, would have
to take into account the complex issues of domestic and
international concern to India and her interests
regarding its role in Sri Lanka.”
That wise judgment applies equally to the
role India would play in the peace process.
The Peace Process
The dynamics of peace processes in divided societies is a
subject that has been analysed and studied in some
considerable detail in recent decades. The proliferation of
intra- state conflicts has emphasized the necessity for such
examination. The examples of peace processes in Northern
Ireland, South Africa, Israel/ Palestine and Sri Lanka have
been examined amongst others as models.
The conclusions of such studies confirm
that, “there has been a paradigm shift toward a new way of
making peace, which increasingly involves internal partners
more than outsiders.” Such studies have shown that peace
dividends and popular movements generally play a minor role
in the process but that symbols and rituals may play a more
significant role than often recognized.
The South African model of Truth &
Reconciliation process is cited as a symbol that may
activate and propel peace processes towards constructive
outcomes. These studies have also highlighted several
obstacles to peace processes. These are in the form of
escalation traps, the desire of elites to stay in power, and
the profitability of war. Lack of international community
support to peace agreements is cited as another obstacle to
peace process.
Amongst the theorists of conflict resolution there are the
emerging schools of believers and skeptics, or, optimists
and pessimists. This is not unlike similar groups looking at
nuclear deterrence theories which have been studied for over
fifty years. The questions being asked are do peace
processes push parties and situations toward an eventual
peace? Or do successful initiatives only causally correlate
with the cessation of violence by parties too broke and
exhausted to continue fighting? It has been said that “
there is no such thing as a typical peace process.”
There is a belief in some circles that there must be a ‘ripe
moment’ for the peace process to deliver. That ripe moment
may come from a ‘hurting stalemate’ where unilateral
solutions are blocked. Is it possible for third parties or
outsiders facilitating the peace process to induce a
‘hurting stalemate’? This can about through aid providing
donors controlling the pace of the peace process.
Consequently, it is believed a conflict resolving formula
might emerge from a readjustment of the belligerents’ power
relations and elimination of alternate strategies through
coercive efforts of third parties.
All the above factors that influence peace processes are or
have been present in Sri Lanka. The peace process in Sri
Lanka thus offers both the basis for a theoretical analysis
and its implementation. The question is whether conduct of
the peace process can benefit from the theoretical studies.
It is apparent that as the Sri Lankan peace process remains
stalled, the LTTE continues to build its military
capabilities and the Sri Lankan political impasse remains
frozen, risks of military and social conflicts remain
potent. The Indian role in the peace process would need to
evolve taking into account the realities of the situation.
Reality of the Peace Process
The reality of the peace process in 2005 is more than the
sum of negative factors in play in Sri Lanka. There is the
reality of serious differences in the majority Sinhala
polity on the final political outcome being sought through
the peace process. While the two major political parties
both seek an Indian involvement in the peace process, their
perceptions and policies on the process demonstrate a wide
gap.
Both political parties have raised
objections and placed obstacles in the process moving
forward. Each side blames the other of conceding too much to
the LTTE. The Buddhist clergy which exercised and continues
to exercise a near veto power over political outcomes, and
by implication on the peace process, has recently gained a
political presence after the last elections. It will be a
major determinant of the process.
Constitutional reform has been identified as
a key component of a political solution. The need to
restructure the Sri Lankan state and redefine the nation to
meet the twin demands of democratic conflict resolution and
governance is widely accepted. This notwithstanding, the
political costs of ensuring constitutional change are
apparently seen as too high by both major political parties.
The LTTE has certainly lost strategic and political space
after the acts of 9/11 catastrophic terrorism. It
understands the limits and constraints placed by the changed
situation on its powerful tools of terror, ie; suicide
bombers and major attacks through explosives on national
infrastructure. LTTE leadership does not trust the current
and future Sinhala leadership in a post conflict scenario
and seeks to retain a military capability. Its aversion to
political liberalism is well known and is to be witnessed in
its demand for full and unlimited powers in the post
conflict scene.
A peace process by its very nature is dependent on the
military equation between the adversaries. The Sri Lankan
reality in military terms is even more starkly unfavorable.
A territorial imperative operates wherein neither the Sri
Lankan state nor the LTTE is in a position to gain any more
territory. A decisive military victory is unavailable as a
choice to either side. A stalemate with both sides
continuing to keep their military formations deployed is
likely to continue. This is a costly and debilitating
exercise which does little to reduce suspicions or build
confidence. It nevertheless creates a false and therefore
dangerous impression of military security, which in turn
reduces the motivation to push the peace process towards a
mutually acceptable outcome.
There is in addition the reality of the economy of conflict
entrepreneurship, which is defined as a set of conditions
which permit one or the other adversary to hold out
indefinitely, even while engaging in a peace process. There
are studies, conducted under the aegis of the World Bank
that point towards this phenomena. This involves a
separatist leadership acting no differently than a business
entrepreneur. A business entrepreneur needs infrastructure,
capital and resources for the success of his enterprise. He
first creates the enterprise and then defends his interests
by corporate fighting or negotiating with the state.
A separatist leader does the same through
other means. He obtains capital by raids, loot or narcotics
and arms smuggling. He seizes territory to gain
infrastructure and resources including human resources. He
realizes in time that he cannot defeat the state and settles
down to negotiate the continuance of his enterprise. A
similar situation prevails with the LTTE negotiating its
future with the Sri Lankan state.
There appears little urgency on its part to
work the peace process, since what it has is not very far
removed from what the LTTE leadership wants. The peace
process therefore is heavily dependent on stimuli which
neither the two sides, nor the donors, nor the facilitating
role players from outside are able to provide.
Outside players play both a positive and negative role in
peace processes. The positive element relates to providing
international legitimacy to the peace process. It also
brings funds to smoothen the wheels that move the process.
On the other hand, the same elements also create political
divisions, provide legitimacy to an otherwise ostracized
adversary, and constrain the state’s strategic and
operational space in managing its security needs.
We see both these factors at play in Sri
Lanka. Sri Lanka has obtained substantial international aid
based on the prospects of a successful peace process. There
are also increased divisions in the Sinhala polity with
major protagonists claiming the spoils of the peace process.
On the LTTE side there is a split and factional killings,
with accusations of dominance by one group over another.
These developments have led to all stake holders adopting
and defending their maximalist positions, that can only have
a negative impact on the peace process.
There is in fact a paradox operating in the peace process
with a convergence of approaches to peace between the LTTE
and the government. The two seem to have a shared
understanding of peace as de-escalation of war. This notion
can be explained as ‘negative peace’ meaning the absence of
war. This falls short of ‘positive peace’ which alone can
remove the structural causes of war, help community
reconciliation and peace building and a host of other
related initiatives.
The reality of the Sri Lankan peace process is viewed, not
surprisingly, in terms of having reached a state of “as good
as it gets,” with No-Peace, No-War being better than the
alternative. The reality has consequently been described as
one of ‘incredible complacency which masks a melting at the
edges of the frozen war.’
The Indian Role
Indian governments have over the decades continued to
reassert their commitment to the well being of the Sri
Lankan state and its people. India’s Minister of External
Affairs, Mr.Natwar Singh has very recently repeated what his
predecessors have been asserting. He said, “ The Government
and people of India remain firmly committed in their support
for efforts being made by the government and people of Sri
Lanka to consolidate the process of peace and to promote
development in their country.” Indian governments have also
supported an outcome that accommodates the concerns and
aspirations of all groups that constitute Sri Lanka’s multi
ethnic and pluralistic society. India’s commitment to
upholding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri
Lanka remains undiluted.
Indian involvement in Sri Lanka has covered a wide range of
activities in support of government and its peoples. It has
included disaster relief, economic assistance, military
training assistance, direct military involvement at heavy
cost in the lives of Indian soldiers, political counsel and
trade and tariff facilities. Successive governments in
Colombo have also demonstrated their commitment to sustain a
strong relationship with Delhi and the Indian people.
Policy makers in Colombo have been seeking
globalised economic security arrangements rather than a
limited regional arrangement. As former Minister GL Peiris
had stated,
” Sri Lanka must not be merely seen as a
market of 18.5 million people. On the contrary Sri Lanka
must be seen as a point of entry to the entirety of
markets of the sub continent.”
India and Sri Lanka have viewed their trade
and economic relations through the prism of ‘shared
prosperity.’ The two countries are partners in many
international forums with shared ideals.
It has been said that the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is a
quagmire that India once got into directly, caused a lot of
problems for Sri Lanka and from which it withdrew. This
simplistic formulation overlooks the fact that India sent a
Peacekeeping Force and withdrew it at the request of the
elected government in Colombo. It is now recommended that
India needs to find a way to contribute positively to the
Sri Lanka peace process. One crucial way in which India can
strengthen Sri Lanka to arrive at a stable solution is to
assist the Sri Lankan government and opposition to arrive at
a bipartisan approach to resolve the ethnic conflict. Such
sweeping recommendations fail to see the reality listed in
preceding paragraphs.
India sees its role as a significant contributor to peace
and stability in Sri Lanka. That has in the past and will
continue in future to involve India in Sri Lanka’s economic
growth, political stability, and security. The challenge
before Indian policy makers is not of participation in Sri
Lanka’s peace process but of restraint in its involvement.
Sri Lanka responds – at the peoples and political levels –
like other smaller neighbors of India. Indian actions are
constantly viewed through the haze of fears of domination by
a very large and powerful state.
New Delhi needs also to be vigilant about
the political fallout in its Tamil population of events,
policies and consequences of policies pursued by Colombo.
New Delhi’s need to be even handed in the support it offers
to the government in Colombo and to the aspirations of
Tamils in Sri Lanka places discrete limits on its role in
Sri Lanka. The peace process is a bold strategic initiative
from the leadership of Sri Lanka. While there are nuanced
differences in the operational approaches of the two main
parties, Sri Lanka’s leadership has developed a consensus on
the validity and necessity of the process. Indian restraint
amounting to ‘no direct involvement’ in the peace process is
therefore a product of enlightened restraint rather than
deliberate disinterest.
The Sri Lankan discourse on constitutional structures are
indicative of the complexities involved in India playing a
direct and intrusive role. The debate on federalism has gone
on in Sri Lanka for quite some time. It still creates strong
responses in the Sri Lankan polity. These responses are not
unrelated to the peace process’ ultimate objectives of
shared powers between the LTTE and the rest of Sri Lanka.
As Minister DEW Gunasekara said, “
federalism is an anathema to some, foreign to some others
and allergic to many.” The political divisions in Sri Lanka
on the issue of federalism cannot be filled by an Indian
role. The Indian constitutional structures of power sharing
are to be judged by Sri Lankan political leaders in whom
substantial constitutional expertise is available.
A similar difficulty faces India on what has been termed by
Sri Lankan analysts as the Southern Consensus. The postures
adopted by the JVP on the question of federalism, on post
tsunami mechanisms, on the give and take needed in the peace
process and the alliance partnership in governance are a
complex web of ethnic beliefs, history and political
jousting. Indian can hardly be expected to drive any
elements in the Sri Lankan political arithmetic towards an
outcome on which there is a serious internal divide within
Sri Lanka.
Ambassador Jayanta Dhanapala has aptly pointed out; “there
is a complex symbiotic relationship between peace and
development.” He goes on to state that the process is one of
broad continuum where lessons are to be learnt from each
chapter of the process as it unfolds. furthermore, the peace
process and peace negotiations are not one and the same.
Negotiation is only one component of the peace process.”
In the maze of twist and turns and political
turnabouts, an Indian involvement will not only run the
risks of being viewed as interference but can also cause a
set back to the peace process itself. India’s interest in
the process nevertheless remains critical. It has therefore,
not surprisingly, chosen a role of observing, remaining in
touch with all stakeholders, and making its views known to
all sides of the equation.
India has chosen to involve itself in Sri Lanka through
trade, handsome economic aid allocations and assistance in
security management. In keeping with the understanding of
peace and development linkages, the Indian focus has
remained on the developmental needs of Sri Lanka. This need
not be taken as a lack of concern in New Delhi on the
stalled peace process. If anything, it demonstrates New
Delhi’s confidence in its ability to play a direct role,
when needed, at short notice.
The disagreements on managing the Post
Tsunami relief arrangements are but one sign of the serious
political dissonance regarding the peace process in Sri
Lanka. At the same time, President Kumaratunga’s
determination and skills to overcome obstacles are highly
regarded, admired and are a cause for confidence in the
future.
New Delhi’s role in the peace process is
determined by a holistic approach. It does not view the
peace process only as a foreign policy matter but as part of
a larger picture, to achieve the objectives of stability and
security in the region. In the interim every one awaits the
‘ripe moment’ in the peace process when things will
hopefully really begin to move.
Conclusion
India has a major stake in the security and political
stability of Sri Lanka. It is committed to Sri Lanka’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is equally
supportive of the legitimate political aspirations of all
segments of Sri Lankan society. Since the ethnic conflict in
the island state is linked to the Tamil population of the
country, its peaceful resolution is both a political and
security requirement of the Indian state.
New Delhi needs always to be conscious of
the impact of the Sri Lankan conflict on the Tamils in
India. That political necessity and the security risks of
Tamil separatist military capabilities impacting on Indian
interests is one dimension of India’s policy choices. The
political impasse in Sri Lanka on the Tamil question is
another dimension. These two combine to lead New Delhi in
choosing to play a carefully calibrated and
restrained role in the Sri Lanka peace process.
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