Jain Commission - Growth of Tamil Militancy Chapter 3 sections 27 to 31

Tamils - a Trans State Nation..

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Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu
Chapter III - Phase III (1989 -May 1991)

72.3.2 It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the Government of Tamil Nadu that several protests had been made by responsible politicians during December 1990 and January 1991 that false and frivolous allegations were being made against the State of Tamilnadu and its administration and records fabricated solely for the purpose of dismissing the ruling Government.

Leaders like Shri Indrajit Gupta had made such allegations. Shri K. Ramamurthy of TNCC(I) who had claimed at that time before the Parliament that the allegations were based on evidence, had, subsequently, failed to adduce any evidence before this Commission. Former Prime Minister Shri Chandrasekhar had also admitted when he was examined on 26.4.1994 before this Commission that even at the time when Shri Karunanidhi was the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, steps were taken to curtail the activities of the LTTE and to curtail terrorism.

It has further been contended by the Government of Tamil Nadu that Shri P. Chidambaram , during his deposition before the Commission on 6.11.1996 had admitted that whatever he spoke in the Parliament regarding the allegations against the Tamilnadu administration, he had spoken as a spokesman of the Congress party; he made no effort to gather further particulars in respect of matters he referred to in his speech; he had also admitted during his deposition recorded on 21.11.1996 that his speech in Parliament reflected the position of his party on the issue of dismissal of the DMK Government and proclamation of President's Rule in Tamilnadu.

He added "that was a political statement made on behalf of my party in the debate on President's Rule". There was no evidence submitted by either Shri Ramamurthy or Shri Chidambaram in support of their allegations made against the State of Tamilnadu, till date.

This contention of the Government of Tamil Nadu finds an answer in the deposition of Shri P. Chidambaram himself. Shri P. Chidambaram has asserted that he had made the speech in the Lok Sabha with a sense of responsibility and the allegations raised in his speech were correct to the best of his knowledge.

It is seen that Shri P. Chidambaram, during his deposition, also attempted to soft pedal the allegations by saying that he was reflecting his party's position in the Lok Sabha. This attempt of his, to dilute the contents of his speech in the Lok Sabha, is for what reasons, is best known to him, but it is known that there is political alignment of TMC with the DMK. However, in his deposition, Shri P. Chidambaram has nowhere denied the veracity of the facts on the basis of which he had raised the allegations, rather he has adhered to his speech.

Shri K. Ramamoorthy, during his deposition, has admitted that the allegations raised by him in his memorandum were largely based on press reports.

Even if the speech and the statement of Shri P. Chidambaram are ignored, the conclusions could not be otherwise.

The truthfulness of the allegations is required to be judged keeping in view the independent, reliable oral and documentary evidence available before the Commission.

72.3.3 The DMK party, besides reiterating the arguments raised by the State of Tamil Nadu, raised the following fresh points in their submissions before the Commission :-

It has been argued that after the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka in 1981, along with the refugees various groups of Tamil militants came to India. All the political parties had contacts with the militants from time to time.

There was a conference of Tamil Eelam supporters Organisations on 4-5-1986 at Madurai which was organised by D.M.K.Party. The other leaders who participated were Shri N.T.Rama Rao, A.B.Vajpayee, Dr.Subramanian Swamy, Ramoowalia, Bahuguna, Unnikrisnnan, Upendra and others. On the next day the TELO leader Sri Sabarathnam was killed in Srilanka by LTTE which upset the D.M.K.Party. Dr.M.Karunanidhi had condemned this.

Suffice it to say that the role of each political party at different periods has to be taken note of and its impact on the situation in Tamil Nadu has to be seen.

72.3.4 It was further argued by the State of Tamil Nadu that after the DMK Government took office in January 1989 there was an incident in February 1990 where certain militants travelling in a Maruti jeep fired at the police check post and escaped. After this, the Government realised the necessity of training the Tamilnadu Police in handling automatic weapons and requested the Central Government for supply of automatic weapons and training to policemen. Thereafter when the IPKF was being withdrawn, a shipload of EPRLF militants were sought to be sent to Tamilnadu by the Central Government. The Chief Minister of Tamilnadu opposed to this and therefore EPRLF militants were accommodated in the camps at Malkangiri and Koraput in Orissa. Padmanabha and other top leaders of EPRLF were there in the camp.

About 90 of the EPRLF cadres escaped from the camp and came to Tamilnadu. They were apprehended by the Tamilnadu Police and detained in refugee camps. The Chief Minister of Tamilnadu wrote a letter on 26.4.1990 to the Prime Minister which is marked as Ex. 568. The Chief Minister requested that the EPRLF militants should be confined in Andamans so that the clash between EPRLF and LTTE be avoided.

Padmanabha and other leaders went to Delhi from Orissa and thereafter Padmanabha came to Madras clandestinely on 19.6.1990. His movements were not known to the Tamilnadu police, but the investigation in his assassination case has revealed that the rival militant group LTTE was following his movements. Padmanabha and his group members were assassinated by the LTTE men in a residential flat at Kodambakkam at Madras on 19.6.1990 evening. The killer gang who could not be identified at that time, escaped initially in a white Ambassador car and thereafter in a Maruti Van. The investigation though could not be completed till the time DMK Government was dismissed in January 1991 was completed in September 1992 after the AIADMK Government was formed.

The former Home Secretary Shri Nagarajan was arrested in Padmanabha case on the allegation that in pursuance of the conspiracy he helped the assassins of Padmanabha to escape and that he assured the killer gang that police will not apprehend them till such time they return to Srilanka and that necessary instructions had been given by him to the police officials in this regard. Subsequently a former Minister of Tamilnadu Mrs. Subbulakshmi Jagadeesan was arrested on the allegation that in September 1991 she harboured two of the accused connected in the assassination when she was not a Minister and there was AIADMK Government in September 1991.

The investigation was conducted subsequent to the dismissal of the DMK government and the charge sheet was filed only in September 1992. Nowhere it is disclosed in the investigation that any other person except those who were chargesheeted was remotely connected to the case. There was no iota of evidence collected during the investigation in the Padmanabha assassination case that any of the State Government functionaries including the Chief Minister or the Ministers or other partymen were involved or remotely connected to the assassination of Padmanabha.

Likewise the investigation conducted by the Special Investigation Team of the CBI in the Rajiv Gandhi's assassination case did not also collect any piece of evidence in any way connecting the State Government and its Chief Minister or Ministers or any ruling partymen even though it is repeatedly alleged before this Commission by the Counsel for AICC that Intelligence Bureau reports were available concerning the involvement of Tamilnadu State administration. There was no investigation worth mentioning by any State or Central Government agencies to collect evidence to substantiate those allegations during the time that both the State and Central Governments were under the rule of the Congress Party and its ally AIADMK party respectively.

In fact Shri K. Ramamurthy and Shri P. Chidambaram who made allegations in the Parliament and demanded dismissal of the DMK government, were some time Ministers in the Congress Government at the Centre between 1991 to 1996. During the time they were in office as Ministers, no evidence could be collected to substantiate their earlier allegations. In fact Shri P.C. Pant, IPS who was the Inspector General of Police and Chief of the Tamilnadu Special Investigation Team incharge of investigation in Padmanabha assassination case has on a specific query made by this Hon'ble Commission filed an affidavit before this Hon'ble Commission (Ref. No. 5/24/JCA dated 14.1.1993) and submitted that there was no information about the interference by Thiru P. Durai, former Director General of police, Tamilnadu and the former Chief Minister of Tamilnadu Thiru M. Karunanidhi.

It has been further argued by the State of Tamil Nadu and the DMK party that leaders at the helm of affairs in the Centre such as Shri Rajiv Gandhi and Shri V.C. Shukla, had complimented the Chief Minister of Tamilnadu Thiru M. Karunanidhi for offering his cooperation in finding a solution to Srilankan Tamil problem.

In his statement marked as Ex. 556 Shri Rajiv Gandhi had thanked the Tamilnadu Government and the DMK for offering their cooperation during the last several months in finding a solution to Srilankan Tamils. He patted the DMK government at a public meeting for extending fullest cooperation in the Srilankan Tamil issue. Likewise Shri V.C. Shukla, Minister for External Affairs in the Government of Prime Minister Shri Chandresekhar made a press statement on 30.1.1991 at Colombo wherein he has stated that Thiru M. Karunanidhi a press statement on 30.1.1991 at Colombo wherein he has stated that Thiru M. Karunanidhi would go by the National policy that Indian territory would not be used for subversive activities by any other country. This statement is marked as Ex.558.

Details of the steps taken by the DMK Government have been elaborated in the statements of Dr.M.Karunanidhi the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Shri Guhan, Shri Jaffar Ali and the documents marked when Shri R.Nagarajan was examined. The White paper released by the DMK party contains details of steps taken to contain the militant activities in Tamil Nadu which is marked as Ex.561.

Government Officers of Tamil Nadu, in their written arguments submitted on 30th. June, 1997, before the Commission, have stated that details of action taken by the then State Government to curb militancy find a place in the affidavit of Shri R. Nagarajan, as also in his explanation given to the show cause notice, which has been marked as an exhibit. They have also enclosed a list of cases registered during the period in question, which is available at Annexure M-138.

The TN Government Officers have further contended that the movement of LTTE were clandestine in Tamil Nadu from 1989 onwards. During 1990 -91, LTTE had closed all their operations in India. The Officers have referred to the TADA statement of Athirai given to the SIT in which she had confessed that LTTE members had been coming to India only for certain specific tasks.

I have already assessed and evaluated the material on record . In the light of that, these submissions have no force. From the evaluation of the material, the conclusion is irresistible that there was tacit support to the LTTE by Shri M. Karunanidhi and his Government and law enforcement agencies. The charge is that such anti national elements were allowed to grow tacitly unchecked and unabated undermining the national security, with such roots in the soil of Tamil Nadu, so that they may be able to execute any plan of assassination.

As regards charges against the DMK party and its leaders in which it has been alleged that there was involvement of the party in the assassination, it may be stated that the Commission would be examining this aspect in the conspiracy angle.

It was submitted by the DMK party that Shri Rajiv Gandhi had visited Tamil Nadu as many as 13 times during the DMK rule and proper security was given to him. The fact that Sivarasan and his men were ultimately found in Karnataka, itself shows that LTTE had no network, base or a safe place for hiding in Tamil Nadu.

This submission, on the contrary, goes against DMK. Knowing it well that all hideouts in Tamil Nadu may be known, it is safer to leave Tamil Nadu and escape to Karnataka to avoid apprehension as far as possible; but the culprits were chased and they had to commit suicide or die.

The State of Tamil Nadu and DMK party also submitted that there were specific allegations made by the former Prime Minister Shri V.P. singh that certain persons connected to the Congress Party in Karnataka helped in harbouring Sivarasan, the prime accused after the assassination. The Commission would fail in its duty if this aspect is not examined.

It is a fact that Shri V.P. Singh has made some such allegations. The Commission would be examining this aspect in the conspiracy angle.

72.4 It has been vigorously argued before the Commission by the State Government of Tamil Nadu that Sri Lankan Tamil militancy in Tamilnadu was a continuing phenomenon which existed since 1982. To prove this, various instances have been quoted. i.e.

Pondy Bazaar shooting incident of 1982; setting up of militant camps in nearly 40 places in Tamil Nadu under the charge of Central Government agencies;

-allegation in the charge-sheet filed by the SIT regarding the Rajiv Gandhi's assassination case containing statement of accused which show that Sivarasan and other LTTE militants were trained at Dehra Dun by the Indian army;

-bomb explosion at the Madras Airport in 1985 caused by the Tamil militants in which 30 people died and one accused called Vigneswaraja who was on bail was allowed to go out of the country.

-A bomb explosion at Besant Nagar, Madras on the roof-top of the house where Shri Anton Balansingham, Adviser of LTTE was staying in December 1985.

-A shoot out in the City of Madras at Choolaimedu on 1.11.1986 in which civilians died.

-On 8.11.1986, 1005 militants were rounded off by an early morning swoop conducted by the Tamilnadu police. Rs. 40 crores worth of arms were seized. Subsequently communication equipments were also seized. Shri P. Chidambaram, the then Deputy Minister for Home stated before this Commission that the equipments were returned on the directions of the Central Government by the Tamilnadu police.

-Shri P. Chidambaram had talks with Prabhakaran at that time as also Shri Natwar Singh, at Madras and Delhi.

-Prabhakaran was brought to India in the middle of the year 1987 with the help of Central Government Intelligence agency officials to Delhi and made to stay at Ashoka Hotel. He met the then Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi and had discussions regarding the Accord.

-Prabhakaran was meeting the Central Ministers, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and other officials during 1983 to 1987, while the non bailable warrant issued by the Court was pending against him for the case relating to the Pondy Bazaar shoot out in Madras in May 1982 without execution.

-After the commencement of the confrontation between LTTE and IPKF there were still militant activities going on in Tamilnadu.

-During the President Rule in Tamil Nadu in January 1988 - 27.1.1989, several bomb explosions occurred in Tamilnadu such as at Nehru Statue, Kathipara Junction in the City of Madras on 10.4.1988, at the Television Relay Station Tower at Kodaikanal on 11.4.1988 and at the botanical Garden at Ooty on 18.5.1988.

It has further been contended by the State of Tamil Nadu and the DMK party that the stand of the Central Government towards the LTTE had been contradictory and confusing; following incidents were quoted which prove the dual policy adopted by the Central Government while dealing with the militants :-

i) letter addressed by Shri S.S.Sidhu the Advisor to the Tamil Nadu Governor dated 20.5.1988 during the President rule complaining about the contradictory stand taken by the Central Government in dealing with LTTE.

ii)The detention of 157 LTTE militants under the National Security Act and their release from Prison on 8-10-1988 when IPKF was fighting LTTE in Srilanka and subsequently flown to Jaffna by Indian Air Force planes.

The letter of Shri S.S. Sidhu, the then Advisor to the Governer of Tamil Nadu, dated 20th May, 1988, (reproduced at page 231) elaborates the steps taken by the State Government to curb militant activities in the State. The letter, inter alia, also speaks about the steps taken with regard to the activities of Kittu, the LTTE leader, based in Madras. It has been stated that the telephone been used by Kittu was under surveillance by some Central intelligence agencies; Shri Sidhu has also stated in his letter that "It is however, to be said that messages from Delhi on the manner of dealing with the LTTE have sometimes been contradictory. ...... Direct and close contacts by certain Central Intelligence agencies, creates confusion about the policy to be followed. The State Government is keen to offer full co-operation to the Central agencies in all matters. However, it will be more effective if we have a clear picture of the basics of the policy towards LTTE to ensure co-ordinated action and will be otherwise very helpful if the State Government is kept fully appraised of the developments from time to time."

How the Centre reacted to this letter is not known. No papers have been submitted to the Commission in this connection.

Keeping a channel open for negotiations, as in this instance, is a matter which concerns the Central Government. However, keeping a watch on the activities of a member of a foreign organisation is the responsibility of both the Central and the State Governments and action to curb their militant activities is the responsibility of the State Government. This is the line of action, which should have been followed by the State Government at that time.

What Shri S.S. Sidhu intends to convey is that the State Government did not have a clear picture of the policy of the Government of India towards LTTE. He had requested that the State Government be kept fully informed of the policy in order to ensure coordinated action. The letter does not indicate any 'dual policy' on the part of the Central Government as has been contended.

The issue of the detention and deportation of 157 LTTE cadres has already been dealt with earlier. The release of Kittu and others after deportation, was a gesture to afford an opportunity to LTTE to initiate dialogue soon after the unilateral ceasefire announced by the IPKF.

It was contended by DMK during arguments that President of D.M.K., Dr. M. Karunanidhi had stated before this Hon'ble Commission that "I have always sailed along with the Centre considering the National interest."

It has been contended that after the President's Rule was imposed in Tamil Nadu in January, 1991, there did not appear to be any control on militant activities in Tamil Nadu. This is proved by the following incidents :-

i)The conference and photo exhibition in support of LTTE which was banned by the DMK Government on 7-6-1990 (Vide Exh.566) was allowed to be held during President Rule on 20.4.1991 (Vide Ex.622).

Ex. 622, produced by Shri M. Karunanidhi, is a detailed report of the 'Q' Branch, CID, Tamil Nadu dated 3rd. May, 1991. The report gives an account of what transpired in the Third State Conference of Tamizhar Desiya Iyekkam, held on 20.4.1991 at Thanjavur. In the Conference, the District President of T.D.I. and other speakers, inter alia, criticised Shri Karunanidhi for withholding permission to the Conference last year and detaining him and others under N.S.A. since they demanded right of self determination for Tamil Nadu and paased a resolution to this effect. The speakers advocated self determination in this Conference as well. The Conference also adopted a resolution, inter alia, condemning DMK Government and Central Government for arresting the LTTE cadres and use of issue of Tamil Eelam for political gains.

Such a Conference was rightly banned by the DMK Government in 1990. This Conference should not have been allowed, if information ragarding this was known in advance to the authorities concerned. Action, as per law, should also have been initiated subsequently.

ii)Kasi Anandan meeting with Shri Rajiv Gandhi on 5.3.1991 was arranged by Intelligence agency officials.

The letter of Kasi Anandan to Shri Rajiv Gandhi, (EX. 552), dated 4th March, 1991, indicates the purpose of Kasi Anandan in meeting Shri Rajiv Gandhi. Kasi Anandan, in the letter, describes his intentions as follows :-

"It is my hope that this meeting will mark the beginning of a cordial and friendly relationship between you and my movement."

The meeting was not arranged by any Intelligence Agency but by Ms Malini Parthasarthy, as deposed by Kasi Anandan, corroborated by I.B. report. He had also deposed that Shri Rajiv Gandhi was not for Eelam.

The State of Tamil Nadu and DMK party have further argued that the above shows that the LTTE militants were not seriously contained and there was no effective control over the militant activities during the President's rule. On the contrary during the time when the State Government was under the rule of any of the parties, there was effective control over the militancy and the policy of the Central Government was followed without any violation.

In their written arguments before the Commission dated 30th. June, 1997, the Government Officers of Tamil Nadu have contended that while the State Government and its officers were taking steps to contain militancy in the State, the Sri Lankan Tamil militants were facing the State machinery because they had been encouraged due to the training given to them by the Central Government in Dehradun (UP). To substantiate this argument, the officers have adverted to references to training camps made in the TADA statement of Suthanthira Raja in Rajiv Gandhi case and in the book "Tigers of Lanka" by M.R. Narayanaswamy.

The TN Government Officers have contended that the presence of militants in Tamil Nadu was felt since the Pondy Bazaar shootout of May, 1982. There were training camps of militants in Tamil Nadu operating with the help of Central Government. The officers have argued that There were no encouragements given to the militants in Tamil Nadu without instructions from the Central Government. The officials of the Central Government agencies interfered and sought for the release of the militants when the Tamil Nadu Police arrested them while dealing with the law and order problems created by the militants and arrested them.

72.5 These issues raised by the Government of Tamil Nadu, DMK party and Tamil Nadu Government officers, are required to be examined in details.

The policy of the Central Government with regard to the problem of Sri Lankan Tamils in the context of the growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in India over the years is required to be examined in depth.

After the ethnic riots of 1981 and 1983 in Sri Lanka, the people of Tamil Nadu fervently appealed to the Government of India to intervene in the crisis. The Government of India, in recognition of the close historical, racial, linguistic and cultural bonds which exist between the Tamils of the two countries, and in deference to the demands of the people of Tamil Nadu, offered its good offices to facilitate a solution to the ethnic crisis. The policy of the Government of India appears to have been shaped keeping into consideration the following fundamental tenets:-

- Whether the actions of the Government in pursuance to their policy vis-a vis the problems of Sri Lankan Tamils were impelled by and in consonance with their commitment to uphold human rights of Tamils of Sri Lanka with whom Indian Tamil citizens have traditional, historical affinity through linguistic, cultural and racial bonds ;

-whether while pursuing an active policy of helping and long drawn, violent ethnic strife in neighbouring Sri Lanka the Government of India had always firmly upheld the view that a solution could be only within the existing constitutional framework of Sri Lanka and a solution envisaging the formation of " Tamil Eelam" was unacceptable;

-whether considerations which shaped the decision taken by the Government of India while pursuing this policy were to safeguard the strategic geopolitical and security interests of India in the region and to ensure that the unity and integrity of India is not jeopardised or compromised.

If the decisions taken and actions pursued by the Government of India and the State Government of Tamil Nadu while tackling the issue of Sri Lankan Tamils are found to be in consonance with the above tenets , it can be said that they were justified.

The issue of Sri Lankan Tamils, the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka and resultant uncertainty and a sense of instability in the region is essentially a matter of foreign policy and falls within the ambit of the functions of the Central Government.

The issue took a regional colour because of the fact that the citizens of Tamil Nadu and the State Government of Tamil Nadu, over the years had been seriously concerned with the atrocities committed on Sri Lankan Tamils across the border. This concern arose due to the close historical bonds which exist between the Tamil inhabitants of both the countries. Tamil Nadu coast line was the closest region to which the affected Sri Lankan Tamils could find refuge when faced with repeated ethnic disturbances and pogroms in Sri Lanka. Arrival of a large number of refugees on the Indian coast of Tamil Nadu from 1981 onwards necessarily brought the Government of Tamil Nadu into picture.

It was the duty of the Central Government to take note of these developments in Tamil Nadu and therefore, while, within the country, the Central Government provided the requisite assistance to the Government of Tamil Nadu, on the external front, it took up the matter with the Sri Lankan Government at a political and diplomatic levels.

The diplomatic initiative and subsequent developments leading to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord have been dealt with in a separate chapter. The historical sequence of growth of Sri Lankan Tamil militancy in India and the response of the Government of India towards this problem has to be examined as well as the prevailing situation in Sri Lanka during this period.

Let us examine the main events from 1981 onwards which are relevant to the context of growth of Sri Lankan militancy in India.

i) Shoot out between V.Prabhakaran of LTTE and Uma Maheswaran @ Mukundan of PLOTE at Madras -May 1982.

The shoot out resulted in the arrest of V.Prabhakaran and Uma Maheswaran; it appears that after the arrest of V.Prabhakaran , a request from Sri Lanka to extradite V.Prabhakaran him was not responded to. The accused were released on bail. It appears that the decisions taken at that time were influenced by the vociferous protests by various political parties in the State as well as other public forums against the extradition of V.Prabhakaran.

S.C.Chandrahasan, son of the celebrated champion of Sri Lankan Tamils rights -Sri. SJV Chelvanayagam , flew down to Madras to provide legal assistance to the accused. There was unanimity in the feelings of the all political parties , public forums and human rights organisations in Tamil Nadu as well as Sri Lankan Tamil Militant groups predominated by TULF that, at that time the prevailing situation in Sri Lanka demanded that Sri Lankan Tamils fighting for their rights, should be given support by India. The scenario in Northern Sri Lanka was indeed, given in a series of ethnic riots , allegedly aided, abetted by the Sri Lankan Security Forces a large number of Tamils had been killed or rendered homeless and the prestigious Jaffna Library , the pride of Tamil culture had been burnt to ashes.

However, it is a fact that such a blatant violation of law and order by Sri Lankan Tamil Militants called for stringent action by the law enforcement agencies and deserved to be nipped in the bud . At this stage it was necessary to send a clear message to the Sri Lanka Tamil militants that their illegal activities on Indian soil were unacceptable. The fact that V.Prabhakaran continued to stay on in Tamil Nadu and meet prominent political figures while Non bailable warrants were pending against him., indicates the lax attitude of the authorities. The Government of the day could have withdrawn the case in accordance with law instead of not executing the Non-bailable Warrant(NBW) intentionally in breach of law.

Evidence available before the Commission indicates existence of training camps of the militants in Tamil Nadu. Shri K. Mohandas, former DGP of Tamil Nadu, has given an official account of the various camps being conducted by militant groups like the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO , PLOTE etc. in Tamil Nadu. He has also asserted that the training was assisted by the Central Intelligence Agencies. Shri.P.Nedumaran has also narrated some specific details regarding the training by the militants. Shri V.P.Singh former Prime Minister of India, has authoritatively asserted that during this period training was provided to various Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups in India. Shri. M.Karunanidhi and the DMK party have also raised similar allegations.

However, on a specific question posed to Shri P. Chidambaram , who was intimately connected with the issue of Sri Lankan Tamils, by the Counsel for the Commission, Shri Chidambaram stated that he was not aware of any training imparted to the Sri Lankan Tamil militants by the Indian Army.

From available evidence it appears that the motive for training of the militant Sri Lankan Tamil groups in India during 1984-86 was apparent. All witnesses including Shri.M.Karunanidhi who appeared before the Commission have unequivocally told that during that period the Sri Lankan Tamils were defenceless and oppressed and circumstances required that they should be supported to defend themselves. No protests from any quarter in India were raised against the training of Sri Lankan Tamil militants for their protection of the defenceless Tamils of Sri Lanka.

What were the imperatives which led to a situation where Sri Lankan Tamil Militants underwent training in India? Evidence available before the Commission indicates that the training was essentially for self defence and not for launching military operations,or for encouraging internecine conflicts among Sri Lankan Militant groups. There is clear evidence in the form of contemporaneous records that India, all along, was committed to a solution to the ethnic problem of Sri Lankan Tamils within the constitutional framework of Sri Lanka upholding the unity and integrity of the island nation.

The implementation of this policy manifested itself when, during the various talks held by the Central Government Ministers and officials with militants, it was always upheld that no demand for a separate Tamil Eelam would be entertained. It was mainly this insistence of the Government of India which led to the failure of talks at Thimpu and later at the SAARC summit at Bangalore. The signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was a resounding affirmation of the policy of the Government of India that it was all for safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. It was this policy of India which led to the growing alienation of LTTE.

To insinuate that the training of militants organised in India had contributed to the growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy would be simplistic.

There is evidence that several Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, notably the LTTE, began seriously training themselves in the hands of organisations such as the PLO and MOSSAD during the seventies as well as early eighties. The LTTE started stockpiling arms from the international market from the early eighties onwards . For smuggling of arms the LTTE also purchased their first ship " MV Cholan" in 1984 and subsequently augmented their fleet of smuggling vessels. There is evidence of huge fund mobilisation by the LTTE for purchase of arms from the international underground bazaars. LTTE cadres also underwent regular courses in wireless communications from foreign countries. During the nineties its cadres were also involved in training in microlite aircrafts.

In fact, it appears that it was this highly specialised guerrilla training which LTTE cadres had undergone in foreign terrorist outfits which made the LTTE a formidable enemy of the IPKF and contributed to the difficulties encountered by the IPKF in tackling the LTTE in the course of implementation of Indo Sri Lankan Accord.

The issue of training of Sri Lankan Tamil Militants in India has to be, therefore, viewed necessarily in the context of the magnitude of the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka and the fact that the defenceless Sri Lankan Tamil citizens were hapless and defenceless in face of the inhuman atrocities perpetrated on them by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces at that time. The period of 1983-86 was one during which India got increasingly involved in the affairs of Sri Lankan Tamils. The unprecedented ethnic riots of July 1983 in Sri Lanka resulted in a huge inflow of refugees and militants in India. Increased militant activity in Tamil Nadu was a natural consequence. Several violent incidents took place in Tamil Nadu. Two particularly violent incidents occurred - TEA was found responsible for the Menambakkam Airport blast and EPRLF was found responsible for a shoot out at Choolaimedu, Madras on November 1, 1986.

During this period it is seen both the Central and the State Government were acting in tandem. Renewed efforts were made to solve the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka and talks were held both with Sri Lanka Government representatives and Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu Shri M.G.Ramachandran had been assisting the centre in these efforts.

It appears that as far as the growth of Sri Lankan Tamil militancy is concerned the situation was under control. The Sri Lankan Tamil Militants were kept under some control in the state of Tamil Nadu. Three of them were deported by the Central Government when it was felt that they had become stumbling blocks to a solution after the talks at Thimpu (Bhutan) during 1985.

An example which demonstrated that the Government of Tamil Nadu had the capability to keep Sri Lankan Militancy under control is seen in " Operation Tiger." As a preventive measure before the SAARC conference at Bangalore, in a state wide swoop , the Sri Lankan Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu were disarmed at one stroke without resistance. This operation yielded a cache of arms which has been valued by many to be valued at Rs 40 crores. Seizures of such an arsenal from the Sri Lankan Tamil militants further exposed that these militants were arming themselves by smuggling in weaponry from outside. This ingenious operation by the State Police rendered them toothless.

After the failure of talks between the Sri Lankan Government representatives and Sri Lankan Tamil Groups held under the aegis of Government of India during the SAARC conference at Bangalore, Shri M.G.Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, who had made personal efforts to convince V.Prabhakaran of LTTE ordered seizure of wireless sets of the Sri Lankan Tamil militants. V.Prabhakran whose obduracy regarding Tamil Eelam was major cause for the failure of the talks, was infuriated and went on a fast unto death. Prior to this, as per available evidence, Shri. M.G.Ramachandran had called Prabhakaran and issued a stern warning to him.

Although it appears that the materials seized from Sri Lankan Tamil militants during " Operation Tiger" was eventually returned to them under pressure from Shri.P. Chidambaram, the then Internal Security Minister, at the instance of the Central Govt, the actions of the State Government against the Sri Lankan Tamil militants appear to have led to a sense of insecurity in V.Prabhakaran, who clandestinely fled India in early 1987 and returned to Jaffna. It appears he left India as he had stopped trusting the Indian authorities and was afraid of his security.

Such was the situation in the wake of 1987. It has been unequivocally stated by several witnesses who deposed before the commission that it was never the policy of Government of India to encourage Tamil Eelam.

However, it appears that contrary to the policy of the Foreign policy formulations of the country, some regional political parties were espousing the cause of Tamil Eelam. The conference of TESO ( Tamil Eelam Supporters Organisation ) held at Madurai in May 1986 was a step towards encouragement of Eelam, as the name of the organisation itself signifies. The details of deliberations of this conference, however, are not available with the Commission. TESO organised and conveyed by the DMK on the initiative taken by Shri.M.Karunanidhi himself. Several eminent politicians, notably Shri N.T.Rama Rao, A.B. Vajpayee, Dr. Subramanian Swamy, Ramoowalia, Bahuguna, Unnikrisnnan, Upendra and others.had participated in the Conference. Shri M.Karunanidhi accepted that the conference could not succeed in its objectives due to the intransigence of the LTTE, who ignored the appeal of TESO to join hands with other Sri Lankan Tamil Groups and assassinated Sri Sabaratnam of TELO in Sri Lanka. This demonstrated that the LTTE was not a trustworthy organisation even to its sympathisers.

The LTTE, it appears had become gradually alienated from India as it had perceived that the policies of the Government of India were opposed to the formation of Tamil Eelam.

It is seen that hectic negotiations were held with the LTTE by Indian diplomats during 1987 before the signing of Indo Sri Lanka Accord, to bring them around to the point of view where a solution short of Eelam was envisaged to the ethnic problem, while the LTTE agreed to the terms and conditions, it appears that it subsequently resiled and backed out.

In October 1987, when hostilities broken out in the Northern province of Sri Lanka between IPKF and the LTTE, actions of LTTE took an anti - national colour. This was the water shed which exposed the LTTE as a militant organisation which was inimical to the national interests of India.

There was no dual policy of the Central Government. Its policy was always taking into account the wishes and interests of the Tamils in Tamil Nadu as they were directly affected of the happenings and events in Sri Lanka. Tamil interests dominated the Central Government's policy. The Central Government helped in whatever ways possible even at the cost of great financial burden affecting the Indian economy, except supporting demand for Eelam and simultaneously safeguarding and preserving its national interest.

The arguments of all the four Counsels on behalf of the State, D.M.K., T.N. Officials and Shri M. Karunanidhi, refer to the incidents and events which had taken place during 1982 to 1988 which have already been taken note of and considered. There is no denying the fact that militancy had taken birth and continued to grow.

The M.G.R. Government of the day openly and overtly supported the militants and Shri V. Prabhakaran was quite close to him. The Centre had also helped the militants in training and arming. The leaders then were meeting militants to devise peaceful solution of the ethnic issue and not for encouraging militant activity.

But by then they were not indulging in anti- national activities which were required to be stopped totally when LTTE made Tamil Nadu a rear base or launching pad for fighting I.P.K.F and injured LTTE cadres were treated in Tamil Nadu and returned back to North East again to fight I.P.K.F.

The LTTE was getting its supplies including arms, ammunition, explosives, fuel and other essential items from Tamil Nadu to continue its fight against I.P.K.F. that too with the support of the D.M.K. Government State Administration and connivance of the law enforcement agencies. Prior to 1989, the militancy particularly LTTE activity was not anti- national in character although smuggling activities in and out of Tamil Nadu shores might be affecting Tamil Nadu economy and may be anti-national in that sense and contrary to the laws of the country which it appears were overlooked and not dealt with firmly having regard to the feelings, views, wishes and interests of the Indian Tamils and it had also some political considerations to gain favour of the local Tamils. It can be said that there was some laxity in enforcement of law.

However, for the Governments, then in power, it cannot be attributed that they covertly or overtly permitted the militants or a particular group to take law in their own hands or to indulge in any anti-national activity. Thus there was no dual policy as argued by learned counsels.

73 I have seen the growth of Sri Lankan militancy in Tamil Nadu since 1981. At different periods the nature and levels of militancy varied and a period came when it assumed anti national character and penetrated into the social fabric of Tamil population and the political parties too were entrenched as the ethnic issue was an emotional issue with all the Tamils. The assassination of Shri. Rajiv Gandhi would not have been possible the way it has materialised without the deep nexus of LTTE operatives with the Tamils in Tamil Nadu and tacit support from the State authorities and the law enforcement agencies.

73.1 Sri Lankan Tamil militancy was a product of discriminatory and repressive policies of the post independent Sri Lankan Government towards Tamil minorities of the island nation. The beginning of the eighties was a period marked by serious ethnic turmoil in Sri Lanka. Anti- Tamil riots in Sri Lanka of 1981 and 1983 resulted in an unprecedented inflow of refugees in India. In Tamil Nadu, all political parties, cutting across party lines, united and went up in arms in favour of the beleaguered Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. By the end of 1986, there were 1 lakh 30,000 Sri Lankan refugees who had sought sanctuary in Tamil Nadu, as per official estimates. There were many more who had come clandestinely and were unregistered.

73.2 The people of Tamil Nadu fervently appealed to the Government of India to intervene in the crisis. The Government of India, in recognition of the close historical, racial, linguistic and cultural bonds which exist between the Tamils of the two countries, and in deference to the demands of the people of Tamil Nadu, offered its good offices to facilitate a solution to the ethnic crisis.

The policy of the Government of India, all through, was consistent with regard to the problem of ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka.

First, the policy reflected the genuine sentiments and concerns, and legitimate interests, of the people of Tamil Nadu with regard to the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka; it was essentially a humanitarian policy; second, while formulating the policy, the strategic geopolitical and security concerns of India were taken into consideration; third, the policy formulation considered, vitally, that the unity and integrity of India was not jeopardized or compromised in any manner; and fourth, the policy envisaged and maintained all through, that any solution to the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, necessarily had to be arrived at within the constitutional framework of a united Sri Lanka; in other words, any demand for creation of a 'Tamil Eelam' was outrightly unacceptable.

73.3 Sri Lankan Tamil militancy spilled over to India when during the period 1982-1986, various Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups set up bases in India in Tamil Nadu, the Sri Lankan Tamil militants were carrying out propaganda, publicity and even training of their cadres in the know of the Central and State Government authorities. They also indulged in clandestine activities including procurement of armaments and smuggling activities. These militants enjoyed considerable support from some political parties.

73.4 The ethnic riots had exposed the vulnerability and defencelessness of the Sri Lanka Tamils. Training camps of various militant groups in India imparted training to Sri Lankan Tamils in self defence in order to ward off attacks and defend themselves and the unarmed Tamil citizens in the event of recurrences of well organized anti-Tamil Pogroms in Sri Lanka.

The imperatives which led to a situation where Sri Lankan Tamil Militants underwent training in India were based on the perception that the training was essential for self defence and not for launching military operations for encouraging internecine conflicts. There is clear evidence in the form of contemporaneous records that India, all along, was committed to a solution to the ethnic problem of Sri Lankan Tamils within the constitutional framework of Sri Lanka upholding the unity and integrity of the island nation.

73.5 The attitude of the authorities towards these militants and their activities was moulded, to a large extent, by public opinion. The increasing criminalisation of the Sri Lankan Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu and their acts of violence failed to evoke any perceptible public response. Cases such as Meenambakkam Airport bomb blast of 1984 and indiscriminate opening of fire by militants at Choolaimedu, Madras in November 1986, did not evoke any serious public outcry. On the other hand, after the shoot-out at Pondy Bazaar, Madras, in May 1982, organised groups of Indian sympathisers of Sri Lankan Tamils went about zealously to prevent the extradition of LTTE Chief V. Prabhakaran and other accused in this case. This shows that while public reactions to acts of violence by Sri Lankan Tamil militants on Indian soil were muted, sporadic and lukewarm, any attempt by the Government to rein in the militants was met with organised protests from their Indian Tamil supporters.

As regards the case relating to the shootout at Pondy Bazaar, such a blatant violation of law and order by Sri Lankan Tamil Militants called for stringent action by the law enforcement agencies and deserved to be nipped in the bud . At this stage it was necessary to send a clear message to the Sri Lanka Tamil militants that their illegal activities on Indian soil were unacceptable. The fact that V.Prabhakaran continued to stay on in Tamil Nadu and meet prominent political figures while Non Bailable Warrants (NBWs)s were pending against him., indicates the lax attitude of the authorities. The Government of the day could have withdrawn the case in accordance with law instead of not executing the Non Bailable Warrants (NBWs) intentionally in breach of law.

73.6 Incontrovertible evidence of possession of sophisticated weapons and explosives by various militants Sri Lanka Tamil Groups based in Tamil Nadu has come to the notice of the Commission by way of a detailed list of weaponry, ammunition and explosives seized in a statewide operation code named "Operation Tiger" carried out by Tamil Nadu Police on 8th November, 1986.

The operation was an indication that the State law enforcement machinery was capable of tackling and disarming all Sri Lankan Tamil militants in the State. The Sri Lankan Tamil militants had, till then, not become a law unto themselves.

73.7 During this period the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was the most organised Sri Lankan Tamil militant group to be reckoned with. LTTE was invariably kept in the picture by the Central Government whenever they had used their good offices to attempt negotiations for a solution to the ethnic crisis. During the Thimpu Talks in Bhutan and their follow up at New Delhi in July - August 1985 and at the efforts made at Bangalore in November 1986 during the SAARC Summit, LTTE was involved; the negotiations could not succeed largely owing to the inflexible stand taken by the LTTE, who were not willing to compromise their demand for Eelam which was not acceptable to Shri Rajiv Gandhi who wanted a solution to the problem within the constitutional framework of Sri Lanka.

An affirmation of the policy of the Government of India is seen in a severe reprimand to V. Prabhakaran by Shri M.G. Ramachandran, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu after the SAARC Summit when Prabhakaran was told by him that he should carry on his struggle from his own country if he was not willing 'to play by our rules'. V. Prabhakaran, at this stage, realised that India was not willing to heed to his persistent demand of 'Eelam' and, soon after, in January, 1987, he clandestinely left India and fled to Jaffna.

Prabhakaran's departure from India in January, 1987 showed the resolve of the Government of India as well as the State Government of Tamil Nadu not to compromise on the demand of 'Tamil Eelam'.

73.8 Notwithstanding their intentions and anxiety to find a peaceful solution to the problem, neither the Central Government, nor the State Government of Tamil Nadu, particularly, can escape the blame for allowing leeway for Sri Lankan Tamil militants while they operated in Tamil Nadu. This attitude paved the way for a gradual introduction of 'Gun and Bomb' culture in the State of Tamil Nadu.

73.9 During early 1987, a major military offensive of the Sri Lankan Government resulted in a resurgence of Pro-Tamil sentiments among all political parties in Tamil Nadu. Shri M.G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, announced a financial aid amounting to Rs. four crores in two instalments to a couple of Sri Lankan Tamil rehabilitation organisations on 30th. April, 1987. All political parties supported this gesture in Tamil Nadu Assembly, when this resolution was passed. The funds were given to the LTTE through these organisations.

73.10 In the months of May, June and July, 1987, the Central Government headed by Shri Rajiv Gandhi initiated dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government and Sri Lankan Tamil groups including the LTTE leaders, which culminated in the Indo Sri Lankan Accord on 29th July, 1987. During the implementation of the Indo Sri Lankan Accord and the resultant operations of the IPKF, some political parties in Tamil Nadu openly came out in support of the LTTE and against IPKF operations. One of the most vociferous critic of the Accord was the DMK which claimed that the LTTE had never fully endorsed the ISLA. It was painted that the Government of India had abandoned the Tamil cause and was collaborating with the Sri Lankan Government in crushing the Tamils.

Under the changed scenario, the LTTE made a strategic shift in their political alignments. They sent personal emissaries to Shri Karunanidhi for seeking his active support in their battle against the IPKF. These overtures by the LTTE towards the DMK started a chain of events which led to LTTE's survival and growth in Tamil Nadu even when the entire attitude of the Government of India had changed towards the LTTE after the hostilities between the IPKF and LTTE in Sri Lanka.

73.11 By the end of 1987, the regional opposition political parties of Tamil Nadu, propagated views arousing considerable public antipathy towards the Central Government and corresponding sympathy for the LTTE in the State. This political strategy led to a situation where these feelings started bordering on the verge of anti nationalism.

73.12 Although, during 1987 - 1988, the activities of the LTTE had clearly taken an anti national dimension, the Government machinery in Tamil Nadu did not effectively intervene to bring an end to the clandestine activities of the LTTE in the State partly due to the propaganda generated by the majority of political parties in favour of the LTTE. The effect of the propaganda had percolated to the junior Government functionaries as well, who were harbouring hostile feelings about the I.P.K.F. and were sympathetic to the LTTE cause. Unfortunately, instead of engaging themselves seriously in the task of cleaning up the State of militant anti national elements, both the Central and State Government agencies entered into trading of charges against one another on the issue of growth of L.T.T.E.'s anti national activities which were required to be put down with determined and decisive action.

A confusion was created by the State Government bureaucracy that peace initiatives being taken by the Central Government Agencies to bring L.T.T.E. around and to make it amenable to a peaceful solution were coming in the way of enforcing the law in the State against L.T.T.E. cadres.

73.13 During 1988, the activities of LTTE cadres based in Tamil Nadu which were perceived to be prejudi cial to the interest of the Nation. 157 LTTE cadres, including Kittu, were arrested and detained under the National Security Act (NSA) during the President's Rule in Tamil Nadu. The detention of these LTTE cadres under the N.S.A. was objected to by the opposition parties, including DMK, TNM etc.

The LTTE cadres were released and deported to Sri Lanka and handed over to the IPKF in October, 1988.

The decision of the Government of India to arrest and deport 157 LTTE activists from India can be seen to be a major step towards eradicating the militant activities of the Sri Lankan Tamil groups in India and as a gesture to negotiate for peace.

73.14 During the eighties, especially after the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka came into sharp focus, there is seen a revival of Tamil Chauvinism. A large number of Tamil chauvinist groups became active in the early eighties. While many groups confined themselves to propaganda, certain other groups began indulging in serious anti national and criminal activities, especially after the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka and pro Tamil sentiments were running high in the State.

73.15 As the year 1988 drew to a close, the overall situation in Tamil Nadu had altered considerably. After the 'Operation Tiger', the Sri Lankan militants had become wary and suspicious of the authorities; V.Prabhakaran had left India and the LTTE establishments in Tamil Nadu were operating with caution. After the deportation of 157 LTTE cadres, activities of the Sri Lankan militant groups were effectively subdued. It is seen that by the end of 1988, the problem of militancy in Tamil Nadu had been overcome to a large extent.

There is no denying the fact that Sri Lankan Tamil militancy took roots and grew during the period 1981 to 1986, but was under control and had not assumed anti- national character.

The LTTE was getting its supplies including arms, ammunition, explosives, fuel and other essential items from Tamil Nadu to continue its fight against I.P.K.F. that too with the support of the D.M.K. Government, State Administration and connivance of the law enforcement agencies. Prior to 1989, the militancy particularly LTTE activity was not anti- national in character although smuggling activities in and out of Tamil Nadu shores might be affecting Tamil Nadu economy and may be anti-national in that sense and contrary to the laws of the country which it appears were overlooked and not dealt with firmly having regard to the feelings, views, wishes and interests of the Indian Tamils and it had also some political considerations to gain favour of the local Tamils. It can be said that there was some laxity in enforcement of law.

73.16 On 27th. January, 1989, after the Assembly elections held in Tamil Nadu, the DMK Government headed by Shri M. Karunanidhi was sworn in.

73.17 Soon after the DMK Government took over the reins of power in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE slowly began to consolidate itself in the State and their clandestine activities, heretofore dormant, became more and more pronounced.

All the activities of LTTE at this stage towards resource mobilisation, propaganda and treatment of their wounded cadres, had taken an anti national dimension.

73.18 At this stage, a gap arose between the policy of the Central Government and the actions of the Government of Tamil Nadu. In an unprecedented event, Shri V. Gopalaswamy, Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, of D.M.K. made a 24 Days clandestine visit to Northern Sri Lanka and reportedly met V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE Supremo. He left India for Sri Lanka on 8th. February, 1989, and was in Northern Sri Lanka till 3rd. March, 1989. Video cassettes of his visit were shown all over Tamil Nadu.

This visit by Shri V. Gopalaswamy, and the manner in which this entire episode was dealt with by the DMK party sent clear signals to the pro LTTE anti -IPKF elements in the State as well as LTTE itself that the newly elected Government would not resort to any drastic action against such elements; on the other hand, the impression the entire episode created was that pro LTTE gestures, even if they were illegal, would be tolerated by the Government.

73.19 The then Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi was keen that some satisfactory solution be arrived at with the LTTE so that the Indo Sri Lankan Accord could be implemented in letter and spirit. He discussed this concern with Shri Karunanidhi and sought his assistance.

73.20 In India, Shri V.P. Singh became the Prime Minister on 2nd. December, 1989. The policy of the Government of India, with regard to the issue of support to the Sri Lankan Tamil groups, as professed by Shri V.P. Singh is seen in the mandate to Shri Karunanidhi conveyed by the Central Government that he should open a dialogue with all the Tamil militant groups for a peaceful settlement amongst themselves with the purpose of participating in the democratic process of devolution of power to North Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka within the broad framework of integrity of Sri Lanka. It was spelt out that if no solution came, India will no longer give any military or monetary help to any of the groups, nor allow its mainland to be used for militant activities.

The LTTE remained adamant during their parleys with Shri Karunanidhi, and continued to demand the formation of Eelam.

73.21 The parleys between the Chief Minister Shri M. Karunanidhi and the LTTE led to a situation where the LTTE got encouragement to operate in Tamil Nadu as it perceived that the Chief Minister Shri M. Karunanidhi was sympathetic to them.

The year 1989 signified the perpetuation of the general political trend of indulging the Tamil militants on Indian soil and tolerance of their wide ranging criminal and anti national activities even at the cost of deterioration of the general law and order situation in the State. The State law enforcement machinery was seen as apathetic and ineffective to deal with the growing aggression of the LTTE in the State. LTTE activities of arms smuggling, abduction of Indian citizens and officials and intimidation of the law enforcing machinery were tolerated.

73.22 The boycott of the function by Shri Karunanidhi to welcome the IPKF contingent deinducted from Sri Lanka, was another gesture of the ruling party of Tamil Nadu which was opposed to the policy of the Government of India, and was hailed by the LTTE. the 'ouster' of IPKF was also celebrated by the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

73.23 The policy of the State Government of Tamil Nadu as well as the Central Government headed by Shri V.P. Singh to allow the injured LTTE cadres to come into India and obtain treatment, enabled the LTTE, to further consolidate their network in India.

73.24 An endorsement of the anti national agenda of the LTTE by the local Tamil chauvinist groups was reaffirmed when Shri P. Nedumaran paid a visit to Sri Lanka in 1990.

73.25 During 1990, a growing nexus between the LTTE and DMK and its repercussions on the local law enforcement machinery were discernible.

73.26 Police inaction was singularly evident in the numerous cases reported during this period. There did not appear to be any sincerity in pursuing investigations and arresting the culprits, rather their connivance was there in the continuation of LTTE activities which went unchecked and unhindered..

It cannot be denied that the unusual ineffectiveness of the police was due to their awareness that the LTTE rank and file operating in Tamil Nadu had political patronage of the ruling party.

The State Government continued to extend lip sympathy to the task of curbing the militant activities of the LTTE in the State, but in actual practice, the anti militancy efforts had been confined to holding of special law and order meetings and coordination meetings. Nothing concrete was done at the field level, and at the level of the State Political leadership as well as the bureaucracy, there was no will to implement any firm measure.

73.27 The assassination of EPRLF leader K. Padmanabha and others at Madras on 19th June 1990 was a shocking reminder of the impunity with which the LTTE could operate in India. No worthwhile investigation was conducted in this case till the case was taken over by the 'Q' Branch of the Tamil Nadu police in August, 1991 - 14 months after the occurrence.

The case assumes significance due to the fact that striking similarities were found in the Padmanabha assassination and the case relating to the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi.

Investigations also , inter alia, disclosed the involvement of some political personalities in the case including Smt. Subbulaxmi Jagadeesan, a Minister in the then DMK cabinet, her husband Jagadeesan and Ravichandran, brother of DMK MP Shri Vai Gopalaswamy. Involvement of some members of the DK, notably Irumborai and Veerasekharan was also disclosed.

73.28 The credibility of the Government of Tamil Nadu plunged to a new low as far as their professed determination to control the activities of Sri Lankan militants in the State was concerned.

73.29 Credible reports exist of active connivance of some DMK leaders with the LTTE. The LTTE was in continuous interaction with the Chief Minister, Shri Karunanidhi, primarily to ensure that their activities continue unhindered even after the Padmanabha killing.

73.30 During this period, a nexus between the LTTE and ULFA and their combined endeavours in Tamil Nadu have also been confirmed.

73.31 It can, therefore, be safely concluded that the growing connivance of the DMK Government with the LTTE having been brought to the knowledge of the National Front Government, effective steps were not taken by the Central Government to check it, whatever may be the reasons.

73.32 From the evaluation of the material, the conclusion is irresistible that there was tacit support to the LTTE by Shri M. Karunanidhi and his Government and law enforcement agencies.

73.33 After the dismissal of the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu during the period of Shri Chandrashekhar, who was the Prime Minister, there was a crackdown on the LTTE. How effective was the crackdown can be assessed by the fact that it was this period during which the Intelligence group of the LTTE cadres, led by Sivarasan, one of the key accused in the case relating to the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, went about their job undeterred and managed to carry out the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi.

During March, 1991, fresh wireless sets were installed by the members of the Intelligence Wing of the LTTE in Madras which were extensively used to pass coded messages to LTTE Intelligence Hq. at Jaffna.

73.34 Imposition of President's Rule may, or may not prove as panacea for the ills for which it is imposed. As a matter of fact, in the case of Tamil Nadu, it did not prove so, as is quite evident from the movements of LTTE cadre Sivarasan, with his suicide squad, including the 'dry run' and other LTTE activities during the period.

74 LTTE will always continue to pose a problem for India as the end of hostilities between LTTE and Sri Lankan Army is not in sight. The ethnic and emotional bondage and proximity of Tamil Nadu coast with Jaffna may, at any time, convert the soil of Tamil Nadu as the rear base or launching pad for LTTE's operations against Sri Lankan Security Forces. Secessionist elements may also grow. The Central Government and Tamil Nadu Government would be required to keep a constant vigil of the coast so that Sri Lankan Government may not have any occasion to accuse Indian or Tamil Nadu Government of any tacit support to LTTE in any way affecting the bilateral relations of India with Sri Lanka.

74.1 The recurrent and persistent scourge of militancy is being tackled the world over by the double edged sword of politico - diplomatic initiatives as well as armed interventions. However, while formulating and pursuing anti- militant strategies, utmost care is required to be taken to zealously protect national interest and the unity and integrity of the country. At no cost can these paramount principles be compromised, for these are the pivots around which our polity revolves.

In our country, no section of the society or any legitimate political party can, therefore, while furthering the legitimate grievances of militants, espouse any cause, which is detrimental to national security and national interests.

LTTE's perfidious strategy of attempting to manipulate the political decisions of our country as well as Sri Lanka to their advantage, and take recourse to the ghastly assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi to assert their might, underscores the need to eradicate this menace.

How was the LTTE aided and abetted in the Commission of this crime? Were there other forces behind the LTTE involved in the conspiracy for the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi? These are questions requiring a deep and anxious probe.