Jain Commission - Growth of Tamil Militancy Chapter 3 sections 11 to 14

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Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu
Chapter III - Phase III (1989 -May 1991)

Lok Sabha debate--dated 10th January 1991 on reported nexus between ULFA and LTTE

66.4 The issue of LTTE ULFA links figured in the Lok Sabha as well. While speaking before the Lok Sabha on the LTTE - ULFA links on 10th January, 1991, the Prime Minister Shri Chandrashekhar also raised serious allegations against the DMK Government alleging that the DMK leadership was leaking information in advance to the LTTE. Relevant excerpts of the speech of the Prime Minister Shri Chandrashekhar are as follows :-

".....when I was an ordinary Member of this House I sent a note to the then Home Minister of the Government of India giving the details of the activities of militants or extremists of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and also the reaction of the then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister at that time. .... I have my own information. But my information is communicated to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu... Mr Karunanidhi has been informed of the opinion of the Government of India and the situation that is operating in that part of the country. I want to bring two or three points to the knowledge of the House. It is true.... that there is not only nexus between ULFA and LTTE but there has been a close cooperation between these two. There have been six centres of ULFA in the Tamil Nadu. I do not know whether it is with the connivance and knowledge of the Tamil Nadu Government. But this is the reality. It is also true that two of the ULFA leader were arrested from the Vellore Hospital and they are important members of ULFA. (Interruptions)I do not know. I do not want to take the names. They were interrogated and the information that they have given is quite disturbing. I also want to make it clear that Tamil Nadu is the place where you can get AK- 47 rifles at the cheapest rate. And in the centre for purchase of AK 47 for naxalites in Andhra, for militants in Punjab and also ULFA people.... But I want to say that when informed the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister about all these things, he assured of action....

I also say and I say with a sense of responsibility that now we are feeling hesitant, what type of information should be passed on to the State Government and what should not be passed on to them because I have information that certain information what were just given to the Chief Minister has gone to the LTTE headquarters not only in Tamil Nadu but even in Jaffna. This is something very serious."

Shri Chandrashekhar deposed before the Commission regarding the controversy of this period and the allegations pertaining to the LTTE's nexus with DMK. He categorically defended his decision to impose President's Rule in Tamil Nadu on 30th January, 1990, and asserted that he had received credible information while he was the Prime Minister regarding DMK's links with the LTTE :-

Deposition of Shri Chandrashekhar dt. 26.4.1994 "Yes that is true that LTTE activities were going on in Tamil Nadu during the DMK Government headed by M. Karunanidhi.

I must have written a letter to Home Minister, Shri Sayeed Mufti Mohd. regarding the LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu.

I do not remember whether I received any reply from the Home Minister Shri Sayeed Mufti Mohd. When I became Prime Minister lot of reports were received about the LTTE activities including training camps in Tamil Nadu.

I did make a statement in the parliament regarding LTTE links not only with ULFA but also with all other terrorist groups.

I cautioned Mr. Karunanidhi to take steps against LTTE activities thrice but he did pay heed and his Ministry was dissolved.

I had seen the reports on militant LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu from Tamil Nadu Government When I was in the Government, and I also received reports about the same from the other Intelligence Agencies."

66.5Following this discussion in the Lok Sabha, The Minister of State, Home, Shri Subodh Kant Sahai, visited Madras and had discussions with the State Government authorities including the Chief Minister.

Available evidence indicates that during his visit to Madras, in a press Conference, Shri Subodh Kant Sahay stated that there was clear evidence of LTTE- ULFA nexus and some ULFA extremists had been arrested in Tamil Nadu. (Annexure M-117)

67 The Government of Tamil Nadu was dismissed on 30th. January, 1990, and President's Rule was proclaimed. Describing the events which immediately preceding the imposition of President's Rule, the then President of India, Shri R. Venkataraman, has stated in his book "My Presidential Years" in the chapter "Chandrashekhar's Tenure as PM" that he had advised the Prime Minister not to go by the allegations of the political parties but get an independent assessment of the ground situation in Tamil Nadu done through RAW and IB before taking he decision for dismissal. According to him, the file put up to him regarding the dismissal of the DMK Government described that the Union Government was of the view that the DMK Ministry was reluctant to deal firmly with extremists in the State with international links. The President, after pondering over all relevant factors, agreed for the dismissal.

The Union Government had not taken a report from the Governor while taking this decision. The President, in his book, stated that this was not an unprecedented step. Shri Chandrashekhar, during his deposition before the Commission, stated on this issue :-

"It is true that TN Government of DMK was dismissed even without Governor's report. Article 356 does not require Governor's report as a precondition for dismissal of a Government.

I did not ask for any report from the Governor of to him before dismissing the Tamil Nadu Government.

I did not ask the Governor to submit the Report, but whatever information I had about the law and order situation in Tamil Nadu was conveyed to him I took action of dismissal of the DMK Government at that very point of time so that no mischief could be played by the DMK Government."

A note for the Cabinet prepared and put up by the Union Home Secretary, Shri R.K. Bhargava, on 30th January, 1990, (Annexure M-118) portrays the situation in Tamil Nadu with regard to issue of Proclamation under article 356 of the Constitution. While elaborately depicting the deteriorating law and order in the State of Tamil Nadu with specific examples, the note, inter alia, observed :-

"The law and order situation in Tamil Nadu has been under review from time to time. Available information indicates that the recent turn of events and deterioration in the law and order situation are causing concern. Apart from the increase in violent crime due to the activities of local criminals and others, the most disturbing aspect is the widespread perception that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are operating as an independent force outside the ambit of the country's laws and have carved out certain sanctuaries for themselves in which the State administration has no authority. They are functioning as a kind of parallel authority in parts of Ramanathapuram, Thanjavur, Pudukottai and Tiruchirapally districts. The unwillingness of the State administration to effectively deal with the menace of the LTTE has tended to give them still greater encouragement to engage in violent activities and threaten and intimidate the people in the coastal areas.

2.5 The situation in the State could not have deteriorated to the extent that it has, but for a serious failure on the part of the State Government to shut its eyes to these activities and in some cases provide necessary direction to its various agencies

2.6 Compounding the situation are reports of the involvement of prominent members of the ruling party, including some of its elected representatives, in such activities.

2.7 All this has affected the administration's effectiveness. It has become most apparent in the police administration.

3. The Governor of Tamil Nadu was in Delhi. His views on the situation prevailing in Tamil Nadu were taken note of while preparing this note.

4.From the foregoing facts it will appear that there has been a break-down of the administration and it cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. ..... "

67.1 The reaction of the DMK party over the dismissal of the Government was predictably strong. Commenting on the dismissal, Shri M. Karunanidhi deposed before the Commission :-

"The DMK Govt was dismissed on 30-1-1990. On 28-1-1991 the External Affairs Minister Shri V.C.Shukla contacted me on phone from Delhi. He wanted me to meet at Madras but I pointed out to him that I would be at Madurai on that day. V.C.Shukla came to me by a Special plane at Madurai. He had a discussion with me for about two hours at Madurai. He had told me at that time that he is on his way to Colombo to discuss Sri Lankan problem, that is why he wanted to have discussions with me at Madurai. He had met the Press at Colombo on 30th January 1991 and had Press Conference. It is on that day only while he was giving a press conference in Colombo my Ministry was dismissed by Chandra Shekhar.

What Shri Shukla had said in the press conference appeared in The Hindu dated 31st January 1991. He stated that "in response to reservations expressed by Sri Lanka on the attitude of Tamil Nadu C.M. Mr Karunanidhi he had explained that Mr Karunanidhi would go by the national policy that Indian territory would not be used for subversive activities by any other country. Mr Karunanidhi had expressed concern about the refugees in Tamil Nadu and said that he did not want to send them from Camps in Tamil Nadu to Camps in Sri Lanka without their willingness and lasting peace assuring the safety should prevail in Sri Lanka for their return". This news clipping is marked as Exh. 558. this speech establishes that I have approached the Sri Lankan issue always in the national interest."

Narrating the events leading to the dismissal, Shri R. Nagarajan deposed before the Commission and stated :-

"...... The Proclamation of President Rule was placed before the Parliament and there was a debate in Parliament regarding imposition of the President Rule. Subodh Kant Sahay was the Minister of State for Home Affairs. .... I am not sure that a report from the Tamil Nadu Government was called before the debate. I do not agree with the statement of the Home Minister made in Parliament to the effect "LTTE was working as an independent force beyond the purview of Law and it had made some hideouts which were beyond the control of the State Government It was functioning as an independent Government in some pockets of Ramanathapuram Thanjavur, Podukottai and Thirucirapalli districts. As the State Government was hesitant to deal with the LTTE effectively, a very dangerous situation had developed due to the latter's indulgence in violence and intimidating the coastal people and getting encouragement from the local administration".

The witness explained that a month before on 10th Jan, 1991, the Home Minister (Shri Subodh Kant Sahay) was in Madras for attending an All India Film Festival and he met the Press at Raj Bhawan. There was a specific question on LTTE and also Law and Order situation by the time and myself and the DG(P) were by his side. He replied that law and order was satisfactory. Nothing adverse had come to his notice in recent time about LTTE activity. Parliament statement was after one and a half month..... Shri Subodh Kant Sahay had a number of meetings before January 10,1991 with the C.M. and the Govt of India, and reviewed the law and order situation. I was also present in such meetings. At no point of time, he made any adverse comments on law and order situation in the state.....

At least before 10 January 1991 there were meetings with the State Home Minister Govt of India at least three times. The Government officials referred to the incidents of the activities of the LTTE in these meetings before 10 January,1991. It was reported to the State Home Minister of the Centre as to how many LTTE cadres had been arrested and for what offences, and what their activities were. The perception of T.N. officials including me was that law and order situation was good. After 10th January 1991 till 30th January 1991, Central State Home Minister did not visit Tamil Nadu.

To my knowledge there is no basis of this view of the Govt of India that the State Govt was encouraging LTTE in the State of Tamil Nadu. ...... There were no movements of LTTE in Tamil Nadu. They were in Camps. It is totally wrong that despite prior knowledge the local police did not check the illegal movement of LTTE in the state of Tamil Nadu. Coastal patrol is the job of the State Government. It is a totally wrong perception that on the coastal line of Tamil Nadu of thousand kms there was no checking, there were 297 check posts manned by more than 1200 people, and equipped by 500 AK-47 rifles supplied by the Govt of India. This is a wild allegation that the people at the check posts were colluding under the orders of the Chief Minister with the LTTE cadres."

On 21st February, 1990, the DMK party came out in a hard hitting rejoinder to their dismissal. (Ex. 561) (Annexure M-119) Some highlights of the

Extracts of Background paper on malafide imposition of President's Rule in Tamil Nadu on 30th January 1991 released by D.M.K. Party Headquarters on 21-2-1991

"The imposition of President's Rule in Tamil Nadu on 30th January 1991 by invoking Article 356 of the Constitution is politically motivated and is a malafide misuse of the Constitutional provision.

........................................... The facts contained in this Background Paper will show that there was no disruption whatsoever to law and order in Tamil Nadu and that there was no question of any Constitutional breakdown.

. .......................................... Para 9:- Throughout these developments, Dr. M.Karunanidhi, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu has followed a disciplined and principled policy in regard to the Sri Lankan Tamil problem and the various Tamil groups belonging to that country. The elements of his policy have been as follows:-

(1) He has consistently acted within the framework of India's foreign policy and has held discussions only in response to requests made to him by the Government of India, keeping the Government of India fully in the picture at all stages;

(2) He has publicly and privately avoided taking sides as between various Sri Lankan Tamil Groups. He has throughout appealed to all Sri Lankan Tamil Groups to resolve their differences and to pursue a united effort to secure the legitimate demands of the Tamil people in Tamil Eelam.

(3) He has taken all steps to ensure that the presence of these groups in Tamil Nadu, to whichever formation or faction they might belong, did not disturb law and order in Tamil Nadu either due to their internecine clashes or due to criminal activities of any kind.

Para 10:- In pursuance of this clear and consistent policy, actions have been taken by the D.M.K. Government in Tamil Nadu at various points of time in 1990 against both LTTE cadres and militants belonging to other groups. These have been listed in Annexure I. Annexure II gives the abstract. It will be seen that the actions of the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu have been entirely impartial in dealing with any breach of law and order from any source. It is noteworthy in this connection that out of the 35 Sri Lankan Tamil militants who were detained under the NSA as at the end of 1990 as many as 16 belong to the LTTE. In as much as the LTTE is entrenched in North Eastern Sri Lanka and continues to be engaged in hostilities with the Sri Lankan Government, most of the militants who have migrated to India belong to groups other than the LTTE. It will be seen from Annexures I and II that these groups have indulged in a wide variety of criminal activities such as burglary, dacoity, rioting, murder, kidnapping and drug-trafficking. Annexure I will also show the largest seizure of arms and ammunition worth Rs. 5/- crores was from ENDLF militants in Dhargavalasai, Ramanathapuram district.

Para 11:- In addition to the actions taken listed in Annexure I, special operations were conducted as follows during December 1990 and January 1991, since the Janata Dal (S) Government came to power at the Centre, to round up suspected militants from among the refugees who had come in large numbers from among the refugees who had come in large numbers from Sri Lanka and to segregate militants belonging to different groups from each other so as to prevent mutual clashes among them.

i) On 14 December 1990, 77 suspected LTTE cadres were arrested in Madras City, Madurai, Trichy, Salem and Thanjavur Districts and communication equipments and vehicles were seized from them.

ii) On 15th December 1990, 77 suspected militants belonging to ENDLF, EPRLF, TELO and EROS were arrested from various places in Tamil Nadu and segregated in special camps. Communication equipments, arms, ammunitions, and vehicles were seized from these groups.

iii) Between 18th December and 30th December 1990, 787 suspected Sri Lankan Tamil militants from various groups were segregated from a number of refugee camps and moved to special camps along with their family members.

iv) In addition, 300 sympathisers and supporters of LTTE in the age group of 18 to 30 along with 205 family members were moved to special camps.

v) Following a violent riot in the camp in the Police Recruits School, Vellore 162 LTTE militants were arrested. Of them, 31 militants were detained under NSA on 22 January 1991.

Para 12:- Since the coming to office of the Janata Dal (S) Government at the Centre, vague and unsubstantiated allegations began to be made that the law and order situation in Tamil Nadu had deteriorated because of the activities of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu. However, in this period, viz., between November 16, 1990 and January 30, 1991, the DMK Government took all steps to keep the Centre informed of the position regarding law and order in Tamil Nadu and, at every stage, it sought the Centre's advice and co-operation in maintaining law and order.

At meetings held in Delhi on December 3, 1990 and January 3, 1991, the Chief Minister personally apprised the Prime Minister of the law and order situation in Tamil Nadu. He also implemented the suggestions given to him by the Prime Minister in this regard. On both these occasions, he had detailed discussions with the Union Minister of State for Home, Thiru Subodh Kant Sahay. Thiru Sahay visited Tamil Nadu on December 12, 1990 and on January 10, 1991 and held detailed reviews with the Chief Minister and State and Central officials on the law and order situation. At the official level, a number of meetings of the State Co-ordination Committee were held between Tamil Nadu officials of Central Agencies such as the Navy, Coast Guard and Customs.

No dissatisfaction was expressed in regard to the adequacy and effectiveness of the actions taken by the Tamil Nadu Government in any of these meetings at the Ministerial or official levels. It may also be mentioned that the Tamil Nadu Government requested the Centre to augment its police with 4 Battalions of the Border Security Force. This was necessary because the Tamil Nadu Government had lent 1,240 men of its police force to Delhi and other States for law and order duties. However, the Central Government did not respond to this request.

Para 13:- It may also be mentioned that Thiru V.C. Shukla, Union Minister for External Affairs met Dr. M.Karunanidhi, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu at Madurai on 28 January 1991, i.e. just two days prior to the imposition of President's rule, for consultations before proceeding to Sri Lanka. Their discussions lasted for more than 2 hours and covered all aspects of the Sri Lankan Tamil problem and the refugee and law and order situation in Tamil Nadu. At the end of the discussions, Thiru V.C. Shukla told the press that his discussions with the Chief Minister were "satisfactory".

Speaking to the press subsequently in Colombo on 30 January 1991, Thiru V.C. Shukla said (HINDU, 31st January 1991): "in response to reservation expressed by Sri Lanka on the attitude of the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr.M.Karunanidhi, he had explained that Mr. Karunanidhi would go by the national policy that Indian territory would not be used for subversive activities by any other country. Mr. Karunanidhi had made this clear when he met him at Madurai. Mr. Karunanidhi had expressed concern about refugees in Tamil Nadu and said he did not want to send them from camps in Tamil Nadu to camps in Sri Lanka without their willingness and lasting peace assuring their safety should prevail in Sri Lanka for their return".

Para 16:- Another allegation that has been made is that there were 6 ULFA camps in Tamil Nadu receiving assistance from the LTTE. The source of this allegation is understood to be the uncorroborated testimony of a person belonging to ULFA who was undergoing treatment at the Christian Medical College Hospital at Vellore in Tamil Nadu and who was arrested with the assistance of the Tamil Nadu police and taken to Assam for interrogation. No such camps have however been located until now. However, allegations continue to be made about links between the LTTE and ULFA. The State Government in any case has had no knowledge of any such links and no information regarding such links were communicated to the State Government by the Centre at any time.

Para 17:- Finally, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar has alleged in Parliament that "sensitive information" which had been given to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu had been passed on to the LTTE. This too is totally baseless. At his meeting with Opposition leaders on 11th January 1991, the Prime Minister informed them that the 'sensitive information' involved consisted in his telling the Chief Minister that if LTTE militants resisted arrest, they should be threatened with deportation to Sri Lanka.

This suggestion had necessarily to be passed on to the Tamil Nadu police officials so that they could implement it while arresting suspected LTTE cadres. It could therefore be expected that the LTTE cadres would come to know of it in the process of being arrested. They might have passed it on to their principals in Sri Lanka through their communication channels and such messages might have been intercepted by the Central agencies. It is impossible to see in this any danger to national security. It is a total canard to suggest that the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu had passed on any secret or sensitive information to persons whose access to it would in any way endanger India's national interests.

Para 18:- In a letter to the Prime Minister dated 13th January 1991, the Chief Minister has rebutted in detail the two specific charges regarding ULFA camps and passing on of sensitive information. He has also given the full facts to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly on 25 January 1991. No other specific charges have been laid at the door of the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu. It is not possible to refute other vague allegations, innuendoes, and baseless charges because they have not been supported by any facts or substantiation."

The dismissal of elected DMK Government in Tamil Nadu may be a political issue with which this Commission, as such, has no concern, but the factual situation gone into consideration is relevant for the Commission.

Interestingly, the LTTE issued a strongly worded statement from its HQs in Paris on the dismissal of the DMK Government and termed the Central Government's allegations as baseless and malicious. The following report of the Intelligence Bureau reported this development :- (Annexure M-120)

(Weekly report for the week ending February 3, 1991 sent by Joint Director, SIB, Madras to DIB vide letter no 16-D/SZX/Weekly/91-26 dated 4.2.1991.)

".... The initial reaction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the dismissal of Tamil Nadu Government has emanated from Lawrence Thilagar, Paris based spokesman for the group. In a telephonic message to the French News Agency, AFP, he termed the Indian Government's decision to sack its Tamil Nadu State administration as "undemocratic and politically motivated." He also said that the reasons given by New Delhi for the State Government's dismissal and subsequent imposition of direct federal rule were 'baseless' and 'malicious.'"

The above reaction of the LTTE indicates the deep affinity between the DMK and LTTE; it also suggests that the LTTE resented this move of the Central Government as it had jeopardised their interests in the State of Tamil Nadu.

68 Let us examine what is the evidence which has come before the Commission with regard to the LTTE activities during the controversial period of DMK in Tamil Nadu.

Crucial evidence - both oral and documentary - is available with the Commission tendered by some key witnesses of Central Intelligence and other agencies as well as eminent diplomats who were deeply involved with this issue during the relevant period.

68.1 Shri N.V. Vathsan was Joint Director in the S.I.B., Madras, from 13.7.1989 to 5.1.1994 and thereafter he was transferred to Delhi and continued to look after the Sri Lankan affairs in the I.B. Headquarters for three months. Then, in April 1994, he was promoted as Additional Director and further promoted as Special Director and superannuated on 31.12.1996.

Having remained as Joint Director, S.I.B., Madras for about five years during the relevant period, Shri Vathsan has knowledge of Sri Lankan Tamil militancy in Tamil Nadu and its network and liaison.

About LTTE activities, Shri Vathsan deposed, "LTTE cadres were identified in Madras, Tiruchi, Madurai, Coimbatore, Salem and Erode. They formed distinct groups looking after :

i. Clandestine boat movements bringing in injured LTTE cadres for treatment and smuggling gold and electronic goods;

iii. Procurement of items required by LTTE such as explosives, detonators, POL, torch cells, tubes, plastic sheets, material for procuring boats and repairing them, military fatigue;

Their activities were noticed in all prime cities of Tamil Nadu. In Erode, they were busy in buying textiles, in Salem where they were busy looking after the injured cadres. The political wing used to liaise with leaders and political parties and also indulge in pro-LTTE propaganda by helping friendly groups with material. They also printed pro-Tamil and pro-LTTE propaganda material. The intelligence wing of the LTTE used to maintain its own clandestine communication network with the LTTE intelligence chief in Jaffna. They invariably used to send messages in codes.

We were able to identify that they had one clandestine wireless station at Madras. They invariably used to monitor all political developments concerning Indo-Sri Lankan relations in general and LTTE matters in particular. Subsequently, we came to know that two more stations were functioning. They were in Tamil Nadu, perhaps at Salem and Trichy. At Madras, we actually seized their wireless equipment during February, 1991 and that became the court's property. But when we went to Salem and Trichy, they had already removed these stations and we had information that in both these places they were functioning.

The I.B. was engaged in monitoring the wireless and radio transmissions and we managed to locate the call signs of the LTTE stations in general". Shri Vathsan deposed about the call signs of Prabhakaran as 'Communication Hq.', call signs belonging to the intelligence wing and the intelligence headquarter at Jaffna. After assumption of hostilities between the IPKF and LTTE in October, 1987, Shri Vathsan stated that the traffic on the intelligence network had increased. He explained the whole system of intercepting and using of codes and breaking of codes. Sri Lankan Tamil issue was a highly emotional issue in Tamil Nadu which had many sympathisers cutting across political lines.

They were liaisoning right from the then Chief Minister downwards, important DMK Ministers, certain Members of Parliament and officials of the Government of Tamil Nadu. Important leaders in touch included Shri M. Karunanidhi, Chief Minister, Ministers like Smt. Subbulakshmi Jagdeesan, MPs including Shri V. Gopalaswamy. The LTTE leaders included Natesan, Kasi Anandan and Kumar. The officials with whom the LTTE had contacts, one of them was Shri R. Nagarajan, the then Home Secretary, one or two Dy.SPs in the State Police. 'Q' Branch was looking after the LTTE.

During the days of Shri M.G. Ramachandran, while he supported the LTTE, he had full control over their movements and activities in Tamil Nadu. This slowly deteriorated and the LTTE began to assert itself and even at times criticised the State Government and leaders including the Chief Minister during the DMK regime. That is why we find some DMK leaders supporting the LTTE totally and others opposing it to a large extent.

But Shri Vathsan categorically stated, "But the fact of the matter is that during the DMK regime, police could not control the LTTE activities with the result that even the killing of a police constable went uninvestigated for a long time. Again, the LTTE succeeded to bribe a large number of State as well as Central Government officers. To give an example, during the raid of LTTE in February, 1991, we found a Sri Lankan Tamil keeping three passports, apparently genuine, issued by the R.P.O., Trichy, Madras and Bombay on different names, purported to be Indian but having the same photograph. They also managed to bribe the Customs and Immigration Officers and were passing through Madras airport abroad almost freely". Shri Vathsan referred to the following reports in his statement on 22.1.1997.

3. Report by CIO, Madras of 6.12.1990 regarding arrest of 10 LTTE militants at Tiruchi. (Exhibit CG/220);

4. Memorandum prepared by CIO, Madras on 13.12.1990 regarding smuggling operations by LTTE between Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. Exhibit CG/221.

5. Memorandum prepared by Asstt. Director, Sri Lanka Cell, SIB, Madras on 5.3.1990, Ex.CG/222, on LTTE activities at Kodiakadu- Kodiakarai area of Vedaranyam, Thanjavur.

6. Telephonic message from a Joint Director in the I.B. Hq. sent to DIB through IB Control Room on 20.7.1990 regarding LTTE, Exhibit CG/223.

7. Report by CIO, Madras dated 10.1.1991 against a DMK MLA for LTTE connections, Ex.CG/224.

8. Memorandum from CIO, Madras dated 5.2.1991 reg.the reaction of Chief Minister, Tamil Nadu, Shri Karunanidhi, to PM's statement in Parliament on 10.1.1991 that the CM Tamil Nadu had passed on certain information conveyed to him to the LTTE, Ex. CG/225.

9. Ex. CG/226 is a contact report prepared by CIO,Madras on 13.12.1990 regarding pro-LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu.

10. Ex. CG/227 is a contact report prepared by CIO,Madras on 12.10.1990 on LTTE affairs.

11. Ex.CG/228 is a memorandum prepared by Asstt.Director, SIB, Madras on 2.3.1990 regarding kidnapping of a Customs Inspector at Mallipattnam coast around the middle of February, 1990 by LTTE.

12. CG/229 is a memorandum prepared by CIO, Madras dated 28.1.1991 on LTTE affairs.

13. CG/230 is a memorandum prepared by Assistant Director, Sri Lanka Cell, SIB, Madras dated 27.11.1991 enclosing interrogation report of Charles, Ravi, Susindaran and Paul Raj.

Report No.18 dated 28.6.1990, Report No.20 dated 28.6.1991(?) (should be 1990).Report No. 21 dated 29.6.1990,

Report No. 31 dated 31.7.1990, Report No. 26 dated 4.7.1990, Report No. 36 dated 3.9.1990, Report No. 45 dated 12.12.1990 enclosed with the affidavit No.247/94 of Shri K. Padmanabhiah, Home Secretary.

The witness also produced a file with the letter marked CG/232 and enclosing papers from page No.1 to page No.67.

Report No.45 dated 12.12.1990 relates to leakage of information emanating from the Central Government to the LTTE by the Chief Minister.

Report No. 45 was CM's disclosure to LTTE about the attitude of V.P. Singh Government and the attitude of Shri Chandra Shekhar Government. - The Centre now contemplates direct action.

Report No. 46 indicates the Chief Minister informed the LTTE cadre Sachitanandam that the Centre had given directions to deport all the Sri Lankan militants.

Report No. 18 dated 28.6.1990 :(Annexure M-63(xi) It speaks of Chief Minister informing Natesan to provide advance information regarding LTTE movements and also sought details of locations of LTTE hideouts to direct the police to keep away from such places; it also records the opinion expressed by the Chief Minister regarding Padmanabha being a betrayer. This report encloses a written note by an LTTE cadre, marked 'X'.

Report No. 20 dated 28.6.1990 : Chief Minister told Natesan that killing of Padmanabha was a necessity and so also of Shri Varadaraja Perumal and that Natesan should ensure that he was taken into confidence before such acts are committed.

Report No. 21 dated 29.6.1990 : Chief Minister assures Natesan of unstinted cooperation in receiving the injured cadres for treatment and medical supplies and unhindered movement of injured cadres and closure of police check posts along the coasts for some time.

Report No. 31 dated 23.7.1990 : Natesan accompanied by Shri V. Gopalaswamy met Shri M. Karunanidhi on 22.7.1990 and handed over a communication from Prabhakaran to Shri Karunanidhi in an effort to explain the additional landing facilities. A note dated 29.7.1990 in the hand of and signed by Natesan is appended with this report together with the report No. 32 of the same date, marked 'Y'. Report No. 31 also discloses that Shri Karunanidhi had discussed with the Prime Minister Shri V.P. Singh about LTTE's requirements.

Report No. 32 dated 29.7.1990 : This report states that Natesan accompanied by Shri V. Gopalaswamy visited Delhi and met the Union Minister Shri George Fernandes and handed over to him the list of arms and equipment required by the LTTE. The Union Minister subsequently apprised the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs. This report is appended with the note dated 29.7.1990 in the hand of and under the signatures of Natesan.

Shri Vathsan took upon himself the responsibility of the reports being reliable and authentic. These are the reports of the time when the DMK was a partner in the National Front Government. He categorically deposed before the Commission,

"Unless the reports were highly reliable and authentic, I would not have sent the reports to the Director, I.B."

State Administration : Regarding the functioning of the State Administration, Shri Vathsan deposed :-

"the State Administration was supporting the LTTE and that made our task more difficult. To some extent, the State Administration, political as well as official, were conniving and colluding with the activities of the LTTE including where they had cache and huge amount of explosives. After raids and recovery, the State Administration deliberately allowed the ring leaders of the LTTE to go scot free".

Shri Vathsan expressed his opinion about the compilation of the allegations made by Shri P. Chidambaram which appeared in the Press (Exhibit 611) and also the statement of Shri R. Nagarajan under Section 164(5), Cr.P.C.(Annexure M-38) He deposed:-

"the allegations made by Shri P. Chidambaram as compiled in Exhibit 611 are correct".

Regarding the contents of the statement of Shri Nagarajan u/s 164 (5) Cr.P.C., Shri Vathsan stated :-

"I have seen the statement of Shri R. Nagarajan made under Section 164(5), Cr.P.C. (Exhibit 429). Whatever he had stated about the directives from the Chief Minister vis-a- vis the LTTE and other material facts regarding functioning of the police vis-a-vis the LTTE, are mostly correct as I remember to have sent reports on these to the I.B. Headquarters".

Shri Vathsan also stated that there was connivance on the part of the D.K. (Veeramani Group) and the D.K. (Ramakrishna Group) and Shri P. Nedumaran and his pro LTTE Tamil National Movement. Reports about their active connivance were received.

"LTTE was regularly organising clandestine boat movements for bringing in injured LTTE cadres and to smuggle gold biscuits. I.B. had identified some 20-30 difficult landing points along the Vedaranyam coast and also elsewhere right upto Chingelpet district. All these were shown in a map and a copy of the map was sent to the I.B. Headquarters. LTTE had given a code name for each and every of its landing points. Their operatives on land were using walkie-talkie sets and were in touch with the on-coming boats. They used to alert the boats to change their landing points depending upon the presence of police or Customs men on the earlier designated landing points".

The statement of Shri N.V. Vathsan if read along with the other oral and documentary evidence including the IB reports, connivance of the DMK leadership and of the law enforcement agencies is very well established.