UTHR 1991 Report

Tamils - a Trans State Nation..

"To us all towns are one, all men our kin.
Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill
Man's pains and pains' relief are from within.
Thus have we seen in visions of the wise !."
- Tamil Poem in Purananuru, circa 500 B.C

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The Clash of Idealogies and the Continuing Tragedy
in the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts

The current report is centred on the East and raises issues which we think are central to the political future of this country. Our inquiries were made mainly on the stretch of the east coast from Vantharumoolai, north of Batticaloa, to Komari, near Pottuvil. In the course of preparing this report, we received invaluable help from some human rights activists in the South, who also gave us accounts of recent massacres of Sinhalese pea sants in parts of the Moneragala district bordering the East. Through discussions with them, we were able to gather something of the feelings of Sinhalese settled in the East.

At the cost of some repetition of material from earlier reports (No.5 and Special No.3), our final chapter attempts to clarify the issues surrounding state aided colonisation.

Some of the areas covered in Special Report No.3 were revi sited. This time we had the benefit of several cordial conversations with Muslims living in the region from Eravur to Akkarai pattu. This helped us to correct some of the imbalance that readers of Special Report No.3 complained of.

The current report is fairly detailed, as some of the ear lier ones have been, and may deter the average reader. Given our situation and our capacity, our primary purpose is not only to make an immediate impact. By leaving behind a historical record, we hope that it would influence the development of healthier politics in the future.

We have argued in our reports that at the root of the present political crisis and the spate of human rights violations, lies the degrading feeling of powerlessness which the different communities feel in the face of forces who not just impose upon them, but are often ready to resort to massacres. Though the protagonists, whether the state or a militant group, may temporarily gloat over the powerlessness of the victim, it also turns the alienated young into militant potential that could be moul ded. It becomes all the more explosive in a culture where it has become respectable to be insensitive.

It has become fashionable in our universitites to tell students not to talk about political issues, while young men and women, peasants, soldiers and even children, are giving their lives by the hundreds. For the, perhaps small, minority of students who are keenly aware of the tragedy of their own village, are unable to talk about it in a sympathetic environment, and feel angry about it, secret societies and covert activity become the only outlets.

We have also constantly argued that the state, with its legal obligations and material resources, must make a bold poli tical initiative based on human rights, to break the ideological blockade, remove the feeling of powerlessness among people, and give them confidence, instead of being trapped in its ugly actions.

Being university teachers rooted in Jaffna, through the experience of our own tragedy, we have found it a necessary part of our special obligation to question those ideological predilec tions, prejudices and hypocrisy on the part of our own community that have also contributed to this tragedy. Though such unortho doxy has caused unease, as we have explained earlier, it is a necessary part of the unfolding. Also, we on our part, regard it as meaningless to record violations without going into the context.

Sadly today, despite the government's claims to have restored a semblance of normality, there are constant remin ders of the state's brutality, potential and actual.

Following the incident in Iruthayapuram, a northern suburb of Batticaloa, at the end of March, when 12 civilians were massacred in reprisals, the regional police chief reassured the citizens' committee. He did not refer to any inquiry or disciplinary action. The police officers involved, he said, were being transferred to Mannar, that was incidentally being prepared to receive a refugee influx from India. A month later, end of April, civilians passing a police check point in the area, witnessed two beheaded corpses 50 yards away. Routine experiences of Easterners are variations on the same theme.

In dealing with such a government, in massacering Sinhalese and Muslim civilians, the Tigers have been prepared to pay the price of utterly discrediting themselves as a liberation group, and greatly diminishing the dignity and security of Tamils, in return for longevity.

A climate of terror now prevails among all communities in the Moneragala district, following massacres of Sinhalese civi lians. Reprisals against hill country (estate) Tamils in the area, appear consistent with some security officials in the area giving the impression that attacks on Sinhalese were carried out by estate Tamils.

With the government proceeding thus in a political vacuum, we need to take serious alarm at the prospect of escalation. Sheer anger and alienation, rather than any tangible gain, may push many estate youth towards a cause which would only use them cynically.

In their state of helplessness and degradation, the Eastern Tamils tend to look admiringly at their Northern counterparts as forming a bastion of resistance. Little do they understand that what obtains in the North is a community with its moral sensibilities shrivelled, groping at survival. Through manipulation and playing on its weaknesses, the community does not question why young children are sent on a suicidal course to give their lives. But in the little room allowed for it to manage some survival tasks, it can show considerable will power and resistance.

People set themselves immediate goals such as : take son to Colombo, arrange to stay or go abroad. Come back to Jaffna. Secure house from takeover. Collect son's documents, testimonials, leaving certificate etc. Go to Colombo and so on.

Irritation resulting from punitive delays at LTTE and Sri Lankan army check points in Vavuniya, can elicit both strong protest as well as some harsh counter action. The task of catching that day's train to Colombo can be so all consuming, that beating the queue by ignoring warnings of minefields would appear natural.

Persons may carelessly remark that now with the army camp at Mankulam demolished, if the same is done to that at Elephant Pass, the route to Colombo will then be clear. This shows the differences in perception between ordinary civilians on one hand and the children who are giving their lives for what they think would be a separate state. The obsession of many is with having a clear route to Colombo, which existed before the war, and not to Trincomalee or Batticaloa. Driven to such a level of existence, the community earns increasing contempt from all armed parties.

The people must also ignore the experience of 1987, reinterpret the contrived tragedy of the East, and go in for hallucinations, in order to believe that the LTTE is protecting them from the vindictive ire of the Sri Lankan army. Many would argue that the policemen massacred by the LTTE last June were killed by Sri Lankan forces, The Eastern Tamils continue as refugees because they are lazy as usual, and so on. The politics needs to encourage such illusions.

We have pointed out that it would be a grave mistake for anyone to take satisfaction in the reduction to such a state, of this or any other section of this country. Jaffna has much poten tial to be tapped for the good of the whole country. Nothing is gained by a politics that turns a section of the people into gelignite.

It must also be mentioned that persons with diverse vocations in Jaffna feel the urge to speak out at considerable risk. One speaker said at a recent public seminar in Jaffna:

"Is it good to lose one's inner freedom and survive for the sake of existence? The war has created a sense of powerlessness which has led to helplessness. Are we being used as pawns in a game of chess? Are the people being victimised?"

The speaker constantly referred to the social impact of the American veterans of the Korean and Vietnam wars, to illustrate what was going on in Jaffna.

Glimmers of hope amidst a sea of despair. In the light of experience over the past decade, and the existing political vacuum, what we face now is surely frightening. Looking back over the war, there have been a few initiatives, often by individual officers, which can be utilised to improve the situation.

We have recorded in this report the case of an army unit at Kaluwanchikudy which had set high standards and also a police OIC in Akkaraipattu who attempted the same. Such attempts did help to usher in a benign atmosphere. There is also the case of the Brigadier who was brought in after a bad experience in Mannar. He promised civilians in Mannar that there would be no further disappearances and that detainees would be treated according to normal rules. His intentions were not doubted, and by comparison elsewhere, his promise was largely kept.

Bombing in Jaffna was mostly stopped when the new defence minister took charge on 6th March. It helped to soften in civilian minds the vindictive face of the government.

We have also seen that good officers can enforce a high level of discipline. Civilian life in Mannar town now goes on normally while injured soldiers are brought to hospital - some thing unique in the annals of the Sri Lankan army. Things were also helped by the interest taken by the UNHCR, the ICRC and the Indian Government.

But all these are largely isolated instances in a political vacuum. An officer who rises above the general level of political culture deserves high praise. In this situation, which lacks clarity regarding goals, the work of a few good officers and the effect of isolated initiatives soon wear off at the slightest fraying of tempers.

Over the traditional New Year there was some senseless bombing and shelling in Jaffna resulting in civilian casualties. The recent bombing of the repaired ferry at Puneryn had no pur pose except to give vent to anger.

When 4 civilians were hacked to death in the Mannar sector on 17th February, even the well-meaning Brigadier became party to a cover up.

There is no momentum leading to disciplinary action against offenders in order to move ahead with confidence building mea sures. There is thus no option except to lauch a bold political initiative. Once the momentum is generated, we are certain that everyone concerned will be pushed into responding positively.

We put forward the following demands pertaining to some urgent issues raised in this report.

1. Create institutional machinery using locally and interna tionally based organisations to further and monitor the observance of human rights. There is an urgent need for the security forces to respond positively to complaints by civilians.
In this connection, a press summary of 'Human Rights in Civil War - the case of El Salvador, a statement issued by the Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka, is given in Appendix 1.

The statement deals with the agreement of July 1990 between the two parties to the Salvadorean conflict laying down a detailed framework for UN participation in the maintenance and monitoring of Human Rights. This precedent opens creative possibilities for both sides to the Sri Lankan conflict. It, more importantly, provides for space to enable ordinary people to express their aspirations.

2. Take all necessary steps to convince Tamils and Muslims living in the East that the state has no agenda of its own to change the demography of the North-East.

Halt the ongoing process of resettlement of a particular community with state patronage. Ensure that all three major communities feel that their specific needs will be taken into consideration in resettlement and rehabilitation programmes.

3. Appoint a committee consisting of persons from all communi ties to study the question of land settlement and to propose a solution acceptable to all three communities living in these areas, respecting the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of our society. The committee should probe into :

(i) The history of re-colonisation and the demographical changes that took place as the result of manipulation by the state. Whether the nature and the working of the present state machinery is biased towards any particular community.
(ii) Social changes resulting from transfer of lands to particular communities, with no state involvement, and the social forces behind such transfers.
(iii) Social changes resulting from a neglect of economic development in the North-East, such as emigration of a large section of the middle class, and the resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability.

4. The government should come out with a clear equitable policy statement on land settlement, and should take positive action at a high level to ensure that any built up inertia of the state machinery to favour a particular community is broken.

The common mood one comes across among Eastern Tamils is one of resignation and utter helplessness. The humiliation they feel has been rubbed in deep by the frustration they experienced in respect of missing persons, and the dire threats connected to burning tyres with which government servants were ordered to return to work. The Batticaloa and Kalmunai areas each have lists of dead and missing extending over 1000. The regime is not always so harsh now. Sentry point checks are mostly formal and policemen and soldiers could frequently be friendly and human. Yet there is an undercurrent of unpredictability. The massacre of 20 or so Tamil travellers in Eravur on 21st February, following the kil ling of two Muslim homeguards is among several sharp reminders that lives are playthings for the state.

Apart from the fact that people are nearly always questioned in Sinhalese, there is the very visible fact in Batticaloa town, that Tamil and Sinhalese policemen are distinguished by the former being unarmed and the latter armed. This is a humiliation to which Sinhalese policement were not subject following the recent JVP uprising.

The visit by President Premadasa on 14th February did nothing to restore confidence among Tamils. A delegation of Battica loa mothers wanted the President to look into the matter of 175, mainly youths, removed by the army from the Eastern University refugee camp on 5th and 23rd September, who then disappeared without a trace.

The President told them in effect: "The mothers of those killed by the JVP are crying. The mothers of dead secu rity forces personnel are crying....."

To many people in Battica loa, this sounded a piece of sarcasm completely evading the fact that the President has an obligation to be accountable. The people also noticed that the President visited Kattankudy where the Tigers killed Muslims, but made no attempt to visit places such as Valaichenai where a large number of Tamils had been killed. The President's gift to Batticaloa town of a clock tower based on Kandyan architecture, topped by an ornament of Buddhist significance, only gave further offence. A university don obser ved, "Kandyan architecture may be good in itself. But we have been through an experience after which we see everything through coloured glasses. Could he not understand that?"

Coupled to a measure of satisfaction that the LTTE is embar rassing the government, there are very grave reservations about its record. When the LTTE ran away in June after announcing the final battle, deserting the people faced with an angry army, there was both puzzlement and anger. After building heavy forti fications, the Tigers had abandoned the Oddaimavadi bridge - the gateway to Batticaloa District - without a fight. Many expostu lated:"Whatever happened to those arms captured from the TNA which the Tigers had displayed in lorry loads?"

One observer said that the Tigers had met their Waterloo in Kiran. Their failure to overrun the small unprepared army camp despite repeated attacks, he felt, had changed their psychology. Their policy then evident ly changed to concentrating their military strength in the North and to provoking and using the conduct of the forces to turn the East into a source of recruits.
Like elsewhere, the result of the struggle particularly in the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts is paradoxical.

A powerful driving force in these areas was to break out of the hegemony of Jaffna and to assert an Eastern identity. The massive participa tion of Eastern youth in the militancy, it was once thought, would lead to this. Eastern youth are today dying for the Tiger cause in larger numbers than ever before. But the hegemony of the Jaffna based leadership has been strengthened. Myths far removed from reality, concerning the superiority of Jaffna, are current in the East.

Common ones are : "Our Tigers are rotters. They are only good at settling personal scores. But those in Jaffna are doing a splendid job, sincerely dedicated to a cause", and, "We Tamils in the East have no future. We are always cutting each others' throats. We have no leadership like in Jaffna."

Ironical ly, the Tigers have been saying repeatedly in Jaffna that it is the Eastern boys who are largely fighting for them, while Jaffna boys were being selfish and are running away. People have become tired and fatalistic, not wanting to talk about what happened ("It is all history now!") and not wanting to analyse.

Only a few understand that Tiger policy is a well co-ordinated policy with Eastern cadre doing a good part of the fighting and dying in the North. To enhance and sustain the Eastern man's loss of confi dence in his own ability is an important aspect of Tiger poli tics. When the Eastern University became a large refugee camp where people were learning to take up issues collectively, des pite serious ups and downs, and the camp leadership was develo ping a strong sense of responsibility, whom the people were looking up to, the Tigers forced the closure of the camp without any discussion with the camp leadership. People who were reali sing some collective strength to fight back, were driven to become helpless fugitives in jungles, unprotected and facing many natural perils in addition to bombing and helicopter straffing. (See report).

The lesson that has been tragically brought home to both Muslims and Tamils is that the two communities are inseparably linked and that a sound basis for co-existence needs to be found. The fear of LTTE attacks on Muslims and Tamil fears of reprisals by Muslim home guards, directly or indirectly backed by the forces, has affected all areas of life. In the rice bowl of the nation, the fields of both communities remain untended. Herds of cattle which used ot supply milk are unaccounted for, because villagers dare not go far looking for them.

On the road between Batticaloa and Kalmunai, passenger vans belonging to one communi ty drive at break neck speed through villages of the other commu nity, not daring to pause. The bulk of Muslim staff and students do not attend Eastern University because it is situated in a Tamil area, although the neighbouring area is Muslim.

Mutual necessity however helps to build bridges. Kattankudy is a Muslim village heavily dependent on trade. Owing to the security situation, Tamil traders lack the ability to transport goods from Colombo. Within three weeks of the Kattandudy massa cre, there were gestures of conciliation. Kattankudy traders have now re-opened their shops in Batticaloa town.
In many areas peace committee meetings have been organised by security forces commanders and held in police stations - the most acceptable venue for both parties.

The exercise has several drawbacks. With the state, ironically in concert with the Tigers, having actually encouraged and used Tamil-Muslim differences, its motives are suspect, although individual officers may be sincere. An important draw back is that apart from expressing good senti ments and bringing about some thaw, these committees can deter mine very little. They cannot give guarantees of safety. At least in the area of expressing goodwill and trying to understand each others immediate difficulties, there have been some successes. A notable failure is Kalmunai.

The resumption of Kattankudy Muslims trading in Batticaloa was aided partly by good personal relations between the community leadership at Kattankudy and the Roman Catholic Church. The Church had also tried hard without success to get the LTTE re lease three Muslim leaders it had abducted form Eravur on 4th July.

But the ultimate guarantee for secrutity rests with forces outside the control of ordinary people, pursuing their own aims. Tamils fear getting back to Pottuvil and Eravur because they cannot predict how the security forces would react to acts of the LTTE. Acts of violence attributed to Muslims have almost never been independent. Muslims on the other hand are looking for guarantees, not from the security forces or from Muslim politi cians, but from the LTTE.

In town after town Muslims has said that the Tamil-Muslim differences would vanish the moment the LTTE states publicly that it would not harm Muslims. The more mature Muslim leaders are extremely anxious to re-establish good relations with Tamils. Our discussions were always cordial. After 9 months of war, the LTTE is seen on the surface as the major actor - it shows the powerlessness of all the communities and the destructive power of the LTTE.

From the time it massacred Muslim and Sinhalese policemen at the outset of the war, the LTTE has pursued a clear strategy of attacking Muslims and deepening communal enmity. Even at the time some Muslims reacted in Kalmunai following the killing of Muslim policemen and the arrival of the army, there were no signs of unrest in the Batticaloa district. There was even a tendency among Muslims here to rationalise the Tigers' actions.

Yet from the 12th July, the Tigers set about attacking Muslims in the Batticaloa district, starting with the massacre at Kurukkal Madam. It is this that argues against the supposition that the initial killing of Muslim policemen among others was simply a mistake by a local leader. The Tigers have stirred the communal cauldron and have used the anger and frustration resulting from government actions to get their recruits. But at what price? All creative activity in the region has been brought to a standstill, and the Tamils in parti cular are on the way to becoming a smaller and fragile community.

While there is a limit to which the state could afford to be seen as working towards anarchy, the Tigers have no such inhibitions. They have cloaked total irresponsibility as a sacred prerogative. Thanks to their adversary, they have been able to demonstrate that they could frustrate anything by anyone else. If they choose to give a guarantee of safety to the Muslims tomorrow, the relief will be so great that if elections are held immediately afterwards, many Muslims would consider voting for them as a survival tactic.

Such benefits can only be shortlived. In defying every human norm, the Tigers have also sown the seeds of their own destruction. The longer the crisis lasts the greater the anger against elders, who appear to compromise Muslim dignity to survive. More Muslim youngsters will draw the conclusion that to oppose the Tigers, they must imitate them. With economic hardship and confinement, there are disturbing signs of such a reaction. Posters have reportedly appeared in Eravur threatening those who have dealings with Tamils. Many Muslims are keenly aware what it would mean for the Muslim community. A Muslim leader in Akkaraipattu said vividly:"An attack is something that lasts a short time, some die and it is over. What we are worried about is the counter-attack. It grows within us and terrorises us, as it happened to your community."

The other danger referred to by both Muslim and Tamil lea ders is that while the present state of communal enmity lasts, there will be no political initiative and matters of common interest vital to both communities will be lost sight of. While the Tamils and Muslims are preoccupied with each other and with the security forces dominating most of Amparai District, the state will push Sinhalese colonisation from the west. As it is few Tamils and Muslims are left in the Gal Oya scheme. With the commencement of the war, the few Tamils left in Amparai town and places such as Inginiyagala and Ingurana were killed or thrown out. Pottuvil is now a no go area for Tamils. While the Tigers have used the mad policy of state sponsored Sinhalese colonisa tion of deprived Sinhalese for mobilisation, they have done nothing to address the issue creatively.

While the Sri Lankan forces began the war in an orgy of blood, as though they were co-operating in a recruitment campaign for the Tigers, the killing at present is at a low ebb. The occasional massacre still does take place. From mid-February to late March at least, those taken prisoner are generally said to be alive. In many cases visits have been al lowed. In Thirukkovil-Thambiluvil, the last known killings by the STF were about early February. In Karaitivu it is said that most of those taken in are released soon. There is some uncertainty about what happens to the rest. We have no information on deve lopments following the deterioration in Moneragala.

There appeared to be a change of orders and a change of tactics. There are even cases in early March where the STF had warned LTTE suspects and sent them home. These may have borne some fruit if the government had launched a parallel political initiative to give confidence to the Tamils. But the forces have been sent to do a thankless and frustrating job in a total poli tical vacuum. The forces lack the discipline, and character to match the Tigers' destructiveness. They had discredited them selves and hurt the Tamils too deeply. The initiative is thus clearly with the Tigers. Everytime the forces react by punishing the Tamils, they move a step in the direction of defeat.

While the government has over 9 months not made up its mind on a political programme, the process of destruction goes on. Barely three days after we had conversations with Muslim leaders in Akkaraipattu, who were both warm and hospitable, a bomb went off in the fish market killing at least six persons and injuring several more. This co-incided with LTTE attacks elsewhere in the East. In Akkaraipattu, both Muslims and Tamils had to put in much creative effort to restore something close to normal relations. Many old friendships had been reactivated and even some inter- communal organisations were functioning. It took only a split second for an imbecile bomb to destroy that trust so painfully rebuilt.

The purpose of the bomb was to simply ensure that Tamils and Muslims do not discover strength in working with each other. In handling the aftermath, the forces have predictably failed, however determined they were to prevent trouble. Local sources said that 23 Tamils had been abducted by Muslim homeguards, not in Akkaraipattu, but in the sensitive region between Kalmunai and Karaitivu. A senior police officer is quoted as saying that he is not aware of such abductions.

This would only further enhance Tamil fears and distrust. To the Tamils, homeguards are simply an arm of the forces. In the incident of 21st February near Eravur, where about 20 Tamil travellers were massacred, at least two gun shots were fired and one or more persons in uniform were sighted. There was no attempt to have an inquiry to punish the offenders and to reassure the Tamils that this would not happen again. The late Minister for Defence simply contended that homeguards were not involved, as if that were the end of the matter.

The state of mind of Tamils around Kalmunai should be understood. It would take a generation or more for them to recover from the entry of the first army battalion last June. Their subsequent experience is one of conti nual horror - mostly linked to Muslim home guards and their masters. They would tell you today: "Do not go on the streets after six", "Do not go near the old police station. That is where they behead people." To the outsiders, the burnt out shops of Kalmunai are merely an eyesore. But those who pass them day after day are reminded of corpses and skeletal remains.

Whether the information concerning the abduction of 23 Tamils is accurate or not, the authorities have to go far beyond simple denial - to the process of the law. It has been brought home to the Tamils again and again that publicising Muslim deaths is good propagan da, but Tamils do not matter for the government. For the Tigers it is the reverse. In the meantime the Tigers have launched a recruitment drive with the slogan of liberating South Tamil Eelam (the East). Tamils in such an environment will seldom see through the cynicism.

Barring a new initiative by a force that can give confidence to all communities, the East stands to slip further into tragedy. On a human level, the trage dy of the East is beyond description. Its vast agricultural potential remaining unused is a mere symptom. Communities who had lived together have been split asunder by hatreds. The Tamils have been prostrated by a sense of division. Many families resulting from intercommunal marriages had been broken up. Communities of Sinhalese had sprung up in many Eastern towns in a healthy manner, through normal migration in search of oppotunities. These Sinhalese who had intimate social relations with those whom they lived among, have also been humiliated, killed or expelled.

The Muslims and Tamils spoke the same language, lived with each other and were bound by local customs. The question whether one is Tamil or Muslim is ironical at a time when perhaps the greater volume of literary output in Tamil appearing locally is of Muslim authorship. Tamils must face up to the fact that in stead of using much that was common to strengthen existing ties, by giving respect to Muslims for their contribution to the economy and culture, they treated them as an appendage. Attempts to forge only a mechanical unity in the face of threats from the state, such as colonisation, exposed all the contradictions.

The tragedy of the East is one aspect of the corrosive politics that has been the bane of every part of the nation. Despite all this human destruction that is a living reality for the vast majority of people in this country, conventional econo mic indicators blithely proclaim a growing economy. It is this that would weigh heavily with those powers who mechanically decide the fate of small third world nations.

In order for the Easterners to find a creative means of fighting back, they need to rediscover the history they had forgotten. Today they are dominated by a total sense of their division and worthlessness, coupled with an admiration for Jaffna that was initially a part of the middle class value system.

The truth is very different. Until quite recently the Eas tern militant cadre showed a community spirit which ignored group divisions. When this posed a challenge to the leadership in Jaffna, they had to send men from Jaffna to create division and restore their authority. When the LTTE took on the TELO in May 1986, the native born Batticaloa LTTE leader, Kadavul, issued a statement expressing the need for Eastern Tamils to be united and assured the other groups that they would not be harmed.

The LTTE leadership had to send Kumarappa and Pottu to enforce the divi sion. Francis, another LTTE leader born in Batticaloa, was very highly regarded and is said to have been against the killing of Batticaloa resident Sinhalese in October 1987. The killings were ordered by the Jaffna leadership. Francis later died a miserable man. Division, mutual suspicion and a feeling of worthlessness in the East are thus integral to the LTTE's strategy, which based on Tamil chauvinism has also meshed with the aims of Sinhalese chauvinism. The organic unity of the East needs to be rediscovered.

The Clash of Idealogies and the Continuing Tragedy in the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts

The Clash of Idealogies and the Continuing Tragedy
in the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts