The Fear of the Demand for One country,
Two States,
and Equal Individual Opportunity
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Volume 10,
2003
Introduction
In my view a common thread running
throughout the history of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in
the post-independence period is the Buddhist fear of the
Tamil demand for sharing as one nation, two states, and with
equal individual opportunity. There is fear on both sides
now and there was probably some fear even at the time of
independence. In the Tamil perspective, the majority
Buddhists and the Sinhalese could have been magnanimous,
accommodative, and reassuring. There can be a peaceful
solution to the conflict only if this angle is understood.
The ethnic problem in Sri Lanka is curious in that it can be
described as a conflict of the Buddhists versus the Tamils.
Some foreigners, even some foreign scholars and journalists
find it difficult to understand this equation and substitute
the Buddhists versus the Hindus. The Sri Lanka Buddhist
clergy and laymen target the Tamils and almost never the
Hindus as such. The Buddhist monks also spearhead the
Sinhala nationalist movements. There is no Hindu clergy
counterpart in the Tamil national movement. The Pali
chronicles also speak about the Tamil invaders of the
Buddhist kingdom, and they refer to the Buddhist kings (even
though they could be wicked), who defeated the Tamil kings
(even though they might have been righteous), as heroes.
Probably self-government is always preferable to good
government. What the Buddhists find difficult to digest is
that even the Tamils could hold on to this maxim.
Immediately before and after independence, the Buddhists
appear to have talked about an inclusive nationalism, as it
was directed mainly against foreign rule and English. By
1956 it became exclusive as it was directed against a
perceived domination by the Tamils and possible domination
by Tamils also. The 1972 Constitution went further and
focused on Buddhism, obviously to please the Buddhist
clergy. The Republic of Sri Lanka were to give Buddhism the
foremost place and it became the duty of the State to
protect and foster the Buddha Sasana. The 1978 Constitution
tried to accommodate the claims of Tamil and English as
official languages to some extent but the clause regarding
Buddhism was retained in toto. The proposed Constitution of
the P.A. government of 2000 tried to make the clause
regarding Buddhism, an entrenched clause in the
Constitution, requiring a 2/3 majority in parliament and the
approval of the country at a referendum for amendment. This
also spoke about the setting up of a Supreme Council in
consultation with the Maha Sangha and consulting it in all
matters pertaining to the protection and fostering of the
Buddha Sasana. If this clause were to become an entrenched
clause, this could be interpreted in different ways to harm
non-Buddhists, especially the Tamils. The government
probably calculated that its proposals regarding devolution
would not face opposition from the Buddhist clergy, if they
found that the clause regarding Buddhism was entrenched in
the Constitution.
If this clause were to continue, then the provisions,
elsewhere in the proposed constitution, that assure equality
of all religions would be incompatible with this, and would
therefore become meaningless. Conferring a superior status
to the religion of one group of citizens over that of others
is of much greater consequence than even the question of
what powers would be delegated to the regional councils.
Here again, there seems to be a fear to accept the situation
that the state should treat all citizens alike. The P.A.
government brought forward an Equal Opportunities Bill a
couple of years ago in the parliament and then withdrew it
because there was much opposition to accepting equal
opportunity for all citizens.
The clause giving Buddhism the foremost place among
religions in the country and stipulating a duty of the State
to foster and protect the Sasana will make the Buddhists who
form about 2/3 of the population of the country, practically
a high caste ruling elite. The attempt to make it an
entrenched clause signifies that a substantial section of
the population are very unhappy about this position and they
might try to overturn this position and this overturning has
to be made very difficult. It is divisive clauses like this
that lead to perpetual conflict in a multilingual and
multireligious society. The Buddhists can have their
organizations to protect and foster the Sasana and
contribute to them. It is unfair to force non-Buddhists who
form about 1/3 of the population of the country to pay for
the pleasure of the other 2/3 of the population. The
Buddhist clergy should agree to let the State to treat all
its citizens and ethnic groups alike.
Difference between the Buddhist perspective and the Tamil
perspective
The difference in perspective between the
Buddhists and the Tamils about how far back we have to go to
bring back peace is very significant. The Buddhists will be
suggesting 1976 if not 1983, when the TULF opted for an
independent state for the Tamils and when militant movements
originated among the Tamils. The Tamils will be suggesting
1948 if not 1956 when tentative steps were taken for the
restoration of a Sinhalese Buddhist state. In the Tamil
perspective, the Tamils were pushed to the limits of
desperation to demand separation and to take up arms in the
1970s. The Sinhalese started to fight against imaginary
Tamil separatism in 1957 when the Provincial Council which
Bandaranayake agreed to set up in the North-East (which was
much less than Federalism) was blown up as a separate Tamil
State by its Sinhalese opponents of the UNP and others. The
Sinhalese opponents of the SLFP and others campaigned
against imaginary Tamil separatism again in 1968 when Dudley
Senanayake agreed to set up District Councils in the
North-East.
During the late fifties and the late sixties, some Tamil
politicians put forward the claim for a separate state for
the Tamils. C. Suntharalingam, the then popular MP for
Vavuniya, was the first to campaign for a separate country
in the late fifties. The Tamil FP campaigned against his
demand, characterising it as extremism, and soon he lost
even his seat. When the District Council bill was abandoned,
V. Navaratnam, MP for Kayts, defected from the FP and
started the Self-Rule Movement, to establish a separate
country for the Tamils. In the 1970 elections, the FP put
forward a loyal candidate against him and got him defeated
in his electorate. These are instances to show that Tamil
nationalism continued to be inclusive. The Tamils continued
to have hopes of a fair settlement within a united country.
In the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka, the issue of majority
versus minority is very important. About a fourth of the
people speak Tamil. Only about half of them are Tamils of
indigenous origin. Regionally the Tamils are the majority in
the North-East while the Sinhalese are the majority in the
South-West. It is the North-East Tamil majority who have
been fighting, trying to remain afloat, without getting lost
and losing their identity. They have been putting forward
various demands to be able to share power and to have equal
opportunity. The history of the ethnic problem during the
last six decades could be described as the Tamils trying to
share power. Even the demand for separation is an attempt to
share the island, if the Buddhists could not agree to share
power and wanted to hold on to a virtual Sinhala Buddhist
state. In the Tamil perspective, which has become hardened
after half a century of oppression and two decades of civil
war, the Tamils, who could have settled down for compromise
solutions in the fifties and the sixties, have begun to feel
that they are a people or a nation. They have their own
language, culture and historical habitat within the island.
They are loyal to their motherland and that is why they have
been fighting for the last two decades.
If Sinhalese nationalism continues to be
exclusive, it is doubtful whether unity will ever return to
the island. If Sinhalese nationalism can be inclusive, a
genuine attempt must be made to make possible real
power-sharing. As a people, the Tamils want to be treated as
equals of the Sinhalese, another people. Independence
implies equality before the law and equal opportunity in the
country. The Tamils believe in the sovereignty of the
people. State comes into being by the free will of the
people. If the present state caters to one people
exclusively, the other people should have a right to
establish a state of their own and share the island.
The unity of the country and the territorial
integrity of the country can be preserved if constitutional
arrangements are so made and governments are so carried on
as to enable the Tamils to have equality and equal
opportunity. In the Tamil perspective, the Buddhist talk
about the unity and territorial integrity of the country
appears hypocritical because the proper course for
establishing the unity of the country is to win over all
sections of the people of the country. If all sections of
the people of the country can be made to feel they have a
stake in the unity of the country, then there will be unity
and territorial integrity. The Buddhists want to have the
land of the North-East, but not its people. They dont care
for the misery of the people there under the long civil war
and the prolonged military occupation, if land can be
brought under the control of the State and ultimately under
their control. Some Buddhist monks perform bodhi pujas and
bless the armed forces to bring unity by conquest and
military occupation. The Tamils have been at the receiving
end of all this; they have been treated as foreign enemies.
Military atrocities against the Tamil civilians very rarely
received any attention from the State or from the media
controlled by the Sinhalese because it was considered
unpatriotic to condemn them or to take action against them.
Tamil political demands and pragmatism
The Tamils have put forward various demands
during the last 60 years:- fifty- fifty, parity of status,
federalism, separation and self-determination. It is too
simplistic to say that the Sinhalese are always for unity
and the Tamils are always for separation. The Tamils began
to demand even federalism rather gradually. What they want
is power-sharing and equal opportunity. At the time of the
Soulbury Commission in the 1940s, the Tamils demanded
fifty-fifty, - 50% representatives for the Sinhalese and 50%
representatives for the non-Sinhalese, -a form of balanced
representation in a unitary constitution so that the
Sinhalese cannot dominate all the others combined. The
Buddhist revival under Anagarika Dharmapala has given the
Sinhalese the ideology of a Sinhala Buddhist state. The
Tamils feared that the Sinhalese would use their political
power to oppress other sections of the people of the
country.
They had a bad experience in 1936 when the
Executive Committee system was manipulated to establish a
Pan-Sinhalese Ministry. To form a government, the Sinhalese
should be able to get the cooperation of at least one or two
members from the other communities so that the government
will not ride rough-sod over the other communities. The
Tamils were thinking primarily of equal opportunity for all
individuals and trying to secure that position within the
unitary constitution. After independence, the Tamil demand
became parity of status for Sinhala and Tamil languages
under a unitary constitution. The Tamils felt that parity of
status would ensure equality of the speakers of the two main
languages of the country as well as equal opportunity for
individuals. The Buddhists argued that parity of status
would lead to the disappearance of Sinhalese language and as
a consequence, of Buddhism itself from the island. This
irrational argument swept through the Sinhalese electorate.
The major parties opted for Sinhalese only and then the
Marxist parties also followed suit later.
The Tamils began to vote for the FP in large numbers from
1956 and continued to do so till 1970. Federalism can
provide for "one country, two states, and equal
opportunity". In the Tamil perspective, the demand for
federalism was a Tamil realization that the Sinhalese wanted
a restoration of the Sinhalese state and in that set-up
there could not be equality of different nationalities and
equality of opportunity for all individuals. The demand for
a Tamil state was to provide for equality as a nationality.
The word state can mean either a country or a unit in a
federation. To avoid confusion, country is used for an
independent country and state is used for a unit in a
federation in this paper. Even after the establishment of a
federation, where states will provide for some form of
power-sharing, equality of opportunity for individuals in
the central or federal government have to be worked out.
The unity of a country can be preserved even
under a federal constitution. Even though there are many
countries with federal constitutions and they remain united,
this demand was portrayed to the Sinhalese electorate as a
demand for dismemberment of their country. The question of
unitary constitution versus federal constitution is really a
question of monopoly of power for the Buddhists or the
Buddhists sharing power with the other groups. The Sinhalese
leaders and the Buddhist clergy vehemently opposed the
federal demand, equating it to separation. Any gain to the
Tamils is portrayed as a loss to the Sinhalese. As the
Tamils were demanding federalism, it was perceived as an
evil to which the Sinhalese should never agree. The
Buddhists have never made an attempt to understand
federalism or to explain the concept of federalism to the
Sinhalese electorate. But the Tamil leaders were not at all
intransigent.
They were ready to settle for much less,
when the relationship between the two peoples had not yet
been embittered by a long drawn out conflict. The Federal
Party tried to be pragmatic and tried to make compromises.
In 1957, it came to an agreement with Bandaranayake known as
the Bandaranayake - Chelvanayagam Pact. A form of provincial
autonomy for the North-East with Tamil as the administrative
language was found to be agreeable for both leaders. Though
it was far short of federalism, the Federal Party was
willing to compromise in the interests of peace and asked
the Tamil people to accept it as an interim measure. This
provincial autonomy could have been established under a
unitary constitution. The compromise solution was portrayed
by the U.N.P. as a betrayal of the Sinhalese to the Tamils
and as giving away of 1/3 of the country to the Tamils. The
Buddhist monks marched to Bandaranayakes residence and
demanded that Bandaranayake abrogate the Pact. Bandaranayake
obliged them and an opportunity for peace was lost. The
Tamil leadership climbed down to be pragmatic. But the
result was nothing.
The Federal Party tried to be kingmaker twice in the 1960s
to find justice for the Tamils. In the1960 March elections,
neither of the two main parties obtained an absolute
majority. The UNP, with the largest number of seats, formed
the government. The SLFP obtained the support of the Federal
Party to defeat the government, promising to redress the
Tamil grievances. In the 1960 July elections, the SLFP came
to power with an absolute majority and formed the
government. There were talks between the government and the
FP but the government was not prepared for any compromise
solution. This effort of the Tamil leadership resulted in
nothing again.
In the 1965 elections there was a stalemate in the
parliament again and this time the UNP with the largest
number of seats came to an agreement with the FP, known as
the Dudley Senanayake Chelvanayagam Pact. In return for
giving full support to the government, Dudley Senanayake
agreed to District level autonomy with Tamil as the
administrative language in the North-East. The FP agreed to
have much less than even what Bandaranayake offered in 1957.
Instead of a big provincial council in the North-East with
administration in Tamil, the new scheme envisaged the
already existing districts in the North-East to have local
assemblies, with elected representatives, conducting their
affairs in Tamil. This arrangement could have worked under a
unitary set-up. Though there were serious misgivings among a
section of the Federal Party that it was too little, the
party leaders argued that the Tamils should accept it, and
then try to build on it in the future. When the District
Councils bill came up for debate in 1969, the then
opposition and a section of the government opposed it
strongly, using the arguments which the UNP used in 1957.
The Buddhist clergy was at the fore-front, demanding the
rejection of the bill. They were not willing to betray the
Sinhalese to the Tamils and they should not hand over 1/3 of
the country to the Tamils. Dudley Senanayake could not stand
up to the pressure from the extremists and withdrew the
bill. Again, the Tamils gained nothing.
Another important opportunity to redress the Tamil
grievances had been missed. Disillusionment with the
parliamentary method of redressing Tamil grievances grew
among the Tamils.
Ethnic majoritarianism and corrupt rule
Sri Lanka is sometimes described as a
democracy, and the Tamils have been advised to choose the
democratic way to solve their problems. It is true that Sri
Lanka has periodic elections and frequent changes of
government between the two major parties. There is very
little democracy, however, except for periodic elections.
Election campaigns and elections are generally violent and
corrupt, especially since the infamous referendum of 1982.
Except for short periods, the country has been under
emergency rule for the past three decades when all normal
individual human rights are suspended. The draconian
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 which targets the Tamils
in practice, overrides all individual freedoms. The
principle of majority rule in a democratic society has been
abused to justify ethnic majority rule. Ethnic
majoritarianism has been so well entrenched among the major
parties from 1956 that there is no scope for minorities to
get justice through parliamentary methods. More than half a
century of so-called democracy in Sri Lanka give the Tamils
no hope. The Sri Lanka Muslim Muslim Congress has emerged
recently as a very important political party. It is almost
the king-maker in Sri Lanka politics during the last decade.
There is some resentment about their influence and power,
especially among some Buddhist nationalist elements of the
affected parties. The solution they suggest is that the two
major parties should form a coalition government to thwart
the minorities wielding power. What they dont seem to
visualize is that it will lead to perpetual conflict and may
open a third front of war, in addition to the present Tamil
front.
There is a point in the argument that a minority party
should not be allowed to dictate terms and unfair demands
when it becomes the king-maker. The problem arises from the
fact that the major parties become in effect Sinhala
Buddhist parties, looking after the interests of the
majority community only. There are many countries with
multi-party democracy. But there are very few multi-lingual
multi-religious countries where compartmentalization of
political forces on ethnic lines is so deep as in Sri Lanka.
This situation indicates a serious malady in the political
structure. The major political parties should so formulate
their policies and programs that at least large sections of
the other ethnic groups can feel satisfied.
The Demand for a federal constitution
When the country became independent, the UNP
government took certain steps which made a section of the
Tamils suspicious. D.S. started many colonization schemes in
the Eastern Province, starting the process of settling a
large number of Sinhalese, changing the demographic nature
of the province. He also disenfrancised the entire Tamil
community of Indian origin, who had voting rights before Sri
Lanka became independent. It appeared a betrayal in a sense
as the representatives of that community stood with D. S.
Senanayake in voting in the State Council. But in the 1947
elections, they had Ceylon Indian Congress, a party of their
own, and they also helped in the election of left-wing
politicians. There was controversy over the question of the
national flag for Sri Lanka. The minorities feared that the
restoration of a flag with lion having a sword in its paw
symbolised the restoration of the Sinhalese kingdom, ready
to use force to subjugate the Tamils. A Parliamentary
Committee went into this question and the present national
flag was adopted by a majority vote, with one of the two
Tamil representatives refusing to accept the flag. Why I
mention this is to show that on matters like this, something
could have been done to adopt a flag, other than a
terrorizing lion with a raised sword, ready to attack.
Some members of the Tamil Congress defected from their party
which was then supporting the government, saw dangerous
signals in these trends and formed the Federal Party in 1949
to press for a Tamil State in the Tamil dominated North-East
within a Federal set-up and to press for citizenship for the
Indian origin Tamil community. It is interesting to see how
the Tamil community voted in the 1952 elections. Even though
sections of the Tamil community had misgivings, the Federal
Party had only two members elected and the vast majority of
the voters in the North-East voted for Tamil Congress,
U.N.P., and independents. The election result was an
indication that the Tamil people were willing to settle for
"one country and equal opportunity" in a unitary
constitution. The Tamil voters were willing to sacrifice on
some important issues and hoped that they might be able to
benefit in some other issues.
Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranayake, who was formerly the leader
of the Sinhala Mahasabha, broke away from the U.N.P. in 1951
and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The party had a
nationalist agenda, but at the beginning his nationalism was
inclusive. His declared aim was to replace English with
Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages of the country.
The title of his party is intriguing. The frequently used
name of the country was Lanka or Lankava. Even though the
name Sri Lanka was recorded in Medieval times, it was not a
popular name. The epithet sri has many meanings; it could
mean holy or sacred Lanka as well. The question arises as to
whom it is sacred or holy. It is quite possible that he
wanted to make the country holy or sacred to the Buddhists.
New converts are always over-enthusiastic to establish their
credentials. Bandaranayake, who was a convert from Anglican
Christianity (his family enjoying all privileges by being
close to the British rulers)to Buddhism, probably wanted to
make this country sacred to the Buddhists. Even the
significance of the word Freedom in the title of his party
is not clear because Sri Lanka was already an independent
country when he formed his party. The nationalist rhetoric
of the party soon lapsed into exclusivism, excluding not
only English but also Tamil. Sinhala as the only official
language, with reasonable use of Tamil became the policy of
his party.
There was a popular wave of support for this
party among the Sinhalese. The UNP which had already
promised parity of status for Sinhalese and Tamil, was in
jitters. It thought that it could come to power only by
taking a stand even more extreme than the SLFP. The U.N.P.
adopted the Sinhalese only slogan, omitting mention of any
place for Tamil. Tamil ministers and members of parliament
resigned en bloc from the U.N.P. From this time onward both
major parties ceased to accommodate Tamil interests. In
the1956 elections, the U.N.P. was routed because the
Sinhalese electorate distrusted its last minute change of
policy. D. S. Senanayakes disenfranchisement of Indian Tamil
voters helped Bandaranayake in a big way because electorates
with a majority or a substantial Indian Tamil stateless
disenfranchised population, elected Bandaranayakes Sinhala
only nationalists. In order to defeat the U.N.P., the
Sinhalese electorate elected some L.S.S.P. and C.P. members
who had some electoral understanding with Bandaranayake,
even though these parties continued to stand for parity of
status for both languages. All the 16 representatives from
the North-East, who were either Tamil or Muslim, plus the
representatives of the two left parties, making up 32,
opposed the Sinhala only Bill.
The U.N.P. was with the government and the
Bill got 66 votes. Dr. N. M. Perera and Dr. Colvin R. De.
Silva, the leftist leaders, made eloquent speeches that the
adoption of this language policy would destroy national
unity. The Sinhala-only Act divided the country into two
distinct regions, the North-East and the South-West. This
division of the country manifested itself dramatically in
1958 when there were massive anti-Tamil riots in the
South-West. The Tamils in the North-East, except in the
recent colonization scheme areas, were safe. Tamils from the
South-West had to be transported to the North-East for their
safety till the return of normalcy. The concept of the need
for a Tamil state received much boost from this experience.
B. H. Farmer, who was studying the developments in the
island, wrote a book under the title, Ceylon- A Divided
Nation. The de facto division of the country had taken place
in 1956. A refusal to face realities has been going on for
nearly half a century.
The Federal Party emerged as the Tamil nationalist party,
winning ten seats out of sixteen from the North-East. Since
they felt they were not strong enough to block the Sinhala
only Bill in the parliament, they opted for some
extra-parliamentary forms of passive resistance. They wanted
to use Gandhis satyagraha method, a kind of sit-in and
fasting in front of the parliament building. The peaceful
protesting Tamil leaders were manhandled by thugs. The thugs
were not identified, but they must have been Sinhala
nationalists, and possibly Buddhists.
Having realized that passive resistance was not understood
in the South-West, the Federal Party and some other Tamil
leaders adopted passive resistance in 1961 in the
North-East. Satyagraha was organized in front of government
offices. They declared that these offices could work only if
Tamil grievances were attended to. As thugs could not go all
the way to disrupt the satyagraha, the Srimavo Bandaranayake
government sent the armed forces to disperse the movement
and to arrest the Tamil leaders. The government thus
succeeded in crushing the passive resistance. What happened
in 1956 and in 1961 indicated that passive resistance on the
model of Gandhi could not work when Sri Lanka Buddhists were
the opponents.
The 1970 elections brought the United Front government, led
by SLFP to power with a two-third majority. The government
took two big steps which led to a crisis situation. The
government introduced media wise standardization of marks
for the university entrance examination, with the clear aim
of disadvantaging the Tamils. The government also convened a
constituent assembly to draw up a suitable constitution. The
FP was invited to participate and to present proposals for
the new constitution. The FP proposed various measures to
redress the Tamil grievances. Their proposals were rejected
in toto and a constitution, acceptable only to the UF
government, was promulgated in 1972.
The Tamils felt that they were pushed beyond
the margin. This constitution was short-lived because it was
overhauled by the UNP government in 1978 when it had 5/6
majority in the parliament. The UNP, which promised to
redress the Tamil grievances in its election manifesto of
1977, made no effort at all to accommodate the Tamil demands
in the new constitution. The TULF proposed various
amendments to accommodate Tamil grievances but they were
summarily rejected, as in 1972. The government started talks
with the TULF, which received a mandate for a separate state
from the Tamil electorates, and introduced District
Development Councils. This appeared too little to many
Tamils and the LTTE. Even then the SLFP opposed it as giving
too much to the Tamils. Elections were held in 1981 and in
the North-East, the TULF won all the districts except
Amparai. High expectations of the Tamils turned into huge
disappointments as the government neither voted sufficient
money for them nor allowed them the power to tax on their
own. So the District Development Council as a solution to
the ethnic problem turned out to be a practical joke.
The Demand for a separate country
As there seems to be no way out for the
Tamils to have power-sharing and equal opportunity in a
united country, the Tamil demand has become leave us alone
in our land. If the Tamils could not share power and if they
could not have equality, they wanted to establish a country
in the land where they were in a majority so that they could
enjoy freedom. The Tamils have been influenced by modern
political ideas. This is a step in desperation, from a
people who felt profound alienation. The situation of the
Tamils then and the demand for a separate country, can be
understood in the following preamble of the American
Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776:
We hold these truths to be self evident,
that all men are endowed with certain inalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, - That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute
a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
The French Revolution of 1789 has emphasized the importance
of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The Marxist thinkers
also argue that nationalities cannot be subjugated
permanently by force.
The demand was a way of giving notice that if the
centralised unitary Sinhala Buddhist framework could not be
dismantled, the Tamil people should use their sovereignty to
establish a separate country. The Buddhists do not want to
share the island with the Tamils in two independent
countries also. In fact they started fighting against an
imaginary Tamil country in 1957 even before any Tamil
thought of demanding a separate country. They say that peace
in the island is possible only if the Tamils give up the
demand for a separate country. The Tamils, including the
LTTE, have been proclaiming again and again that the demand
for a separate country is negotiable if a proper alternative
constitutional arrangement were proposed. The Buddhist
groups which demand the Tamils to give up separation, are
not at all willing to go half the way. No Buddhist leader of
consequence has said till now that he is prepared to accept
federalism, even though it is well-known that federalism
preserves unity, integrity and sovereignty of many
countries.
There is a clear attempt among Sinhalese
politicians to confuse and mislead what political structure
they could accept. They tell the international community and
the Tamils that anything short of a separate country could
be discussed during negotiations. They tell the Sinhalese
electorate that they would settle for any solution within a
unitary constitution. It is a calculated attempt at
deception which could lead to trouble soon. Devolution
within a unitary constitution cannot provide real
power-sharing. The equal opportunity for individuals is
possible in a unitary set up but such a set up has been so
abused for more than half a century that Tamils will not
trust it again.
When India intervened in the ethnic conflict
in 1987, Indian lawyers came to Colombo and helped the Sri
Lanka government to draft devolution proposals. When these
proposals were submitted to parliament, the Supreme Court
deleted some provisions because they were inconsistent with
the unitary nature and the entrenched clauses of the
constitution. The parliament passed the other provisions as
the thirteenth amendment to the constitution. Sri Lanka now
has many elected provincial councils and administrations,
but they have very little power and authority, except
concurrent powers with the central government. Some of the
Buddhist liberals who stand for the solution of more
devolution under a unitary constitution, want to continue a
set up similar to this. It is an extended version of the
1981 District Development Council scheme. It is an irony
that the provincial council scheme, which came into being to
give some autonomy to the North-East, functions everywhere
in the island except in the North-East.
In 1995, the PA government introduced devolution proposals
which tried to bypass this shortcoming. The government
omitted provisions referring to unitary nature; Prof. G. L.
Pieris explained that it was done purposely so as to enable
devolution to work. The LTTE rejected it as too little,
while the TULF welcomed it and suggested that some
improvements be made to meet Tamil aspirations. There was a
hue and cry among the Buddhists and the Sinhalese, and the
government started the process of strengthening the unitary
character of the constitutional arrangements and continued
to do so in its subsequent reformulations. The PA government
introduced its latest proposals in parliament in 2000. The
TULF and other Tamil political parties were thoroughly
disillusioned with the new proposals while there was
opposition from some Buddhists even a Buddhist monk
threatening to fast and die that so much of devolution
should not be given to the Tamils.
The divide between what the governments have been offering
till now and what the Tamils demand seems to be so big that
it is necessary to agree on some basics before any
meaningful negotiations can take place. In the India
sponsored peace talks in Thimpu in 1986, the Tamil party
including all important militant groups like the LTTE, came
out with the Thimpu principles, specifying the acceptance of
the concepts of Tamil homeland, Tamil nationality, and
self-determination for the Tamils as basics on which a
political solution acceptable to the Tamils could be worked
out. In the Tamil perception, these are all essentials if
the Tamils were to feel free and secure in Sri Lanka.
Why do the Tamils ask for self-determination when the
government is prepared to give devolution is a question
frequently asked. One of the arguments advanced against
self-determination is that it could lead to separation or
something unacceptable to the other peoples of the island.
It is correct that the ethnic problem could be solved only
if there is consensus among major sections of the other
peoples. There is no point in going for a solution if that
solution could be overturned in the foreseeable future. Many
attempts have already been made to evolve a solution
acceptable to all the parties. To forestall Indian attempts
to impose a settlement, J. R. Jayawardane convened an
all-party conference in 1985.
In addition to political parties, the
Buddhist clergy was also invited. The Buddhist clergy
adopted a totally uncooperative attitude about devolving
power to the Tamils, and nothing came out of this effort. R.
Premadasa appointed a Select Committee of Parliament. This
committee made some proposals but they were not at all
satisfying to the Tamils. Again, nothing came out of this
effort also. As already noted, the PA governments proposals
for reform of the constitution to accommodate Tamil
aspirations floundered between 1995 and 2000 in the same
way. It should be now clear that no solution acceptable to
the Tamils could be found in this way.
The only sensible approach seems to be for
the Tamils to decide what they want and then for the other
parties to put in place some safeguards to preserve the
unity of the country. Another reason why the Tamils ask for
self-determination is what one Sri Lanka government offers
could be taken away by another Sri Lanka government. The
Tamils want to feel that they are equal partners to the
constitution and that they form part of the country on their
free will and not because they could not throw off the
military occupation. The Tamils look forward for the
recognition of their rights; they dont beg for gifts or
grants.
What worries the Tamils most is that up till now no Buddhist
leader of consequence has come out with the statement that
Tamil aspirations are just. Some Buddhists appear to be
believing that modern independent Sri Lanka is the
restoration of medieval Sinhalese kingdom which should be
governed as it was then. At the time of independence in
1948, about 90% of the people of the North-East were Tamil
speakers. At every election from 1956, it is clear that Sri
Lanka is divided, Tamils in the North-East expressing
aspirations different from the rest of the island. As the
number of Tamil representatives is small, their aspirations
are ignored consistently. The Sinhalese are settled in large
numbers to change the demographic pattern and to elect
representatives who will help to keep the Tamils in check.
The Tamils are not simply a minority but a people or a
nationality having a historical habitat. The Tamils, having
a territory of their own, make a big difference. There are
many independent countries in the world today, with a
territory smaller than the North-East and with a population
smaller than the North-East. The Tamils have been able to
carry on the war so long because they have a territory and
the militants have mass support in that territory. The
Buddhist leaders do not care for the misery of the Tamil
people when their territory became the war zone. They wax
eloquently on the unity of the country but not on the unity
of the peoples of the country. The Tamil representatives,
through their long experience in parliament, realize that
they cannot deliver anything to the Tamils.
Extra-parliamentary passive resistance can be crushed by
brute force, as seen in 1956 and 1961.
The Peace Process
The peace process is on and the government
is trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement. There is some
sort of military stalemate in the war front and the country
is in serious financial difficulties. The international
community appears to be pushing both sides to negotiate a
peaceful solution. Some Buddhist leaders want the government
to use proscription of the LTTE and normalization of life in
the North-East as bargaining points so that Tamil
aspirations will not become the focus of negotiations. The
question is frequently asked how could you trust the LTTE.
Those who question dont care that for the Tamils, it is a
question of how could any Sinhalese leader of consequence be
trusted. Speaking on the Sinhala Only Bill in parliament in
1956, Dr. N. M. Perera asked how the Tamils could trust any
Sinhalese leader as they had betrayed their trust many
times. Even he betrayed the trust of the Tamils after a
decade.
Periodically, many Buddhist leaders have
raised the hopes of the Tamils; everybody has backed out in
the face of extremist threats or the lure of cabinet
portfolios. Perceptive Tamils are still skeptical of the
future because so many hindrances are still possible in the
three stages of the process. The 2001 elections as well as
what is happening among the Tamils recently clearly indicate
that a vast majority of Tamils pin their hopes on the LTTE
to negotiate on their behalf. Normalcy to the North-East
must return, and the LTTE must be deproscribed if some trust
were to be built up between the two sides. A radical
political solution has to be worked out. It has to be
incorporated into the constitution.
The constitution has to be implemented. The
second and the third stages of the process cannot be
accomplished if the two major parties do not adopt a
bipartisan attitude. There could be a big gap between
incorporation in the constitution and implementation at the
ground level. Though the present constitution provides for
the use of Tamil language, complaints continue that the
provision relating to Tamil is not properly implemented.
Tamils who dont know Sinhalese are forced to transact
business in Sinhalese and even forced to sign Sinhalese
legal documents. What has been accomplished so far in the
peace process is the preliminary step of signing a
memorandum of understanding for a permanent ceasefire. So
much noise is made against it by the JVP and a section of
the Buddhist clergy that it is clear that extraordinary
statesmanship and courage among political leaders will be
needed at every stage of the long peace process.
The Tamils remain skeptical even now because of the
retention of the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979. This
draconian act which suspends all individual rights for
anybody suspected of being a terrorist or aiding a terrorist
has been used by the government for indefinite detention of
suspects in prisons, where some of them are beaten up,
tortured and killed. Cases have not been instituted against
many of them because there are no cases, but only
suspicions. After suffering so long, they sometimes start
hunger strikes, demanding that they should either be
released or tried in courts. This Act brings untold
sufferings to the Tamil civilians but very ineffective in
preventing Tamil militancy which it characterises as
terrorism.
When this Act was passed, there were only
two militant movements- the LTTE and the PLOTE- with their
membership, not even reaching a hundred. Militant movements
mushroomed after 1983. The LTTE continues to prosper till
today. So it is clear that it is worthless in controlling
militancy. It has only served to inflict inhuman and
degrading punishments on Tamil civilians who are suspects.
The Tamils find it difficult to understand the merits in
having an excellent constitution with a wonderful chapter on
fundamental rights, if the PTA can override all the rights.
The LTTE has released many times, its prisoners who had been
fighting against it. The government still cannot make up its
mind on releasing long suffering prisoner suspects, against
whom it has no cases, because they are detained under the
PTA. It is amazing that the Buddhists, who claim that
ahimsa/ non-violence is the prime virtue of their religion,
do not care for the misery of Tamil civilians.
One of the arguments used by some persons from the ethnic
majority for opposing regional autonomy for the Tamils is
that in that case the Muslims and the Upcountry Tamils could
also ask for it and the majority Sinhalese could not give
away so much of the country to the minorities. In addition
to many other factors, in the Tamil perception, some persons
from the ethnic majority have encouraged the other two
communities to raise their demands so that they could be
used as a counter-weight to weaken the demands of the
Tamils. The Tamil speaking Muslims of the East, who form
about a third of the population there, want to secure their
position. The Muslims in the East are not concentrated in a
contiguous territory; their villages and towns intermingle
with Tamil villages and towns. So it will not be possible to
have separate territorial units for the Tamils and the Tamil
speaking Muslims. Some safeguards for them should be worked
out during negotiations on substantive issues when their
representatives should also take part.
Conclusion
The principle guiding the future
constitution of the country should be equality for all
groups and individuals. This should try to establish equal
opportunity for all individuals. This aim could have been
achieved easily under a unitary constitution. But the
opportunity was sadly missed. The distrust that has grown
among the Tamils for almost half a century by the oppressive
use of the unitary constitution will not allow them to
accept empty verbose promises and platitudes. There should
be checks and balances to see that an ethnic majority does
not take over everything into its hands once more and try to
consolidate its power by military conquest and occupation in
the name of unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of
the country.
The process of negotiation with the LTTE could be difficult.
The sweeping victory of the TNA in the 2001 elections in the
Tamil electorates of the North-East is an endorsement of
their election manifesto that the LTTE should be the sole
representative of the Tamils during the peace process. Half
a century of political experience has convinced many Tamil
political parties - most of whom suffered at the hands of
the LTTE at one time or another- that there was no other way
to come to a just settlement of the ethnic problem. The LTTE
reason for the failure of previous negotiations is that the
previous governments treated them as just another group or
party and evaded discussion of important issues as equals.
But the government, the Buddhists, and the Sinhalese have
one big advantage in negotiating with the LTTE. If an
agreeable political solution could be worked out and
implemented and the LTTE made to have a stake in the
administration of the country, one can be sure that the
settlement will hold, atleast as far as the Tamils are
concerned.
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Response to Professor Alvappillai Veluppillai's Paper
'The Fear of the Demand for One Country, Two States, and
Equal Individual Opportunity' By Professor Dagmar
Hellmann-Rajanayagam
Professor Veluppillai provided a useful, if pedestrian,
overview of developments regarding the Tamil problem and
their demands in Sri Lanka from independence until the
present. What made his paper unusual and impressive was the
strong underlying tenor of a general Tamil perception of not
only being isolated and marginalized in their own country,
but even more, of consistently being betrayed and deceived.
In his paper he also very strongly emphasised the strange
character of the conflict in Sri Lanka: it is not a conflict
Buddhists against Hindus, but Sinhala Buddhists against
Tamils. On the other hand, the Tamils do not fight against
Buddhism, but against the Sinhalese who deprive them of
their rights.
The Sinhalese in their quest for unity, Veluppillai pointed
out, do not want the people, they want the land without the
people. The author described this attitude as consistent
from independence onwards as a political development that
aimed at the progressive exclusion and marginalisation of
the Tamils. The Tamils, he said, progressively scaled down
their demands since Ponnambalams demand for a 50/50 solution
in 1939, which aimed at preventing precisely this
marginalisation. They would have also settled for a 60/40
solution, (which approximated what Gandhi had offered the
Muslims: 57/43). Yet, none of their concessions was honoured
or even appreciated. In the end, a complete reversal
occurred: the demand for a totally independent country.
The author queried the often repeated arguments put forward
most virulently by the clergy that a federal set-up and
parity status for both the Sinhala and the Tamil languages
would destroy Sinhala and cause the Buddhist religion on the
island to disappear.
To neutralise the Tamil demands, the Sinhalese instigated
other, smaller minorities to put forward their own claims.
They could then say, if we indulge the Tamils, others want
the same, and it never ends (the same argument was put
forward against an independent Tamil Eelam: then their own
minorities would demand secession as well). But what the
Tamils demand amounts to is simply to be left alone in their
areas. The Sinhalese conjured the spectre of Tamil secession
long before the Tamils themselves thought of such a thing.
It became a self-fulfilling prophecy, just like the PTA
created the militancy it was introduced to prevent.
It was important to note, so Veluppillai that the Tamils ask
for rights, not for gifts. They must decide what they want,
after that only safeguards for unity can be introduced. But
it must be a unity of the people, not the country. Any
solution, moreover, must include the Thimpu principles.
Veluppillai further stated that Gandhian methods did not
work against the Sinhala Buddhists, though Buddhism is
purportedly non-violent over and against Hindu texts that
promote violence (e.g. the Bhagavadgita). If Buddhism is so
non-violent, why then must the Sarvodaya movement itself
look towards Gandhi and employ Gandhian methods for its
success?
Until now, the Buddhist leaders have never even acknowledged
the justice of the Tamil demands. They and other agencies
always asked whether the LTTE could be trusted, but never
whether the Sinhalese could be trusted, that seems to be
assumed (in the face of ample proof to the contrary). If a
solution with the LTTE is worked out and the LTTE has a
stake in it, then the Tamils will hold on to it, so the
Sinhala Buddhist had no reason to worry on that count.
Let me divide my comments into two parts, a general one, and
one geared specifically to the paper at hand. The first one
deals with the theme of this conference, especially with the
concept of just or righteous war from a different, i.e.
another than the Buddhist, perspective.
History, as they say, is the unintended result of
intentional actions. On this count, the disputed concept of
righteous war and righteous war in Theravada Buddhism (which
was discussed at length at this conference and which Dr.
Premasiri denied exists in the canon) becomes irrelevant. No
war is fought for the same aims at its close as at the
start. There might be wars that are necessary (like WWII),
but they are not in themselves any more righteous for all
that, even if, and here I follow to some extent the
interpretation of the Buddhist experts, the intentions of
the protagonists are considered honourable. Whether they
really are so, is another question altogether again. To
speak with Dr. Premasiri, all wars are wrong, but some are
less wrong than others. And for the affected, all war is
total.
Since we are now talking about the Tamil - and some might
say - though I would, as Veluppillai does, emphatically deny
that the Hindu side, let us take a look not so much at the
Bhagavadgita - which is a piece of idealistic Hindu
Mahakavya writing and its view on war, but at something more
pragmatic, culturally Indian in general and not primarily
religiously informed: the Arthashastra by Kautilya. It deals
with foreign policy and statecraft in general and with war
in particular. There, war is not only a fact of life, but
also the duty of the king, though with qualifications: the
best way to fight a war is to avoid it; by seducing the
enemy with kind words, gifts, bribes, threats, or even by
secretly undermining his power. Kautilya has advice how to
fight a war successfully, but he has something more useful
and rare: if you lose the war, how do you act and behave to
prevent the worst? If, as I mentioned just now, war is a
fact of life and the duty of a king, the question of just
and unjust or righteous and unrighteous does not arise. It
is rather how to fight a war successfully and/or how to
extricate oneself from it with least loss. Negotiations and
diplomacy are integral parts of this endeavour.
Having said that, I am not sure that the LTTE apply
Kautilya, nay whether they know him at all. They rather seem
to follow an altogether different ideal and a very Tamil
one: that of the Purananuru poems, the early period of Tamil
heroic literature and of intense fratricidal war
(comparable, as Karl Graul observed, to the heroic
literature of the Greeks and their fratricidal fights). In
this heroic time, rather like in a Western movie, one would
shoot first, ask later, and settle differences of opinion
with fists or weapons, instead of negotiations. Negotiations
were calls to surrender, nothing more, nothing less. And
that feature characterised the negotiating style of the LTTE
for a considerable time (fuelled and supported, no doubt, by
Sinhalese intransigence and bad faith, both sides
freewheeling on mistrust and mutual suspicion). Their
diplomatic skills lagged behind their military ones to a
huge extent. That created problems for negotiations, but the
deeper reasons for, and the problem behind, this attitude
Prof. Veluppillai has also pointed out. Let me therefore
come to his paper proper now. It is a passionate
presentation of the Tamil view, and there is hardly anything
I could disagree with. Let me highlight some of the points
which I have stressed in the summary already - I found
particularly relevant to the current situation and maybe
focus or angle them a bit differently.
1) This is not a religious war, but a sort of asymmetrical
conflict of the Buddhists against Tamils, not Hindus or even
infidels. Priests play no role in it, nor does the ideology
of Hindutva (though Peter Schalk has claimed that an
ideology of Sinhalatva may be discerned). And this
perception holds on both sides. To make the unique character
of this situation clear: the Sinhalese claim to fight a
religiously motivated fight (for the survival of their
religion, Buddhism) not against another religion, but
against another ethnic group. (1) Conversely, the Tamils
fight an ethnically motivated fight against the Sinhalese,
and against Buddhists only insofar, as the Sinhalese want to
limit Tamil religious freedom by privileging Buddhism. But
primarily the fight is directed against attempts at
wholesale physical and cultural annihilation. Several
authors have called the Sinhalese attitude the Mahavamsa
mindset, especially in connection with the Dutthagamani
episode where the king fights for Buddhism against the
Damilas. The content of the latter designation is ambiguous,
but it nowadays seems to combine both ethnicity and
religion: Damilas cannot, by definition, be Buddhists, since
their ethnicity is defined as the enemies of the religion.
(2) The question that arises in this connection is how do
the Buddhists nowadays hope to safeguard the religion by
defeating the Tamil ethnic group or to put it, as
Veluppillai has done, the other way round: why would parity
of language and autonomy for Tamils detract from and
endanger the survival of Buddhism and/or Sinhala? To see the
problem in this way would only be possible if the Sinhalese
perceive Sinhala-Tamil relations as a zero-sum game: the
Tamils gain is the Sinhaleses loss. It has to be asked where
this perception stems from. To merely put it down to the
Mahavamsa mindset discussed just now is, in my mind, too
facile an answer: how and why did this mindset become
established? It is a question I put as much to Professor
Veluppillai as to the experts gathered at the conference.
Veluppillai gave a hint that might lead us further, though
it is a thoroughly depressing one: that the Buddhists want
the land, not the people. The question of the danger Tamil
rights pose for Buddhist aspirations then arises the more
acutely, in addition leading to an even graver one: what, in
that case, do you do with the Tamils? One participant put it
rather poignantly: do you kill them all, or throw them into
the sea?
2) The second point leads on from the first and was
mentioned earlier, too, but I think it is a vital one and
one we have to face squarely. If many Sinhalese see the
conflict indeed as a zero-sum game, i.e. what one side wins,
the other one loses, then there might be a reason here
particularly for the intransigence of the Bhikkus. How can
we argue plausibly to them that both sides can win only
within a context of accommodation and a just solution? Would
the clergy ever accept that argument when they have not even
acknowledged the justice of Tamil grievances? (3) In
connection with this let me touch on a related finding
discussed earlier: the majority of Sinhalese, we heard from
Ariyadhamma, want peace and a peaceful solution. But what
should this peace look like? This is an answer rarely
considered or given. Are the Sinhalese prepared to grant
devolution or even federalism, or do they want peace through
war, as Chandrika Kumaratunge aimed to achieve, in other
words, the peace of the graveyard? In the latest Marga
monograph, De Silva/Bartholomeusz ask precisely this
question. (4)
3) The point that other minorities were encouraged to put
forward demands of their own to delegitimise Tamil claims,
is backed by considerable evidence: one can point to
escalating demands by other minorities, which the Sinhalese
themselves have awakened and instigated. The Muslims are a
case in point, but even the Tamils themselves: the Sinhalese
wailed about the danger and scheming of the Tamils for
secession long before the Tamils dreamt of it. It became a
self-fulfilling prophecy that flew in the face of all Tamil
intentions who wanted to belong in Sri Lanka. An early
example for the latter kind of attitude is Rasanayagams book
Ancient Jaffna from 1926(1) where he consciously tries to
sever the Indian connection that had been axiomatic until
then and to locate the Tamils and their origins firmly in
Sri Lanka. He goes even so far as to deny admittedly against
historical evidence - the Indian origins of the
Aryachakravartis, the rulers of Jaffna, and wants to declare
them descendents of the early Naga kings. Anybody who trawls
the Internet nowadays will find on the Sri Lankan Tamil
pages ample proof that they do not want to make common cause
either with Tamilnadu or with Indian Tamil nationalism. The
Sinhala allegations and reproaches occurred for blatantly
political and power purposes. The same mistake, as
Veluppillai pointed out, was repeated with regard to the PTA
that created the militants it wanted to destroy. For a
comment on this I refer the reader to the remark quoted at
the beginning of this comment.
4) As mentioned earlier, Veluppillais paper is particularly
remarkable insofar as it presents not so much Tamil demands
as Tamil perceptions. And where the Sinhalese talk about
concessions (gifts), the Tamils claim what they are asking
for are rights. Veluppillai here poignantly reverses the
Sinhalese intentions: the Tamils want unity of the people,
not just the land. I have a feeling that it is precisely
this perception gap that has created problems, is creating
problems and will create them unless and until it is
consciously faced and dealt with by both sides. Only in a
set-up where the rights of all groups are assured and
guaranteed, can real unity of the people be achieved.
5) Prof. Veluppillai concluded his investigation with the
question of trust: can the LTTE be trusted, is the question
on everyones lips. But nobody asks the reverse question: can
the Sinhalese government be trusted in the face of a road to
parliament littered with good intentions and broken pacts
and promises? That would go a long way to explain the LTTEs
all or nothing attitude, over and above that of the Puram
mindset. Have they, apart from this mindset, also taken a
leaf out of the Sinhalese book in their own dealings with
the government? But the really memorable point Professor
Veluppillai makes is that any solution negotiated by the
LTTE will be endorsed and abided by the Tamils. This hints
at several scenarios simultaneously: first, that the LTTE is
really representative of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, as well as
their spokesman; second that any solution needs LTTE
cooperation and approval to become operative at all, and
third, that there might be a dreadful warning here: the
Indo-Lanka Accord was concluded without LTTE consent or
participation at all, and it consequently went terribly
wrong. That mistake should not be repeated. The LTTE will
have to be a partner to any solution.
These are a few of the outstanding points. Professor
Veluppillais is a cautionary tale of the awakening of hope
and shattered illusions in turn. One would like to know
still something more about the reasons for the seemingly
irrational Sinhalese fears. Even theories of a majority with
a minority complex and such like do not really clarify
whether the Sinhalese actually think autonomy for the Tamils
will destroy Buddhism or bring some new Greater
Tamilnadu-invader to their shores, especially now when India
has completely disassociated herself from any interference
in the conflict at all and the government of Tamilnadu is in
the forefront of Tiger-bashing. If, therefore, this attitude
cannot be explained with any even remotely rational fears,
will we really have to look for reasons for Sinhalese
intransigence in some ontological predisposition la
Kapferer? This would be a disturbing thought. Or is it not
rather, as Professor Bechert has pointed out many years ago,
and which has been reiterated here as well that religion is
instrumentalised for quite different purposes and interests?
Mind you, I do not totally endorse either view because I
think the reality might be rather more complex. And that
brings me to my final question: Would religion, any
religion, be at all predisposed to tolerance and
understanding in the light of a basic claim by all religions
that they and only they, hold on to truth and every other
teaching is wrong and has to be, in the final account,
suppressed or eliminated? Is there then scope for tolerance
in religion correctly understood? This is a troubling
thought about religion and which is quite divorced from
possible or actual political and social
instrumentalisations. I would like to end my comments with
this consideration.
Notes
(1) Gombrich and Obeyesekere have pointed out this
remarkable constellation already in the late 80s,
Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, Buddhism
Transformed. Religious Change in Sri Lanka, Princeton
University Press, 1988, p. 219. Return to text.
(2) Here again, the evidence of Gombrich/Obeyesekere is
enlightening: One of the self-styled, self-ordained
monks or even Buddhas, publishes his doctrinal claims
with hints also for Christian and Muslims children who
are presumably accessible to this kind of teaching, but
Hindu children are ignored, perhaps because they are
assumed not to read Sinhala., ibid., p. 332. Return to
text.
(3) On the other hand, it is good to remember that not
all of the clergy supported this intransigence:
Gombrich/Obeyesekere, ibid., p. 390, report that the
incumbent of a Bodhi temple declared it very wrong for
military personnel to perform Bodhi puja for military
success, because it was flatly opposed to the Dhamma of
the Buddha, for whom all mankind was one. Return to
text.
(4) De Silva and Bartholomeusz, Marga Monograph Return
to text.
(5) C. Rasanayagam, Ancient Jaffna, Jaffna 1926. Return
to text.
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