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Reflections on the shedding of Tamil
blood
for fifty years in Sri Lanka
Beginnings of State
oppression of the Tamils
Many people in the international community seem to blame the
Tamil side for not talking, negotiating and settling the
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. They don’t seem to understand
the complexity of the problem. My view is that the Sinhala
side has been so intransigent throughout – Sinhala
chauvinism more and more assertive during the last two years
-that there is no basis for negotiating any just solution
for the suffering Tamils.
The latest ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’ speaks
about finding a solution within a unitary constitution;
President Mahinda Rajapakse is talking about ‘maximum
devolution’ within a unitary constitution. This is euphemism
for cosmetic changes within Sinhala Buddhist hegemony. To
get justice for the Tamils, the constitution of Lanka should
be structured differently; it should be acceptable to
mainstream Tamil opinion.
On certain matters, the situation in
Lanka in the forties and fifties should be taken into
consideration when finding a solution today. The history of
mainstream Sinhala political parties after independence does
not give any hope for the Tamils that they can pin their
hopes on one of the two main Sinhala political parties. Even
though it is arguable that the UNP has done less evil, it is
responsible for sliding the country towards Sinhala Buddhist
hegemony, immediately after independence. Even though it had
a historic opportunity in 1977 when it came to power with a
huge majority and introduced a new constitution, it failed
miserably to find a solution to the ethnic problem, even
though it spoke eloquently of the need to find a solution in
its election manifesto.
It is now 58 years since Sri Lanka attained independence
from British rule in 1948. Oppression of the Tamils in
various forms by the Sinhala dominated State started in 1948
itself. The UNP government was in power till 1956. It was
not interested in building up a modern secular democratic
country for all the people of Lanka. It was more interested
in restoring the ancient Sinhala kingdom. At that time,
Sinhala Buddhist hegemony was not the ideal discussed in the
political platform. It was just national interests, securing
the welfare of Lankan nationals like the Sinhalas, Lankan
Tamils, Lankan Muslims, etc. About 10% of the population of
Lanka, who were mainly Tamils,
were deprived of citizenship and franchise, because they
were considered recent arrivals from India during the
British rule in the 19th and early 20th centuries. At the
time of independence, Lanka had roughly about 70% Sinhala
speakers and 30% Tamil speakers. Depriving the franchise of
a big segment of Tamil population has reduced the Tamil
share in the political process of Lanka to an insignificant
level. The Sinhala dominated State went
a step further to increase its grip on the political process
in Lanka. The disfranchised Tamils were counted for the
purposes of demarcation of electorates but were not allowed
to vote. What this meant was electorates with majority or
substantial Tamil population and with insignificant or
minority Sinhala populations elected members of parliament
with pro-Sinhala or anti-Tamil platforms. Thus, this step of
the UNP government seems to have set up the stage for the
future politics of Sinhala Buddhist hegemony. Most of the
Tamil members of parliament supported the Sinhala dominated
government on this issue as they didn’t want to raise a
communal cry. At the time of
independence, the Northern and the Eastern Provinces of
Lanka were just Tamil-speaking. The Sinhala populations even
in the border districts were less than 10% of the population
of those districts. The UNP government wanted to develop
irrigation and agriculture and to settle people from
over-populated districts. The Tamil speaking Eastern
Province was found to be sparsely populated. Massive
irrigation schemes were developed in the East and Sinhala
populations were settled in different parts. Trincomalee
district was a focus for Sinhala governments because of the
importance of its natural harbor. Seasonal migrant Sinhala
fishermen were encouraged to settle there, the Sinhala State
providing all the necessary facilities.
Lands not owned privately in
Trincomallee district were also given away, to be developed
by private enterprenuers, a vast majority of them were
Sinhalas. The Sinhala State
has changed the demographic pattern of the East. Some of
the Sinhalese claim that at present the East is
multi-linguistic and multi-cultural because of this
development. From the Tamil perspective, the East has to
continue as part of the Tamil traditional habitat as Sinhala
colonists after independence could not be rewarded for their
aggrandizement.
The Sinhala colonization had been slowed
down after the ethnic civil war began. If the Tamils
decommission their arms, it will be a signal for large scale
Sinhala colonization. The talks cannot lead to any solution
as the gap between the expectations of the Sinhala and Tamil
sides remain huge. The international community, if it really
cares for peace, should come forward to impose some
parameters on which peace talks could start.
Just insisting on the Tamil side starting talks with
the Sinhala side so that at the end of the tunnel there
could be a glimmer of hope, seems to be very
unrealistic. The Tamils giving up arms and declaring
that they will seek only a negotiated solution may end
up in genocide of the Tamils as the solution for the
ethnic problem.
1956 was the first year Tamil blood was
shed by the Sinhalas in independent Lanka. It also marked
the historic 2500 years of the birth of the Buddha,
according to Lankan records. The SLFP, which started as a
splinter group of the UNP, came to power on Sinhala communal
platform. Sinhala only was to be the official language of
Lanka while reasonable usage would be allowed for Tamil.
Finding that that there was a wave of support for the SLFP,
the UNP also changed its policy from parity of status to
Sinhala only. Many Tamils who trusted the UNP felt let down
by the opportunistic change of UNP policy. There was an
ethnic polarization from 1956.
Both main Sinhala political parties
joined in supporting Sinhala only as official language. All
the sixteen members of parliament from the Northern and
Eastern Provinces opposed this move. Two Marxist political
parties- the LSSP and the CP- joined in the opposition,
prophesying the doom of united Lanka from ethnic
polarization. Most of the Tamil members of parliament from
the North-East were elected on Federal Party ticket,
demanding the creation of a Tamil state within united Lanka.
They organized peaceful Gandhian type Satyagraha protest
outside parliament building protesting against ignoring the
claim of Tamil language to official status. The Sinhala
hoodlums cannot tolerate the protest of the Tamil leaders.
The Tamil leaders were manhandled in Colombo. Some of
them were injured and some Tamil blood was shed in Colombo.
There were also instances of killings of Tamil civilians by
footloose Sinhala laborers/ Sinhala colonists in sugar-cane
plantations in Gal-Oya Scheme and Padaviya Scheme in the
Eastern Province. This is also the beginning of the Lankan
tradition- there was no attempt to bring the Sinhala
criminals against the Tamils to justice.
What started in 1956 has been going on intermittently during
the last 50 years, even though it has taken different forms
at different times. There was a
huge explosion in 1958 when Sinhala hoodlums went on
rampage against the Tamils. Many Tamils had to be ferried to
their historical habitat of the North-East for their
personal safety. The Tamils were made to understand that the
Lankan State was really a Sinhala State and the Tamils had
to accept a subservient status to preserve peace. After
watching these developments, B.H.Farmer, a Professor of
Geography at Cambridge University, published a book under
the title,
‘Ceylon- A Divided Nation’.
The country had been divided emotionally
and sentimentally from that time. Sinhala people could not
produce real national leaders who could rise above narrow
Sinhala nationalism and who could unite the country for the
past fifty years. Tamil people could not put up armed
resistance for many more years. Political leaders of the
Tamils were trying to talk to the Sinhala leaders on
compromises. Each time, they were rebuffed.
Could the international community point out how the
situation is different now? |
