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The move to topple the government was lost with the
abstention of the JVP when the crucial vote on the third reading of
the budget was taken. However, the lessons learnt are important.
The calculation of those who expected the JVP to vote with the
opposition was pinned on the assumption that the party was prepared
to make its initial moves towards the goal of eventually sidelining
the SLFP-dominated PA, and becoming the main opposition to the UNP
in Sri Lanka's parliament.
This is not only because the JVP has been more strident than the
SLFP in its nationalist rhetoric but also because it is well-known
that the party, of which President Mahinda Rajapaksa is the head,
cannot form a government without the support of the Sri Lanka's
pseudo-Marxists.
The fact that the JVP, despite all its defiance was prepared to
remain under the shadow of the SLFP, at least for the time being,
became obvious when the government refused to concede any of the
four public demands made by the JVP as a condition for its support.
Instead the government upped its rhetoric as the best equipped to
fight LTTE terror.
The second set of issues revolves around the crossing back of SLMC
Leader Rauff Hakeem and his greatly-diminished group of supporters
to the opposition. It was well-known that Hakeem was more or less
compelled to sit with the government to prevent his MPs deserting
him to the ruling coalition.
The importance of Hakeem in the opposition however is more than he
and his three loyalists. It means that the foremost Muslim party
that stands for the rights of Muslims as an ethno-religious group
now opposes the government.
This brings us to the third set of issues. There have been reports
of so-called 'jihadists' or armed Muslim extremists in the East
supporting Pillaiyan. The arming of Muslims in the East began in the
1980s in the guise of requiring Muslim home guards to counter the
LTTE. Today, these shadowy elements are seen as the nucleus of
ultra-nationalist Muslim groups functioning under ex-SLMC MPs who
serve as ministers in the present government.
At a time when Pillaiyan is actively leading Tamil paramilitaries in
the East to help the government perpetrate human rights violations
against Tamil civilians, pro-government Muslims from the East are
accused of using coercion through armed elements under their command
to erode the support of democratic parties such as the SLMC, thereby
strengthening the Sinhala-nationalist government of Rajapaksa.
These manoeuverings to debilitate independent Tamil and Muslim
political power in the East in favour of eastern politicians
dependent on Colombo are undertaken by Pillaiyan and his Muslim
compatriots in the guise of promoting a so-called 'multicultural
East,' an idea actively supported by certain elements of civil
society too.
Based on the abduction of a relative of a TNA parliamentarian before
the November 19 vote on the second reading of the budget, this
column referred to the possibility of the Pillaiyan group working
against the TNA in the event a general election was called.
Abductions of TNA parliamentarians' relatives and officers last week
only strengthen this. Therefore, despite the possibility of
elections in the near future being warded off by the passing of the
budget on Friday, there is no doubt the TNA and SLMC will bear the
brunt of the Muslim and Tamil armed groups in the East supported by
the security forces.
It is in this context that we have to view the unexpectedly
forthright statements of British High Commissioner Dominic Chilcott
last week delivering the Dudley Senanayake memorial lecture.
Chilcott said: "Let me be clear, I am not saying that the political
aspiration for Eelam is illegitimate, any more than I would argue
that the Scottish National Party's goal for an independent Scotland
is illegitimate�
"What is crucial is what methods are used by the SNP or the LTTE �
to achieve their goals. And the LTTE's methods are simply
unacceptable." It is important to note that Chilcott stressed
'legitimacy' of the political aspiration for Eelam but deplored the
methods of the LTTE, which he characterised as 'terrorist.'
The word 'Eelam' has been used differently by different people, but
always as the embodiment of the political aspirations of Tamil
nationalism. However, it has, over the years, come to be used as
synonymous with secession. So the meaning Chilcott wanted to convey
is very clear.
In his article of October 21 this writer referred to the Tamils'
right to self-determination. He said that the Tamils were a 'people'
by standards of international law and were therefore entitled to
freely choose their political status, which means exercising their
right to self-determination.
That article was written when UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Louise Arbour was visiting Sri Lanka to address human rights
violations taking place both in the hands of the government and the
LTTE. It is well known that the government rejected the accusations
of Arbour and other international human rights experts who have
proffered their advice recently.
Chilicott in his address spoke about the legitimacy of the Eelam
demand in the context of repeated human rights violations,
deteriorating condition of a rule of law, no hope of a credible
political solution and the government's clich�d response
("interference") when the international community pointed out these
problems of governance.
It has to be noted however that the right to self-determination can
be exercised internally or externally. Internal self-determination
means political autonomy within the state, while external
self-determination denotes secession, or setting up a separate
state. And international law recognises that conditions where
secession may be justified are when full-blown human rights
violations amounting to genocide take place, which many believe is
happening to Tamils in Sri Lanka.
All what the Tamils can take out of Chilcott's address is that by
recognising the legitimacy of the Eelam demand he is willing to
accept the Tamils' right to self-determination, which is a cardinal
clause of the Thimphu principles. The rest, such as the comparison
between the Scottish and Tamil nationalisms, and the SNP and LTTE,
have too many contradictions to be taken literally.
The issue however is whether the international community is willing
to translate pious words uttered by an outgoing diplomat into
action. For this to happen it will need what Chilcott's referred to
the "many non-military interventions that a country can make - from
arguing and persuading, to economic and political sanctions."
The Tamils have waited for such interventions, which have not come.
I leave it to the readers to judge whether they believe the UK would
be persuaded to use "economic and political sanctions" against a
recalcitrant regime in Colombo just because the Tamils adopt the
methods of the SNP, to which Chilcott gives his hearty approval.
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