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The government has predicted that 2008 would be
decisive in its campaign against LTTE separatism and reiterated its
ability to defeat the Tigers in their Wanni lair before this year
closes. �We must realise that military victories will surely pave
the way to push the LTTE to seek a political solution to the
problem... Like we overcame the tsunami tragedy, we will face the
threat of terrorism and overcome it soon,� said President Mahinda
Rajapaksa with imperturbable self-assurance at the national ceremony
to commemorate the 2004 catastrophe.
The army commander too echoed these sentiments. The Daily News on
December 31, 2007, said, �Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka
who has already announced his intention of shifting the current
battles to a decisive phase in August next year, expressed
confidence of achieving the mission �� Statements issued by other
senior government figures, too, reflect an upbeat mood. They suggest
that while acknowledging the battle for the Wanni would not be as
smooth as clearing the East, it could be achieved by sheer military
might. And why not? According to the military spokesman and the
MCNS, Tiger cadres are perishing like flies in the battlefields of
the North.
While this might be one way of perceiving on-going military
operations, there are alternate perspectives too which we would do
well to consider. The military establishment, assisted by sections
of the media, has succeeded in projecting what has been going on in
the past three months or so as that of the security forces readying
themselves for a frontal assault on the LTTE�s armed formations in
the Wanni. In other words, the army is poised to strike on the Tiger
heartland but that the operation is yet to begin.
While breaking into the LTTE stronghold appears to be the overall
objective, the strategy appears to clear the mainland between
Vavuniya and Mannar and cut through the western flank of Tiger
territory to link up with Pooneryn (to which reference was made in
these columns some weeks ago). Control of Pooneryn by government
forces is expected to debilitate the LTTE and prevent it from
launching attacks across the Jaffna lagoon on the southern part of
the Jaffna peninsula.
With the view of executing this strategy, the military began
assaults on Tiger bunker lines northwest of Vavuniya from around
October last year. Its first �capture� was Silavathurai. Though
trumpeted by the government as a major victory, those following the
conflict know that Silvathurai was actually no man�s land and it
offered no strategic benefit to the rebels. The Tigers, therefore,
withdrew from Silavathurai, which the army then occupied.
Beyond that, judged even by the information supplied by the Ministry
of Defence, it is clear that fighting is centred round the forward
lines, or FDLs. Recent confrontations of significance include
Pandivirichchan, Parappakandal and Mullikulam. Clashes on the FDLs,
where there is usually significant loss of lives on both sides, are
hailed by the government as major battle gains. How come that
limited progress on the advance into LTTE-controlled areas has not
created adverse reactions in the public? Interestingly, the
government has managed to ward off such criticism by not declaring
full-scale operations have already commenced. The public is made to
believe that what has been going on from October last year are no
more significant than border clashes.
This is at variance with the army�s approach under President
Chandrika Kumaratunga. Operation Jayasikurui was launched from
Vavuniya and Weli Oya (Manal Aru) with the intention of establishing
a main supply route (MSR) to the North by taking the A9 highway. A
secondary objective was to split the LTTE-dominated Wanni through
the middle. Since the government was in control of areas north of
Kilinochchi it meant clearing a mere 45 mile strip between the two
towns.
The launching of Jayasikurui on May 13, 1997 was attended by great
fanfare. The then Minister of Defence, Anuruddha Ratwatte, belting
out words of defiance and taunts at the Tigers became routine. But
while the fanfare might have been elixir to the ego when the going
was good, the setbacks that began to occur as the army approached
Pulliyankulam found the media and the public beginning to criticise
the government on its inept handling of the operation.
The present government has learnt from its predecessor�s mistakes.
It is able to fend off adverse criticism by not declaring formally
that a military operation has already begun. The public is made to
believe that all that is taking place is a series of armed clashes
on the FDLs with the great �push� yet to come. While on the subject
of Jayasikurui � the last major assault on the Wanni � comparisons
are inevitable. Initial battlefield victories of the security forces
during Jayasikurui were quite imposing. Despite a counterattack by
the LTTE on the Thandikulam camp soon after the operation began, the
military was able to overcome Tiger resistance and advance up to
Omanthai (from Vavuniya) and Nedunkerni (from Weli Oya) in around
five weeks.
It was only as the army approached Puliyankulam that the Tigers
launched a major counteroffensive, which served to alter the whole
complexion of the operation. With its armour bogged down by the
monsoon rains and fierce resistance by the LTTE, Jayasikurui began
floundering. Judging from the government�s accounts of the fighting
in the past weeks and a glance at an atlas, it is evident the
advance to link up with Pooneryan has been confined, in the past
three months, to fierce clashes at the FDLs stretching between
Vavuniya and the north-western coast. As far as battlefield losses
are concerned, each side makes different claims and I leave it the
reader to investigate the veracity of the respective assertions.
Unable to advance significantly on this particular front, the
military�s strategy seems to be opening other fronts with the
intention of dispersing the LTTE units away the northwest line. Thus
there have been clashes on the Muhamalai and Weli Oya (Manal Aaru)
FDLs too. Meanwhile, the LTTE clashes with the STF regularly in the
Amparai jungles; two zones of insecurity have been created by
civilian killings in areas near Yala and, from this week,
Moneragala. If they intensify it would take away the government�s
ability to concentrate its forces on advancing on the Wanni, while
also resulting in civilian displacement from these areas. There is
also access to the Eastern Province through Moneragala.
All this might very well change in the coming weeks with the army
surging forward from the northwest FDLs. Its self-imposed deadline
for completion of this Operation Without a Name is August this year.
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