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An irony of ironies occurred on 17 November when a candidate popularly seen as
representing Sinhala nationalism was elected to the country’s highest office
with the help of the LTTE, an organisation, which he wowed during his election
campaign to see tamed. Ranil Wickremesinghe, the candidate who portrayed himself
as a “Sinhala-Buddhist,” but coming forward as a “Sri Lankan” (one can read
multiple meanings into “Sri Lankan”) was relegated to a close also ran.
The warning signs were present from at least a week before with the LTTE
declaring it regarded the election with supreme indifference though it did not
advocate its boycott. The boycott was promoted by certain civic organisations,
which in the south were construed as “front organisations of the LTTE.”
The result was that the Sinhala ruling class epitomised by the UNP and the
Bandaranaike loyalists of the SLFP, who had visions of using the elections to
taste power, throw a few crumbs to the Tamils, while setting about crushing the
JVP were left to lick their wounds. The traditional ruling families
(Bandaranaike, Senanayake, Wijewardene) of the south, which the Tamils
obligingly kept in power for 50 years, gave way to a new leadership, though once
more through the efforts of the Tamils.
While all this might be true, the most important message coming through with the
triumph of Mahinda Rajapakse is that the south is split down the middle about
how to deal with the Tamil problem and the elections have brought the Tamils
face to face with Sinhala chauvinism in its most virulent form.
The options before the Tamils were twofold: (a) help the election of Rajapakse
who was head of a Sinhala extremist coalition that had on board the JVP and JHU,
had renounced power sharing through federalism, rejected P-TOMS and expressed
its frank disapproval of Norwegian facilitation or (b) Wickremesinghe who fought
the election on the basis of offering a federal solution to the ethnic problem,
but whose benign manifesto was to be backed by the international community
expected to apply fetters on the Tigers as part of its fight against
international terror. Of the two, the Tamils backed what they felt was the
lesser evil.
The LTTE’s action will, most probably, set in motion a certain dynamic in the
south. For instance, there will be an ideological polarisation, with the UNP and
sections of the SLFP that were portraying themselves as moderate, having to take
on a more chauvinist stand, not only because half the electorate in the south
has rejected moderation, but because it has not washed with the northeast
either. One does not know whether this might even mean a change of leadership in
UNP.
However, it is very unlikely that Rajapakse’s victory is a prescription for
immediate war. No southern leader can afford it. On the other hand, the
extremist pronouncements in his manifesto to resolve the ethnic problem will
require a new look at things, for which his government lacks the wherewithal.
And even if it does have it, it is unlikely the Tigers are going to waste their
time talking to someone who believes in a solution within a unitary state. The
government and LTTE might negotiate to implement the CFA better, but it is
hardly likely the two parties will get down to talks on substantive matters
anytime soon.
It is also hardly likely that the coalition of extremist parties Rajapakse has
led to power will act with crass irresponsibility. The BJP was in power in
India: its rule might have heightened Hindutva chauvinism, but went a long way
towards restoring better relations with Pakistan despite all the setbacks on the
way. The record of the Likud in Israel over the Palestinian conflict is no
different.
It has to be bourn in mind that Rajapakse is not a warmonger. The JVP too is not
intrinsically chauvinist as the JHU – its racism is more to capture power. There
are elements within the JVP which realise the ethnic problem has to be
constructively dealt with. This element might not have shown its face because of
strategic reasons, but one cannot deny its existence all the same.
Such extreme chauvinist posturing, combined with realisation it is not going to
work in actual practice is what will lead to a period of limbo in the talks. As
mentioned above, important existential issues such as the CFA could be
addressed, but hardly anything more.
This situation of ‘no war, no peace’ will also suit the LTTE because it will not
have to grapple with an enemy who will be constantly seeking to undermine it as
the UNP would have done. Whatever might be the reason for Milinda Moragoda’s
outburst on the eve of the polls about the UNP having engineered the Karuna
split within the LTTE, the fact is it did happen, and for which the UNP is now
paying the price.
But while ‘no war no peace’ might not be anathema to the Tigers and Rajapakse,
it will have a catastrophic effect on Colombo’s elite, which expected a UNP
president who would jumpstart the economy and resume the peace process (in that
order). The Sri Lankan business classes, international investors, donors and the
NGOs were all eagerly awaiting this but are now disappointed.
With the Rajapakse victory the almost automatic linkage with the globalised
economy the business community was planning through large-scale privatisation
and opening up for foreign investment and trade, would not be as forthcoming as
it would have been if Wickremesinghe had won. Foreign aid, both bilateral and
multilateral will continue to trickle in, subject to the strict conditions
donors impose on regimes they do not like. The economic environment will be such
that the modest 5-6% growth we have had will continue. Sri Lanka will survive,
but mere economic survival was not what was expected if Wickremesinghe had
emerged victor.
On the other hand, Sri Lanka could very well suffer in not being able to avail
itself of special donor funding such as the US$ 4.5 billion it has been hoping
for in the event the peace process resumed. It is well known that the donor
community was hoping to pull out of Sri Lanka in late 2004 because nothing
substantial was happening in the peace process. The tsunami stayed that
decision. There is reason to think with Rajapakse and the LTTE not interested in
substantive negotiations, the donor community might go ahead with the decision
to support on-going programmes but not much more. This will be a body blow to
Colombo.
However, the retreat of the western donors and investors would mean a very
important development – India will be inevitably drawn into that vacuum. We know
the closeness of India to the JVP and the Rajapakse camps and the assistance
they have received in the past. Therefore, India playing a bigger role in Sri
Lankan affairs is to be expected. And this role will not be confined to propping
up the country economically, but politically too. And it is important to note
that India’s political role here will not be marred by inveterate LTTE-haters
like the late Lakshman Kadirgamar, who muddied every effort at reaching a
compromise on the ethnic question.
Despite Indian involvement, the Rajpakse regime in Colombo will be a
considerably debilitated one in comparison to what Wickremesinghe would have
commanded. And the LTTE will relish that situation. It knows only too well how
the international community, including the majority of the co-chairs, put
constraints on it on a number of occasions – the Washington and Tokyo
conferences, statements by the EU, the U.S and human rights organisations being
some of them. The Wickremesinghe regime also attempted to sign the CASA
agreement with the US that would have given the west a strong foothold
militarily in Sri Lanka. It was not signed due to firm Indian intervention. In
fact, it could be said that ever since the CFA, the international community has
twisted the LTTE’s arm more than any government in Colombo.
While all these might be positive developments for the LTTE there are certain
formidable challenges the Rajapakse presidency throws at the Tigers.
The most important of these is the anti-Tamil anger spewed by the JVP-JHU
election campaign. While it was mentioned above that racist parties, once in
office, become more moderate, it is not to suggest for a moment they become
liberal or tolerant. It will be foolish to forget that Rajapakse has been
propelled to power on the wheels of naked Sinhala racism. It is promises of not
implementing P-TOMS or the ISGA, introducing the unethical conversions bill,
settling the ethnic problem within a unitary state that convinced the Sinhala
people to elect Rajapakse. And he cannot disappoint them.
Therefore, a vital constraint would be how soon a party that came to power on
ethnic chauvinism will be able transform itself to act responsibly on issues of
governance. It has to convince its electorate that Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism
does not pay and on the long run and makes the community more vulnerable. But
accomplishing that will be a Herculean task, what with the UNP too becoming more
hawkish, due to the exigencies of electoral politics.
The second challenge is the consequences of peace talks being in limbo for long
and living conditions not changing for the Tamil population living as IDPs, or
those unemployed due to the high security zones etc, etc. The northeast also
lacks capital investment, a good industrial base, services and infrastructure.
Talks in limbo will mean there will be no peace dividend and nothing to hope for
except the bleakness the northeast has been ‘enjoying’ ever since the CFA. Over
a period of time, civilian populations that see no respite for their suffering
inevitably grow restive. If talks being in limbo help the Tigers in one way,
dealing with domestic socio-economic issues will present a formidable challenge.
The third and the most crucial issue will be reaction of the international
community. The EU, which is a prominent member of the international community
put the LTTE on notice after the assassination of Kadirgamar with a travel ban
and threat of proscription if the Tigers continued to default on human rights
issues, democracy, pluralism etc. But the LTTE’s indifference to the
presidential poll and the resultant low turnout in the northeast demonstrates
only too clearly that in matters affecting it most, the LTTE is prepared to defy
the international community and incur its displeasure. But the fact remains the
international community will use human rights, pluralism, democracy standards on
the LTTE to weaken the organisation’s political stance.
What the LTTE has to also take into account is that however unhappy the
international community might be of the Rajapakse presidency, it will not go
beyond a point when pressurising a government into making concessions to rebels.
This is due to the international system’s inherent prejudice against liberation
movements, which it calls “international terrorism.” Therefore, the hope in
sections of the Tamil polity that the international community wanting to
destabilise Rajapakse could do so by forcing Colombo to grant concessions to the
Tigers, is a forlorn hope. Most probably the international community would use
the Tamils to intimidate Rajapakse to making concessions on economic, trade and
diplomatic issues that concern those countries, but stop well short of what the
Tamils want.
There is also the very real possibility that the challenges thrown by these
elements might matters to a head between the government and LTTE. And it cannot
be overlooked in that respect too, the Tigers have found it easier dealing
against presidents and governments in office after 1994, than before.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has stated repeatedly that the Tamils do not
want war, but will not hesitate to take up the challenge if it is thrust upon
them. And it is his National Heroes’ Day address on 26 November we should now
await.
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