How free is the East today?
31st March 1996
The government�s military and administrative grip on the
Batticaloa district has weakened considerably since the completion
of Operation Riviresa in the North. The influence of the LTTE
pervades the entire district in one form or the other although some
local officials claim that almost 85 percent of the district is
under the LTTE.
The visible aspect of the situation is that the Army has precarious
control of the Polannaruwa - Batticaloa road which is now the only
access route to district on its northern side and the Batticaloa -
Kalmunai road to the south and that all the towns linked by these
two roads are under stable government control. If one were to stay
long enough in Batticaloa it would gradually become apparent that
the LTTE exerts substantial influence over the population in areas
which seem to be under the Army�s unchallenged authority.
The LTTE regularly summons people from the Batticaloa town to the
Paduvankarai region across the lagoon to the west to demand money or
to consult on the various matters. Such summons used to be ignored
in the past. Now, people either go themselves or in matters
concerning the payment of money, try to negotiate the terms through
persons in contact with the local Tiger leadership. This is so
because there is a general feeling that the LTTE can gather
information and strike anywhere in the town and other places which
are supposed to under the control of the Army. Several incidents
since last April have strongly impressed upon the people here that
it would be dangerous to defy the Tiger even in the �secured� areas.
The government has, in the past, poured a lot of resources into
securing the Batticaloa town and its environs thoroughly. There were
large units of the National Intelligence Bureau, the Directorate of
the Military Intelligence, the Counter Subversive Unit of the Police
etc. which were operating in the town assisted by the TELO, EROS,
PLOTE, the Mohan Group, some Tiger surrendees and a substantial
number of dropouts from various Tamil militant outfits who work for
a regular salary.
In the latter phase of Eelam War Two it became virtually impossible
for the Tigers to influence people living in the town in any manner.
Even sympathisers found it extremely difficult to help the Tigers
except providing some information and money at great risk to
themselves.
Things have changed very much in favour of the Tigers today in spite
of the EPRLF and a group of assorted ex- Tamil militants operating
with the Air Force joining the ranks of those whose job it has been
to keep the town free of LTTE�s influence.
The land prices in this once sleepy but picturesque town rose
sharply as many wealthy land owners and businessmen began to move
out of the hinterland settling down in Batticaloa fearing the war
and sometimes to escape harassment by all parties to the conflict. A
large number of jewelers from the villages of Annamalai,
Koyittporathivu and Munaithivu in the hinterland who made their
fortunes in the south have also moved into the town rather than in
their respective villages where they had invested their wealth
before the war. Now they find that things are no better in the town
which was once considered quite secure from the LTTE and free from
the bullying of paramilitary groups operating with the Army and the
various intelligence organisations due to the authority �granted�
the Police to manage law and order through proper procedures.
One businessman lamented that paying money to the LTTE in addition
to five paramilitary groups regularly may ruin him soon. The EPRLF
which hitherto remained aloof of the government�s counter insurgency
campaign in the northeast, crying foul at other ex-Tamil militant
groups seems to have changed its mind after the arrival of Raazik
who was a commander of the ill fated Tamil National Army which was
propped up by the Indians in 1989. Raazik�s group has been given
weapons so that they may operate as a paramilitary group against the
LTTE . Some members of the EPRLF in Batticaloa have strongly
objected to this move. The other Tamil paramilitary groups operating
in the town are quite irked by the activities of the Raazik and his
boys.
It is obvious that the issue at stake is the collection of money in
the town. Although the units of the Tamil National Army commanded by
Raazik took to their heels even before they could see the Tigers in
1990, people in the east still retain a sense of fear of this man
for his role in the infamous conscription drive for TNA at that time
and for the ruthless killings of several suspected but harmless
ex-Tiger sympathisers. Raazik, like everyone else involved with the
TNA fled to India and stayed there until last year. This fear is
still effective in that it helps the EPRLF immensely in collecting
money from the local people without much hassle.
The other groups are worried about Raazik�s activities apparently
because this is the particular time of the year when �collection� is
very high. A few members of these groups are at least sensible (!)
enough to realise that the general ability of the local population
to keep paying �taxes� will be affected drastically if the number of
those demanding money from it increases beyond a certain point. They
are also not unaware of the very bad harvest in the fertile
Paduvankarai region this year and of the growing number of farmers
who are abandoning paddy cultivation just to be spared the
harassment and pain which go with the demand by all the groups for
�taxes� in cash or kind.
The Paduvankarai region used to produce almost twelve percent of the
island�s paddy in more peaceful times. This is no more the case.
There was a time during the latter phase of Eelam War II when people
in the town were bold enough to complain to the Police about
extortion attempts by groups operating with the Army and the
intelligence units. But now many say that very little action is
being taken. This has discouraged people from having recourse to the
law and order machinary. They rather prefer to negotiate through
third parties for obtaining a substantial reduction in the amount
demanded.
Some groups operating in the town are usually content with sums as
low as ten thousand rupees. The LTTE however is quite tough on the
question of �tax�. Once the local Tiger intelligence and �collector�
determine the wealth of a person, he is notified of the amount
expected of him and the date before he has to send the cash. If not
he would be held until negotiations are over. Many people in the
Tamil villages on the trunk road between Kalmunai and Batticaloa who
had not paid a cent to the organisation for years have recently been
taken to LTTE areas - which are now not very far from the STF camps
on the main route - and are being held until their relatives
conclude negotiations on the final amount. Those who have paid say
that the LTTE�s local intelligence arm is quite efficient in getting
precise details of people�s assets and incomes which, they say,
makes obtaining a concession or a reduction extremely difficult .
In deed, Ramanan, the LTTE�s intelligence chief in Batticaloa
appears to have assumed a greater presence in the lives of ordinary
Tamils here than the special commander for the region Karuna
himself. But it should also be stated that there are many people who
contribute voluntarily to the LTTE. They say that the LTTE is the
only organisation which has not �Let down the Tamil side� by
continuing to fight and hence deserve the �tax� they demand.
The government expended a lot of resources and adopted a wide range
of counter insurgency measures between 1990 and 1994 to secure the
Tamil villages on the trunk road between Batticaloa and Kalmunai. In
the past these villages have supplied a relatively large number of
recruits and provided sustenance to many militant Tamil
organisations including the LTTE. There are ten villages- the
largest being Aaraippattai, Kaluwanchikkudy and Periya Kallar. The
elite Special Task Force has camps in Aaraippattai, Puthukdiirruppu,
Cheddipalayam and Kaluwanchikudy.
The LTTE however operates unhindered - collecting �taxes�, gathering
intelligence etc.,. - in all these villages. The Chairman of the
Kaluwanchikudy Pradeshiya Sabha �Selva� (formerly of the PLOTE and
now of the UNP) says that the LTTE runs most affairs which come
under the purview of his Pradeshya Sabha. He has to now work from
the Batticaloa town.
The STF which used to be the most effective instrument of the
government�s counter insurgency campaign, appears to be less sure of
itself after taking unprecedented casualties in Eelam War III. So
much so that STF personnel have to travel between camps on this road
in crowded civilian buses and other vehicles assuming, most
probably, that the LTTE would be reluctant to take the blame for
killing a lot of innocent civilians in order to gun down a few of
them. The people who have to regularly travel by public transport
are, of course, absolutely terrified by this.
In short the situation in Baticaloa may be summed thus: the
government does not have the resources to curb the LTTE in this
region which has put a lot of pressure on the armed services
operating here and also made them exposed and vulnerable to the LTTE
which in turn has increased the silent or publicised friction
between the civilians and the security forces. This, combined with
the general feeling in this area today that the Chandrika government
means no good to the Tamils, helps the Tigers thrive politically and
otherwise despite serious problems and irritants like �taxation� in
their relations with the local population.
What goes on in Batticaloa does not give one the slightest hope that
the war can be brought to a solemn conclusion - as the General would
have it. |