all towns are one, all men our kin.
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Selected Writings by Dharmeratnam Sivaram (Taraki)
On Vadamarachchi & Anton Balasingham
6 May 1990, Sri Lanka Island
"The RAW knew all the details of the Vadamarachchi operation and when it would begin. But they gave us false information. The Sri Lankan troops are going to launch a massive offensive on the Jaffna town, move your troops into that area, the RAW told us. We believed it and our troops in all the other parts of the peninsula were sent into Jaffna town. Therefore when the Sri Lankan government attacked Vadamarachchi we were defeated." This is what Dr Anton Balasingham has said at the meeting held in Nallur as reported by the Jaffna press.
I think this is the first time the Tigers have said that
they were defeated in that operation. Coming at this juncture when
the LTTE is seriously working on broadbasing itself politically
Balasingham's account of Vadamarachchi is not I think in the best
interests of his organization.
There is another important point. Didn't the Tigers see that they were being given a dead rope when, as Balasingham says, the RAW had indicated Jaffna town as the point where the Sri Lankan armed forces were going to start their offensive? Logistically it would have been next to impossible to sustain a major thrust from Jaffna town. Even for the Vadamarachchi operation the Sri Lankan army was busy, quietly clearing the Palaly - Thondamannar coastal road for more than an year, so that the thrust out of Thondamannar and the subsequent spread into the Vadamarachchi region would have an extremely vital line of supply. Given the maximum fire power of the Tigers (mines and all) operations of such scale could present Sri Lankan troops with logistical problems (amphibian and air).
Everyone knew with what
difficulty the Jaffna fort camp used to secure its supplies.
However, despite what the Tiger theoretician, who was mainly in
Madras, Delhi or London at that time, says I do not think
Prabaharan would have handled the situation in that manner. In the
first place the Tigers had come to seriously doubt the wisdom of
having `liberated zones' in the North and East towards the end of
1986. To their chagrin the information flow to the Sri Lankan army
had increased sharply, during the period of peace they had secured
by having confined the army to its camps in the peninsula.