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Waning importance of the rearbase in Tamil Nadu
29 October 1989
If anything characterizes the new phase of Tamil militancy, it is
the waning importance of the rearbase in Tamil Nadu, or in India for
that matter. Even if there is a drastic turnaround in affairs,
leading to a pre-1987 situation a rearbase across the Palk Straight
will not be as essential to Tamil groups as it was during 1983-87.
During that period, the rearbase became so important that North and
East Sri Lanka was simply referred to as ‘land’ in the parlance of
the Tamil militants.
The preoccupation that the rearbase (Pin Thalam) was so great that
rifts within the groups were mainly on the lines of the leadership
in Pin Thalam and those on ‘land.’ The Sri Sabaratnam-Das split
(TELO), the Pathmanabha-Douglas Devananda split (EPRLF), the Uma
Maheswaran-Eeswaran split (PLOTE) were all primarily due to the
rearbase/land dichotomy. The only leader who circumvented the
problem was Prabhakaran. He had a separate command for each district
and handled supplies separately through an efficient communications
network. Therefore none of his area commanders could even think of
consolidating his power on land. The India-based LTTE leadership
kept power by controlling the supply of weapons, ammunition and
finance. They were also extremely careful to keep the top RAW
contacts in their hands. It was felt that if these lines slipped RAW
would have an opportunity to put through deals with somebody with
influence on ‘land.’
Those who call EPRLF “quislings” of the Indians should remember what
RAW did to the EPRLF – pulling out their ‘land’ commander and
teaming him up with PLOTE’s ‘land’ political leader to form the
ENDLF. Despite their stated and even real political position, the
EPRLF has strong reservations about RAW’s intentions on this score.
The rearbases control over supplies, their strategic links with
Delhi, commitments and vested interests in Tamil Nadu reduced the
leaders’ sensitivity to and grasp affairs on ‘land’- even in the
case of the LTTE, but to a lesser degree than the others. The fact
that the leaders in the rearbase lived in comfort for which the boys
on ‘land’ had to pay with their blood and sweat was the stuff which
the disgruntled made generous use of to sow discord.
The now-forgotten ‘literature of heresy’ within the groups from
1983-1987 bears ample evidence of the extent to which the rearbase
became a fissure in the affairs of the Tamil movement. There was
serious concern about the wisdom of having come to India in the
first place and about the disproportionate importance of the
rearbase among some quarters. The extent to which the war was
becoming dependent on Tamil Nadu did not go without criticism. That
a multipurpose, comfortable rearbase would in the longterm erode the
conviction to fight and play into the hands of India was an opinion
expressed as early as 1983. Finally the rearbase started becoming a
factor that threatened to undermine the control various leaders had
over their fighting cadres. Meanwhile the Indian authorities began
demonstrating regularly that they had the militants in their mercy
by locking up and releasing weapons and men at will, but by this
time, the militants were hopelessly entangled. There was a time
towards the end of 1986 when the Tamil Nadu state police started
treating even the leaders of groups like common criminals. Further,
the long period of inactivity and the absence of the natural
discipline imposed by the guerilla’s fighting environment turned
several cadres towards anti-social behavior.
Another serious mistake was that if the rearbase in India had been
developed on the basis of a sound political commitment from
sympathetic local antiestablishment groups it would have been useful
in the long run without jeopardizing the future of the movement,
even though such a line of action would not have had the massive
benefits offered by the Indian state. In the early stages, before
the split in the LTTE which saw Uma Maheswaran and Prabhakaran go
their separate ways, some contacts of this nature were made. The
Vinod Mishra faction of the Naxalbari movement and Perunchitranar’s
group which left the DMK when it abandoned the separatist call for
Dravidanad in the early ‘60’s, were two such groups. Except for the
National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam and the Thamilar PaduKappu
Peravai (Assembly for the protection of Tamils)- both Maoist groups
which said they were only fighting for self-determination and not
separation- every one else went for the big parties in Tamil Nadu,
especially after 1983.
The Indian central government became aware of the presence and
nature of the Tamil militant movement on their soil only in 1982,
when Prabhakaran and Maheswaran shot at each other at Pondi Bazaar
in Madras. The actions of both after the incident made it obvious
they preferred to work under ground in Tamil Nadu. But it was too
late by then. The matter was transferred from the State police to
the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of the Central Government. In due
course, RAW took over.
Despite the IB’s involvement (the first batch of militants was
trained by them) operations in Tamil Nadu continued to be secretive.
But 1983 saw too many young men wanting to “join up” for the groups
to handle in the North and East. Camps in Tamil Nadu became
inevitable as each organization was faced with the dilemma of
absorbing at least part of the massive influx or becoming a
nonentity.
The maintenance of large numbers in the camps needed the support for
politicians from the AIA-DMK, the DMK and in some cases the CPI. The
LTTE made a grave error, according to some sympathizers in Tamil
Nadu, by cultivating MGR while discreetly and sometimes openly
avoiding others, Karunanidhi and Thamilaga Viduthalai Padai (Tamil
Nadu Liberation Army) leader Thamilarasan were deeply vexed by the
LTTE’s strict adherence to MGR. In Colombo, the LTTE has adopted a
similar one track allegiance.
In Tamil Nadu, the LTTE were very careful that not a single weapon
went to either any of the various underground Marxist rebels or to
Thamilarasan’s separatist movement. Thus, unlike other groups, they
had a very good record with the Q branch in Tamil Nadu set up to
crush the Maoist Naxalite movement and later given the
responsibility of monitoring the Tamil movements. But despite their
careful conduct, the growing incidence of separatist and Naxalite
violence in Tamil Nadu was seriously worrying some Indian
authorities. The accord provided an opportunity for a cleanup. RAW’s
premises were such that the LTTE never expected them to stand by and
allow all of them to be arrested. But Ranjan Appa who managed their
vast finance, Kittu and Rahim were among those arrested and sent
back to Sri Lanka. Thus, when the LTTE started waging war against
the Indian Army, they found themselves without any friends who could
act outside the supervision of the Indian state.
Although analysts have attached considerable importance to the role
of Tamil Nadu politics in shaping Delhi’s attitude to the Tamil
militants, it is Delhi and Delhi alone that decided on the course of
action and maintained all the most important connections with the
militants. Therefore, as soon as the RAW-LTTE talks of mid-1988
broke up, there was no one to help them in Tamil Nadu.
The war required higher and higher inputs in terms of ammunition,
explosives, medicine etc. Even though the LTTE- suspicious of RAW-
had hoarded vast quantities of ammunition and explosives in the
North, it soon faced sharply reduced mobility and pressure on
supplies due to the constant fighting on all fronts. The LTTE’s
brand of guerilla war requires the kind of high inputs a
conventional army needs. The volume of money that has to be handled
to finance these inputs, and the international transactions need an
urban center. The ‘closure of Madras’ was a serious crisis for the
LTTE from this point of view.
As IPKF operations aimed at throttling LTTE supply lines and the
intensity of operations pushed them closed to Sinhala border areas
the prospect of a hostile Sinhala army at their back became a
serious consideration. This forms the background to their decision
to deal with Colombo, which is also proving much cheaper than having
a rearbase across the Palk Strait. Cynthia, a 3rd year medical
student at the Jaffna University and Kittu’ fiance, came to Colombo
three weeks ago. Kittu followed- for a reunion, apart from other
reasons connected with diplomacy or health. A strongly pro-LTTE
paper ‘Unmai’ published in Colombo, is proving to be a bothersome
fissure in moves towards an information-monopoly in the NorthEast.
In the meantime, the LTTE’s public relations operation in Colombo
has been expanding.
These are all signs that a fundamental change is taking place.
Because of this change in the rearbase and its nature, the LTTE’s
commitment to Eelam, India may not be able to play the same role in
Tamil-Sinhalese politics that it did before.
But the possible outcome to two recent developments may determine
prospects for the internalisation of conflict-resolution in Sri
Lanka.
Saravanabhavan, elder brother of Francis, the LTTE’s Batticaloa
political leader, has been missing since last month, allegedly
picked up by men in police uniform in Wattala. The LTTE leadership
is seriously worried about this. And the RAW Director for Sri Lankan
Affairs had visited London recently- to meet LTTE representatives
there, according to sources in Delhi. It remains to be seen how the
LTTE reacts to these developments
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