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			 LTTE will negotiate only with Parity of 
			Military Status  
			 
			27 January 2004 
	 
			Mr. Anton Balasingham says that the India Sri Lanka Defence 
			Co-operation Agreement (DCA) will "upset the balance of forces to 
			the disadvantage of the LTTE". The Tigers have accused Prime 
			Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe of trying to tilt the military 
			equilibrium by weaving an international safety net.  
			 
			I formulated the concept of the balance of forces between the LTTE 
			and the Sri Lankan armed forces as the basis for the ceasefire 
			agreement in a paper presented at a conference in Switzerland in 
			April 2002. (Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva presented the Army's point of 
			view. But Chatham House rules prevent me from discussing details of 
			the matter here).  
			 
			I argued that the LTTE leadership decided to start negotiations with 
			the Government of Sri Lanka because they were unequivocally 
			satisfied by December 2000 that they had achieved a strategic parity 
			with the Sri Lankan armed forces and were in a position to sustain 
			that parity, barring an overwhelming and sustained external military 
			intervention.  
			 
			Why does the LTTE deem strategic parity so necessary for sustaining 
			the ceasefire? - Or indeed the whole peace process itself?  
			 
			Everyone who firmly and unshakably believes that Prabhakaran is an 
			irredeemable militarist/terrorist would find it hard to swallow my 
			explanation that the concept of strategic parity has a fundamentally 
			political dimension to it. (They might rather continue to indulge in 
			the rather comforting view that the LTTE leader was so terrified by 
			the wrath of America after September 11 that he sued unconditionally 
			for peace)  
			 
			Here one should emphasise that the Tigers consider military power 
			first and foremost as a means to negotiate political ends. To 
			negotiate effectively one should have a clear understanding of the 
			'negotiating behaviour' of one's opponent.  
			 
			What has been the GOSL's negotiating behaviour in the past? It has 
			either entered negotiations if and when it felt that it could 
			effectively water down Tamil demands or when it was under strong 
			military pressure.  
			 
			There have been only two instances in which the GOSL actually 
			implemented 'solutions' - one was the District Development Councils, 
			the other was the Provincial Councils. The former is an instance of 
			the watering down the Tamil negotiating position to fit perfectly 
			into the unitary state structure and the latter is an instance of 
			responding to unavoidable military pressure.  
			 
			The TULF asked the Tamils in the northeast for a mandate to 
			establish a separate sovereign state in 1977, entered into 
			negotiations with the GOSL and three years later came back with the 
			District Development Council idea which was a silly travesty of 
			devolution. The threat of Indian invasion made J.R. Jayewardene sign 
			the Indo Lanka Accord, under which the Provincial Councils were 
			established.  
			 
			Therefore the LTTE sees military pressure as being essential to 
			critically influence the GOSL's negotiating behaviour. The converse 
			of this is that the GOSL would seek total surrender and elimination 
			of all legitimate Tamil aspirations if it has internally 
			unchallengeable military prowess.  
			 
			This argument tends to hold water with many Tamils. What did the 
			President do when the LTTE declared a ceasefire unilaterally on 
			December 24, 2000? She rejected it out of hand, imperiously and 
			rashly. She did it every time the LTTE extended the ceasefire until 
			April 2001.  
			 
			It was obvious that she was rejecting the LTTE ceasefire because she 
			was confident (or made to feel so) that the Agni Khiela Operation 
			for which the military was making major preparations during the 
			ceasefire was going to succeed.  
			 
			LTTE commanders often state that if the Agni Khiela offensive had 
			succeeded then President Kumaratunga would have ordered the army to 
			move on towards Elephant Pass and hence relegated the question of 
			starting peace talks to the backburner.  
			 
			Norway, wittingly or unwittingly, provided a singular window of 
			opportunity to the military for planning the offensive and for 
			achieving a concentration of forces in Jaffna.  
			 
			The LTTE ceasefire, declared unilaterally as a goodwill gesture on 
			the eve of Christmas in December 2000 consequent to discussions with 
			Norwegian facilitators helped the military gather together some of 
			its best but war battered divisions and train for four months in 
			Jaffna, unhampered by distracting force deployments that may have 
			otherwise been necessitated by offensives and attacks by the 
			Liberation Tigers in the northeast.  
			 
			The army may not have been able to achieve the necessary 
			concentration of force to launch Op. Agni Khiela if not for this 
			window of opportunity that was opened by the LTTE's ceasefire. 
			Norway, Britain and the US were not unaware of the preparations for 
			the offensive by the SLA.  
			 
			Sri Lankan armed forces commanders insisted at the time that the 
			southern parts of Jaffna had to be recaptured from the Tigers to 
			ensure Colombo's hold on the peninsula. They particularly wanted to 
			deny the LTTE the only all weather over land supply route to the 
			peninsula at Elephant Pass (EPS).  
			 
			Undisputed control over the EPS causeway, the coast between 
			Chundikulam and Nagar Kovil and the terrain in Pallai for 
			concentration of forces had, in their eyes, tilted the overall 
			strategic balance of the Eelam War, at least geographically, in the 
			LTTE's favour.  
			 
			Historically, the southern parts of Jaffna have been its Achilles 
			Heel. In colonial and pre-colonial times, military forces from the 
			mainland intent on capturing Jaffna entrenched themselves in the 
			Pachchilaipalli Division, encompassing Pallai and Iyakkachchi, 
			before launching their main thrust into the peninsula.  
			 
			On 16 September 1628 when a large force from the mainland entered 
			Pachchilaipalli and dug in there against the Portuguese rulers of 
			Jaffna, the greater part of the Tamils in Jaffna are said to have 
			joined the invaders who were hence able to swiftly advance on the 
			Fort and lay siege to it for 13 days. The Portuguese were threatened 
			similarly the next year too. They were able to hold the peninsula 
			only because they defeated the encamped mainland forces in 
			Pachchilaipalli itself.  
			 
			"He who holds Elephant Pass owns Jaffna", said Balraj, one of LTTE's 
			most senior military commanders, addressing a public meeting in the 
			Vanni last year. Another key aspect of the balance of forces that 
			the LTTE was able to achieve before it decided to declare a 
			ceasefire unilaterally in December 2000 was its hold on southern 
			Trincomalee.  
			 
			Much has been written about the threat posed to Trincomalee harbour 
			by LTTE forces in Mutur. Prabhaharan's hold on Trincomalee and Mutur 
			and the necessary concentration of forces that he has massed (or can 
			potentially mass) in these strategic vantage points define the 
			strategic parity that underpins his negotiating strategy.  
			 
			This is a critical check on any move by the GOSL to tilt the balance 
			of forces on the ground in its favour. The LTTE leader is 
			negotiating with a firm grip on the jugulars of Jaffna and 
			Trincomalee. The India Sri Lanka Defence Agreement will do naught to 
			loosen the grip.  
			 
			If they have any understanding of these matters, the President and 
			Prime Minister should re-start negotiations as soon as possible 
			without letting the winds of political change in the south close the 
			valuable window of opportunity the LTTE will hold open as long as it 
			is certain of sustaining the strategic parity it achieved at great 
			cost.  
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