by Bhashyam Kasturi and Pankaj Mehra
[Courtesy:
Indian Defence Review, April-June 2001, vol.16, no.2, pp. 22-31.
Complete text reproduced. The words and sentences in italics and two
subheadings in the main text, are as in the original. 16 Footnotes have
been faithfully reproduced.]
(Dr Bhashyam Kasturi, an international security affairs
specialist focuses on Indian national security issues relating to
intelligence and special operations. Pankaj Mehra, a security analyst
organization in matters relating to intelligence. While Dr. Kasturi is
currently Chief Correspondent with the Deccan Herald newspaper,
Mr. Mehra is a free-lance writer with special interest in intelligence.
The authors would like to express their appreciation to B. Raman, former
additional secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, who read an earlier
draft of this paper and offered his critical comments on several aspects
of covert action.)
Intelligence organizations
the world over require means of getting information using covert methods.
While it is possible for nations to get information, at times active
measures become necessary to achieve certain foreign policy objectives. For
this purpose, intelligence organiｚations
undertake covert action, which involve intervention in a variety of
clandestine ways in the internal affairs of other nations. Such operations,
often called covert or special missions, involve carrying out clandestine
missions, ranging from pro-insurgency, insurgency, sabotage and deception
to, political assassination and political subversion. Missions often
encompass the whole spectrum of activity from para-military to military
operations, at times even the overthrow of governments.
Covert action (CA) is separate from
covert intelligence gathering. The difference is that the latter involves
clandestine gathering of information in enemy territory using human or
technical means, by activity that the enemy is not aware of. Covert action
is employed to influence politics and events in another country without
revealing one�s involvement or at least while maintaining plausible
deniability.
Covert action is an important tool for
policy makers seeking an alternative between the application of large-scale
military force and sitting quiet when confronted by a foreign policy
challenge or when opportunities arise to further national interests and
goals. For this purpose, intelligence agencies have separate units or organizations
to undertake special missions. In a way, covert political action is an
extension of foreign policy. If properly coordinated and controlled, such
action can have results out of proportion to the inputs. For instance,
India�s support to the Mukti Bahini preceding the Bangladesh war gave it an
advantage in terms of information flow and in aiding the advance of Indian
troops during actual military operations after 3 December 1971. It also
provided the base for the creation of Bangladesh.
Nations undertake covert operations based
on their peace and wartime needs. The former USSR and US carried out such
missions during the Cold War to fulfil their goals. Both the superpowers
have organizations in such activity, which pursue pro-insurgency, political
assassination and subversion to suit their national interests. The
Sandinista experience, the Iran-Contra affair, and the Bay of Pigs
operations come to mind when discussing such type of missions. In the US,
the period from the 40s to 60s saw a strong consensus concerning the need
for covert action. Opposition to covert action began during the
Congressional investigations in the mid-1970. Since then classic covert
action has reduced considerably and congressional oversight ensures the CIA
does not act on its own.
CA can be broadly found to be in five
forms; Propaganda; Political action; Para-military assistance; coup d� etat
and, secret intelligence support. Perhaps the most telling comment on CA was
made by a former chief of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner who says �Only
do covertly that which if it is exposed will cause you little political
harm.� [1] To this end it is important that covert action be carried out
with the aim that it has certain plausible deniability.
It may well be argued that democratic
states should not exercise the CA option. But instruments of statecraft,
whether covert or overt can be used to achieve objectives that are vital for
national security. In this sense, nations can find the way to blend
strategic interest and democratic norms to protect vital interests. In
India�s case, foreign policy has the long-term vision of living in peace
with its neighbours and does not seek relations to be held hostage on
singular issues as it is with Pakistan. Which is why India�s world vision is
expansive and seeks to foster cooperation rather than confrontation. Within
this paradigm it is necessary to view relations with Pakistan.
It is argued in this analysis that
India�s experience suggests undertaking covert action has not always been to
fulfil foreign policy goals or to serve vital national interests. Secondly,
it is perceived that inadequate covert action has been undertaken against
Pakistan, enough to dissuade it from engaging in a proxy war with India.
This is an essential part of the politics of persuasion that India must
engage in, if it is to organize a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan.
The reason why covert action by India in
other countries has not been so effective is because more often than not
clear directives are not forthcoming for the objectives with which covert
action is to be undertaken. Also due to the autonomous nature of agencies
engaged in such activity, and changing political equations it is not
possible to sustain covert action.
In a few cases, there has been links
between foreign policy and operations undertaken to further national
security goals, like in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. This paper
studies the role of Indian intelligence in utilizing this asset to further
national goals. Its links to foreign policy and the national executive are
also examined. The Indian experience in undertaking covert action has been
mixed; this is due to the varying politico-military objectives and level of
coordination with institutions that determine policy.
This paper is divided into two parts. The
first section narrates the Indian experience of covert operations in various
parts of the South Asian region. It also provides inputs on some missions
undertaken by other agencies.
Part two outlines a strategy for India in
engaging in covert action against Pakistan. It is suggested here that India
must undertake active and passive covert operations against Pakistan with
the objective of breaking the stronghold of the army, bureaucracy and
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on Pakistani society. There is a belief
that covert action against Pakistan could lead to the break-up of an already
anarchic state, but Indian aims must be focused on breaking the stranglehold
of the army, ISI and bureaucracy in Pakistan. This could have two effects.
By playing the Pak game in their own backyard, it would keep them occupied
and perhaps take attention away from India.
Alternatively, it could force them to
re-think strategies, vis-�-vis the region, including Afghanistan and create
circumstances for a new diplomatic initiative with India. There is always
the worst-case situation where a special forces strike by India on mujahid
training camps across the LoC could lead to a war, but this eventuality
India must be prepared for.
India�s experience of covert action
Intelligence agencies have undertaken
covert operations, independently and in cooperation with agencies of other
countries. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW)
and Military Intelligence (MI) have undertaken operations covertly with
certain objectives. These have been low grade and little has been achieved.
In the present context, the focus is on operations conducted by India�s
external intelligence agency, R&AW, termed as RAW for this paper.
India, in the late 50s and 60s with the
help of the CIA aided the Tibetan rebellion, providing training facilities
in India. The 1962 border war with China led to the establishment of several
organizations that are today under the Cabinet Secretariat, the Special
Frontier Force (Establishment 22 at Chakrata) and Special Services Bureau.
Additionally, a group was raised with the objective of carrying out aerial
reconnaissance of China and Tibet, the Aviation Research Centre (ARC). One
source suggests that at Charbatia in December 1964 a U-2 aircraft was
deployed for operations over Tibet. The Tibet operation continued till the
early 60s when the CIA, withdrew its operations on Indian soil and moved to
Nepal. [2]
The Tibetan rebellion against the Chinese
forces and Indian help straddled an era of post-colonial assertion of
non-alignment as the major plank of foreign policy, and yet Jawaharlal Nehru
chose to engage in covert action as a foreign policy tool knowing fully
well, that India could do little for Tibet. He was keen to have friendly
relations with China, but he still believed, like the British did, that a
Tibet with an identity was important for sub-continental India. The question
may well ask if this policy did not contradict the policy of non-alignment?
Possibly yes, but in Nehru�s mind, the best way of dealing with the Chinese
was diplomatic, and towards this end he was even willing to sponsor China�s
candidature to the UN. The help given to the Tibetans was probably a small
cog in the larger worldview and helping the US in this was a part of
geo-politics of the time. This did of course have the adverse effect of
changing Chinese perceptions about India. All this is of course based on the
scanty evidence that is available in different sources but this is important
to suggest directions of discourse in order to dilate on the foreign policy
angle to covert operations.
Then in the late sixties, the need for an
organization tasked with gathering external intelligence led to the
formation of RAW, and the Directorate General of Security was transferred
from IB to RAW. As the Bangladesh crisis arose, RAW was given the task of
gathering intelligence and undertaking covert missions, including
pro-insurgency. This is the most successful operation till date, publicly
written about, carried out, involving the training of the Mukti Bahini of
East Pakistan and their role in helping the Indian military intervention.
The operation involved getting the
freedom fighters in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) together and training and
arming them. This was essentially a Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW)
operation, with the Indian army providing the training infrastructure. The
Mukti Bahini was formed in January 1971 and for the next ten months people
who came across the border were selected for training. By September-November
1971, these forces were infiltrated into East Pakistan for covert missions,
including sabotage of lines of communication and command and control
centres. [3]
When war did officially break out on 3
December, the Mukti Bahini was ready, (just like the French resistance in
1944, when Operation Overlord the invasion at Normandy began). The Mukti
Bahini helped Indian troops find their way, harassed Pak troops and
generally made itself a nuisance. Naval Mukti Bahini divers planted mines in
the harbours around Bangladesh and sunk many merchant and warships, playing
a crucial role in blockading the ports. Another facet of covert action was
witnessed in the trans-border attacks carried out by the Special Frontier
Force (SFF) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Thus a combination of
para-military action in the form of the Mukti Bahini and direct covert
action using special forces, complimented the main military action in the
1971 Bangladesh war. The benefits accruing from coordinated covert action
allowed implementation of foreign policy to secure national interests namely
liberation of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh.[4]
Subsequently measures taken to integrate
Sikkim into the Indian Union by the RAW proved crucial. One authority states
that RAW performed the task of counter-intelligence in Sikkim preventing
foreign agencies from getting a foothold in the sensitive Himalayan kingdom
and allowing it to accede to India.[5] But soon after the successful
mounting of Bangladesh and Sikkim operation, leading to the latter�s
integration as a state in the Indian union, came the Sri Lanka operation.
This pro-insurgency operation launched by Mrs Gandhi during her second term
in office, meant to train Tamil separatists followed the same lines of the
1971 case. Equipping and training of insurgents from across the Palk Straits
took place on Indian soil, in the state of Tamil Nadu and in places as far
as, Chakrata and Dehradun. With the active support of the state and central
government, Indian intelligence agencies took up the task with gusto. But
what was missing was the broad institutional oversight so essential for
tying up the loose ends. Foreign policy makers and defence planners were
scarcely aware of what was happening as political masters changed and
priorities shifted.[6]
Former foreign secretary JN Dixit
covertly has identified the reasons for India getting involved in Sri Lanka.
He says Mrs Gandhi was aware that all political parties in Tamil Nadu were
sympathetic to the aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils. Therefore extending
support to Sri Lanka Tamil parties and Tamil militant groups from 1980
onwards was a natural corollary. There was also the security factor, Sri
Lanka getting Israeli and US military personnel to train its own army and
para-military. And there was the VoA station in Trincomalee. India perceived
this to be an opening for US strategic presence in South Asia. These factors
created the conditions for Indian covert intervention in Sri Lanka.[7] The
main point was that Mrs Gandhi did not like J Jayawardhane, for his policies
and thus began Operation Sri Lanka.
Secrecy is undoubtedly called for in
operations of this sort. But as the Iran-Contra affair in America showed, in
the Sri Lanka operations also one part of the government did not know what
the other was doing. In the Indian case, while RAW knew what it was doing
politically, neither it nor the government was unable to fathom the
potential for trouble that was generated by this operation. This was because
the mission sought to achieve too much at one time. The number of groups
being trained were one too many and difficult to control. No accountability
existed and eventually not enough attention was paid to the risks of losing
control over the insurgents. Thus by the time Mrs Indira Gandhi was killed
in 1984, and Rajiv became prime minister the priorities changed and so did
policy towards Sri Lanka.
In politico-military terms, covert action
eventually proved to be of little use when the Indian Peace Keeping Force
(IPKF) went into Sri Lanka in 1987. For the simple reason that intelligence
on the insurgents trained by India was not forthcoming. Additionally, the
intelligence agencies continued to covertly continue political dealings with
the insurgents to suit their ends, even during the IPKF�s stay in Sri Lanka.
This undermined the foreign policy goal of sending a peacekeeping force to
restore peace in Sri Lanka. The problem was that too many prime ministers
were involved in the Sri Lanka episode, resulting in several conflicting
decisions. Also involvement of state leaders like MG Ramachandran created
more complications for command and control.
Intelligence agencies have been involved in various covert acts, both within
India and in the surrounding region. Intelligence agencies often make
alliances and then forget to inform their cousins resulting in confusion. In
February 1998, the Armed Forces intercepted ships at sea off the Andamans
killing six people and arresting 73 others. This was essentially a �sting�
operation carried out by MI in collaboration with their Burmese
counterparts. But the result was a big hue and cry.
In April, the leader of the National Unity Party of Arakans (NUPA) wrote to
the Defence Minister that the men abroad the ship were in fact Arakanese
revolutionaries who were cooperating with the Indians. He wrote, �The Indian
military intelligence had okayed our voyage and that is why we entered
Indian territorial waters to avoid the Burmese Navy.� The issue is whether
it was a case of military intelligence not giving the information to its
forces in the field in time or it was a case of giving up its people. Maung
wrote, �We were cooperating with each other. The Indians asked us for help
to track down gunrunners carrying weapons to Northeast India and we helped
them. So it came as a shock to us that our ship, about which the Indians
were given full information, should be attacked.� [8] The point here is that
at one level India is willing to help the pro-democracy movement in Burma,
but due to the insurgents buying arms from South-East Asia and this having a
direct influence on the insurgent movement in India�s north-east it becomes
necessary for the army to curb such activity. The dichotomy in policy
towards the region is a reflection of the lack of understanding how to
secure vital interests in the north-east.
It needs recalling that in the 80s, RAW supported tribal and ethnic factions
fighting the SLORC in Myanmar. One of the factions supported by India was
the Kachin Independence Army. The Kachins, known more accurately as
Jingphaws or Marus, account for some 3 per cent of Myanmar�s ethnic
population. They inhabit the north-east of the country and have the
reputation for resorting to arms to assert what they believe are their
rights.
A senior officer in RAW deputed to Bangkok in the 80s, made contact with
Burmese underground leaders in the hope of gaining some information. Then
this officer decided that the KIA could be beneficially used to channelise
information. And RAW could aid them with money and arms. Having made
contact, the idea was to get members of KIA into India for training and
contact creation. After the controlling officer returned from Bangkok,
infiltration of KIA cadres was started. They came as students, youths
touring India and helpers, sent for training to Chakrata and other locations
in north and north-east. Arms and other material began to filter through to
camps in North Myanmar and this reached its peak in 1991-92. Arunachal
Pradesh and Mizoram provided exfiltration sites, while some material went
via Bangkok. This was the post election period when Aung Sang Suu Kyi had
won but was not allowed to take power by SLORC. [9] All this was stopped by
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, as part of his �Look East� policy.
Looking back, one may well ask what purpose did this operation serve? What
national interests or foreign policy goals did it serve? Keeping in mind the
dimension of policy in the 80s, that of coercive diplomacy there is little
doubt that the Government thought it fit to aid all rebels across the
borders, wherever it suited us. But on many an occasion it backfired, as it
did in Sri Lanka.
There is one other aspect of covert action that requires highlighting in the
present study. Nation-states also engage in action within the territorial
confines of the country for politico-military aims, such as pro-insurgency
or counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism. Since the institutional
framework for covert action exists in most countries in the South Asian
region, indulging in domestic covert action is a continuing tool for
governments. In India for instance, it was suggested that SSB was used to
raise and train the Bodos in the late 80s in an effort to counter other
groups in the region. Their employment to fulfil political goals has
affected their organization and performance and impinges on their role,
which is really to engage in �stay-behind� operations.[10]
It has been often suggested that RAW should function as efficiently as
Pakistan�s ISI. In fact both India and Pakistan accuse each other of
encouraging subversion through their intelligence agencies. ISI�s activities
in India get greater media coverage than RAW�s activities in Pakistan. The
latter seems to lack the intensity of operations in Pakistan to counter or
duplicate ISI�s activities in India.
The ISI has been involved in covert action in various parts of India since
the 80s. The main focus has been on Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. Infiltration
of arms and drugs into India, along with men to stoke insurgencies has been
common. For Jammu & Kashmir, the ISI has a special cell to fuel the
insurgency. It has been responsible for the setting up and maintenance of
training camps in POK and Pakistan, the provision of arms and equipment,
infiltration and exfiltration of both recruits and trained militants into
the Valley. The entire plan to infiltrate Kashmir and launch a covert
low-intensity war there has been described in the part fact, part
organizations Operation Topac in 1989. The Pak strategy has followed the
lines suggested in this analysis.[11]
Op Topac visualised a three-phased strategy in Kashmir. First, fuelling of a
low-level insurgency in the Valley. Next, attacks on military and
infiltration of mujahids and other special forces for strikes and attacks on
soft targets. And then finally, to liberate Kashmir.
The Kashmir operation was an offshoot of the US-Pakistan fight against
Soviet Union. The CIA backed the Mujahadeen, via the ISI. The latter
siphoned off money and weapons meant for Afghanistan to stoke the insurgency
in Kashmir. But infiltration into the Valley has been taking place on a low
key since the early eighties, first of Kashmiris who were alienated from
India and currently of Pak mercenaries, including criminals and foreign
soldiers of fortune from Afghanistan and further afield. This occurred
through training camps in POK and Pakistan proper.
The enormous powers enjoyed by ISI were brought to the notice of Robert
Gates in May 1990 on a visit to India and Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto
apparently expressed her helplessness to Gates, in controlling the training
camps run by ISI in POK and Afghanistan used for anti-India operations. Even
accounting for an element of exaggeration, the illustration speaks much for
the ISI�s independence. Being a military controlled organisation, covert
operations are tightly controlled. A more recent statement by Benazir Bhutto
portrays an intelligence operation that has run amok and that one wields
enormous power within Pakistan.[12]
The Indian case is slightly different in terms of the methods of control. In
theory there are levels of civilian control, but in practice agencies like
RAW function in their own spheres of influence. If proper command and
control had been established with clear political objectives the Sri Lanka
operations would have been better tasked. All covert operations, both
domestic and foreign require political clearance, but covert intelligence
activity can be decided upon by the chief of RAW. Here too, the authority of
the Prime Minister is needed if the intelligence gathering is done in a
friendly country.[13] The chain of command in the case of RAW is Special
Services Bureau/Special Frontier Force through to the Directorate General of
Security and Secretary (R), in the Cabinet Secretariat, who reports to the
Prime Minister.
Most intelligence organisations the world over have a department or section
for active measures. Recruitment and training is often based on special
operations lines involving, parachuting, electronics, weapons and languages.
Area orientation and mobility along with, light but powerful weaponry for
fire fighting is essential for covert operations teams. The use of covert
action to support national foreign and security policy has been commonplace
amongst intelligence agencies round the world. Their success or failure has
often depended on the command and control, and the level of involvement of
political controllers. India�s experience shows that results have often been
positive when proper attention was paid to proper control and coordination.
When this has not been possible misuse of covert assets has taken place.
This combined with the duplication of covert efforts has reduced the impact
of such action on national security.
Covert operations against Pakistan
India has limited experience of covert operations against its western
neighbour. Clandestine electronic intelligence gathering and aerial
reconnaissance gives it some part of the picture. Additionally, it has
gained experience in exfiltrating agents into POK into the training camps
and this has helped in keeping tabs on activity in the POK region. But
India�s ability to influence events in Pakistan itself is limited.
Small-scale moral and material support does go out to ethnic groups in
Pakistan and some effort is made to infiltrate �spies� by Military
Intelligence in the border regions. But the larger picture is still
dependent on Technical/electronic intelligence and even here capability to
tap landlines in Pakistan is limited. Human intelligence from within
Pakistan is much less than required.[14] It is however suggested by one
source on the Internet that RAW has over 35,000 agents in Pakistan.[15]
Therefore, plans have to be made to covertly gather intelligence from inside
Pakistan to help in foreign policy objective of breaking the monopoly of the
ISI and army over Pakistan. India has to have a plan of action to
destabilise Pakistan, its economy and society, to the extent that it gives
us leverage in foreign policy terms. It must however, be clear that it is
not in India�s interests to have a disintegrated Pakistan. The aim is to
break the stranglehold of the intelligence agencies, the bureaucracy and the
military in Pakistan.
The proposed strategy is to undertake covert passive and active measures
against Pakistan including, psy. Ops, disinformation, strikes in rear
areas, border raids and so on. The last may include strikes by special
forces against training camps in POK and Northern Areas. Such operations
require a clear national will and motivation. They also require sustained
funding from the political leadership and it requires highly trained and
motivated manpower to execute this task. The objectives of such
operations are to first, penetrate Pakistani society and its institutions of
power. Obtaining intelligence from within the establishments of power is the
main aim. Associated with this is the second, long-term aim of breaking the
stranglehold of the main power brokers in Pakistan.
For the above mission, there is a need to create, to start with two sets of
teams. First, a plans section and second, an operations section. The first
will draw up the plans and stages for operations against Pakistan. Also
recruiting agents for the task and training them should be completed in
about six months. Planning from conception to actual operations should take
8-12 months, depending on the resources and manpower available. Once this is
achieved the operations begin.
The operation can be politically cleared by RAW and then a separate section
can be raised under the Director RAW, drawing the best talent from within
and other agencies including the army, all volunteers of course. Known as
Plans Directorate (PD), this will mastermind the operation. Personnel for
Strike Directorate (SD) should be picked from SSB, Army para-commandos and
NSG. For the agents and sleepers recruitment has to be from outside. The
need to know principle has to be strictly followed. Accountability should be
from Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, to Director RAW and to PD
head.
The entire operation can be divided into three phases. First phase is
penetration and setting up of networks. Second phase is to begin operations
in rear areas. Strikes against soft targets in Sind, Baluchistan and
Northern Areas. These will make the enemy react and make them sensitive.
The main aim is to infiltrate and subvert Pak institutions, the police,
communication network and other important organisations. To this end, it
makes sense to penetrate Pakistan from two sides, from outside the
sub-continent and from POK. Then, in the next stage, focus moves to
organising and training subversive elements. These groups would target
communication and logistic lines inside POK. Threatening the Mangla dam or
Kahuta for instance, would be a major psychological factor. Third phase is
hitting hard targets. First, to carry out disinformation campaign carried
out by agent provocateurs and others. A few expendable agents are used to
plant false information on police and intelligence agencies. At this stage,
the strike teams begin hitting hard targets like economic centres, financial
markets (like Karachi), ports and the like. Military installations like
ammunition dumps, communication centres, airfields can be targeted in case a
war breaks out. Otherwise the aim is to penetrate and gather intelligence
with the intention of breaking the stranglehold of the military over
Pakistan society.
The mission entails sending two teams of men (and women) into Pakistan for
two separate missions. This first team will consist of sleepers, and agent
provocateurs, and the second team will be the strike force. The sleepers and
agents will consist of network builders and specialists who will recruit
local people for both disinformation and strikes in the rear areas of
Pakistan. The agent provocateurs will be placed such that they can engage in
disinformation and activate sources within who can be expendable when
required. The second team is for strikes against key targets of economic and
military importance.
Both teams will have to be infiltrated on the basis of genuine documents and
placements in Pakistan. Identities can range from middle level social
workers, journalists and political workers. Crucially, the persons selected
for this job will have to be extensively trained for operations in living
off the land in Pakistan. One may at this stage refer to the operation
conducted by the Israeli Mossad in Syria aimed at the KHAD party. The agent
was an Israeli but was trained to behave and live like a Muslim.[16]
Therefore it should not be difficult to train an Indian, Hindu or Muslim to
live in Pakistan. The key lies in creating excellent and plausible
identities. Training has to be rigorous and thorough. Training will also be
common initially and then separate and then separate and compartmentalized
for the two teams � one, sleepers and agent provocateurs and two, demolition
teams that will serve as strike teams in the rear.
While both teams need training in explosives, weapons and communications,
each has a specific role, which calls for intensive training. For the
sleeper the aim is to penetrate Pakistani society and build a local network
for further infiltration. The important thing is therefore for these members
to be �Islamised.� For the strike teams it is going further afield, into
Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. This means differing identities and
covers; identities are important. The first team has to consist of
�Pakistani nationals.� Punjabi or Sindhis, who are from abroad, can be
targeted. Some thought can be given to recruiting people from the Asian
community in UK. Some members can be selected from Uzbekistan or
Turkmenistan. For those coming in from the west, penetration point is
obviously the United Kingdom, USA or Europe. Even the Middle East can be
used. In other words, the potential areas for recruitment are large and this
needs to be analysed carefully.
The strike teams could penetrate from Afghanistan or Tajikistan. The NWFP is
full of Afghan refugees and the Northern Areas have Turks, Tajiks and
Uzbeks. Finding these persons who are reliable and capable is going to be
the tough part, but not impossible.
Another option is to exfiltrate these teams from Indian soil. Therefore, the
strike teams could penetrate from northern Kashmir. The northern areas of
Jammu & Kashmir bordering Gilgit and Baltistan, mainly Kargil is a Shia
dominated region, this could also serve as a recruiting base. There are also
traditional routes that could be used for exfiltration into POK.
Additionally, India can find local recruits from amongst the Turks and
Tajiks in these regions who could act as couriers and informants. Similarly,
in POK the Gujjars and Bakkarwals can be recruited for the same purpose.
Seasonal migrants and sheepherders come from the Northern Areas, Chitral and
Koistan areas. They can also be recruited. The aim of penetrating the strike
teams is to get them to strike in the rear areas of Pakistan. The entire
infiltration process of both teams, will take at least one year. Then it is
a slow task of making inroads into Pak society.
So it is clear that mission objectives of both teams are different and
require different infiltration and exfiltration routes. As suggested above,
the first team cannot jump off from India; the second might, given the right
circumstances. The sleepers and agent provocateurs are always in danger of
exposure. Thus their exfiltration will depend on their own resources and on
the overall command and control of the mission. If mission control did want
to abandon the task, then alternative exfilitration routes will require to
be planned. The strike teams consisting of individuals, usually two to four
must have routes of escape, and this is possible in those areas bordering
India. It is thought best, diplomatically, at some stage to use Tajikistan
as the exfilitration route for those employed in the Northern Areas and
surrounding regions. Those in Baluchistan, Sind and NWFP will have to use
Afghanistan or get to the Arabian Sea for exfiltration.
The first team should consist of 10-20 persons, both men and women who will
be sent to Islamabad, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore. The second team,
consisting of only men will go to towns in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP, as
also the areas of Gilgit and Chitral. Numbers will depend on how much rear
area attack is envisaged, perhaps initial numbers may be 8-10 in groups of
two, to each region. The entire operation has to be planned keeping in mind
that the initial period of infiltration and consolidation should be about
four-six months. And then once the strike teams have got into place,
situations can be created.
The aim of the first team is to settle in Pakistan, infiltrate society, make
inroads and build networks for information gathering and find niches in high
places. The agent provocateurs will be expendable and need to be locally
recruited, though for the sake of authenticity, one or two sleepers need to
be expendable also. Key areas of penetration are the bureaucracy, the army,
ISI, elite middle class and media. After a lull of a year, information
should be leaked, through available means of the existence of these agent
provocateurs, who will have in their possession, propaganda material,
disinformation material and generally stories that lull Pakistani
intelligence into a sense of complacency that they have achieved a coup.
Further, as the Russians so successfully did with the CIA and MI-6, the
agent provocateurs should talk of moles and other sleepers in the Pak
military and intelligence establishment to create internal dissension.
Once this leads to internal turmoil, it is time to activate the strike teams
who will launch rear area attacks on installations of economic and military
value. This will lead to further conspiracy theories being floated, leading
to political uncertainty. The risk that this entails is that it will weaken
the democratic process and possibly lead to military rule in Pakistan, but
that is a contingency that India has to prepare for. The aim of strikes is
to create a situation where the establishment is caught in an over-reach
situation. The rear areas, which are under the administrative control of
Pakistan, but given its tribal and ethnic composition are quite independent,
can be suitably engaged by India for its own purposes. Strikes will mean
deploying more police and para-military troops to these regions and will
stretch the Pak establishment.
Surprise and timing are an important element in these missions and those in
the strike formations should be constantly on the move, working from small
towns, crowded market places and religious places. Rear area operations are
to succeed by strikes in a few important cities and installations of
economic value such as oil fields and tankers. Karachi city and its port is
an example. Period of operations will depend on the nature of Pakistani
response; if they do according to plan then teams can be exfiltrated. If
they need to be in for some more time, then further deception plans need to
be put into operation.
The duration of operations in most cases is stretchable. The first phase may
take anything between one and three years, while the second phase will be
carried out in synchronised fashion for a month or two in one place and then
move on to another target. After a respite of a few months it will be time
to carry out operations again. The long-term objective is to build
information networks in Pakistan that will provide a human intelligence
source for India and additionally it will help us make inroads into the
military establishment and bureaucracy.
Along with the strike missions carried out by the second team, plans may be
made to carry out heliborne operations and SF strikes in the border regions
against militant training camps and other suitable targets. Forces for this
are already available in the form of the National Security Guards and Indian
Army para-commandos. These can be configured and trained for operations in a
near-war like situation or simultaneously with the covert strike missions
outlined above. All this of course requires a national security policy that
seeks to engage and contain Pakistan in foreign policy terms.
To aid this process and to improve intelligence gathering on Pakistan the
above covert action plan is commended to the Indian decision-maker and
political leadership. The Indian diplomatic and security response to
Pakistan sponsored terrorism has often been to fight fires within after the
incidents have taken place. Additionally, there is a dialogue track, which
seeks to engage Pakistan in a meaningful bilateral exchange. But little
thought is given to the possibility of engaging in covert operations on a
scale suggested above and its usefulness as a tool of diplomacy. The
intention as stated above is not to help the disintegration of Pakistan but
to engage Pakistan in a battle in which the key players, the army, ISI and
bureaucracy will get embroiled to an extent that it creates conditions for,
first Pakistan�s disengagement from the sub-continent and second, may help
the process of bilateral dialogue.
