From the land of
make-believe to the realm of real politik
1 January 2002
1. The Sinhala people have had a long sojourn in the
land of make-believe. Their leaders have promised them things which
defy belief. Junius Richard Jayawardene hoped to disarm the LTTE in
72 hours with Indian assistance. He began the ritual mantram of
promising all-out military victory. His successor, Ranasinghe
Premadasa, promised from the pattirippuwa of the Temple of the Tooth
in Kandy that the single all island state would be preserved come
what may. His two successors, Wijetunga and Kumaratunga, made annual
promises of military victory.
2.A variation on this theme was the repeated assertion that the LTTE
could be so seriously debilitated by military pressure that it would
be forced to sue for peace on the government�s terms. This mantram
was persisted in despite manifest increases in the LTTE�s military
capability resulting in a series of staggering defeats suffered by
the Sri Lankan armed forces during the last five years.
3.For the last 14 years from 1987 all governments without exception
have assured the Sinhala people that a constitutional solution
enacted into law could end the conflict by weaning away the Tamil
peoples� support for the LTTE. The 13th Amendment to the
constitution which established Provincial Councils was intended to
have precisely that effect and was a complete failure. The Tamil
people could not be persuaded to believe that a constitutional
change enacted by a Sinhala majority parliament would never be
repealed by the same body. They demonstrated a complete
unwillingness to entrust their security and future to the
constitutional enactments of a Sinhala majority parliament.
4.During the course of the war all Sinhala governments persuaded
themselves and the Sinhala people that the LTTE and the Tamil people
did not have the financial and manpower resources to sustain a
prolonged war against the larger financial and manpower resources of
the Sinhala state. The fact that the Tamil diaspora now over 800,000
strong and resident in the world�s richest countries has a per
capita annual income at least 25 times greater than that of the
population of Sri Lanka is never mentioned. The illusion is
maintained that the LTTE has not the means for the long haul.
5.A recent variation on the last theme is the hope that the
categorising of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and the
consequent banning of financial support to it will starve it of
funds and so bring it to its knees. The Tamil diaspora�s financial
support for the LTTE could thus be ended. It was in 1997 that the US
Government imposed its so-called �ban� on the LTTE. There is reason
to believe that support from that country has increased rather than
diminished after the ban. It is a well-known fact that attempts by
governments to stifle the wishes of their citizens often produce the
opposite of the desired result. The 6th amendment to the Sri Lankan
constitution outlawed, on pain of severe penalties, any secessionist
activity. It was intended to kill the LTTE at birth; we are all too
well aware how successful that attempt has been.
6.All the leaders of the Sinhala people, political, religious and
social, have asserted the proposition that secession is an act of
moral turpitude and for that reason its suppression , by military
force if persuasion fails, is morally justifiable. While the
secessionist aspiration is roundly condemned there is never in
Sinhala society any inquiry into the causes that led to its
emergence and adoption by an entire people. The series of pogroms
against the Tamil people living among the Sinhala people from 1956
to 1983 produced no legal process against the wrongdoers. Custodial
massacres, obviously with the connivance if not the encouragement of
the government custodians ( Welikade in 1983; Kalutara in 1996;
Bindunuwewa in 1999 ) resulted in no legal redress against the
culpable. These and many other reasons combined to produce the
determination to seek their own security in a state of their own
where the minimum rights of a citizen will be safeguarded and
enforced. Condemning secession without seriously and rationally
examining the reasons for it is a deliberate attempt at drawing the
wool over the eyes of the Sinhala people, investing them with a
misbegotten sense of righteousness and burdening the victim with
guilt.
7.The determination of the Tamil people to secede and set up an
independent state of their own in the area of their domicile is
presented to the Sinhala people as a criminal conspiracy against the
state without any reference to the fact that all over the world, and
in our nearest neighbours, secessionist tendencies have manifested
themselves and have come to fruition in some cases. At the moment of
independence in 1947 Pakistan seceded from the Indian Raj; in the
sixties The Federated Malay States split up,peacefully, into three
separate, independent states; in the seventies Bangladesh seceded
from Pakistan and became a separate, independent, sovereign state.
Two years ago East Timor seceded from Indonesia and set itself up as
an independent state. These states are our nearest neighbours to
east and north. Further afield many secessions have taken place
during the last century � The Republic of Ireland from the United
Kingdom in 1922 and Norway from Sweden even earlier. After the end
of World War II many secessions have taken place in Europe.
The several republics of the former Soviet Union
from that state; Slovakia from Czechoslovakia; the five constituent
members of the Jugoslav Federation from that state; the Turkish
Republic of Cyprus from the state of Cyprus. It is only a matter of
time before the secession of Kosovo from Serbia becomes an
accomplished fact. The secessionist tendency is a common part and
parcel of the rise of ethnic nationalism in many parts of the world.
It is presented to the Sinhala people as an unique phenomenon due
solely to the bloody-mindedness of Mr.Velupillai Pirabakaran and the
LTTE. The Sinhala people are never reminded that at the general
election of 1977 the Tamil people of the northern and eastern
provinces voted overwhelmingly for an independent, sovereign Tamil
state in the area of their domicile. The Sinhala people have been
misled into an irrational and false conception of the nature and
conventionality of the Tamil decision to secede. Thus mislead they
have been railroaded into war as the only means of dealing with
Tamil nationalism and its secessionist aspiration.
8.Each of the seven paragraphs above has dealt with an element of
the Sinhala mind-set as it inhabits the land of make-believe. Not
one of them has any relationship to existential reality. Indeed,
every one of them is the diametrical opposite of current reality. To
approach a negotiation with the LTTE for peace an end of the war
with such assumptions and such a mind set is to guarantee failure
from the very outset itself. Fundamental changes in Sinhala
thinking, eschewing these egregious myths, is an absolute sine qua
non if the peace negotiations are to have any chance of success.
The lessons of the first three sets of talks with the LTTE
9.It is a well known truism that those who do not learn the lessons
of history are condemned to repeating their mistakes and disasters.
This is especially the case with the lessons of recent history. The
18-year war now has a history of its own and within it is the
history of the three sets of talks with the LTTE first in 1985 at
Thimphu, secondly from 1989 to 1991 in Colombo and finally from 1994
to 1995 in Jaffna. Each of these talks failed and the failures hold
important lessons which we shall now examine.
10.The Thimphu talks failed because the two parties were on
different planes and did not engage on common ground. The Tamil
parties, which included the LTTE, took their stand on their national
rights as a separate nation. The Sinhala side denied the existence
of a separate Tamil nation and so dismissed the claim to national
rights. These positions are set in stone to this day. At present all
Tamil political parties, not just the LTTE alone, stand rock-solid
on this ground. The reason for the Sinhala refusal to acknowledge
the Tamil position is the inevitable end of the single all-island
state if it is acknowledged. On that rock the Thimphu talks
foundered. The adamant refusal of the Sinhala side was based on the
absolute conviction of the possibility of successful military
suppression if the talks failed
11.By the time the second set of talks came round the LTTE was fully
engaged in open war with the Indian Army�s Peacekeeping Force. Both
sides found it expedient to make common cause against the Indians
and the issue of Tamil national rights was put on the back burner.
When the Indians withdrew the strong impetus on the Sinhala side for
a quick military victory against an adversary severely bloodied by
the Indians surfaced in the ranks of gung-ho militarists whom
President Premadasa could not restrain. Once again the unquestioned
certainty of military victory � a coup de grace on a weakened LTTE -
led to the resumption of war in June 1991.
12.The third and final set of talks by the last government from 1994
to 1995 contains the greatest number of lessons for the future. The
very form the talks took showed up the government�s lack of
experience in peace-making and its unwillingness or inability to
learn from recent international experiences in this field. The
initial gambit was correspondence between the President and
Mr.Pirabakaran. The letters exchanged were not made public at the
time and were kept secret. They were revealed only by the
publication of Dr.Anton Balasingham�s book, �THE POLITICS OF
DUPLICITY� in the year 2000 ( Fairmax Publishing Ltd., London ). The
talks themselves were desultory affairs carried out on the Sri
Lankan government side by low level officials and a few confidantes
of the President. They flew to Jaffna for talks of a few hours on
each occasion with lengthening intervals between them. On the Sri
Lankan government side there was an element of condescension in that
the government was willing even to talk to people who should really
be blown out of the water. The LTTE understood quite early that the
government was susceptible to military pressure and even relatively
minor relaxations of the embargo on food and drugs would be thwarted
by military foot-dragging The effort to secure international
observers of the ceasefire and other relaxations proved abortive .
When the futility of the talks became clear to the LTTE it gave
notice to the government of the end of the period of ceasefire which
the government failed to take seriously. When fighting resumed on
19th April 1995 there were angry allegations by the government of
foul play and bad faith which had little effect on international
observers in Colombo who knew the facts. The talks never proceeded
to an engagement with the casus belli, namely the national rights of
the Tamil nation.
13.International peacemaking efforts demonstrated clearly the need
for fully accredited representatives, supported by experts and
administrative staff, housed together in the same building, engaging
in patient , specific, factual negotiations with constant reference
back to the principals of each side. Complex issues would be dealt
with by specialised working parties containing experts in the
respective fields in order to arrive at clear, viable undertakings
by each side. The mediating party would strive to encourage each
side to understand the realities of the conflict to which both sides
could be blinded by the heat of the conflict and the ill-will and
hatred generated by it. Accordingly the talks themselves were
invariably long drawn-out affairs, sometimes involving �proximity
Talks� where the parties were not on talking terms or refused to
discuss face-to-face ultra sensitive issues. Such structural
arrangements in which both sides participate are an earnest of the
seriousness with which each side approaches what is indeed a matter
of life and death for so many of their subjects and supporters. All
of this was totally absent in the third set of talks in Jaffna.
Indeed, these talks were a classic demonstration of how peacetalks
should not be undertaken.
14. With the hindsight following the passage of time, the lessons of
the three sets of talks are crystal clear.
They may be summarised as follows:
i.from the very outset a direct, unambiguous
engagement with the casus belli i.e. the national status and the
national rights of the Tamil people has to be faced up to
however ominous its potential consequences.
ii.secondly, the reliance on a military fall-back option needs
to be abandoned as experience has amply proved its futility. Its
corollary, that the LTTE can be so weakened militarily as to be
forced to sue for peace on the government�s terms has to be
abandoned as clearly illusory.
iii.thirdly, the strategy of seeking a constitutional settlement
for a problem which has nothing to do with constitutional form
but has to do with the national configuration on the island, has
also to be abandoned as a proven delusion. The constitutional
form of each national entity is a matter for each entity and
will follow the treaty or agreement on which peace will be
founded.
iv.fourthly, the negotiations between the two sides must
necessarily be structured on the lines of other well known
peace-making efforts with the clear understanding that it will
be a very prolonged and time consuming process not amenable to
the imposition of �time frames� for the attainment of its
several objectives.
v.fifthly, it must be clearly understood that the international
mediator or facilitator cannot alter the realities that have
resulted from a long war and that peace will have to take
account of those realities.
vi.sixthly, there has to be an absolute and unqualified
understanding that everything is up for negotiation and there
are no non-negotiable reservations. Whatever is needed for the
two peoples to live in peace and amity on the island which is
their home will form the foundation of the settlement.
Unquestionably this will entail a new and hitherto undreamt of
statal configuration upon the island which will end the
spectacular failure of the single all-island state to maintain
peace within it for the island�s population.
vii.finally, detailed and serious consideration must be given to
well known international examples , such as the Benelux Union,
which demonstrate the possibility for a close social union as
opposed to political unity which could afford both peoples the
great benefits of cooperation and amity in place of hostility
and war.
The significance of the present background of the
peacetalks
15.For the first time the peacetalks will take place in the
background of shattering and unprecedented military failures by the
Sri Lankan armed forces. From July 1996 when the massive defeat at
Mullaitivu took place the five year period up to date has seen
nothing but one military failure after another. The debacles at
Killinochchi (1998) , the winding up of the unsuccessful Jayasikurui
campaign ( Dec 1998) the tremendous reverses of November 1999 in the
Wanni , the fall of the huge Elephant Pass complex in April 2000 and
the virtual rout in the Pallai salient in April 2001 have
demonstrated conclusively a profound military failure. The thirty
thousand troops marooned in the Jaffna peninsula have no land supply
route and have to be sustained at enormous expense by sea-borne
supplies on a tenuous sea route subject to frequent interruption by
the LTTE�s naval forces.
16. The economic context has seen a similar deterioration,
especially during the last year after the LTTE disrupted the tourist
industry by its attack on the island�s sole international airport.
The general downturn in world trade following the September 11th
events in the USA has compounded the island�s economic difficulties.
Worst of all is the emerging horror story of the economic
mismanagement of the recently expelled government of the PA. The
bare ability to service the burgeoning public debt and keep the
basic elements of civil government going are now in jeopardy.
Setting apart financial resources for war is now nothing more than a
purely academic speculation. The economic situation utterly
forecloses any possibility of continuing with the war.
17. The political context itself has undergone a major change
following the general election of December 5th 2001. The nationalist
parties espousing the projection of military hegemony throughout the
island were wiped out. The vox populi is clearly for pragmatism and
the recognition of ineluctable realities in preference to the hollow
triumphalism of the PA government which itself was the carry over of
the same syndrome from all previous governments. The psychological
willingness for fundamental change is there and both military and
economic necessities are compelling. Never have the auguries for
peacemaking been more propitious.
18. Over the last year there has also been a sea-change on the Tamil
side. The overwhelming majority of Tamil members of the present
parliament have recognised the LTTE as the true representative of
the Tamil people and asked that peacemaking be untertaken in talks
with the LTTE. This is an important advance from previous
ambivalence in this respect and is greatly conducive to a successful
negotiation.
The will for PEACE
19.It is a vital truth in human affairs, and one that needs
repeating, that �where there is a will, there is a way�. The 18-year
duration of the war and its current continuance are a clear
demonstration that peace was not the overriding priority but was
only an adjunct to other more valued objectives. On the Sinhala side
this was crystal clear � peace was acceptable only within the single
all-island state. The concept of peace as the primary objective for
which even the single all-island state was a price worth paying was,
and still is, wholly absent on the Sinhala side. Indeed, the very
mention of such a concept in the public domain is virtually outlawed
both by political timidity and the forlorn hope against hope that it
could be avoided. The time has come now to grasp this nettle and
�come clean� with the public. Peace will be possible only if this
priority is reversed and peace becomes the prime objective. Peace
within a two state island is peace none the less � the treasure
beyond compare for which both nations on the island yearn today. In
today�s context an insistence on peace only within a single
all-island state means opting for continued war. An advance away
from the land of make believe to the realm of realpolitik requires a
clear and unambiguous understanding of this simple equation There is
no doubt that this requires a seismic upheaval in Sinhala thinking
and Sinhala policy and that is what coping with change implies.
The Future
20.For all the peoples of the island both the past, especially the
recent post-independence past, and the present have been bedevilled
by violence. From the fateful day in 1956 when the eminent leaders
of the Tamil nation were clubbed and beaten on the pavement before
Parliament without intervention by the police present and without
legal process against the assailants, the public life of the country
has been besmirched by the recourse to physical violence of persons
and political parties in power. The disease has become endemic and
has grown to catastrophic proportions at present. Neither the past
nor the present conjure a vision of peace in the public domain. If
we want peace it will be a journey into new territory. Peace if ever
attained lies in the future. To reach such a future fundamental
changes of self- conception and in attitudes towards others in the
public domain are needed. The attempt at Sinhala majoritarian
hegemony has failed the Sinhala people and wreaked havoc on others
whose safety and well-being should have been our concern and
responsibility. A state worth that name must ensure to every one of
its citizens personal security and prompt legal redress by due
process under a functioning rule of law. The �state� that now exists
failed that elementary test long ago and needs to be re-created on
lines taken for granted in many countries of the contemporary world.
21.The title of this paper implies a journey from one world to
another � from the world of make-believe and illusion and hollow
triumphalism to the world of reality. It is a journey that has been
postponed far too long but can be postponed no longer. On peace
hangs the very survival of the state as a recognisable entity.
Massive foreign intervention with both aid and direct investment
might just save the day if the quality of the peace that is achieved
is internationally credible. Sri Lanka is now as close to final
collapse as Argentina but paradoxically it has a way out absent in
Argentina, namely, the war which can be ended to international
acclaim. Salvation from the tragedy of war and from the ruin of
economic collapse both hang on just one thing now � PEACE.
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