|
Peace - The Difficult, Yet Necessary Path Jayadeva Uyangoda,
Daily Mirror, 30 May 2006
Time, indeed, is running out for Sri Lanka. More than ever, the
fate of Sri Lanka depends on the decisions made by one person, Sri Lanka�s head
of state.
One can only hope that President Rajapakse has the strength to continue to defy
the counsel given to him by some of his advisors and allies for a military
solution, and without delay inaugurate a new phase of political engagement with
the LTTE.
A large-scale break out of hostilities between the government of Sri Lanka and
the LTTE seems to be now inevitable. As things stand right now, the decision by
the European Union on the question of listing the LTTE as a terrorist entity is
crucial in shaping the agenda of events in the next few weeks to come.
Mr. Erik Solheim, the Norwegian Minister in charge of Sri Lanka�s peace process,
has given expression to an increasing sense of pessimism felt by the
international actors, concerning the prospects for Sri Lanka. He spent two days,
May 25 and 26, in Colombo, along with the special peace envoy, Mr. Jon
Hanssen-Bauer.
Then on May 27, he flew to New Delhi to consult the Indian government. As AFP
reported on that day, he has said in New Delhi that Sri Lanka �could be heading
back to all-out war.�
Solheim has also commented that Sri Lanka�s peace process was �more difficult�
than he thought. These are indeed strong words coming from a man who knows the
mind of both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. One may also note that
Solheim as well as the Norwegian diplomats have always been very cautious in
making public statements about the failures in their peace-making task in Sri
Lanka.
Banning Meanwhile, the proposed banning of the LTTE by the EU is
most likely to be a defining event in the conflict. It will certainly force the
LTTE into a period of isolation and in turn to a behaviour of isolationism.
Both the international community and the gvernment appear to work on the
assumption that the LTTE leadership might become flexible in response to a
coordinated campaign of international isolation. It would be interesting to see
how this strategy works. Tigers might be less likely to be flexible under
conditions which they see as coercion. This is a major policy dilemma for any
government in dealing with the LTTE.
In the coming phase of isolation and isolationism, the LTTE might be tempted to
act unilaterally. There are already warnings of such unilateralism. In an
extreme scenario, the LTTE can withdraw from all their international
engagements, including the dialogue with the SLMM and the Norwegian facilitator.
Such an action will amount to withdrawing from the CFA, without actually saying
it in writing. The LTTE leaders probably think that by such action they would be
able to turn the tables on the government as well as the international
community.
Show down Meanwhile, it appears that both the government and the
LTTE are willing to risk a major military show down. If the war breaks out, it
will create immense destruction to both sides. The tragedy is that the two sides
know it, but take little concrete action to arrest the sliding back to war. Such
is the way things happen in this age of unreason.
What will eventually happen after a mutually destructive war between the
government and the LTTE? One distant possibility is the realization of what many
Sinhalese patriotic forces are opposing at present, namely the entry of the UN
peacekeeping troops to separate the two warring sides from fighting. Those who
oppose such a development seem to behave in a manner that will actually create
conditions for it.
The unkind dialectic of politics is that one often gets outcomes one does not
want. If the JVP leadership is really committed to preventing an eventual UN
intervention, the best course of action is to prevent a large-scale war from
breaking out.
But their thinking appears to be based on the assumption that in a full-scale
war, there will be a real chance to defeat the LTTE militarily. As this thinking
goes, an external military intervention to separate the two warring sides will
only prevent such a favourable outcome.
Mutual bleeding
The second, more realistic possibility is that after a lot of bleeding, the two
sides, tired and exhausted of war and violence, might ask the international
community to come and mediate in the conflict.
This scenario of mutual bleeding will interestingly create a new strategic
equilibrium between the government and the LTTE on an �I lose-you also lose�
framework. This would be an original contribution that the government of Sri
Lanka and the LTTE would be making to the theories of conflict resolution: A
lose-lose outcome is as important in defining conflict dynamics as is a win-win
outcome.
This is where Sri Lanka has to learn lesson from Nepal. A country that does not
boast of its achievements as we Sri Lankans do, Nepal has shown a tremendous
example of a low-cost path to political change and reform.
There is a low-cost path to conflict management in Sri Lanka. It is the path of
political engagement. Return to political engagement is not only a low-cost path
to peace. It is also the most humane and rational option.
Window of opportunity The reported statements made by President
Rajapakse insisting that he does not consider war as an option can constitute a
new, though narrow, window of opportunity for re-opening the path to political
engagement.
But the effects of these statements need to be further strengthened by
elaborating a broad framework statement for a new process of political
engagement between the government and the LTTE.
This �framework statement� can have three main components. It should first
re-iterate the government�s assurance to fully implement the CFA as well as the
commitments made in Geneva in February this year. By making this point,
President should invite the LTTE�s reciprocity. Secondly, the framework
statement should propose broadening of the scope of political engagement, from
talks on the CFA and de-escalation to political negotiations suspended in 2003.
Thirdly, it should propose a political-constitutional framework for ethnic
conflict resolution, conceived in terms of extensive regional autonomy.
Time, indeed, is running out for Sri Lanka. More than ever, the fate of Sri
Lanka depends on the decisions made by one person, Sri Lanka�s head of state.
One can only hope that President Rajapakse has the strength to continue to defy
the counsel given to him by some of his advisors and allies for a military
solution, and without delay inaugurate a new phase of political engagement with
the LTTE. This is difficult, but necessary. Even if does not work fully, it is a
path worth taking.
|
