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Mahinda adopts definite strategy towards Tamils D.B.S. Jeyaraj
26 May 2006
Mahendra Percy Rajapakse now known as Mahinda Rajapakse is
perhaps the first Sinhala head of state with a clear and coherent idea of how to
resolve the National question also called the ethnic crisis , Tamil issue and
Tiger problem. This assertion may run contrary to many assessments that describe
Mahinda as being confused and indecisive on how to handle this issue.
This writer too has in earlier columns subscribed to this viewpoint. Evaluating
Mahinda�s presidency after six months of being in power provides fresh insight.
Rajapakse seems to have definite ideas of why, where and how he is going to
arrive at his destination. What he is uncertain about is the when or timing.
This does not of course mean that Rajapakse�s objectives are correct or whether
he will be able to achieve them. Another troubling factor is that in the process
of trying to achieve these objectives Mahinda may be opening the lid of yet
another Pandora�s box. A host of unintended consequences and resultant problems
mat arise.
There are also three factors that may inhibit, restrain or even defeat his
strategy. Firstly there is the Sinhala domestic constituency. It remains to be
seen whether the people will be ready, willing and able to face the consequences
of this policy.
Secondly there is the International Community(IC). It is not possible at this
juncture to speculate as to whether the IC will go along with Rajapakse or apply
brakes and if it is a case of the latter how it would be done. The role of India
in this would be of particular importance.
Thirdly there is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and by extension
the Sri Lankan Tamil people. The only certain thing in all this is that the LTTE
will strenuously oppose Rajapakse. It may even be that the tigers could be the
sole deterrent to a policy which if successful can only keep suppressed the
minority communities in general and the Tamils in particular.
In such a situation the vast majority of Tamils are likely to back the LTTE
directly and indirectly. Even those Tamils who are not supportive of the LTTE
will not oppose the tigers . Only a Tamil segment actively collaborating with
the Rajapakse regime will be supportive of the GOSL.
There is a mistaken impression among many that Mahinda Rajapakse like his
predecessor Chandrika Kumaratunga or chief rival Ranil Wickremasinghe wants to
resolve the National question amicably and equitably. This would entail some
form of federalism or quasi - federalism. After all he is willing to go in for
maximum devolution within a unitary state it is pointed out. Mahinda himself
often makes statements to this effect.
Rajapakse is being circumscribed due to his dependency on the Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna and Jathika Hela Urumaya it is said. There are also other external
pressure groups like the Patriotic National Movement. Like SWRD Bandaranaike 50
years aho Mahinda too is unable to do the right thing by the Tamils due to JVP,
JHU and PNM constraints it is argued.
This argument could have been true of SWRDB. He was a Westernised Liberal
Democrat who donned the national dress and promoted Sinhala and Buddhism to
capture votes. He was one of the pioneering Donoughmore Buddhists. The real
Solomon wanted to be just by the Tamils after he had opened the floodgates. He
could not as the torrents he had released engulfed him. Literally and
metaphorically he was destroyed by the very same forces he unleashed to achieve
power.
In Mahinda Rajapakse�s case it is different. He is not play acting when he takes
flower baskets and trays to the Pansala. The only time he is play acting is when
he sits with foreigners talking about serious political reform.The crucial
difference between SWRD and Mahinda is that the latter unlike the former really
and truly believes in what may be called the Sinhala Buddhist supremacist
ideology. Mahinda is of the same mindset as the JVP, JHU and PNM. He is not
their unwilling captive. If that ideology is indeed restrictive then it is a
state which Mahinda has willingly chosen and will not come out of.
Rajapakse was born in 1946 but he is in reality the politically quintessential
child of 1956 (Panashaye Daruwo) Mahinda believes that the Sinhala Buddhists are
the rightful and sole heirs to this Island. The Sinhala Buddhists who have a
divine right to this Dhammadeepa have no where else to go. The Sinhala Buddhists
being a generous people have allowed other minority communities also to share
this land. But they must know their place and behave accordingly. The Sinhala
Buddhists are way on top of the pecking order.
The privileged position of the Sinhala people depends on a united and undivided
Sri Lanka. For this a strong, centralised State under a unitary Constitution is
essential. Some minorities may be concentrated in certain regions. This does not
mean that they have special rights or that power needs to be devolved to the
periphery. There can be no Federalism. There can be no recognition of any region
as a historic habitat of the minorities. There cannot be even real Devolution.
Only some de - centralisation for the sake of administrative convenience could
be possible.
Rajapakse like most Sinhala Buddhist hawks does not believe that the LTTE will
ever agree to anything other than Thamil Eelam. Besides Rajapakse cannot
accommodate the LTTE in a settlement even if the tigers are willing to
compromise. Even if the LTTE agrees to a united Sri Lanka some form of
Federalism or even Confederationalism is necessary. This Rajapakse is unwilling
to agree to. This is not a case of Rajapakse being flexible and the Sinhala
hardliners being rigid. Mahinda and the Mahajanaya are of the same opinion. He
is truly a man of his people in this.
Against this backdrop Rajapakse realises that whatever the time frame of any
potential discussions with the LTTE the final outcome can only be a total
breakdown. The impasse will surely lead to total war. Mahinda sees himself as
the divine instrument that would lead the rightful owners of this Island to
complete victory over the enemy threatening Country, Race and Religion. (Lanka,
Sinhala and Buddhism)There was much talk of the great liberator �Diyasena� in
1956. Mahinda is Diyasena delayed perhaps by 50 years.
It is well - known that Mahinda is a strong Southern regionalist. Such Ruhunu
Consciousness has its own baggage. There is the Dutu Gemunu syndrome where many
Sons of the South think they are latter - day incarnations of Rohana. They have
to protect the Country and liberate it from its enemies.
Let it not be forgotten that Mahinda never associated himself with any major
effort to resolve the national question through federalism under Chandrika
Kumaratunga. The excuse is that Kumaratunga ignored him. True! But then this was
what Rajapakse wanted. Had Rajapakse really wanted to associate with those
efforts I am sure he could have bulldozed his way in. After all when he wanted
to be Premier he cut Lakshman Kadirgamar�s throat neatly. When he wanted
Presidential nomination he circumvented the Bandaranaikes , did he not?
What has been apparent in the past is Mahinda�s consistency in identifying
himself with the forces of Sinhala racism opposing even meagre concessions to
the Tamils. There he was at the Buddhist demonstration opposing the Devolution
bill in 2000. There he was visiting the fasting Omalpe Sobhitha at Dalada
Maligawa. Who was the man behind the JVP action against the P- TOMS.?
Compounding matters further is the treatment meted out to Mahinda in Jaffna in
the aftermath of the Tsunami.by tiger instigated mobs. Spoiled rice and excreta
pots were hurled at him. Just as JR Jayewardene never forgot the slippers thrown
at him in Jaffna Rajapakse also would not forget this insult. Of course
Rajapakse can say he has no grudges against Tamils and prove it by saying �My
Best friend is a Tamil. Its Douglas Devananda�.
Frivolity apart Rajapakse has very correctly gauged the LTTE to be the primary
and effective obstacle to his political aims. He has devised a policy therefore
of containing and undermining the LTTE in the short run . In the long run he
hopes to launch an all out war to annihilate the tigers. Another important
consideration is the IC. The active support of the IC is required to bankroll
the economy while war is conducted.These are the defining parameters of Mahinda
Rajapakse�s current policy towards the resolution of the National question.
Satisfying or hoodwinking the IC is of crucial importance. The idea is to pay
lip- service to certain words , phrases and statements that are music to the
IC�s ear. Its like chanting Manthras in a Pooja. The current key words as far as
the IC is concerned is peace, talks and peace process. Other Manthras of
importance are negotiated settlement, democracy, pluralism, human rights,
devolution, minority rights, inclusivity etc.
The important thing to remember is that only paying lip service is required.
Keep mumbling the jargon and go through the motions of peace process
participation. In order to impress the IC Rajapakse would always appear to be
reasonable and flexible. Take the Geneva talks for instance. Mahinda instructs
his team to accept the accord. �Porunthuvelaa Enda. Passa Balamu� (Promise and
Come. Lets see later).
So the Geneva agreement is signed. But within 24 hours all sorts of new
interpretations are given. A fresh stance is articulated. This negates the
essence of what was agreed upon in Geneva. The LTTE is humiliated at the
Airport. Helicopters are not provided for internal transport thereby causing an
unnecessary crisis. Making promises on the one hand in Geneva and defaulting in
performance on the other in Sri Lanka is the standard adopted..
In a sense Mahinda is not being very original in this approach. The tragic
history of Sinhala - Tamil relations in this Country is replete with such
instances. The first Sinhala film(produced by a Tamil SM Nayagam) to be made was
�Kadawuna Poronthuwa� or Broken Promise. The breakdown in Ethnic relations is
characterised by a trail of broken political promises. That history continues.
So this component of the strategy is quite simple. Appear to be reasonable and
flexible and above all amenable to the IC requests. Talking to the Tigers? Yes
of course!. Strengthen the ceasefire? Yes Certainly!! But act entirely the
opposite in practice. Thus we witness the spectacle of refusing to dismantle the
high security zones, we see assassinations of Tamil activists and the blatantly
transparent support extended to alternate armed Tamil groups.
While impressing the IC in this manner attempts are made to diplomatically
weaken and isolate the LTTE. The most convenient label is terrorist. The LTTE is
essentially a freedom movement but some of the methods it uses are
�terroristic�. It is easy therefore for Colombo to get the LTTE proscribed
internationally in a post - Sep 11th 2001 World. Even here the GOSL is smart. It
requests international proscription of the LTTE only for two reasons. One is to
pressurise the tigers into participating more actively in the peace process. The
other is to protect Tamil expatriates from tiger extortionists.
What is underway carefully and systematically is a slow process through which
the LTTE is being driven away into the cold. The tigers are being put in the
international dog house. The purpose is long term. The isolation of the LTTE
from the mainstream International Community would be of immense help to Colombo
when all out war starts. A concerted transnational effort against the LTTE short
of deploying actual personnel on ground could very much be on the cards.
Unfortunately the LTTE seems unable or unwilling to transform itself even as a
tactic to prevent this phenomenon. It makes all the wrong noises and emits all
the wrong signals thereby expediting its downfall. It appears utterly helpless
in preventing or even forestalling the impending calamity. Some policies
practised by the tigers in Sri Lanka and abroad have proved Counterproductive.
It is now experiencing the consequences of such conduct.
Meanwhile Rajapakse is preparing for total war. Shopping lists are being sent
out. Diplomatic missions are undertaken to solicit support. Not so subtle
efforts are being made to exploit differences among rival nations to stimulate
competition in helping Lanka� s war effort most. Plans are afoot for
conscription. A war emergency declaration suppressing press freedom and
concentrating power in Rajapakse�s hands is very likely. Those who think Mahinda
with the beatific grin is incapable of dictatorial tendencies are in for a nasty
surprise. A Bonapartist is on the make.
If preparatory efforts are on for a total war there is overt and covert warfare
of a limited nature going on at present. This is another important aspect of
Rajapakse�s regime. Overtly it is described as retaliatory and confined to
specific objectives. Covertly it is an undeclared, shadow war that is both
provocative and retaliatory at times.
Whenever the LTTE crosses the line too much like the suicide bomber attack on
Army headquarters or the marine assault on a naval convoy retaliatory strikes
are openly announced and implemented. Thus we had the air, sea and land assault
on Muthur. Aerial bombardment. artillery firing from Army camps and shelling
from Naval gunboats was done incessantly. The second time saw Muthur getting
only artillery firing and naval gunboat shelling. Nothing from the air. But
Kilinochchi and Mullaitheevu districts experienced aerial bombardment.
The amazing thing about this is that Rajapakse has been able to get way with
this. No International opprobrium at a policy which deliberately targets a
segment of civilian population as collective punishment. Vicarious
responsibility is being imposed upon a people for no fault of their own. The IC
through its silence is being perceived as supportive of this. Again Rajapakse
has been clever in responding this way only after a grave violation by the LTTE.
Thus the IC sees these acts as a consequence of LTTE behaviour. Both the GOSL
and LTTE are guilty of violating the ceasefire and basic human rights. But the
culpability of the GOSL is even higher but in a Post - Iraq scenario the Global
Policeman acts dumb.
On the other hand there is the covert warfare. On one level it is retaliatory
and reactive. Those responsible are Tamil groups like the EPDP and TEMVP (Karuna
faction). The security personnel provide logistical support. So if and when a
soldier is targeted by the LTTE or pro - tiger militia the alternative armed
groups go ahead and bump off civilians suspected of having tiger links. The GOSL
propaganda machinery puts the blame on the LTTE or it is attributed to
internecine intra - Tamil strife. The IC praises the �Commendable restraint� of
the armed forces and the �Buddhist� patience of Rajapakse.
There is also proactive and even provocative violence unleashed by the state.
These are of different types and serve different goals. One result of the
ceasefire has been the growing influence of the LTTE in GOSL controlled areas.
This has created a potential fifth column in these areas. By targeting those
supporters of the LTTE and those suspected of being connected to the tigers the
people are being driven through fear into tiger controlled area. Thus a
potential fifth column threat when open war erupts is being diminished.
There is also the deliberate provocative violence which targets the LTTE or
tiger supporters. The deep penetration squads are actively infiltrating LTTE
areas and exploding landmines. Civilian supporter Vigneswaran is shot dead in
Trincomalee. LTTE senior leader Ramanan is killed in Batticaloa. Muslim groups
are being armed and instigated into targeting Tamil civilian supporters of the
LTTE in Muthur. Sinhala home guards and criminal elements are being encouraged
to engage in anti - Tamil violence with armed forces aiding and abetting.
There are also acts of violence against civilians by armed forces. The Puthur ,
Nelliaddy, Allaipiddy killings. Manthuvil disappearances etc are but some of
these. There are the specific acts against LTTE supporters like businesspersons,
auto rickshaw drivers and barbers by Tamil paramilitary outfits like the EPDP.
It is interesting to note that EPDP chief Douglas Devananda is a minister in
this cabinet. The trail of responsibility goes right up to ministerial level.
Not even one person has been penalised so far for any act of violence against
Tamil civilians.
All these acts are not individual or random acts of violence. There is method in
this mayhem. A clear design is visible. The climate of impunity afforded by the
Rajapakse regime and its active encouragement is very much conducive to the
violence. What is going on now is calculated state terror. Colombo newspapers
spoke of a �Dog response� or �Lion response� when it came to responding to LTTE
violence. Naturally the regime headed by the Ruhunu lion chose the lion
response. The state terror being unleashed is the Lion response.
This does not mean that the LTTE is blameless. Of course it has to bear much
blame. But there are three points to consider. Firstly tiger violence is duly
recognized and roundly condemned nationally and internationally whereas the
state - inspired violence is neither identified correctly or condemned
deservedly. Secondly not all state violence is provoked by the LTTE. Much of it
is initiated by state agencies. Thirdly the LTTE is after all �terrorist� outfit
being proscribed by the IC. The GOSL is a democratically elected entity that has
a greater responsibility to refrain from state terror.
These then are the parameters of Rajapakse�s policies towards the tigers and by
extension the Tamils. Against this backdrop is the slow build up of a Sinhala
Consensus for war. The farce that is an all party Conference passes resolutions
supportive of peace and negotiations for international consumption. Outside the
Conference the JVP and JHU and PNM carry on relentless campaigning for war
against the LTTE which in practice would be against the Tamils.
It cannot be denied that Mahinda Rajapakse�s task has been made much easier by
the LTTE. The tigers by their conduct and posturing have alienated much of
international opinion. Erik Solheim rescued them several times and delayed the
inevitable international backlash. The LTTE however keeps on blundering
diplomatically again and again. Instead of being able to expose Mahinda
Rajapakse for what he is the LTTE has succeeded in the impossible. They have
managed to make even Mahinda look good in International eyes and get praised for
his restraint.
If Mahinda was really keen to free himself of JVP and JHU shackles the easiest
course would be to align with the UNP. But he does not do that. Instead he
travels along with them. Apart from being ideologically similar Mahinda needs
them to make him look moderate. Also they are building up the climate for hate
and war. I think a national Government comprising the JVP , JHU and hawks among
the UNP will be a reality when open war breaks out. To a man of Mahinda�s
Chinthana War will be the best option to garner, consolidate and retain power.
Western media reports refer to Sri Lanka sliding or drifting towards open war.
No the Country is not drifting towards war. It is already at war. The killing of
more than 500 persons in a single year can be classified as war. If we take the
casualty figures from Dec 2005 to May 2006 we find that the figure has been
passed. What is happening now is a steady steering of the Country into total
war. Both the GOSL and LTTE are doing this for their own objectives.
Both sides help each other indirectly. The targeting of security personnel makes
many Sinhala people support Rajapakse. They feel firm action is necessary to
combat the LTTE. The targeting of Tamil civilians by security and paramilitary
groups makes many Tamil people support the LTTE. They feel only the tigers can
effectively counter the state terror.
When Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidential elections last year on a hardline
platform I wrote that it was a defeat not for the tigers but for the moderate
Tamils desiring to live in a united Sri Lanka with equal rights. With the rising
anti - Tamil violence the moderate middle is diminishing. The International
Community has also contributed to this diminution by its own blunders. The Tamil
moderates are rendered totally impotent.
Both sides know that their acts help strengthen the other. But they want it
because extreme polarisation on ethnic lines is what they require. Sinhala
people must rally round the GOSL and Tamil people must flock to the LTTE is the
credo. Sadly this is happening now. The middle ground is disappearing. Moderates
are perceived as traitors. Armageddon is on the way!
Will Mahinda Rajapakse be able to achieve his objectives and usher in war? if he
does so will he succeed in defeating the LTTE and re-structuring the Sri Lankan
state under Majoritarian hegemony?
The answer to the first question rests primarily on the Sinhala people and the
International Community. Will they go along with the hidden agenda of Rajapakse
or recognize the future danger and act preemptorily?
The answer to the second lies in the LTTE. How will it transform its politico -
diplomatic strategy and mobilise its military resources to combat the enemy?
Unless the Sinhala people and the International Community recognize the true
colours of Rajapakse total war would be inevitable. In such an eventuality the
Tamil people will be forced to support or at least not oppose the LTTE.
The war that will erupt would be a terrible, horrible one. Unimaginable
destruction and death will be let loose on this Island. Whichever side wins the
ultimate losers will be Sri Lanka and her people.
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