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Tamilnation > Struggle for Tamil Eelam > Conflict Resolution - Tamil Eelam - Sri Lanka > Norwegian Peace Initiative > Ceasefire Agreement & Lifting of Ban on LTTE > 'Norway's role undermines Sri Lanka's sovereignty' says President Kumaratunga, 3 March 2002
'Norway's role undermines Sri
Lanka's sovereignty'
says President Kumaratunga
Hindu, Press Trust of India - 3 March 2002
Full text of
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga
``I observe that the powers and functions which by
the agreement are vested in the Norwegian Government travel far beyond
the role of a facilitator for the expected negotiations towards a
political agreement,'' Ms. Kumaratunga said in an 11- page letter to
Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, last night.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, to be set up under the
accord, will be headed by a Norwegian and will be the final arbiter in
interpreting its terms and the sole authority to decide disputes over `lines
of control' that will separate the armed units of the Army and the LTTE.
``This is the first time in the history of post-
independent Sri Lanka that a foreign Government is being authorised to draw
demarcation lines on the soil of Sri Lanka'', she said in her first detailed
response to the ceasefire.
``The submission of such matters to the binding authority
of an individual nominated by a foreign Government appears to be wholly
inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people of Sri Lanka,'' she said.
Text of
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga letter to Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe:
letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe:
I refer to our meeting in the
evening of Thursday 21st February 2002, in the presence of Mr. Lakshman
Kadirgamar P.C., M.P., when you gave me a copy of the final version of
the Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE, which neither Mr. Kadirgamar nor
I had seen up to then.
You will recall that after our meeting had commenced you informed me
that Mr. Pirabaharan, on behalf of the LTTE, had already signed his
letter to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, as provided for in Article 4.1
of the Agreement, notifying the consent of the LTTE to be bound by the
Agreement, and that his signed letter was already on its way to Colombo
in the hands of the Norwegian Ambassador who had gone to the Vanni on
Thursday by helicopter to collect the letter.
You also informed me that you intended to proceed to Vavuniya on
Friday, 22nd February where you would sign and hand over to the
Norwegian Ambassador your letter of consent addressed to the Norwegian
Foreign Minister. Article 4.1 of the Agreement required only the
signatures of yourself and Mr. Pirabaharan, not mine.
It was clearly impossible for me at that late hour to make any
useful suggestions regarding the text of an Agreement I had not read. In
any event it was too late to propose any alterations in the text as Mr.
Pirabaharan had already signed his letter of consent and you were keen
to sign your letter the next day.
I stated that I was indeed glad that you have arrived at a ceasefire
agreement with the LTTE. I added that the manner in which the Head of
State and Government was kept completely unaware of the contents of this
Agreement until it was signed by one Party to the Agreement was improper
and unconstitutional. I expressed surprise that you should have adopted
this procedure, especially in view of the fact that the process of
negotiations with the LTTE was commenced by my first government in 1994
and then again, with facilitation from the Norwegian Government in March
1999 and you as Prime Minister of my third government, were carrying
forward the same process.
Whenever you requested advice and assistance, I and Hon. Kadirgamar
gave it to you generously. The detailed document we prepared in February
2001 to ensure the "free flow of goods" to the Vanni was handed to you
at your request, and you are presently using it almost "in toto".
I have invited you to Security Council Meetings so that you may be
briefed about military concerns.
The very late submission of the Agreement for my consideration and
approval precluded what could have been a valuable opportunity for you
and me to discuss the Agreement thoroughly and agree on the details of
the text, thereby forging a consensus between the two major political
parties in the country, which I am sure you would agree is essential for
the bi-partisan momentum that is required for the sustained
implementation of an Agreement which is so important to the destiny of
our people. I do not wish to say more on those matters at this time.
It is my constitutional duty as Head of State, Head of Government,
Head of the Cabinet and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to
scrutinize carefully any agreement that might affect the security of our
people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
On studying the Agreement, I noted with satisfaction that provision
has been made for the "unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from
the LTTE dominated areas", subject to the quantities set out in Annex A,
a concept worked out by my previous government in cooperation with the
Norwegian government and the LTTE in the first quarter of 2001.
This use of foundations for the peace process laid down by my
previous government is most welcome. It will save time and strengthen
the process.
I was pleased to notice the provision in Article 2.11 for the
gradual easing of day and night fishing restrictions. This has been a
troublesome point for many years and I am glad that a satisfactory
formula has finally been evolved. But extra vigilance requires to be
exercised in our coastal waters until the new arrangement is seen to be
working smoothly.
There are however, some Articles, which could impinge on national
security concerns and will have to be reviewed by our Service Commanders
and the Security Council.
I note that the Agreement deals
substantially with questions concerning the ceasefire and humanitarian
and confidence building measures, while making no reference at all to
the important political issues that would have to be addressed, while
the ceasefire is in place, in order to achieve lasting peace.
I understood from our discussion that your preferred approach was to
leave out of this Agreement any reference to the political issues or
even to a date for the commencement of substantive talks, and to reach
an agreement later with the LTTE on a date for the commencement of
talks.
I believe that it is important to include in the Agreement, a date
for the commencement of talks, so that it would be clear that the
ceasefire agreement is not an end in itself; that it is not an
arrangement that is intended to continue indefinitely without a
political solution being reached. I have taken note of the statement in
your press release from Vavuniya on 22nd February that "the ceasefire is
a process designed to prepare the ground for the negotiations which will
deal with the substantive issues".
I cannot fail to stress the necessity for the talks on the
substantive issues to commence and conclude as early as possible.
A careful study of past experience of previous UNP governments and
my first government of 1994, leads us to conclude that for effective
results, the ceasefire agreement should have contained a commitment from
the LTTE to come for negotiations.
The Agreement which was almost finalised in 2001 between the PA
government and the LTTE, through Norwegian facilitation had an objective
- that of persuading the LTTE to come for negotiations and to
immediately commence talking on the substantive issues-which would
resolve the Tamil peoples problems, while safeguarding the rights of the
Sinhala, Muslim and other peoples of Sri Lanka.
It was clearly understood and accepted by all concerned that the
issue of a separate State was not on the agenda.
The present agreement does not include any indication, let alone a
commitment, that the LTTE agrees to come to the negotiating table and
talk of the essential and substantive issues. This gives me reason for
concern.
Some of the Articles in the Agreement, which raise concerns that
require clarification, are itemized below:
1. Article 1.2 refers to a number of prohibited military operations,
including "offensive naval operations". This Article read with Article
1.3 which permits the Sri Lankan armed forces to continue to perform
their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Sri Lanka "without engaging in offensive operations against
the LTTE", could create the impression that the Navy is prohibited from
engaging LTTE boats even if they are suspected of carrying arms.
It might be argued that a naval interdiction in such circumstances
would be a defensive, not an offensive, operation. What then would in
prohibited offensive naval operation be? It would have been very much
better to have had an unambiguous provision on this point in the
Agreement itself.
I have noted that in your statement from Vavuniya you say, "The
Army, Navy and the Air Force will have the right to intercept the
illegal movement of arms into Sri Lanka". You would, of course, realize
that this being a unilateral statement made outside the Agreement does
not in law bind the LTTE.
It must be remembered that if a dispute arises on this question
involving the interception of illegal arms movements which is vital to
the security of Sri Lanka, it will be the Head of the Monitoring
Mission, a national of a foreign government, who will under Article 3.2
be "the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement".
That is not, as I point out later, a satisfactory situation for the
country.
Rules of engagement at sea should be drawn up and placed before the
Security Council. Until these matters are fully discussed at the
Security Council our Naval authorities should be given clear
instructions as to their powers and duties regarding the interdiction of
illegal arms shipments.
2. (a) Articles 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 deal with the "drawing up of
demarcation lines" "regarding defence localities in all areas of
contention". The parties are required to provide information to the
Monitoring Mission about their defence localities. In the event of
disagreement between the parties the demarcation lines will have to be
drawn by the Head of the Monitoring Mission - "the final authority
regarding interpretation of this Agreement".
2. (b) Article 2.7 refers to the establishment of checkpoints to
facilitate the flow of goods, and the movement of civilians on the "line
of control" - a highly evocative expression in our region and also
elsewhere in the world where lines of control and demarcation have been
an endless source of confusion bitterness and tragedy.
I only draw your attention here to the immense problems emanating
from the "Line of Control" established in Kashmir which have so severely
strained Indo-Pakistan relations and established our region.
This is the first time in the history of post independence Sri Lanka
that a foreign government is being authorized to draw demarcation lines
on the soil of Sri Lanka. The submission of such matters to the binding
authority of a single individual appointed by a foreign government
appears to be wholly inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people of
Sri Lanka which is declared by the Constitution to be inalienable.
Thus, in my view, Article 3.2 calls for amendment and modification
as envisaged under Article 4.3.
By way of contrast, in the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities
of January 1995, which was signed by Mr. Pirabaharan and myself
provision was made (Article 5.a) for Committees to be set up in
stipulated areas to inquire into violations of the Declaration.
These Committees were to comprise representatives drawn from Canada,
The Netherlands, Norway, the ICRC and from among retired judges, public
officers, religious heads and other leading citizens, all approved by
mutual consent (Article 5.c). Each Committee could consist of five
members - two from the Government, two from the LTTE and one from a
foreign country who will be the Chairman (Article 5.d). Those three
Articles are reflected in the present Agreement.
But in Article 5.6 of the 1995 Declaration it was to be the
responsibility of those Committees to take immediate action on
complaints made by either party to this Agreement and to inquire into
such disputes. The power to inquire into and resolve such disputes was a
collegiate power to be exercised by the whole Committee, by a majority
in the event of disagreement, and not by the Chairman alone, as in
Article 3.2 of the present Agreement. These Committees were not given
powers to draw "Lines of Control" or Demarcation.
Moreover, under the present Agreement (Article 3.8) "the Committees
shall serve the Monitoring Mission in an advisory capacity". They will
seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this
Agreement only "at the lowest possible level".
It is only the Monitoring Mission composed of the "representatives
of the Nordic countries" (Article 3.5) that will have the responsibility
to take action on any complaints made by either party to the Agreement
and to inquire into and assist the parties in the settlement of any
disputes (Article 3.11). The Sri Lankan representatives (from the
Government and the LTTE) play no part in this procedure.
I also observe that the powers and the functions, which by this
Agreement are vested in the Norwegian Government, travel far beyond the
role of a facilitator for the expected negotiations towards a political
agreement. The Norwegian Government has now been cast in the role of a
mediator or arbitrator in the resolution of disputes between the
parties, which is not the basis on which Norwegian assistance was sought
by my Government in 1999.
I was not aware that the nature of the Norwegian Government's
mandate had changed to such an extent as to make it incompatible with
the sovereign status of Sri Lanka.
3. In the light of the verified evidence coming in from various LTTE
controlled areas, especially in the East, relating to extortion,
intimidation, abduction and harassment of civilians, much of it against
members of the Muslim community but extending also to the Tamil and
Sinhalese communities in these areas, we must make sure that our people
are protected by the strict application of Article 2.1 which prohibits
such acts.
I have noticed that among the six districts (Jaffna, Mannar,
Vavuniya, Trincomalee Batticaloa and Ampara) in which the Monitoring
Mission will maintain a presence and local monitoring committees will be
established. Kilinochchi and Mulaitivu, which are LTTE-controlled, are
not included.
Does this mean that if "hostile acts against the civilian population
including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and
harassment" (Article 2.1) are committed in those two districts the
Monitoring Mission and the Local Committees will not or cannot,
intervene to help our citizens who live in these areas?
4. I cannot over emphasize my concern for the plight of children
forcibly recruited by the LTTE. This practice appears to be continuing.
The evidence gathered by reputable national and international sources is
disturbing and irrefutable. Sri Lanka has been in the forefront of the
international campaign against the conscription of child combatants,
which is an issue that gravely troubles the conscience of mankind. There
are many treaties and international resolutions on this subject.
The LTTE has continued to violate assurances given by them to the
Untied Nations, that they will not recruit under-age children. We
cannot, even in the name of securing a lasting peace, compromise the
rights of these children. We must be resolute on this point.
5. I have also observed that the extensive freedom of movement for
"political work" in Government-controlled areas in the North and the
East granted to the LTTE members under Article 1.13 will not be afforded
to others (political parties, for instance) who might wish to do
"political work" in LTTE-controlled areas in the North and the East. In
a democratic society this is an indefensible distinction, which should
be reviewed.
6. I note that although the Agreement gives ample latitude to
individual combatants from both parties to visit family and friends
residing in areas under the control of the other party, there is no
reference whatsoever in the Agreement to the plight of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) who surely would wish to enjoy the same rights
conferred on combatants to visit their original homes and their
families. I find it difficult to justify this disparate treatment of
combatants and IDPs who have suffered for so long and urgently require
sympathetic consideration.
7. Article 1.13 further permits freedom of movement in the North and
East to all unarmed LTTE members after D'day+90. This could prove
extremely dangerous. The LTTE could freely penetrate into the Government
controlled areas of the North and East and effectively attack from
within if they have plans of taking over the entire North and East as
demonstrated on numerous occasions by the LTTE during the past few
decades.
Looking ahead, to the day when the ceasefire Agreement is subsumed
in a permanent peace based on a negotiated political solution to the
problem that has so seriously damaged our society, I must emphasize my
concern that the final agreement will ensure the basic human rights of
the people of the North and the East, including the rights and freedom
of association, movement, expression, political activity and voting,
within a United, multi-ethnic, democratic Sri Lanka.
It is very important, in my opinion, that our citizens who live in
the North and East of the country, all of them, should enjoy the same
rights and freedoms that are enjoyed by our citizens in the rest of the
country.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate briefly what I have said on
numerous occasions before and after my first election as President of
the Republic, and repeated after your appointment as Prime Minister of
my third Government, I stand firmly and unequivocally for a negotiated
political solution of the ethnic problem from which the country has
suffered for many decades.
I do not believe a solution can be found through war alone. Soon
after I came to office in 1994, I commenced talks with the LTTE because
I believed that without the full engagement of the LTTE in the process
of dialogue that must necessarily precede a final solution, a durable
peace will not be possible. On 8th January 1995, Mr. Pirabaharan and I,
without the assistance of any facilitator, affixed our signatures to a
document entitled "Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities".
Most of the provisions of that document are reflected in the
Agreement to which you and Mr. Pirabaharan have now given your consent
by your respective letters to the Foreign Minister of Norway. Several
rounds of talks were held between my representatives and the
representatives of the LTTE. Questions relating to humanitarian and
confidence building measures were implemented.
There was a lengthy correspondence between Mr. Pirabaharan and
myself. Although the Cessation of Hostilities was violated on 19th April
1995, by the LTTE when they bombed our naval ships in Trincomalee
harbour, I continued with my efforts to promote peace by directing that
a new Constitution be drafted to devolve power substantially and to
guarantee all rights of the minorities, and that intensive all party
consultations should take place in a Parliamentary Select Committee.
Work in the Select Committee was terminated because the UNP was
unwilling to discuss conclusively the substantive issues.
We then engaged in intensive rounds of talks with all the six
parties in Parliament and obtained the agreement of all but the one
JVP/MP. The UNP delegation led by you held talks with the Government for
five months and agreed to support the adoption of the Constitution in
Parliament, but then pulled back from the promise when it was presented
to Parliament in August 2000.
Nevertheless, in the first quarter of 2001, work began again, this
time with the assistance of the Norwegian Government as facilitator, on
an agreement for implementing additional humanitarian measures for the
Vanni region as a prelude to the commencement of substantive talks with
the LTTE. That draft Agreement was far advanced.
My commitment to peace remains firm and constant. I wholly approve
of the concept of a mutually agreed ceasefire. On our side, as far as
the Government of Sri Lanka is concerned, you and I must, in close
consultation and cooperation with each other, make this ceasefire work.
We must be ever vigilant against the consequences of failure; but we
must strive to make it work. Equally, when the time comes - and it must
come soon - to address the different core issues on the resolution of
which a just and lasting peace will depend, we must work together in
order to carry the mass of our people with us.
I hope that you and your party will make an honest and sincere
effort to assist me in my endeavours to make consensual government work
effectively.
