Indian Press Reports at Conclusion of Talks

New Delhi's snafu over the deportation of two Tamil militant leaders (a third left the country before the order could be served on him), reinforces the gloom engulfing not merely the reconciliation talks at Thimpu between the guerrillas and the Sri Lanka government, but also the overall situation in Sri Lanka where the ethnic conflict is fast taking on the dimensions of a full-scale civil war.

Although New Delhi is trying hard to put the talks back on an even keel, the chances of it succeeding are daily becoming more and more remote. If Thimpu is in danger of becoming little more than an innocuous sideshow to the unstanched bloodletting in Sri Lanka, for which the brutal rabble that passes for the Sri Lanka soldiery is mainly responsible, then that is because both antagonists, the guerrillas as well as Colombo, are busy preparing to settle the issue through the force of arms.

Again, however, the evidence, as provided by independent accounts by foreign correspondents and international humanitarian bodies like Amnesty International, suggests that Colombo is chiefly to blame. The June 18 ceasefire, which India helped to bring about, was violated by Sri Lanka soldiers when the ink on the agreement had scarcely dried, as our Colombo correspondent has reported (August 19). While the guerrillas have responded in kind, their commitment to the search via Thimpu for a political solution envisaging autonomy but short of "Eelam" has been genuine.

Buying Time

Along with Tamil United Liberation Front leaders, they have been seeking a measure of self-governance for the Tamil-dominated northern and eastern provinces and for, if not the merger of, then at least a structural link between, them. Initially, it is true, they set out four principles as a framework for any settlement and these appeared to emphasise Tamil political and cultural separateness. But apart from being generalised formulations, there was nothing in them that could not be reconciled with the degree of autonomy the Tamils could in practice be persuaded to settle for and which would have been wholly in line with Sri Lanka's unity.

Unfortunately — and this New Delhi either cannot or will not see —the Sri Lanka government has given every indication of being interested in palavering at Thimpu only in order to buy time while it readies itself for a military solution. Its strategy includes pressuring New Delhi to crack down on guerrilla operations from bases in Tamil Nadu and to twist the militants' arms to induce them to climb down more and more in negotiations; trying to set the insurgents against New Delhi; putting India on the defensive by constantly raising the bogey of "intervention" and counting on its western aid donors, who have been. as enamoured of the post-1977 Jayewardene government and its pro-Western policies as  they were previously hostile to Mrs. Bandaranaike's anti-Western set-up, to deter India from succumbing to mounting domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu, buttressed by growing international humanitarian concern over the persecution of the minority Tamils, to intervene militarily and enforce a Cyprus-type solution.

Tamils across the Palk Strait and who, expecting that New Delhi will use its clout to stay Colombo's hand, find instead that it is turning the screws on those who represent the victims.

Paradoxically, while this unfortunate turn of events serves Colombo's purpose for now, it may jeopardise its interests later. For if the reaction in Tamil Nadu to New Delhi's harsh and capricious handling of the guerrilla leaders snowballs into an avalanche of popular protest — with schools and colleges closed indefinitely, and with "rail rokos" and public rallies planned throughout the state, it could easily do so —, New Delhi will no longer be able to ignore this sentiment in the cavalier way it has done and will have no option but to assuage it by taking, privately as much as publicly, a much tougher line with Colombo.

It is imperative that New Delhi be hard headed. The Sri Lanka government has never taken Thimpu seriously. What it has set about doing feverishly is arming its soldiers. The "Financial Times" (London), in an editorial on August 22, says that ".,. the Western aid group, which has watched with alarm as government arms purchases over the past six months have increased sevenfold, has, in effect, given President Jayewardene an ultimatum: 'Reach a political solution or aid 'will eventually dry up'." Whether such pressure comes to be applied is not the point; what is relevant is that even Colombo's benefactors are getting alarmed at  the armament it is piling up.

Further evidence of its militaristic  intent comes from reports that it is refurbishing airfields long fallen into disuse, and from the Sri Lanka national security minister, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali's exhortation to India to crack down further on Tamil guerrilla bases and training camps in Tamil Nadu — if the insurrection "were confined to Sri Lanka, we could deal with them" —while defending the butchery perpetrated by Sri Lanka soldiers — "I give a lot of leeway to things done in the heat of the moment".

Political Rivalry

It is often said that the Sri Lanka government cannot act decisively because it is split between rival caucuses. Even if President Jayewardene wants a political solution, he is powerless to get one. Hardliners in the government will not let him have his way. Nor will the Buddhist clergy, no less hardline.

Nor will Mrs. Bandaranaike, now allied with the clerics, and with them demanding that any settlement arrived at be approved in a national referendum or a general election. By deliberately trying to reduce President Jayewardene's room for manoeuvre, she is seeking to discomfit him and eventually to bring him down to avenge his stripping her of her civic rights. Internal political rivalry is the name of the game in Sri Lanka, not finding a just and humane solution to the ethnic conflict.

These difficulties, however, only. make it plainer than ever that Colombo has no stake in Thimpu. It is trying to impose a military solution which it knows cannot be accomplished without neutralising India through seeming acquiescence in New Delhi's wishes. It is time New Delhi started to see Colombo's motives for what they really are.

Vital to this approach is the show of apparent reasonableness by publicly agreeing with New Delhi's view that a political solution is the only way out and by going on participating in the dialogue with Tamil representatives that New Delhi has arranged. In reality, however, the policy is to use the ceasefire (theoretically in force until September 18) to build up the Sri Lanka security forces and, even while spinning out he powwow at Thimpu endlessly without giving away anything of substance, to resume military operations against the guerrillas when heir own hands are tied because of heir commitment to Thimpu and, more importantly, because they are subject to the control of New Delhi which has needlessly put its prestige in the line in working for a settlement at Thimpu.

Erratic Behaviour

So it is that while Mr. Hector Jayewardene — Colombo has not seen fit to send to Thimpu anyone of greater political weight than a legal-constitutional expert, albeit one who happens to be the Sri Lanka president's brother — regurgitates the same old proposals that were long ago found inadequate by the Tamil delegates. the Sri Lanka army gets to work on Tamil guerrillas and civilians in Trincomalee, Vavuniya and elsewhere in an intensified offensive aimed at bringing the rebellion once and for all to heel.

And when, incensed at Colombo's duplicity and at the butchery of hundreds of fellow-Tamils, the Tamil representatives storm out of Thimpu, New Delhi rounds, not on those who are in fact sabotaging the talks while going through the motions of taking part in them, but on those who have shown a genuine willingness to look for a political solution at New Delhi's bidding. What puts New Delhi in an even poorer light is that its irritation at the sudden rupture of the Thimpu deliberations makes it so edgy as to construe the return to Madras of the guerrilla delegates, instead of going directly to New Delhi for discussions at the Prime Minister's invitation, as defiance of the Indian government, thereby warranting some deportations as exemplary punishment. Its belated revocation of its expulsion of one of the militant leaders, Mr. Chandrahasan, after he had journeyed to the U.S. and back and after he had been detained in Bombay for over 24 hours only underwrites its initial blunder. Should it revoke the marching orders of the other two leaders as well (as it properly should), its clumsiness would be fully exposed.

Such erratic behaviour is not only unbecoming of a mature government running a major country, it is also downright bad policy. It plays straight into Colombo's hands, confirming in its eyes the wisdom of its strategy of pitting the guerrillas against New Delhi and of getting the latter to pressure the militants into making more and more concessions. It ensures that Colombo will have even less reason to take Thimpu seriously — except as a forum of procrastination while it prepares for a military solution. It diverts attention, to Colombo's relief and delight, from the excesses of its soldiers in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Above all, it infuriates 50 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu who are helpless with rage as reports come in of the brutalities against their fellow Tamils.

Talking Over Genocide: Sri Lanka's Tamils find India keener to see the peace talks go on than condemn the atrocities against them - Anita Pratap in Sunday, 1-7 September 1985

As the second phase of the Thimphu talks petered out, the Tamil militants seemed to be caught between the devil and the deep sea—a recalcitrant government back home and an Indian government that was apparently only interested in an 'instant solution' to the island's ethnic crisis. The known enemy was the Sri Lanka government that was covertly "intent upon the extermination of the Tamils." Bitter historical experience had compelled the militants (who formed the Eelam National Liberation Front, ENLF } to believe that for the Sri Lanka government, the Thimphu talks were a fiendish charade where they could buy time by putting forward a jaded mockery of proposals for devolution, of power to the Tamils. while strengthening their armed forces to ultimately opt for a military solution to the ethnic imbroglio. The predictable behavioural patterns of the Sri Lanka government did not cause them anxiety. They expected it and to that extent were psychologically prepared for it. But what has alarmed and dismayed them is the behaviour of the unknown friend, India.

While they continue to have immense faith in Rajiv Gandhi, they are still apprehensive about the modus operandi of the intelligence agencies, namely the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) who are acting as intermediaries between the Indian government and Tamils. For the first time the militants complained about the 'undue pressure' they were subjected to by the agencies. Pressure has been building up on them ever since the summit meeting between Mr Gandhi and Mr Jayewardene in June this year but it peaked on thenight of 17 August after the Tamil delegation staged a walk-out in Thimphu. While Romesh Bhandari, foreign secretary, has been given the responsibility of dealing with the Sri Lanka government, the agencies have been entrusted with the task of getting the militants to come to the negotiating table. In their zealousness to 'do their duty' they have resorted to threats, blackmail and armtwisting to get the militants back to the negotiating table. Surely the knuckledusters-and-lathi philosophy is grotesquely unsuited for solving intricate and sensitive political problems.

For the Tamil delegation, Thimphu II had added injury to insult. First came the modified version of the July proposals that heightened their suspicion about the fact that the Sri Lanka government was not serious about a political settlement. And then came the news that about 200 Tamil civilians in Vavuniya had been brutally massacred by the security forces. (The Trincomallee incidents came later).

On 17 August the Tamils handed over a statement to the leader of the Sri Lanka team Hector Jayewardene. The statement read, "As we have talked here in Thimphu the genocidal intent of the Sri Lank-an state has manifested itself in the continued killings of Tamils in their homeland. In the most recent incidents which have occurred during the past few days more than 200 innocent Tamil civilians, including young children—whose only crime is that they are Tamils—have been killed by the Sri Lanka armed forces running amok in Vavuniya and elsewhere.

These events are proof of the intention of the Sri Lanka government to seek a military solution to the Tamil national question. It is farcical to continue peace talks at Thimphu when there is no peace and no security for the Tamil people in their homelands. We do not seek to terminate the talks at Thimphu but our participation in peace talks has been now rendered impossible by the conduct of the Sri Lankan state which has acted in violation of the cease-fire agreements which constitute the fundamental basis for Thimphu talks." The Tamils then walked out. The time was 4.40 pm.

Mr Bhandari, to whose diplomatic genius one can attribute the Thimphu talks, lost his temper with the Tamil delegates for bringing about the collapse of the talks. Bhandari started off on the wrong foot because his instinctive reaction was to blame the Tamils for the failure of the talks and lambast them for their "blunder" in staging a walk-out. His bid to persuade them to return to the table was defeated in the flurry of heated exchanges between him and the ENLF delegates, in particular Mr Satyendra of TELO. The militants had always suspected that Mr Bhandari empathised more with the Sri Lankans than with them. The ranking suspicions snowballed into a broiling confrontation. The ENLF delegates appealed that Bhandari's priority was clearly to resume the talks at any cost rather than protest against the shabby proposals and the carnage of Vavuniya, which is a serious violation of the cease-fire accord. Instead of being sympathetic, Bhandari was incensed. Wishing to avert a ghastly collision, Amirthalingam, the TULF leader and Vasudeva of the PLOT apologised on behalf of the Tamil delegates for the acrimonious confrontation. Incidentally, there is a schism in the Tamil delegation with the ENLF on one side and the TULF and PLOT together on the other side. However, this inherent division has not yet seriously affected the unity of the delegation. The night of 17 August made one thing clear: just as the Sri Lankan delegation expressed a crisis of confidence against Mrs Gandhi's special envoy Mr G. Parthasarathy the ENLF seems to be experiencing a crisis of confidence regarding Mr Bhandari who they fear, harbours antipathy towards them.

But mare than Bhandari it is the "arbitrary" behavior of the intelligence agencies that has upset the militants. What infuriated the militants was the cursory dismissal of the report about the Vavuniya incident as a "gross exaggeration" by the agencies. By this time. Trincomallee was also engulfed in anti-Tamil violence with large-scale killing of Tamils and burning of Tamil property by the security forces and armed Sinhala thugs. Whenever the militants disagreed or failed to toe the line, the agencies warned that they would withdraw their "support." The militants resented the fact that the government of India, instead of applying pressure on the Sri Lankan government to put forward meaning-ful proposals. chose to exert pressure on the militants to continue with the Thimphu talks even when the masses were being brutally attacked.

The militants were also appalled that the Indian government had not officially voiced its concern about the Vavuniya and Trincomallee incidents. They construed this as a "drastic shift in the priorities and perceptions" of the Indian government. They could not help comparing Mr Gandhi's silence over the atrocities perpetrated by the Sri Lankan armed forces with his mother's strong protests whenever Tamils civilians were killed. Mrs Gandhi had often gone on record that "India could not remain silent when innocent Tamils were being killed in Sri Lanka." An ENLF member told SUNDAY "When Mrs Gandhi was alive there was constant fear in Jayew ardene that she would not take kindly to any act of violence against the Tamils. When Mrs Gan dhi was assassinated, more than the Indians, it is we Tamils of Sri Lanka who were orphaned. Mr Gandhi's soft diplomacy is just not going to work with Jayewardene. The more soft he is with Mr Jayewardene, the greater will he the acceleration of the genocidal onslaught on the Tamils by the Sri Lanka government." It was only on 21 August when 331 Tamil -refugees landed on the shores if

Rameshwaram in Tamil Nadu. fleeing their homeland following the Vavuniya incident that India chose to express concern over the killing of innocent Tamil civilians.

In the meantime the scene had shifted from the dragon kingdom the Himalayas to the dingy streets of Kodambakkam where the ENLF has its offices. The ENLF leaders of the four groups were told that Mr Gandhi wanted them to come to Delhi. The initial reaction of the ENLF members was to disbelieve that the summons had emanated from the PM July, on the eve of the talks Thimphu, they had been summoned to Delhi, ostensibly by Mr Gandhi. But the three-day Delhi sojourn turned out to be a brainstorming session with the RAW officials. Despite repeated appeals, they did not get to meet the PM.

Fearing that it would he a repetition of the arm twisting session, the ENLF did not respond. Crime branch and IB officials. who were acting as emissaries of the RAW in Madras, assured the ENLF that this time the PM had kept time for them. The ENLF, however, refused to rush into the matter, saying they needed time to discuss the issue among themselves and present a coherent statement before the PM when they met him. Meanwhile V. Pirabhakaran, leader  of the LTTE, Sri Sabaratnam, leader of the TELO and Padmanabha, leader of the EPRLF, became totally inaccessible to the intelligence agencies.

An intriguing development has meanwhile taken place which portends serious implications for Sri Lanka's ethnic strife. All of a sudden news analysis of the Sri Lankan situation emanating from 'sources' in the government in Delhi are claiming that Uma Maheshwaran, leader of the PLOT, is the person to "watch." Oddly enough identical words are used to describe Uma's "ascendance." The representatives of the Indian government expound that among the militants only Uma is "balanced, politically mature and canny." In promoting Uma it is pointed that in the event of a political settlement the Tamils require a "shrewd politician" and Uma fits the bill. It doesn't seem to matter that Uma's "political astuteness" was not in evidence when his arch rival, the LTTE, outmanoeuvred him by joining the ENLF, thereby isolating Uma from the militant mainstream.

It is equally intriguing that Colombo datelined despatches point out that the ruling UNP feels that only Uma has responded positively to the Indian persuasion among the militants. Moreover, even the TULF is more favourably disposed to the PLOT than the ENLF. The fact is that Uma is being given an entirely artificial boost. Independent sources from the Tamil areas—essentially visiting foreign journalists and Tamil refugees — categorically state that PLOT does not enjoy the kind of mass support that the LTTE, TELO, and EPRLF does. They have been completely overtaken by the LTTE and TELO on every conceivable front, be it guerrilla warfare, helping affected Tamil civilians with provisions or visiting refugees in Tamil Nadu. Apart from issuing statements deploring the 'hit and run' tactics of the LTTE, or expressing the need to enlist the support of the Sinhala proletariat for the Marxist revolution of the Tamils and to resist forces of imperialism and failing to smuggle arms to Tamil areas, Uma has done nothing tangible to promote the cause of Eelam to which he is supposedly committed. On the other hand, he seems to have developed ties with representatives of the Sri Lanka government.

The second phase of the Thimphu talks seemed jinxed right from the beginning with Hector Jayewardene preempting the Tamils by rejecting outright the four cardinal principles they decided to press. He also declared that the government of Sri Lanka "did not acknowledge the right or status of any persons present in these talks to represent or negotiate on behalf of all the Tamils living in Sri Lanka." He also said that the militants should renounce their armed struggle and close down their camps in Sri Lanka and abroad if the settlement reached at Thimphu could be implemented. The Tamil delegation raised the issue of colonisation, demanding to know why Tamil villages like Thinnaimaravadi, Kokilai, Karunatukeni and Gnayarhad been amalgamated into the Sinhala-majority district of Anuradhapura. They also raised the issue of clandestine colonisation in certain areas in Vavuniya. Mullaituvu and Muthur districts where the Tamils were chased out of their homes.

Hector Jayewardene did not reply to these points even in the subse quent rounds of talks. Anyway, the Tamils subsequently stressed that they were interested in a 'rational dialogue' with the Lankan delegation. They also insisted that their legitimacy as the representatives of the Tamils should be acknowledged as otherwise the talks would be an exercise in futility. While rejecting this point, Mr Jayewardene however assured that "there is sufficient representation of Tamils in Thimphu for the talks to arrive at a negotiated settlement."

On 16 August the new proposal was presented which the Tamils rejected the next day, pointing out that it was only a rehash of the earlier proposal which, instead of granting genuine autonomy to the Tamils, only reinforced the centre's power to manage the district councils. After issuing their statement on the Vavuniya incidents the Tamils walked out.

They made it clear that the talks could resume only on three conditions: first, the immediate cessation of state violence against Tamil civilians: second, the total and faithful observance of the ceasefire agreement by the Sri Lankan government; and third, the submission of a fresh set of proposals. The Tamil delegation meanwhile indicated that it would be willing to return to the table using the "CWC" proposals as a "working basis" for negotiations.

S. Thondaman, president of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), which represents the plantation Tamils, who is a member of the UNP cabinet, had submitted a set of proposals at the time of the all-party conference in 1984. The Tamils, including the ENLF, were favourably disposed to the CWC proposals because they incorporated the four cardinal principles—though euphemistically. For instance, it did not mention Tamil home lands. It referred to them as a 'linguistic region'. It envisioned the amalgamation of the north and east, an issue that is firmly opposed by the UNP government. That Tamils have the status of people of a district and their right to self-determination and the restoration of civil and political rights to the plantation workers had got due mention in the CWC proposals. It was also reported that the Sri Lankan delegation was willing to discuss the CWC proposals.

As one of the Tamil leaders told SUNDAY "There is no point in negotiating if the Sri Lankan delegation merely says they are prepared to discuss the CWC proposals.

Tamil militants want Parthasarathy instead of Bhandari at talks - Sadanand Menon, The Sunday Observer, September 8,1985

MADRAS: A notable feature of the Eelam muddle of the past few weeks which has pushed any conceivable solution to the Tamil nationality question troubling Sri Lanka to a distant horizon, has been the bull-in-the- China-shop diplomacy of India. And the bull is none other than foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari — so say Tamil groups who were at Thimpu II.

According to one of the Tamil participants at Thimpu-II, many in his delegation had broken down and wept as they heard BBC reports of the massacre of over 300 Tamils in Vavuniya and Trincomalee. There were many emotional scenes and some in the delegation wanted to quit the scene then and there. However, after a hurried meeting, they took a collective decision ,to 'walk-out' of the talks in protest against the killings.

Of course, the idea of the 'walkout' was not new as, even before the delegation left Madras for Thimpu, Balasingham had announced on behalf of the ENLF that any opposition from the Lankan delegates or the TULF or PLOT to the 'liberation charter' draft they had prepared would result in a 'walk-out' by the ENLF representatives.

As the talks began, the Lanka delegation's superciliousness in questioning the representative status of the Tamil delegation and their "sarcastic" and "cynical" remarks on the notion of 'Tamil homelands' had raised the hackles of the Tamil delegation. They felt a silly "intellectual game" was being played by the Lankan team which kept saying, "Long before you came, we had a Buddhist civilisation in Lanka". It was in the midst of all this civility that news came of the killing of Tamil civilians which immediately amalgamated the Tamil delegation into one united group and hastened their resolve to stage a 'walk-out'.

Romesh Bhandari, fresh from a road accident, was rushed to Thimpu plastered nose and all, and he launched a tirade against the Tamil delegation — a speech liberally laced with epithets like 'bloody' and 'what the hell'. Though smarting under this patronising 'scolding', the youngsters in the Tamil delegation took it all silently, but at one point the 'new face' in the team representing TELO, 53-year-old N Satyendra, whom Bhandari had not met before and who was an unknown factor even within the ENLF circles, abandoned his restraint and told Bhandari, "Stop this stupid talk. We are not here to learn lessons from you". He insisted that Bhandari apologise and withdraw words like 'bloody' used in reference to the Tamil groups. Sathyendran said, "Mr Bhandari should realise that at Thimpu we are not just anybody but the representatives of a nation and a people and expect to be treated with minimum protocol and courtesy. This is no way to proceed with a negotiation". This, in turn, prompted Bhandari to walk off in a huff exclaiming, "Maybe you want to teach me lessons now".

The ENLF delegates were particularly offended that Bhandari had not shown any inclination to protest against the massacre of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Other delegates would have pitched into the fray of .the verbal slanging match had not TULF's Amirthalingam and PLOT's Vasudeva tried to mend fences by apologising on behalf of the Tamil delegation to Bhandari.

It's impossible that Bhandari did not know Satyendra's background. But it's unlikely he would have talked in the manner he did if he had known. For Satyendra is a leading labour lawyer currently on a four-year assignment with Cambridge University to prepare an industrial law digest and, just three years back, was also an advisor to, the Jayewardene government in Colombo. The son of S Nadesan, one of the foremost human rights and constitutional lawyers of Sri-

Lanka, Satyendra did his physics Tripos from Cambridge and was a bar-at-law in London. In early 1982, Jayewardene had appointed him as secretary to the Lankan labour ministry. But he resigned within six months after undergoing a radical change in perspective while appearing as senior defence counsel for Thangathurai, Kuttimani and Jegan, the legendary heroes of the Tamil Eelam Movement who had been charged with criminal conspiracy against the state and who were later to be martyred in the Welikade prison massacres of 1983.

LTTE's Balasingham can be away only (or a few days more. Already reports are that an Indian entry visa for him is under process. This has proved another major embarrassment as with the deportation of Balasingam LTTE leader Pirabhakaran, the most active and organised leader of the guerilla groups, went underground and is variously reported to have been seen in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Rameshwaram. But the fact is neither RAW or the IB nor the state CID has a clue to his whereabouts, and now MGR himself has been requested by the Centre to ensure his return to Madras. For, without Pirabhakaran, the EMLF is a mere paper organisation and no decision by its other constituents will carry any weight.

Before Thimpu-I, when the militant leaders had been summoned to Delhi ostensibly to meet Rajiv Gandhi, but only to be grilled by RAW and IB officials, Pirabhakaran, in a fit of irritation, had shouted he was not interested in talks and preferred returning to Jaffna to conduct his 'revolution'. He had been gently reminded by the Indian secret service agencies that he should not forget he was on Indian soil and that India would need only six hours to mop up the entire Eelam militant operations in India. "Where can you go avoiding our gaze", Pirabhakaran had been taunted. But Pirabhakaran has slipped away right from under the noses of all these multiple agencies keeping 'watch' on him.

Meanwhile, both the militants and the moderates among the Tamil groups in Madras have stepped up their appeals to the Indian government to give Romesh Bhandari a rest and bring back G Parthasarathy into the picture, who, they feel, has better appreciation of the problems of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.