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CONFLICT RESOLUTION
TAMIL EELAM
- SRI LANKA
Rajapakse Bent on Dictated Peace
B.Raman,
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India
and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai
7 January 2007
In an assessment on the ground situation in Sri Lanka
written on October 8,2006, I had stated as follows: "The hardline
advisers of Mr.Rajapakse think that they can now see the light at
the end of a long and dark tunnel and that this is the time to force
upon the LTTE a dictated peace, which would restict the eventual
Tamil control in any political solution to the Northern Province
minus Jaffna and the Batticaloa District of the Eastern Province
minus the Tricomallee and Amparai Districts. Their reported plans
for an ultimate political solution also envisage excluding the
LTTE's presence and influence from even the Batticaloa District, by
placing the Karuna faction and other Tamil parties in power there
and keeping Jaffna, Trincomallee and Amparai directly under the
control of the Government in Colombo. Among other ideas reportedly
under consideration are changing the demographic composition of the
Trincomalle District by re-settling Sinhalese ex-servicemen there."
(http://www.saag.org/papers20/paper1983.html )
2.In pursuance of its strategy for a dictated peace, which will
remove the Eastern Province from the control of the Tamils and
ultimately convert it into a Sinhalese majority area through the
re-settlement of Sinhalese ex-servicemen and others, the Mahinda
Rajapakse Government has already initiated a number of steps by
taking advantage of the silence of the international community,
including India, on its policy of using its Air Force, heavy
artillery and forced starvation to force the Tamils into submission.
3.In the third week of December,2006, Rear Admiral (Retd) Mohan
Wijewickrama was sworn in before President Mahinda Rajapakse as the
Governor of the Eastern Province. He has been appointed to hold
concurrent charge as the Governor of the Northern Province till a
regular incumbent for that post is found. After being sworn in, he
was reported to have told the media: "From 1 January 2007, we have
no choice but to run the two provinces separately.Finances have
already been appropriated separately for the two provinces."
4.He also said that fresh appointments would be made to the Northern
and Eastern Provincial Councils in keeping with the Supreme Court
ruling that the 1987 merger was illegal. According to him, the new
ethnic balance would be taken into consideration when these
appointments are made. Consequently, the Eastern Provincial Council
is likely to have more Sinhalese and Muslim employees than before.
Earlier apppointments had been made in keeping with the ethnic ratio
of the combined North and East.
5. The first batch of about 80 Sinhalese ex-servicemen for
re-settlement was brought to Trincomallee under Army protection on
December 30. More are expected. Not only Sinhalese extremist
leaders, but also Buddhist monks have been associated with the plan
for the dilution of the Tamil presence and influence in the Eastern
Province.Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander, has been
discussing the future strategy with local military commanders. He
reportedly met senior commanders of the Army's 23 Division based in
Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa, in the island�s east on January 3.He has also been
meeting Buddhist priests and seeking their blessing and co-operation
for the success of what he called the Government's new strategy to
crush the movement for a Tamil Eelam during 2007.
6. In an informal New Year-eve discussion with the media in
Colombo,Lt. Gen. Fonseka reportedly said that the Security Forces
would be able to take the strategic eastern coastal towns of Vaharai
and Kadirweli in about a month. According to him, only the rains and
the slushy terrain were preventing the tri-services from launching
an offensive to capture the two towns. He claimed that the LTTE had
only about 800 fully-trained fighters in the East in addition to a
militia of about 2,000. He mentioned during his interactions at
Colombo that he was confident of defeating the LTTE in the East as
well as the North before the end of 2007.
7.While he attributed the delay in the long-expected Army offensive
to take Vaharai to bad weather, another reason is understood to be a
shortage of artillery shells for the heavy artillery being used
against the LTTE positions. A new consignment of arms and ammunition
from Pakistan including artillery shells is expected shortly and
once that arrives, the offensive is expected to be stepped up. The
fighters of the anti-LTTE faction headed by Karuna are now openly
assisting the Army in its operations in the Eastern Province. No
effort is made any longer to conceal the presence and key role of
the followers of Karuna in the military operations in the Eastern
Province.
8. The strategy of Mr.Rajapakse's advisers is to develop Karuna as
the future leader of Batticaloa to co-ordinate anti-LTTE activities
there and Mr.Douglas Devananda, a Tamil member of the present
Government, as the future leader of Jaffna to co-ordinate the
anti-LTTE activities in the Northern Province. The men of Devananda
have already been working under the over-all supervision of the
Army. Devananda has also been made in charge of co-ordinating the
movement and distribution of humanitarian relief goods donated by
India.
9.The Rajapakse Government has not been unduly worried over the
concerns of the Government of India at the humanitarian situation of
the Tamils and over the reported decision of the German Government
not to make any fresh budgetary allocations for assistance to Sri
Lanka till the fighting stops. Lt.Gen.Fonseka and other advisers of
Mr.Rajapakse have been claiming that the new strategy of crushing
the LTTE by the end of 2007 has the tacit support of the Indian
authorities and that the expressions of concern over the
humanitarian situation in response to pressure from the political
parties of Tamil Nadu should be understood in the correct
perspective and should not be interpreted to mean that the
Government of India disapproves of their military strategy against
the LTTE. They also claim that their plan to remove the Eastern
Province from the control of the LTTE was in continuation of a
similar plan reportedly drawn up by Rajiv Gandhi himself in 1988-89
to build up Varadaraja Perumal as a counter to Prabhakaran.
10. While there has been a slight forward movement in the Government
of India's Sri Lanka policy, it is still marked by considerable
ambivalence. The policy continues to be based on the following
postulates: A federal solution maintaining the unity of Sri Lanka,
but not its unitary political set-up; only a political solution is
feasible; the problem cannot be solved militarily; till a political
solution is found the status quo (North-East merger) should not be
disturbed;No direct role for India in the search for a political
solution;No supply of lethal military equipment to the Sri Lankan
Armed Forces, which they could use in their counter-insurgency
operations; No disruption of training assistance; active monitoring
of the humanitarian situation and provision of relief through
channels approved by the Government of Sri Lanka.
11. Many of these postulates have already been rendered irrelevant
by the Rajapakse Government in total disregard of the sensitivities
of New Delhi. It has already ruled out a federal solution and has
been working for a unitary solution. It has already set in motion
the process of de-merger and the reduction of the Tamil influence in
the Eastern Province. As a sop to Indian sensitivities, it wants to
associate India more actively with the economic development of the
Eastern Province in order to convey a message that a reduction of
Tamil influence would not mean a reduction of Indian influence. It
is bent upon finding a military solution to the problem during the
New Year. Mr.Rajapakse's advisers are convinced that the ground and
the international situation are at present the most favourable to
Sri Lanka and that they if they miss this opportunity to turn the
tide against the LTTE, they may not get another opportunity like
this again. The ultimate objective of Mr.Rajapakse's advisers is to
reduce the Sri Lankan Tamils to the status of the Red Indians of Sri
Lanka kept confined to certain reserves as museum pieces. A more
anti-Tamil group of hardline advisers Sri Lanka has not had since
the Tamils rose in revolt in 1983.
12. Operationally, the LTTE continues to be handicapped by the lack
of anti-aircraft capability and a diminution in the stock of
explosives. The leadership losses in the Eastern Province following
the desertion of Karuna have not been effectively made good so far.
Its international wing has been considerably weakened by the death
of Anton Balasingham, its ideologue, at London last month after a
painful struggle with cancer. His network of contacts in the Western
world, his close relations with the Norwegian authorities, his
insights and negotiating skills and his understanding of the Western
mindset were a tremendous asset to the LTTE. Whle Karuna was the
conventional fighting genius of the LTTE, Balasingham was its
political genius, with a lucid understanding of the political
realities. He imparted a sophistication to the LTTE's political
approach which it might not have otherwise had.
13. With Karuna having joined the Government forces against the LTTE
and with Balasingham dead, the LTTE leadership has been finding
itself without adequate material and intellectual resources to carry
on its struggle for Tamil Eelam. However, it would be foolhardy for
Mr.Rajapakse's advisers to conclude therefrom that the LTTE is
losing its resilience and has become less of a fighting machine than
it was till 2004. It is still a formidable fighting machine, with
considerable reserves of energy and motivation still left. |
