Peace through Change:
the British Devolution Experience
Peter
Hain, Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
Speech delivered at the British Council, Colombo, Sri Lanka
23 November 2000
"This is a war neither side can win militarily.
It is a conflict that cannot be resolved without elected leaders being prepared
to sit down with people who may well be responsible for barbarous
assassinations, but
who do have a legitimate political programme which needs to be engaged, not
shunned. It took far too long for us to learn that lesson in Britain, and far
too many lives were lost as a consequence.
Equally, the LTTE, like the IRA, need to acknowledge that, whilst a Tamil
Kingdom constitutionally split from the rest of the island will not receive
recognition by Europe, the USA or indeed India, the principle of self
determination and control over most if not all the key policies affecting daily
life would be supported by the international community. There is no future for a
Sri Lanka paralysed by dogma, intransigence and cruelty. Compromises, difficult
decisions and tough choices will be needed, some painful..."
UK is keen to help in the search for a peaceful settlement...
I would like to share with you some of the experiences that we have had
in the UK, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland...
I firmly believe that Devolution will not lead to the break up of the
nation state...
How devolution came to Northern Ireland...
Three strands of the Good Friday Agreement...
How to negotiate with those speaking for paramilitary groups...
Two issues in any peace process are paramilitary prisoner release and
decommissioning of weapons...
Three factors that helped achieve Agreement: conflict weariness, strong
public yearning for peace and international involvement...
Also nothing was agreed until everything was agreed...
Both Sri Lanka's insistence upon territorial sovereignty, and the LTTE's
objective of autonomy, can be secured...
This is a war neither side can win militarily: this is a time for
boldness, vision and strong leadership from both sides...
see also: "...many peace agreements are fragile and the
'peace' that they create is usually the extension of war by more
civilised means... A peace agreement is often an imperfect compromise
based on the state of play when the parties have reached a 'hurting
stalemate' or when the international community can no longer stomach
a continuation of the crisis. A peace process, on the other hand, is
not so much what happens before an agreement is reached, rather what
happens after it... the post conflict phase crucially defines the
relationship between former antagonists. Hence the title, After the
Peace.." (Walter Kemp, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, reviewing
'After the Peace: resistance and reconciliation' by Robert L.Rothstein,
1999) |
UK is keen to
help in the search for a peaceful settlement...
It is a great pleasure for me to be here today. This is my first
visit to Sri Lanka and it is a good opportunity for me to get to know key
opinion formers and to learn about the issues of the day.
Everyone I speak to agrees that the top priority on the
political and economic agenda is to find a lasting solution to the ethnic
conflict. I have followed events in Sri Lanka with considerable interest and
sadness as a friend with a shared history and common values, and a fellow member
of the Commonwealth family. It is a tragedy to see so many lives being lost and
development opportunities missed as a result of this destructive conflict.
The UK is keen to help in the search for a peaceful settlement to this complex
problem if we are asked to do so. But the solution must come from within Sri
Lanka if it is to be sustainable. There is no magic wand that people from
outside can wave to make things better. So I have not come here with any
preconceived ideas on what form a settlement might take; that is a matter for
the Government and the people of Sri Lanka.
But others have also experienced internal conflict and have searched for ways of
giving different communities a greater say in the governance of their own
affairs within a unitary state.
I
would like to share with you some of the experiences that we have had in the
UK, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland...
I would like to share with you some of the experiences that we
have had in the UK,
particularly in
the context of Northern Ireland. I do this, not because I want to suggest
that the formula we have developed in Northern Ireland must necessarily be the
right one for the Sri Lankan context - but because we have encountered some of
the problems that you face and there may be something of value in that
experience which you can draw upon.
Since our Labour Government came to power in 1997, we have devolved power to
Scotland and Wales and, as part of a Peace Process to Northern Ireland as well.
Each has a different model of devolution. The Scottish Parliament has fully
fledged legislative powers over most things, excluding foreign and defence
policy and social security. The Welsh Assembly has more limited control over key
areas like education, health and economic development. The powers of the
Northern Ireland Assembly fall midway between those of Scotland and Wales.
Conflicts around the world - for example, in the Middle East, Kashmir, Western
Sahara, the Balkans, South Africa, Indonesia and Spain - have some similarities.
But each has its own unique history demanding its own unique solution.
Nevertheless we can learn lessons and draw from each others experiences. I would
like today to concentrate on how the United Kingdom has worked towards a
negotiated settlement in Northern Ireland, following centuries of bitter
conflict, horrendous violence, terrorism, discrimination and injustice.
We have not yet secured a genuinely lasting peace embraced by
all. But we are making significant progress which just a few years ago would
have been regarded as impossible. And if Sri Lankans continue to despair about
the prospects for peace in their own beautiful island, they can take courage
from the fact that the conflict in Northern Ireland goes back much longer and
has been at least as bitter and entrenched.
I firmly believe that Devolution will not lead to the break up of the nation
state...
But first, the principle, of devolution itself. Some ask: will it not ultimately
lead to the break up of the nation state?
I firmly believe that it will not. Our devolution arrangements respect the
history, culture and tradition of different parts of the United Kingdom. They
strengthen not weaken our Union. The arrangement which we have put in place seek
to devolve to the constituent parts of the UK the power to manage their own
affairs in the areas which are of most concern to the local populations. At the
same time, they reserve for the national government the tasks which are best
performed at the national level.
The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, recently commented:
"Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, alongside
changes under way at regional and local levels in England, have all strengthened
the ability of each part of the United Kingdom to find solutions which meet
theirparticular needs while maintaining the integrity of the United Kingdom and
respecting the common interest and traditions which bind us all together,
wherever we live."
Devolution has required courage, but it is the forging of a new,
modern Britain - a strong, multinational, multicultural and multiethnic country,
where our strength comes not from uniformity but from diversity; not from a
flattening process of programmed assimilation, but from a democratic renewal
through mutual tolerance and respect. I believe that devolution, rather than
undermining the UK, will actually strengthen it.
I fought apartheid in the old South Africa because I hated racism and I believed
in equality; justice, pluralism and the dignity of all ethnic and religious
groups. I know that the Sri Lankan people share these beliefs and care deeply
about their diverse cultures, languages and traditions.
Nelson Mandwela's "rainbow nation" vision for South Africa is a vision the
British Government shares and we are proud to be a multicultural, multiethnic,
multi faith and indeed multinational state. Devolution is one example of
how that vision is put into practice.
I hope devolution will awaken a greater civic interest and encourage people to
participate in determining their own local affairs. By recognising and
accommodating the diversity that exists in the UK, by allowing its various parts
to do things differently, I believe we strengthen the UK. It is this ability to
adapt and adjust, to evolve and improve in response to changing circumstances,
that has been the hallmark of democracy in Britain. I hope it will be a model,
which your island will share.
How devolution came to Northern Ireland...
So how did devolution come to Northern Ireland? In 1801 the marriage of Great
Britain and Ireland created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
Britain's rule was often violent and oppressive. By the second half of the 19th
Century, "home rule" (or devolution) for Ireland had become one of the major
issues of British politics. From 1886 onwards the Liberal Government made
several unsuccessful attempts to legislate for Irish Home Rule.
In the aftermath of the First World War, the British Government finally
legislated for Home Rule. However, by then the pressure for a completely
independent Irish State was overwhelming and in 1921 the Irish Free State, later
to become the Republic of Ireland, was established in the South. However, the
six counties of the North were not included; they were left as part of the
United Kingdom and were granted their own devolved parliament and govemment.
These six counties of Northern Ireland were dominated by the majority Protestant
community (roughly 60% of the population).
Historically, the Protestants identify closely with Britain and are known as
Unionists, as they favour the union between Northern Ireland and the rest of the
United Kingdom. The minority Roman Catholic population tend to identify with the
independent Republic of Ireland to the south and are known as Nationalists.
After 1921 the Nationalists were effectively excluded from power by a Unionist
majority which ruled with intolerance, injustice and blatant discrimination
against Catholics.
A distinguishing factor of Northern Ireland is its long tradition of violence
for political ends. It was against this background of growing violence that the
devolved government was suspended in 1972 and direct rule from London put in its
place. Civil and human rights were also an important factor 30 years ago at the
start of the so called Troubles. Until reform began in the 1970s Roman Catholics
were regularly the victims of discrimination, for example in gaining access to
public housing and to jobs in both the private and public sectors.
Throughout the ensuing years, successive British governments, both Labour and
Conservative, and the main political parties in Northern Ireland have looked for
a way to restore a measure of self rule which would ensure the interests and
rights of the minority community were fully represented. The history of the
negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement is long and complex.
But it is marked by a recognition by successive British - and Irish -
Governments, of whatever party, that an enduring solution can only come about if
institutions are established which are accepted as legitimate across the whole
community. This essentially bipartisan approach over many years, both within the
UK and Ireland, and between our two Goverments, has been important in achieving
success. The Agreement now offers Northern Ireland the best chance of peace in a
generation.
Three strands of the Good Friday Agreement...
So what is the Good Friday Agreement?
It deals not only with the political relationships within Northern Ireland, but
with Northern Ireland's relationships with the Republic of Ireland and the rest
of the United Kingdom. This took the form of the so called Three Strand
Approach, which is at the heart of the Good Friday Agreement, and as a concept
had been around in talks going back at least as far as 1991.
Strand One has produced the involvement of both communities in the devolved
Govemment of Northern Ireland: the sharing of power. The Agreement established
an Assembly elected by proportional representation capable of exercising
executive and legislative authority with safeguards to protect the rights and
interests of all parties within the community.
Strand Two has established structured co-operation between Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland. The form agreed includes a Council made up of Ministers
from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Republic of Ireland, plus cross
border bodies handling specific subjects with all Ireland implications.
Strand Three establishes new institutions to handle both bilateral relations
between London and Dublin and also a British Irish Council, bringing together
representatives of the British and Irish Governments and the devolved
administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Underlying the Agreement is the acceptance by all, that the people of Northern
Ireland are free to choose whether to remain part of the United Kingdom, as a
majority clearly want at present, or to become part of an independent united
Ireland. Also an acceptance that all parts of the community are free to pursue
their differing aspirations, as long as they do so by exclusively peaceful and
democratic means.
But the Agreement goes further than simply issues of national identity, the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland and political representation, vital
though they are.
It is also about Northern Ireland's future being one of fairness, justice and
opportunity for all. Those elements are particularly important to ordinary
people in Northern Ireland, particularly those from the minority nationalist
community, who in the past have been denied agreed rights.
The Agreement ensures that the human rights of all sections of the community in
Northern Ireland are fully recognised and protected. It is about creating new
and inclusive social structures in Northern Ireland to ensure justice, fairness
and equality for all sections of the community.
How to negotiate with those speaking
for paramilitary groups...
So how did we achieve a process which produced this Agreement? How did we manage
to negotiate with those speaking for paramilitary groups, most notably the IRA,
which had only recently been responsible for horrendous acts of terrorism and
assassination? A question perhaps of special interest to Sri Lankans.
The main challenge confronting all the democratic participants in the
negotiations was how to involve parties closely associated with terrorist
organisations. There was a natural concern about engaging in direct negotiation
with political representatives associated with organisations responsible for
terrorist campaigns. Some of those who ended up talking across the negotiating
table had relatives or neighbours who had died in terrorist attacks.
The approach that we took as a Government was that those parties had to affirm
their total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful
means. Ceasefires declared by their paramilitary wings had to be seen to be
genuine and lasting. Transgressions from ceasefires led to the suspension of
participants from the talks on two occasions.
Deciding when a paramilitary group's ceasefire is genuine and lasting, rather
than simply a short term tactic, is probably the hardest judgement confronting
any government in initiating a negotiating process of the type we have seen in
Northern Ireland. Such paramilitary organisations, by their very nature operate
in a political culture difficult to understand from the outside. They naturally
tend to be secretive, authoritarian and undemocratic. Nonetheless in the case of
Northern Ireland, the paramilitary groups' views were a reflection, albeit an
extreme one, of the passionately held views and tensions of a deeply divided
society.
There is almost bound to be an element of ambiguity about any halt to violence.
But it is essential to tie those who want to give up violence into a position
where it is virtually impossible for them to go back.
They need to be locked into a political process which gives them the opportunity
to achieve at least part of their objectives. At the same time governments need
to be very clear in their own minds about their own basic principles and what
their bottom line is. With this firm framework in place, one can then try to be
inventive in coming up with initiatives to keep the process moving forward,
including for example, over such issues as agreeing to meet with the
paramilitaries' political representatives, talks about talks and so on.
Two issues in any peace process are paramilitary prisoner release and
decommissioning of weapons...
Two particular issues almost certain to come up in any peace
process of the kind seen in Northern Ireland are paramilitary prisoner release
and decommissioning of weapons.
The early release of paramilitary prisoners is always likely to be
controversial. But it can form an important part of the process of binding
former terrorists into the democratic process. This was a key part of the Good
Friday Agreement. Without it, it is unlikely a
broad based, sustainable settlement could have been achieved.
Decommissioning of weapons is also an integral part of the Good Friday
Agreement. The people of Northern Ireland want and deserve reassurance that
there is an end to violence for good. Decommissioning has not yet happened, but
as a first step the IRA opened some of their arms dumps in June 2000, to two
eminent independent, international inspectors, who carried out a second
inspection of these dumps in October.
Three factors that helped achieve Agreement: conflict weariness, strong
public yearning for peace and international involvement...
Finally a few thoughts on the actual talks process itself and
some of the elements that helped achieve Agreement. Conflict weariness on the
part of the paramilitaries after 30 years of conflict, and the acceptance that
they could not achieve their aims by violence, was undoubtedly a factor.
The strong public yearning for peace has also been crucial,
both in encouraging the politicians in their search for a solution and in
underpinning the Agreement once reached. This has manifesto itself both in the
findings of opinion polls but also in the establishment and growth of many non
Governmental voluntary and self help groups that have worked to bring about
reconciliation between the communities, in many cases by devoting their efforts
to practical, grass roots projects.
An integral part of the process was the involvement of the
international community. A major role was played by various distinguished
international figures. Central to success was the participation of formor US
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, as Chairman of the Good Friday Agreement
negotiations; his co Chairman, ex head of the Canadian Armed Forces General John
de Chastelblain; and former Prime Minister of Finland, Harri Holkeri. All played
an important, manifestly neutral role in facilitating the negotiations.
Patience, patience, and yet more patience were perhaps the most important of the
many qualities Senator Mitchell and his colleagues brought to the process.
Senator Mitchell returned to Northern Ireland yet again in the autumn of 1999 to
conduct a review of the implementation of the Agreement, which produced the
breakthrough allowing for the establishment to the Agreement's various
institutions.
General de Chastelain has continued his involvement as Chairman of the
Independent International Decommissioning commission, where his two colleagues
are a former US diplomat and a senior Finnish army officer with past experience
of decommissioning in the Balkans. The Patten Commission on police reform also
included 3 international members, each with specific expertise on policing
issues, two from the US and one from Canada.
Similarly the Tribunal set up to look into the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972,
when 13 civilians were killed during a demonstration in Londonderry, is being
conducted by three Senior judges, one British one Canadian and one Australian.
This international involvement has helped reassure members of both communities:
being seen as having the necessary expertise for the task; and as clearly free
of any bias towards one community or the other.
But the commitment and determination of the political leaders of Northern
Ireland was probably most important in achieving an Agreement in the end.
They showed an extraordinary courage in setting aside the
hatreds and violence of 30 years, in which some had been directly involved, to
hammer out an agreement.
The actual talks process leading to the Good Friday Agreement
lasted on and off for over 2 years, although many of the ingredients in the
final Agreement had been the subject of negotiations going back several years
before this. In the end setting a firm and realistic deadline, in this case
Easter 1998, also helped concentrate minds. The high level personal involvement
of both the British and Irish Prime Ministers in the final stages, as well as
the intervention of President Clinton at crucial moments, was also a key to
success.
Also nothing was agreed until everything was agreed...
It was also essential, and reflected a lesson learned from previous attempts,
that all parties understood that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed.
This gave parties confidence to explore areas of possible agreement with less
fear of compromising on their fundamental objectives. In other words they knew
that they would not be left at the end of the process, having made concessions
in some areas without getting something in return.
In the end no party got everything they wanted in the Agreement. Compromise was
essential in order for it to be achieved. Compromise, co-operation, commitment
and courage are all qualities that will be needed if the new institutions
established under the Agreement are to work.
The Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland devolution are now in business.
Society is returning to normal. Positive changes can be seen in the economic
climate and in the spirit and hopes of the people. But there are still problems
to be solved. More work is needed on all sides to consolidate the gains that
have been made. But in the long run I believe Northern Ireland will prove that
force can never supplant democracy as the solution to our differences.
AFP reported on 27 November 2000:
"Sri Lanka Prime Minister Ratnasiri
Wickremanayake vowed to crush Tamil rebels and pooh-poohed British
attempts to replicate the Northern Ireland experience in their former
colony...
The state-run Daily News quoted
the Premier as saying ... that experiences of other countries cannot
be "planted" in Sri Lanka.
"We will carry on the military option until the enemy is totally
eliminated... Sri Lanka cannot compare its situation with that of
(northern) Ireland as (LTTE leader Velupillai) Prabhakaran is the
embodiment of brutality, killing even his own comrades " the Prime
Minister said.
British junior foreign minister
Peter Hain, who left Thursday after a brief visit had asked Sri
Lanka to use the Northern Ireland peace process as an example and
move towards ending the separatist war...
Hain told reporters .. that... he
was asking both the Tamil Tigers and Colombo to begin a dialogue in
line with an initiative by Oslo. "It is in everybody's interest to
end the military conflict," Hain said.
"We have given a strong message to
the LTTE that there is no alternative to peace talks. And that has
been my advice to the government."... |
Both Sri Lanka's insistence upon territorial sovereignty, and the
LTTE's objective of autonomy, can be secured...
Devolution is new to the UK and it is in its infancy. We have
made bold and radical changes to the way the UK A governed. The establishment of
devolution has required much effort and continues to challenge us as we adapt to
changing circumstances.
If our experience is useful to you, we are more than happy to share it. Sri
Lanka has suffered enough from a long and destructive conflict, which has
drained the island's material, emotional and moral resources for the past 18
years. No two conflicts are the same: Sri Lanka must find its own solution to
its own problem. But I cannot emphasise strongly enough the need for patience
and a properly thought out process, which gives all section of the community an
opportunity to contribute to the search for peace.
Britain stands ready to help Sri Lanka in any way we can, and remains fully
supportive of Norwegian peace facilitation efforts in its dialogue with the
Government and the LTTE. I am convinced that both the Government's insistence
upon the territorial sovereignty of the whole island, and the LTTE's objective
of autonomy, can be secured. But for that to happen the shooting must stop and
the talking must start.
This is a war neither side can win militarily: this is a time for boldness,
vision and strong leadership from both sides...
This is a war neither side can win militarily. It is a conflict that cannot be
resolved without elected leaders being prepared to sit down with people who may
well be responsible for barbarous assassinations, but
who do have a legitimate political programme which needs to be engaged, not
shunned. It took far too long for us to learn that lesson in Britain, and far
too many lives were lost as a consequence.
Equally, the LTTE, like the IRA, need to acknowledge that, whilst a Tamil
Kingdom constitutionally split from the rest of the island will not receive
recognition by Europe, the USA or indeed India, the principle of self
determination and control over most if not all the key policies affecting daily
life would be supported by the international community. There is no future for a
Sri Lanka paralysed by dogma, intransigence and cruelty. Compromises, difficult
decisions and tough choices will be needed, some painful.
This is a time for boldness, vision and strong leadership. The Sri Lankan
people deserve no less from their leaders, both Sinhalese and Tamil. |