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TAMIL NATION LIBRARY: War & Armed Conflict *  Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* indicates link to Amazon.com bookshop on line Book Description Editorial Reviews "...Last winter, Gen. Casey opened a school for U.S. commanders in Iraq to help officers adjust to the demands of a guerrilla-style conflict in which the enemy hides among the people and tries to provoke an overreaction. The idea for the training center, says Gen. Casey, came in part from Col. Nagl's book, which chronicles how the British in Malaya used a similar school to educate British officers coming into the country. ''Pretty much everyone on Gen. Casey's staff had read Nagl's book,'' says Lt. Col. Nathan Freier, who spent a year in Iraq as a strategist. A British brigadier general says that ''Gen. Casey carried the book with him everywhere.'' more Table Of Contents Interview with John Nagl �The key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create more insurgents than you capture or kill. A stray tank round that kills a family could create dozens of insurgents for a generation. Thus, it is essential to use force as carefully and with as much discrimination as is possible�. Always consider the long-term effects of operations in a counterinsurgency environment. Killing an insurgent today may be satisfying, but if in doing so you convince all the members of his clan to fight you to the death, you�ve actually taken three steps backwards.� more [see also Professor Nagl's War - New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass] Book Description Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl�a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq�considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl - the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass - argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. With a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians. Editorial Reviews from Amazon.com Michael Schrage, Washington Post :  "[A] highly regarded counterinsurgency manual."�Michael Schrage, Washington Post Tom Baldwin, Times (UK) :  "The success of DPhil papers by Oxford students is usually gauged by the amount of dust they gather on library shelves. But there is one that is so influential that General George Casey, the US commander in Iraq, is said to carry it with him everywhere. Most of his staff have been ordered to read it and he pressed a copy into the hands of Donald Rumsfeld when he visited Baghdad in December. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (a title taken from T.E. Lawrence � himself no slouch in guerrilla warfare) is a study of how the British Army succeeded in snuffing out the Malayan insurgency between 1948 and 1960 � and why the Americans failed in Vietnam. . . . It is helping to transform the American military in the face of its greatest test since Vietnam. " Frank G. Hoffman Proceedings of the United State Naval Institute : "An extremely relevant text. Those interested in understanding the difficulties faced by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, or who want to grasp the intricacies of the most likely form of conflict for the near future, will gain applicable lessons. [Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife] offers insights about how to mold America''s armed forces into modern learning organizations. As the Pentagon ponders its future in the Quadrennial Defense Review, one can only hope that Nagl''s invaluable lesson in learning and adapting is being exploited." Greg Jaffe Wall Street Journal :  "Brutal in its criticism of the Vietnam-era Army as an organization that failed to learn from its mistakes and tried vainly to fight guerrilla insurgents the same way it fought World War II. In [Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife], Col. Nagl, who served a year in Iraq, contrasts the U.S. Army''s failure with the British experience in Malaya in the 1950s. The difference: The British, who eventually prevailed, quickly saw the folly of using massive force to annihilate a shadowy communist enemy. . . . Col. Nagl's book is one of a half dozen Vietnam histories -- most of them highly critical of the U.S. military in Vietnam -- that are changing the military''s views on how to fight guerrilla wars. . . .The tome has already had an influence on the ground in Iraq. Last winter, Gen. Casey opened a school for U.S. commanders in Iraq to help officers adjust to the demands of a guerrilla-style conflict in which the enemy hides among the people and tries to provoke an overreaction. The idea for the training center, says Gen. Casey, came in part from Col. Nagl's book, which chronicles how the British in Malaya used a similar school to educate British officers coming into the country. ''Pretty much everyone on Gen. Casey's staff had read Nagl's book,'' says Lt. Col. Nathan Freier, who spent a year in Iraq as a strategist. A British brigadier general says that ''Gen. Casey carried the book with him everywhere.''" Nick Ayers Armor :  "As the United States enters its fifth year of the war on terror, military leaders are conducting low-intensity and counter-insurgency operations in several different areas around the world. Of the different books produced on this subject, LTC John Nagl''s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is an absolute must for those who want to gain valuable insight on some of the hard lessons of fighting an insurgency before actually getting on the ground. The book expertly combines theoretical foundations of insurgencies with detailed historical lessons of Malaya and Vietnam to produce some very profound and topical implications for current military operations. The true success of the book is that Nagl discusses all of these complex issues in an easy-to-follow and straight-forward manner. . . . I read this book upon returning from my tour in Iraq after commanding a company on the ground for a year. I was amazed at how insightful and ''true'' the conclusions were and wished that I had read it before I deployed." Nathaniel Fick Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute : "Nagl, currently a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, focuses on organizational culture as the key to defeating insurgencies: successful militaries learn and adapt."�"Recommended Reading on Counterinsurgency," Nathaniel Fick, Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute Nigel R F Aylwin-Foster Military Review :  "The capacity to adapt is always a key contributor to military success. Nagl combines historical analysis with a comprehensive examination of organisational theory to rationalise why, as many of his readers will already intuitively sense, ''military organisations often demonstrate remarkable resistance to doctrinal change'' and fail to be as adaptive as required. His analysis is helpful in determining why the U.S. Army can appear so innovative in certain respects, and yet paradoxically slow to adapt in others." Trudy Rubin Philadelphia Inquirier :  "One key army text is Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife by Lt. Col. John Nagl, which focuses on counterinsurgency lessons from the 1950s war in Malaya and from the Vietnam War. The title phrase was used by Lawrence of Arabia in describing the messy and time-consuming nature of defeating insurgents. Nagl focuses on the ability of armies to learn from mistakes and adapt their strategy and tactics�skills in which he finds U.S. forces lacking. He shows how the British in Malaya were nimble enough to defeat a communist insurgency, while the U.S. military in Vietnam clung to a failing doctrine of force. Sadly, the Pentagon had not absorbed such insights before invading Iraq. Nagl himself says he learned a lot more during a one-year tour in Iraq. His ideas, if applied back in mid-2003, might have checked the growth of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and prevented Sunni Islamists from provoking a civil war with Iraqi Shiites. It may be too late for the Army''s new doctrine to stop Iraq from falling apart....It''s past time to make Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife required reading at the White House." The Jerusalem Post Michael Leeden : "As the Baker/Hamilton club considers America''s options in the Middle East, its members would do well to browse currently hot books on counterinsurgency [including] Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam...Stimulating, thoughtful and serious."

Table Of Contents Illustrations Foreword by General Peter J. Schoomaker Preface to the Paperback Edition Acknowledgments Introduction List of Abbreviations Part I. Setting the Stage 1. How Armies Learn 2. The Hard Lesson of Insurgency 3. The British and American Armies: Separated by a Common Language Part II. Malaya 4. British Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1951 5. The Empire Strikes Back: British Army Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1952-1957 Part III. Vietnam 6. The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and Learning During the Advisory Years, 1950-1964 7. The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and Learning During the Fighting Years, 1965-1972 Part IV. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 8. Hard Lessons: The British and American Armies Learn Counterinsurgency 9. Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Selected Bibliography Index

Interview with LTC John A. Nagl ,  9 January 2007 [I, Dr. Christopher K. Ives (CI), developed the following questions for Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl (JN) in support of the Operational Leadership Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He, in turn, responded in writing to each and submitted his responses over email. In preparing these questions, I read his Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). This first paperback edition included a new preface by the author, �Spilling Soup on Myself,� reflecting on his experiences as the operations officer (S3) for Task Force 1-34 Armor in 2003-2004. I also heard Lieutenant Colonel Nagl speak on a similar subject on 19 October 2005 at the US Army Soldier Heritage Center and Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition, I consulted Peter Maass� article and review in New York Magazine titled �Professor Nagl�s War� (January 11, 2004, section 6). The resulting �discussion� was conducted at the unclassified level.]  Abstract  - Full Text in PDF The acclaimed author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (2005), Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl served as the operations officer for Task Force 1-34 Armor � part of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division � during the battalion�s September 2003 to September 2004 deployment to Iraq�s volatile Anbar Province, and during which he discovered an environment that was �far more difficult than [he] had imagined it could be.� In this email interview, Nagl explains that, even though the term �counterinsurgency� was not yet �being widely used to describe what was happening in Iraq,� the waging of it in the face of a �very determined enemy� became the overarching mission of his task force. In particular, Sunni insurgent elements as well as those of the al-Qaeda in Iraq group arrayed themselves against his unit � using everything from sniper fire and improvised explosive devices to car bombs as their weapons of choice � and, as Nagl noted, �We could practice classic counterinsurgency against the Sunni insurgents but the AQI members had to be killed.� Drawing upon his both in depth historical knowledge and his on-the-ground experiences in Iraq, Nagl discusses the often complicated intersection between counterinsurgency theory and practice, stressing among other things the need for far greater interagency presence and cooperation. (Indeed, after returning from Iraq, he was actually asked to take the lead on writing the Army�s new counterinsurgency field manual; and while his job at the Pentagon precluded his spearheading the project, he did offer a great deal of assistance.) In addition, Nagl reflects on his task force�s efforts to recruit, organize, train and mentor Iraqi security forces, and also talks about how the Internet and other technologies can be used to �disseminate best practices in counterinsurgency� to those who are (or will be) conducting it in the field. �The key to success in a counterinsurgency environment is not to create more insurgents than you capture or kill,� Nagl said. �A stray tank round that kills a family could create dozens of insurgents for a generation. Thus, it is essential to use force as carefully and with as much discrimination as is possible�. Always consider the long-term effects of operations in a counterinsurgency environment.� As he reminds us, �Killing an insurgent today may be satisfying, but if in doing so you convince all the members of his clan to fight you to the death, you�ve actually taken three steps backwards.� "...Protecting members of the population who wanted to help us but who faced assassination at night if they were seen talking to us during the day was an immensely difficult challenge. It was also harder working through interpreters than I had imagined it would be, and interpreters were in much shorter supply than I had thought they would be as well. Clausewitz talks about friction with the words, �In war, everything is very simple, but the simplest things are very difficult.� In an insurgency, a smart, committed, ruthless enemy dedicates himself to adding friction to everything we do and with greater effect than I could have imagined before doing it myself..."

 

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