There was a good deal of difference between the CI operations
conducted in our country and those that confronted us in Sri
Lanka. They can be listed under politico-economic aspects and
military aspects.
Politico-economic Aspects
� Nagaland - Mizoram have their own district councils, State
and Central Governments, all of which are helpful, positive and
ensure constitutional guarantees provided for the tribal people
of the region. In Sri Lanka there were no district councils, nor
was the provincial government effective. The people had no faith
in it while the Sri Lankan Central Government was hostile to the
PC and obstructed every move by India, the IPKF and the PC to
get the NEPC going.
� State and Central Governments in India have undertaken
massive economic development activities in the subject states
and are ever ready to pour in money and resources. In Sri Lanka,
it was exactly the opposite; the government was tardy, if not
reluctant, to supply even the essential sustenance, leave aside
economic reconstruction. Neither did the Indian Government do
anything worthwhile to provide tangible relief to the Tamils in
Sri Lanka.
� Above all, Nagaland and Mizoram are part of our own
country; Sri Lanka was not. Security forces in insurgency
infested states and State and Central Government agencies do
cooperate with each other in various fields; this was not so in
Sri Lanka.
Military Aspects
� It would be difficult to come by a more motivated,
educated, dedicated and politicised insurgent or militant group
than the LTTE. Theirs is a far more formidable insurrection than
the Naga or Mizo ones.
� Technical expertise, training, wherewithal and
innovativeness of the LTTE was of a far higher degree than those
of our Northeastern insurgents, whose methods (though effective)
were rather primitive in comparison.
� The level of people's education, politicisation,
sentimental attachment and psychological surrender to the LTTE
far outstripped those of the Nagas and Mizos. Basic (fulfilment
of) needs of food, medicine, etc., which substantially satisfied
the simple Naga-Mizos, had very little impact on the highly
strung Tamils of Sri Lanka.
� Eelam and the LTTE had strong appeal to the Sri Lankan
Tamils. In India over the decades certain counter-ideas and
alternatives to secession and militancy had gotten the better of
the idea and sentiment of the insurgents.
� In Sri Lanka, we had a formidable problem with the language
which adversely affected our communication with the people and
collection of intelligence. In our Northeastern states it is not
so bad.
� The Tamil Nadu factor worked against the IPKF's interests,
such situations in Nagaland-Mizoram, where our own countrymen or
our own government agencies obstructed security forces, were
few.
� Intelligence as a system and a requisite of the first order
remained organisationally ad-hoc and qualitatively weak in Sri
Lanka; in our insurgency areas, it is not that bad.
In essence, the CI operations conducted by the IPKF in Sri
Lanka were far more exacting, tough and difficult. The odds were
too many, supportive factors too few, complications numerous and
the motivational factor reduced to almost the lone one - that we
were professional soldiers and our duty, therefore, was to do
what our Government ordered us to do...
...we were not very clear about our aim - destruction of the
LTTE or weakening it. If the latter, then to what degree? We had
not thought through the eventuality of the Sri Lankan Government
refusing to fulfil its part of the Accord obligations; we did
not know what to do with a warring LTTE, hostile population and
a recalcitrant Sri Lankan Government; and, as it finally turned
out, we were not even sure of what our national interests were
and what military intervention and, later, military operations
were required to achieve.... The IPKF could not do
anything about politico-social or strategic aspects. In the
tactical field it was unable to match the LTTE, mainly because
of the lack of innovation and serious application of all our
professional acumen to stymie the LTTE. Our methods, largely
remained conventional.
On Our Performance
Used as we are to wars of a fortnight or three weeks, the CI
Ops against the LTTE in Sri Lanka, which went on for nearly two
and a half years, proved indeed tough - and to many, too much.
Careerists suffered a great deal. Calculations of many went awry
and many were 'found out' if not found wanting. Large numbers
felt uncomfortable, dissipated, disheartened. Some were
dispirited, on the verge of tears. The contagion spread to the
families of not only officers but jawans also. One common
question most earnestly asked was: 'When will our husbands
return?' People, village elders, old veterans, friends back home
asked: `What are you doing in Sri Lanka'? We quietly asked
ourselves: `What are we achieving?' ......
Communication facilities fortunately, in Op PAWAN were indeed
well engineered and quite a few could talk to their families at
various locations from where formations had moved. This carried
some to the other extreme. Talking every day to the families
became a fashion. Eyebrows would be raised if this was not done.
And families would gathered at central places where telephone
facilities existed and talk to their husbands. If he did not
call twice or thrice a week, the wife would be in tears. Some
wives specialised in finding out details of not only their
husbands' activities but also those of their superiors: Where
they went, what they did, when, in what manner etc..."
The Army's character and outlook needed a push, a jolt and an
awakening to wider national and professional issues. That the
Army responded clumsily and conducted the business of war with
less than desirable efficiency, effect and elan is not the fault
of the decision but of the system. It is the system that has
been becoming, over the years, callous, cynical and moribund.
Views and visits of senior generals and their interaction with
field commanders and troops did little to inspire us
subordinates, provided little worthwhile guidance and clarified
little as to what the whole game plan was about. Everybody lived
and thought from one day to the next. Our wait for pearls of
wisdom remained endless! What increasingly showed up instead was
the political eye and bluster of the GOC IPKF, the tentativeness
and uncertainty of the Army Commander above him and the Army
Chief's loquaciousness which did little to change systemic
incongruities and tackle the hidden rot, in all those two years
and more of our military venture...
