Nations & Nationalism
Warwick Debate: Anthony D. Smith &
Ernest Gellner
Warwick University provided the venue
for a series of debates on nations and nationalism. The
debate, held on 24 October 1995 under the above title
and chaired by Edward Mortimer, brought together two of
the best known authorities on the subject in a
stimulating intellectual exchange.
The arguments of these statements were taken up in the
second annual
Nations and Nationalism Public Lecture (renamed the
Ernest Gellner Nationalism Lecture in his honour)
held
at the London School of Economics on 21 March 1996. The
lecture was to have been given by Professor Gellner, but
in the event Anthony Smith was asked to give the lecture
and appropriately employed the occasion to offer his
reflections on his former teacher's contribution to the
study of nationalism.
Anthony D. Smith's opening statement
Nations and their pasts
May I first thank the Vice-Chancellor of Warwick University, and
Professor Edward Mortimer, for their kind invitation to me to take
part in this unique series of debates about nationalism. It is
certainly a welcome idea to get away from the usual lecture format,
and I hope that you will forgive me, if, with the agreement of
Professor Ernest Gellner, I detain you for some twenty minutes with
a rather telescoped opening statement.
The present occasion affords me an opportunity to express my great
appreciation of the achievement and the inspiration provided to me,
and to all of us, by Ernest Gellner. It was his work that first
caught my imagination in 1964, when I was groping for a method of
studying phenomena that had already for some time absorbed me and
that were, after the wave of decolonisation in Africa and Asia, very
much in the air. Not only did Ernest encourage and guide my thesis
on theories of nationalism with much patience and care; he taught me
some fundamental lessons about nations and nationalism, which served
me for a guide thereafter.
The first is that nationalism is elusive, even protean, in its
manifestations; and so we have to try to classify the rich variety
of movements and ideologies if we are to make any progress in
understanding so variegated a phenomenon. Second, he taught me to
appreciate the underlying sociological reality of nationalism and
its creation, the nation. Against all those who would tell us that
the nation exists only in the imagination and that it can be
deconstructed away, Ernest has always insisted that nations and
nationalism are real and powerful sociological phenomena, even if
their reality is quite different from the tale told about them by
nationalists themselves.
And third, he convinced me that nations, as well as nationalism, are
modern phenomena, in the sense that the basic features of the modern
world require nations and nationalisms. You could not have one
without the other. This is obvious in the case of nationalism, the
ideological movement, which clearly did not exist before the
eighteenth century. But it is also true of nations in general. That
is to say, even if a few nations could be found before the advent of
modernity, most nations are modern in the sense of being relatively
recent in time - and necessarily modern. And yet - and this is why,
in the spirit of this evening, I shall admit that debates are not
just invented - there is at this point a certain difference between
Ernest and myself.
Insofar as he is a wholehearted 'modernist', Ernest would claim that
the nation is not only relatively recent; it is also the product of
specifically modern conditions - those of early industrialism or its
anticipations, social mobility, the need for mass literacy, public
education and the like. It is the modern transition from
spontaneous, non-literate 'low' cultures to highly cultivated,
literate and specialised 'high' cultures that engenders nationalism
and nations (Gellner 1964; 1983).
Now, it is not that I find this account wrong, only that it tells
half the story. There is another half, and other ways of looking at
this protean phenomenon. I shall try to tell this other half and
consider some of these other ways.
I think most of us would agree that nationalism is today one of the
most powerful forces in the world, and that the national state has
been for a century at least, and continues to be, the cornerstone of
international politics. Nationalism provides the sole legitimation
of states the world over, including the many polyethnic and federal
ones. It is also the most widespread and popular ideology and
movement, and it comes as no surprise that many of the world's most
intractable conflicts - in India and the Middle East, the Caucasus
and the Horn of Africa, the Balkans and southern Africa - are either
ethno-national conflicts or possess a strong nationalist component.
Of course, it is easy to exaggerate the influence of nationalism,
and to inflate the terms, nation and nationalism, to cover every
aspect of a state's social, cultural and political policy, and every
dimension of inter-state relations. The first thing, therefore, is
to define our concepts.
Definitions
By 'nationalism' I shall mean an ideological movement for the
attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a
human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an
actual or potential 'nation'. A 'nation' in turn I shall define as a
named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths
and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common
rights and duties for all members.
This definition suggests that the concept of the nation refers to a
particular kind of social and cultural community, a territorial
community of shared history and culture. This is the assumption of
nationalists themselves, for whom the world is composed of unique
historic culture-communities, to which their citizens owe a primary
loyalty and which are the sole source of political power and inner
freedom (Smith 1991, chs. 1, 4).
It is important to distinguish the concept of the nation from that
of the state. The state is a legal and political concept; states can
be defined as autonomous, public institutions of coercion and
extraction within a recognised territory. States are not communities
(Tivey 1980). We should also recall that the systems of states that
arose, first in Europe and then in other parts of the world, often
preceded the rise of nationalism, as well as many of today's
nations, though not necessarily many of their core ethnic groups.
This lack of temporal and spatial fit between state and nation is
one of the main causes of many of today's national conflicts (Tilly
1975, Introduction and Conclusion).
Modernist and 'post-modernist' theories
For most people, nations, especially their own nations, appear to
be perennial and immemorial. They cannot easily imagine a world
without nations, nor are they happy with the idea that their nation
is a recent creation, or even a construct of elites. Indeed, an
older generation of scholars, often under the unconscious influence
of nationalism, tended to seek and find 'nations' everywhere, in all
ages and continents (Walek- Czernecki 1929; Tipton 1973).
Today, however, most scholars would regard the idea of nations
existing perennially through antiquity and the middle ages as simply
'retrospective nationalism'. For most post-war scholars, nations and
nationalisms are fairly recent phenomena, arising immediately
before, during or in the wake of the French Revolution. They also
tend to see nations and nationalisms as products of modernisation
and features of modernity. Many of these modernist' theories are, at
root, materialist. In some cases, the materialism is explicit. Tom
Nairn, for example, regards nationalism as the product of, and
response to, the 'uneven development' of capitalism. In other cases,
the materialism is part and parcel of other, cultural processes of
modernisation - be it the mobile society based on a public system of
mass, standardised literary education which Ernest Gellner regards
as critical, or the rise of reading publics engendered by the spread
of the technology of 'print- capitalism', stressed by Benedict
Anderson. In all these cases, nations and nationalisms are viewed as
more or less inevitable outgrowths of a modern, industrial society,
however regrettable their consequences may be (Anderson 1983;
Gellner 1973; Nairn 1977, ch. 9; Smith 1988).
It is, of course, in the deconstructionist models of Benedict
Anderson and Erie Hobsbawm that the question of the real or imagined
status of the nation has been most sharply posed. In Hobsbawm's
approach, the nation is seen, in large part, as a set of 'invented
traditions' comprising national symbols, mythology and suitably
tailored history. In Anderson's model, the nation is seen as an
'imagined political community', one that is imagined as both finite
and sovereign. I do not think that either would regard the nation as
a wholly imaginary category; at the same time, they wish to debunk
nationalist views of the nation as somehow 'primordial' and
'perennial'. (Anderson 1983, ch. 3; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, ch.
1).
This seems to me quite proper, provided that, in designating the
nation as an imagined community or tradition, we do not gainsay its
reality or consider it a fabrication. There is nothing contradictory
about saying that something is both imagined and real: the
Parthenon, Chartres and the Sistine ceiling are no less real and
tangible for all the imagination of their creators and spectators
down the ages. But, if nations are not fabricated, are they cultural
artefacts created in the same way as artistic monuments? I shall
argue that, although we can often discern elements of deliberate
planning and human creativity in their formation, nations and
nationalisms are also the products of preexisting traditions and
heritages which have coalesced over the generations.(1)
Let me return to the far more acceptable 'modernist' theories, those
that emphasise the sociological reality of nations, once they have
been formed. There are certain problems associated with these
theories. The first is their generality. Though they make out a
convincing case for explaining 'nationalism-in-general', they are
often pitched at such a level of abstraction that they cannot be
easily applied to specific areas or cases. They appear to cover
everything, and yet, when we look to them to illuminate actual
historical instances, they so often invoke exceptional circumstances
- like the religious factor, or colour, or a history of ethnic
antagonism (Gellner 1983, ch. 6).(2)
Second, their materialism is often quite misleading. Nationalism can
emerge in all kinds of socioeconomic milieux - in rich Quebec and
poor Eritrea, in areas of decline as well as improvement, in
pre-industrial as well as industrial conditions. Nor is it easy to
explain the content and intensity of particular nationalisms through
the workings of global capitalism or the dynamics of relative
deprivation (Connor 1984; Smith 1981, ch. 2).
But the third problem is the most crucial, since it stems from their
commitment to modernism, the idea that nations and nationalisms are
the product of modernisation. What this systematically overlooks is
the persistence of ethnic ties and cultural sentiments in many parts
of the world, and their continuing significance for large numbers of
people. Erie Hobsbawm, indeed, goes so far as to deny any connection
between the popular 'Proto-national' communities that he analyses
and subsequent political nationalisms (Hobsbawm 1990, ch. 2).
Ethno-symbolic approaches
This is exactly where I disagree. Modern political nationalisms
cannot be understood without reference to these earlier ethnicties
and memories, and, in some cases, to pre-modern ethnic identities
and communities. I do not wish to assert that every modern nation
must be founded on some antecedent ethnic ties, let alone a definite
ethnic community; but many such nations have been and are based on
these ties, including the first nations in the West - France,
England, Castile, Holland, Sweden - and they acted as models and
Pioneers of the idea of the 'nation' for others. And when we dig
deeper, we shall find an ethnic component in many national
communities since - whether the nation was formed slowly or was the
outcome of a more concerted project of 'nation-building' (see
Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986, 1994).
I believe that this kind of approach which we may term
'ethno-symbolic', is more helpful for understanding the growth of
nations, the rise of ethno- nationalisms and the conflicts to which
they give rise.
To begin with, it is an approach or perspective, not a theory. I
doubt whether we are in a position yet to offer a theory of so
protean and many- sided a set of phenomena as ethnies, nations and
nationalisms, except at a very general level.(3) Second, this kind
of approach may help to explain which populations are likely to give
rise to a nationalist movement under certain conditions, and what
the content of their nationalism is likely to be - though there is
much work to be done here.
An exploration of earlier ethnic
configurations will, I suggest, help us to explain the major issues
and concerns of a subsequent nationalism in a given population and
provide us with clues about the likely growth of a nation and its
nationalism. Modern Greece provides an example. Its dual heritage of
Byzantine imperial Orthodoxy and classical democratic antiquity
shaped the patterns and contents of rival - Greek nationalisms in
the nineteenth century and beyond - and suggests some reasons for
expecting the rise of a powerful nationalism among the Greeks rather
than, say, the neighbouring Vlachs (Campbell and Sherrard 1968, ch.
1; Kitromilides 1989).
Third, the approach that I recommend emphasises the important role
of memories, values, myths and symbols. Nationalism very often
involves the pursuit of 'symbolic' goals - education in a language,
having your own language TV channel, the preservation of ancient
sacred sites like the mosque at Ayodhya or the Wailing Wall area,
the right to worship in one's own way, have one's own courts,
schools and press, wear particular costume, and so on - goals which
often bring protest and bloodshed, based as they are on popular
memories, symbols and myths. Materialist, rationalist and modernist
theories tend to have little to say about these issues, especially
the vital component of collective memories (see Connor 1993;
Horowitz 1985, ch. 2; Hutchinson 1987; Kapferer 1988; cf. Tonkin,
McDonald and Chapman 1989).
Fourth, an ethno-symbolic approach can help us to understand why
nationalism so often has such a widespread popular appeal. The
intelligen- tsia may 'invite the masses into history' and politicise
them and their cultures. But why do 'the people' respond? Not simply
because of promises of material benefits. Their vernacular culture
is now valued and turned into the basis of a new mass, public
culture of the nation. So nationalism often involves the vernacular
mobilisation of the masses (Nairn 1977, ch. 2; Smith 1989).
This is why the ethnic form of nationalism has become such a
powerful force today. Unlike the civic, territorial nationalism of
the French Revolution and the West, which sees the nation as a
territorial association of citizens living under the same laws and
sharing a mass, public culture, ethnic nationalism regards the
nation as a community of genealogical descent, vernacular culture,
native history and popular mobilisation.
The civic kind of
nationalism is a nationalism of order and control, and it suits the
existing national states and their dominant ethnies. But it has
little to offer the many submerged ethnic minorities incorporated
into the older einpires and their successor states.
So they and
their intelligentsias turn to ethnic nationalism, and try to
reconstruct their community as an ethnic nation. Theirs is the
politics of cultural revolt. Revolt not only against alien rulers,
but against 'the fathers', the passive older generations, guardians
of ancestral traditions and notables of a traditional order. To
achieve their cultural revolution, they must thrust their ethnic
communities into the political arena and turn them into political
nations (see Kedourie 1971, Introduction; and Smith 1995, ch. 4).
Here is the deeper, inner source of so many ethnic and national
conflicts today. The clash of rival nationalisms, ethnic and civic,
is at the heart of the conflicts in the Middle East, India, the
Caucasus and Balkans. We can also find it in more muted, but no less
persistent, form in the West: in Quebec and Euzkadi, Scotland and
Catalonia, Flanders and Corsica, wherever members of marginalised,
threatened or aspiring ethnic communities seek to restore their
heritage, language and culture.
Conclusion
What follows from this analysis? First, that in a world of
political and cultural pluralism where states and ethnies operate
with rival conceptions of the nation and its boundaries,
ethno-national conflict is endemic. Second, that nations and
nationalisms are a political necessity in a world of competing and
unequal states requiring popular legitimation and mobilisa- tion
(Smith 1995, ch. 6). Third, that because so many people feel their
nation performs important social and political functions, it is
going to take more than a Maastricht Treaty to wean them away from
these deeply felt national allegiances.(4) And finally, because so
many nations are historically embedded in pre-modern ethnic ties,
memories and heritages, we are unlikely to witness in our lifetime
the transcendence of the nation and the supersession of nationalism,
of which so many utopians have dreamt!
Notes
1 These arguments about the role of nationalist 'agency' versus
modern or pre-modern, structures' can be found in Breuilly
(1993) and Smith (1991).
2 Gellner (1994), in distinguishing between time-zones in the
development of nationalism in different parts of Europe, does
implicitly introduce contingent historical elements to
supplement his general theory.
3 Geliner is perhaps the only scholar to ofrer a full and
explicit theory; but Nairn (1977, ch. 2), Breuilly (1993) and
Mann (1995) offer partial theories of aspects and/or types of
nationalism.
4 On the question on European integration and national identity,
see Smith (1992) and Schlesinger (1992).
Ernest Gellner's reply
'Do nations have navels?'
Well I would like to begin by thanking the two previous speakers
for the kind things they have said. Obviously it is a source of
great pride to me that my student Anthony Smith should become the
leading specialist on nationalism and is making such an enormous
impact on the subject. I won't labour this but it is a fact that I
am very proud of. Again my admiration of Edward Mortimer is
connected with the fact that he is a rare - I mean most of the time
you know he is a journalist, not an academic - he is a rare
journalist who generally gets things right. He actually managed to
cover an entire page of the Financial Times about me without a
single mistake, which was an astonishing achievement, so it gives me
special pleasure to correct him on a factual matter in what he has
just said. My ancestors were not natives of Prague. They were
provincial Bohemian petty bourgeois, but that's not of great
importance.
Now to get to the heart of the matter. It's useful in a subject of
debate, when the battle lines are clear, when you get a very, very
clear issue. Anthony and I now tend to get pitted against each other
on what has become one of the major dividing lines in the study of
nationalism, namely, the dividing line between what I now call
primordialists and modernists, where one side says that nations were
there all the time or some of them were anyway, and that the past
matters a great deal; and where the modernists like myself believe
that the world was created round about the end of the eighteenth
century, and nothing before that makes the slightest difference to
the issues we face.
This is a clear dividing line which is important.
(1) Now the question is how do you decide between us? I mean,
what I really have been wondering is by what kind of evidence
can we establish the reality of the past? Most of you may know
the debate in which Bertrand Russell asked tongue in cheek how
do we know that the world wasn't created five minutes ago
complete with memories? Well, how do you know? Maybe it was!
What is the evidence? And of course some of the real debates of
this kind are embedded in the division between the creationists
and evolutionists.
(2) Was mankind the creator of Adam and did it slowly evolve?
Well there is some evidence and of course the evidence was
debated at the time this issue was very much alive, namely did
Adam have or did he not have a navel? Now it's a very crucial
question, you see. No, no, you may fall about laughing, but
obviously if Adam was created by God at a certain date, let's
say 4003 BC, obviously 1 mean it's a prima-facie first reaction
that he didn't have a navel, so to say, because Adam did not go
through the process by which people acquire navels. Therefore,
we do know what will decide whether the world is very old and
mankind evolved or whether the world was created about 6,000
years ago. Namely, all we need to find out is whether Adam had a
navel or not.
The question I'm going to now address myself to of course is: do
nations have navels or not? Now the point about Adam's navel of
course is not as simple as you might think. It's perfectly possible
to imagine a navel-less Adam because navels, once they were
engendered by the original process by which they were engendered,
perform no further function. I mean you could live navel-less and
there is no problem.
Now on the other hand there are other aspects of a human
organism, supposing creation did occur at a definite date and
mankind was suddenly created, which are rather navel-like but which
would have to be there anyway in a kind of misleading way. There are
all kinds of rhythms; I'm not a physiologist, but there are all
kinds of rhythms about one's breathing, about one's digestion, about
one's blood-beat, which come in cycles and the cycle has to be
continuous.
So even if Adam was created at a given date, his blood
circulation or his food consumption or his breathing would have to
be in a condition such that he'd been going through these cycles
anyway, even though he hadn't been, because he had just been
created. For instance, I imagine his digestive tract wouldn't
function unless it had some sort of content so that he would have
signs of a meal, remnants of a meal which in fact he had never had
because he had only just been created.
Now it's the same with nations. How important are these cyclical
processes? My main case for modernism that I'm trying to highlight
in this debate, is that on the whole the ethnic, the cultural
national community, which is such an important part of Anthony's
case, is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some don't
and in any case it's inessential.
What in a way Anthony is saying is that he is anti-creationist
and we have this plethora of navels and they are essential, as he
said, and this I think is the crux of the issue between him and me.
He says modernism only tells half the story. Well if it tells half
the story, that for me is enough, because it means that the
additional bits of the story in the other half are redundant. He may
not have meant it this way but if the modernist theory accounts for
half of 60 per cent or 40 per cent or 30 per cent of the nations
this is good for me.
There are very, very clear cases of modernism
in a sense being true. I mean, take the Estonians. At the beginning
of the nineteenth century they didn't even have a name for
themselves. They were just referred to as people who lived on the
land as opposed to German or Swedish burghers and aristocrats and
Russian administrators. They had no ethnonym. They were just a
category without any ethnic self-consciousness.
Since then they've
been brilliantly successful in creating a vibrant culture.(3) This
is obviously very much alive in the Ethnographic Museum in Tartu,
which has one object for every ten Estonians and there are only a
million of them. (The Museum has a collection of 100,000
ethnographic objects). Estonian culture is obviously in no danger
although they make a fuss about the Russian minority they've
inherited from the Soviet system. It's a very vital and vibrant
culture, but, it was created by the kind of modernist process which
I then generalise for nationalism and nations in general. And if
that kind of account is accepted for some, then the exceptions which
are credited to other nations are redundant.
The central fact seems to me that what has really happened in the
modern world is that the role of culture in human life was totally
transformed by that cluster of economic and scientific changes which
have transformed the world since the seventeenth century. The prime
role of culture in agrarian society was to underwrite peoples status
and peoples identity. Its role was really to embed their position in
a complex, usually hierarchical and relatively stable structure. The
world as it is now is one where people have no stable position or
structure. They are members of ephemeral professional bureaucracies
which are not deeply internalised and which are temporary. They are
members of increasingly loose family associations.
What really matters is their incorporation and their mastery of
high culture; I mean a literate codified culture which permits
context-free communication. Their membership of such a community and
their accept- ability in it, that is a nation. It is the consequence
of the mobility and anonymity of modern society and of the semantic
non-physical nature of work that mastery of such culture and
acceptability in it is the most valuable possession a man has. It is
a precondition of all other privileges and participation.
This automatically makes him into a nationalist because if there
is non-congruence between the culture in which he is operating and
the culture of the surrounding economic, political and educational
bureaucracies, then he is in trouble. He and his off-spring are
exposed to sustained humiliation. Moreover, the maintenance of the
kind of high culture, the kind of medium in which society operates,
is politically precarious and expensive. It is linked to the state
as a protector and usually the financier or at the very least the
quality controller of the educational process which makes people
members of this kind of culture. This is the theory.(4)
Now this is the process, the creation process, my equivalent to that
event of 6000 BC of years ago when humanity was suddenly brought
into being, that is, nationalist humanity, and I agree with Anthony
that we are a nationalist population. Anthony's case contains a
number of points with which I would in no way disagree. Cultures,
even a shared number of symbols and communication, were important
even in the pre-industrial age. That is indisputable. So one's
navel, one's culture, was important then as well. Culture is
sometimes deeply loved and its members are aware of it, there is no
shadow of a doubt. The ancient Greeks knew the difference between
people who read Homer and those who did not read Homer. They knew
the difference between people who were allowed to participate in the
Olympic Games and those who were not. They had a deep contempt for
Barbarians who fell into the negative class. In that sense obviously
they were cultural chauvinists. All right, so cultures are sometimes
conscious and sometimes they are invisible, they are sometimes loved
and sometimes being invisible they are ignored.
Now sometimes, but this is unlikely, they have political
institutions connected with them and aspirations to a political
unit, but generally speaking the condition of the agrarian world was
made for political units which were local intimate communities,
smaller than a culture or much larger than a culture, for example
large empires. There was nothing in the logic of the political
situation to lead political units to expand the boundaries of the
culture or not to expand beyond them. They tended to be smaller or
larger.
Sometimes a culture had political expression, more often it
did not. (5) Sometimes there is continuity between the cultures
which were loved in the pre-industrial age and sometimes there is
discontinuity. To pick on a point of detail, Anthony, I wouldn't say
that there is either genuine folk memory or any preoccupation in
modern Greece with Periclean Athens. There is some continuity with
Byzantium or at any rate with the clerical organisation left behind
by Byzantine church certainly; but some- times there is and
sometimes there isn't.(6) So I would say in general there is a
certain amount of navel about but not everywhere and on the whole
it's not important. It's not like the cycles of respiration, blood
circulation or food digestion which Adam would have to have in order
to live at the moment of creation. You'd have to have a kind of
fictitious past and the past would not be real. The cultural
continuity is contingent, inessential.
Where does this leave us? I think Anthony was slightly unfair to me
in saying that I was only interested in how it came about and not in
the practical implications. Now obviously it does matter to predict
which nations will assert themselves, which potential nations, which
cultural categories, will assert themselves and which will not. I
would say it is inherent in the situation that you cannot tell. You
can indicate certain factors. Size is an obvious one, very small
cultural groups give up. Continuity is another one, but not an
essential one. Some diasporic communities have very effectively
asserted themselves. Size, continuity, existence of symbolism are
important, but again the Estonians created nationalism ex nihilo in
the course of the nineteenth century.
I think Anthony was a little
bit harsh on the economic determinists. When a cultural category is
either systematically underprivileged in contrast with its cultural
neighbours who may be territorially interspersed or on the contrary
excites envy by advantages, that again provides motivation.(7) Size,
compact- ness, presence of symbolism, motivation and historical
accident. And given the fact that the agrarian world was enormously
rich in cultural nuances whereas the modern world has only space for
something of the order of 200 or 300 national states, not all the
potential nations become real ones and many of them don't even try
to, and I don't think you can have any kind of formula for
identifying them.
So I am in fact interested in that problem, and
perhaps our ditlerence of approach does make a difference in our
anticipation, in that the modernists have a greater sense of the
kind of navel invention as opposed to the sense of continuity of
navel.
I think I have done my best to highlight the issues which are before
us, and I think at this point it might be good to turn to the
general discussion..
Notes
1 On the debate between primordialism and instrumentalism, see
McKay (1982), and Eller and Coughlan (1993).
2 On this debate, see Gellner (1964).
3 For a historical analysis of the formation of the Estonian
nation, see Raum (1 987).
4 The theory is fully set out in Gellner (1973, 1983).
5 This is elaborated in Gellner (1983, ch. 2); on ancient Greek
chauvinism, see Fondation Hardt (1962).
6 On this question of continuity with Byzantium, see Campbell
and Sherrard (1968, ch. 1).
7 On the economic aspects of nationalism, see Nairn (1977); on
the nationalism of smaller East European communities, see Hroch
(1985) and Gellner (1994).
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